This forlorn adventure: British policy towards Poland, 1944-1947 by Mason, Andrea
1The London School of Economics and Political Science
‘This Forlorn Adventure’: British Policy Towards Poland, 1944-
1947
Andrea Grace Mason
A thesis submitted to the Department of International History of
the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy, London, June 2014
2Declaration
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of
the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other
than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent
of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted,
provided that full acknowledgement is made.  This thesis may not be reproduced
without my prior written consent.
I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of
any third party.
I declare that my thesis consists of 97,832 words.
I have followed the Chicago Manual of Style, 16th edition, for referencing.  I followed
the conventions of British spelling and punctuation except in cases of quoted text that
originally appears in American English.
To refer to the names of towns and cities in areas which were in the process of being
transferred from Germany to Poland, I have used the Polish with the German equivalent
indicated in brackets.
Statement of use of third party for editorial help
I can confirm that my thesis was copy edited for conventions of language, spelling and
grammar by Janet Mason, Matéo Celi-Cadieux, and Vladimir Unkovski-Korica
3Abstract
This thesis offers a study of British policy towards Poland from 1944 to 1947. It traces
the British attempt to negotiate a postwar political settlement for Poland that would
meet the expectations of both the Polish government-in-exile, to which Britain had
committed its support in return for Poland’s substantial wartime military contribution,
and the Soviet Union. During the last year and a half of the war, British policymakers
struggled to mediate between the two sides and accommodate their competing demands.
Ultimately, a compromise was reached, which saw the former prime minister of the
exile government, Stanisław Mikołajczyk, return to Poland at the end of the war to join
the provisional government. Mikołajczyk agreed to return on the basis of a British
commitment to provide ongoing support in reconstituting a sovereign Polish state and
establishing a democratic government.
This thesis charts the outcome of that commitment, from the negotiations for the
formation of the new Polish government under the auspices of the Three Power
Commission in the summer of 1945, to the Polish referendum of June 1946, and the
elections in January 1947. It shows that British policymakers struggled to meet the
commitment to Poland within the changing context of the postwar international system.
In the circumstances of the emerging Cold War, as the reality of the Soviet resolve to
absorb Poland into its sphere grew clearer, Britain’s political promises to the Polish
democratic opposition became increasingly difficult to fulfil. Not all sections of the
British policymaking establishment were immediately prepared to accept their
dramatically circumscribed power to influence the shape of the Polish political
settlement. Whereas the foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin reconciled himself to the new
circumstances with pragmatic speed, the Warsaw embassy, and many of the Foreign
Office Northern Department officials, were less willing to abandon the original terms of
the British commitment. Thus, while some diplomatic and Foreign Office officials
continued to lend support to the democratic Polish opposition parties, Bevin
increasingly sought to limit Anglo-Polish relations to bilateral issues, including
negotiations for financial and trade agreements, the repatriation of former members of
the Polish armed forces, the final demarcation of Poland’s western frontier, and the
transfer of the German population from western Poland to the British occupation zone.
The result of these different priorities was a lack of uniformity in British policy.
Much of the scholarship on Britain’s early postwar policy towards Poland takes one of
two approaches: either it assumes that Britain understood immediately in 1945 that
Poland was ‘lost’ to the Soviet Union, or it sees a reprehensible cynicism in the British
approach, without due acknowledgement of the limits which constrained British policy
options. This thesis offers a different interpretation; it argues that Britain adjusted much
more slowly and unevenly to its diminished position after the war, and that its limited
capacity to shape the Polish political settlement was understood only gradually, and at
different times in different parts of the policymaking establishment, creating an overall
inconsistency in policy.
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9Introduction
In June 1945, Stanisław Mikołajczyk, the former prime minister of the London-based
Polish government-in-exile left for Moscow to participate in the negotiations for the
establishment of a new Polish government under the auspices of a commission
composed of representatives of Britain, the US and the Soviet Union. Mikołajczyk
harboured doubts as to the viability of the negotiations, partly because the Soviet
government had allowed very limited representation from the parties affiliated to the
government-in-exile. He agreed to go on the strength of a promise of support from the
British government and with the understanding that Britain would continue to actively
assist in the establishment of a democratic system of government in Poland. The British
prime minister, Winston Churchill assured Mikołajczyk that the British government
would be prepared to bring its influence to bear on the Soviet Union in order to secure
this outcome.1
This work offers an analysis of the origins of Churchill’s June 1945 promise to
Mikołajczyk. It assesses the extent to which Britain was able to determine the postwar
political settlement in Poland and considers the constraints which ultimately restricted
British influence. It begins with a study of the relationship between the British
government and the London-based Polish government-in-exile during the last year and a
half of the war. Britain’s involvement in Poland in the immediate postwar period was
part of a continuous process which began with the 1939 British guarantee to protect
Poland against German aggression, and was extended and deepened by a series of
political commitments to the restoration of a free and independent Polish state in return
for the significant Polish military contribution to the allied war effort.2
The military contribution is important in explaining the extent of British involvement in
the Polish issue. From the time of its arrival in London after the fall of France in June
1940, the Polish government-in-exile had extended to Britain all of its available military
1 The National Archives: Public Record Office (hereafter TNA: PRO) FO 371/66090/N658, ‘Mr
Churchill’s conversation with M. Mikołajczyk’, 15 June 1945.
2 On 31 March 1939, the British prime minister Neville Chamberlain announced a guarantee to defend
Poland against German aggression in the House of Commons. This guarantee was formalised in the treaty
of mutual assistance between Britain and Poland concluded in August. TNA: PRO FO
371/39436/C11513/62/55, ‘Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Polish
Government regarding Mutual Assistance’, 25 August 1939.
10
resources. In August 1940, the conclusion of the Anglo-Polish military agreement
formalised the commitment of the Polish armed forces to the allied war effort and
brought the Polish air force under the direct command of the Royal Air Force. In the
spring of 1942, the Polish government augmented its military contribution with the
addition of almost 80,000 Polish troops evacuated from the Soviet Union. Although
Polish leaders had intended for the troops to participate in the liberation of Poland, they
consented to their gradual dispersal across several theatres of war, according to the
needs and strategic priorities of the British high command. Over the course of the war,
Polish troops under British command fought in campaigns in the Middle East, Italy and
northwestern Europe, as well as in the Battle of Britain. These troops represented a
valuable source of manpower for Britain, especially during the precarious time between
the fall of France and the German invasion of the Soviet Union, when Britain was
without European fighting allies and was desperately short of resources. The heroism
and sacrifice of the Polish forces caught Churchill’s attention and won his loyalty,
which helps to explain his unusually close interest – particularly for the prime minister
of a country at war – in matters relating to the exile government of a small state.3
Britain had specifically committed to securing the restoration of an independent Polish
state in return for the Polish military contribution. The extent of British involvement in
the negotiations with the Soviet Union over Poland’s future is nevertheless surprising:
Poland was a relatively minor ally; Britain had no particular strategic interests in
Eastern Europe; the British government did not involve itself in the same way in the
affairs of the other London-based exile governments. Yet Churchill and the foreign
secretary, Anthony Eden, persisted in their efforts to secure a settlement for Poland even
when the negotiation process became mired in discord. This persistence defies an easy
explanation but seems to have had three main components. First, the defence of Poland
was the reason for Britain’s declaration of war against Germany; failure to secure a
satisfactory postwar settlement would amount to a public admission of defeat and an
acceptance of diminished British influence. Second, the Polish military contribution
created a strong sense of obligation on the part of British leaders and policymakers,
particularly given the dispersal of Polish forces across British theatres of command and
away from Poland. Third, the future of Poland was wrapped up in Britain’s broader
3 Anita Prażmowska, ‘Churchill and Poland’, in Winston Churchill: Studies in Statesmanship, ed. R.A.C.
Parker (London: Brassey’s, 1995), 110, 117.
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conception of the shape of postwar Europe, which was based on an assumption of
ongoing Anglo-Soviet cooperation. Thus, the attainment of a deal over Poland was
equated to some extent with confirmation that this outcome would be feasible.
In the summer of 1945, Britain accepted Soviet conditions as a basis for the formation
of Poland’s postwar provisional government: the cession of Polish territory east of the
Curzon line4 and the participation of only a small number of leaders from outside the
Soviet-sponsored rival to the London-based exile government, the Polish National
Committee of Liberation (Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego – PKWN).5 This
decision has been cast in the existing literature either as a cavalier discarding of an ally
whose importance had diminished or as a regrettable but inevitable consequence of
Soviet military dominance throughout Central and Eastern Europe.6 Little attention,
however, has been devoted to the analysis and assumptions which formed the basis for
this decision. This work will argue that British acceptance of the Soviet terms in the
summer of 1945 was based on two main considerations. First, the British expectation
was that the inclusion of Mikołajczyk in the provisional government would allow him to
establish a secure foothold in the leadership of the country, given the overwhelming
support for his party among the Polish population. Second, the British proceeded on the
basis that Anglo-Soviet cooperation would endure beyond the end of the war, allowing
Britain to exert influence over the final composition of the Polish government and the
structure of the country’s political system. Further, when Churchill urged Mikołajczyk
to return he did so with a clear sense that Britain continued to bear responsibility for the
satisfactory outcome of the negotiations. This work establishes that Churchill’s sense of
obligation was shared by the rest of the British political leadership and the officials of
the Foreign Office. It was not a commitment that expired with the end of hostilities.
4 The Curzon line had been proposed as Poland’s eastern border by the British foreign secretary, Lord
Curzon, after the First World War. Ultimately the border had been set approximately 150 miles further
east between 1920 and 1939. Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin agreed at the Tehran conference that the
Curzon line with a few modifications should form Poland’s postwar frontier. Adrian Webb, Routledge
Companion to Central and Eastern Europe since 1919 (New York: Routledge, 2008), 328.
5 TNA: PRO FO 371/47595/N7369/6/G55, Moscow to Foreign Office, 23 June 1945.
6 David Dilks, Epic and Tragedy: Britain and Poland, 1941-1945 (Hull: Hull University Press, 1995), 29-
30; Mark Ostrowski, ‘To Return to Poland or not to Return: The Dilemma Facing the Polish Armed
Forces at the End of the Second World War’ (PhD dissertation, School of Slavonic and East European
Studies, 1996), 164-8; Michael Hope, The Abandoned Legion: A Study of the Background of the Post-
War Dissolution of Polish Forces in the West (London: Veritas, 2005), 14; Evan McGilvray, A Military
Government In Exile: The Polish Government-in-Exile 1939–1945: A Study of Discontent (Solihull:
Helion, 2010), 133, 144-5.
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After the war, the new Labour government struggled to fulfil the British commitment to
Poland within the context of the shifting international system. This work traces the
evolution of British policy towards Poland through the uncertain period of the
immediate postwar years. It argues that British policy towards Poland underwent a
gradual process of downscaling concurrent with the foreign secretary Ernest Bevin’s
shift towards the conclusion that workable collaboration with the Soviet Union was
going to prove impossible, and that as a consequence, Britain would have to accept
Poland’s absorption into the Soviet sphere of control in Eastern Europe. Bevin adjusted
his foreign policy to the new postwar reality relatively quickly. The officials of the
Foreign Office and the Warsaw embassy, on the other hand, were much more reluctant
to withdraw support from the Polish democratic opposition, particularly as Mikołajczyk
increasingly came under attack. This work charts the growing divergence between the
direction of Bevin’s policy and that of his officials in the two and a half years following
the end of hostilities. It argues that far from a seamless withdrawal from Polish affairs,
British policy during this period was characterised by an overall inconsistency: sporadic
interventions in Polish political affairs followed by quiet lulls; support for Mikołajczyk
which waned and then resumed.
Structure and approach
This work follows a chronological approach beginning immediately after the Tehran
conference, when Churchill and Eden initiated a negotiation process aimed at restoring
Soviet-Polish relations and achieving a satisfactory territorial and political settlement
for Poland after the war. British postwar policy towards Poland had its origins in the
wartime relationship with the Polish exile government; it is therefore important to
examine the extent of British involvement in Polish affairs during the war in order to
establish the expectation of continuity of policy once hostilities had ended. The first
chapter shows how this involvement deepened in the last year and a half of the war as
the British government attempted to mediate the Polish-Soviet dispute, eventually
taking over the negotiations from the exile administration altogether. As successive
rounds of negotiations failed, the British concluded that part of the problem was the
implacable hostility towards the Soviet Union of a significant section of the Polish exile
leadership. The British calculated that once Mikołajczyk was free to negotiate with the
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Soviets and the Polish Workers’ Party (Polska Partia Robotnicza – PPR) without the
constraints of the exile government, it would be possible to reach a settlement. The first
chapter also charts the course of Anglo-Soviet relations over the last year and a half of
the war. The much-criticised British decision to accept the Soviet terms in the summer
of 1945 must be understood as the result of both an accumulation of experience of
dealing with the Soviets, and a set of assumptions about the likely direction of postwar
Soviet policy, both of which suggested that although unlikely to be smooth and
uncomplicated, Anglo-Soviet collaboration would continue after the war.7 It was this
analysis which conditioned the British decision to encourage Mikołajczyk to return.
The second chapter analyses the transformation of British policy over the second half of
1945. After the war, Bevin initially adopted the same approach to the Polish issue as his
Conservative predecessors. His sense of responsibility for the establishment of a
democratic Polish political system was in evidence at the Potsdam conference, where he
pressed the new Polish leaders to commit to a definite date for elections and the Soviets
on the timeline for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Polish territory. By the end of
the year, however, as relations with the Soviet Union became increasingly strained,
Bevin’s response was to try to extricate the Polish issue from British relations with the
Soviet Union in an attempt to limit the points of contention and reduce the overall level
of tension in the relationship. Bevin’s own belief in the importance of maintaining
sound Anglo-Soviet relations – particularly when the future of American involvement in
Europe seemed very likely to be short-lived – was reinforced by the expectation on the
part of both the Cabinet and the party that the Labour government would pursue closer
relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of shared socialist principles. Bevin’s
policy of avoiding the Polish question with the Soviets stood in contrast to the views of
the Foreign Office Northern Department and the Warsaw embassy, which urged a
robust British defence of Mikołajczyk as the PPR attempted to marginalise his party.
The beginning of this divergence between Bevin and his officials over Poland was in
evidence at the first Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in London, where Bevin
made a last-minute change of tactics, choosing not to confront the Soviet Union over the
repression of the Polish Peasant Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe – PSL).
7 Martin H. Folly, Churchill, Whitehall and the Soviet Union (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 167-8, 171.
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By early 1946, Bevin was beginning to fear that it would be very difficult to restore
viable relations with the Soviet Union. At this stage, however, the US – on which
economic weakness was making Britain increasingly reliant – was still committed to
pursuing cooperation with the Soviet Union. Further, Bevin’s foreign policy was
beginning to come under criticism both in the Cabinet and in the wider party for its
perceived anti-Soviet, anti-communist character. Bevin’s response was to pursue a ‘dual
policy’ towards the Soviet Union: outwardly civil and in search of cooperation and
common ground while at the same time beginning to plan on the basis of an eventual
breach of Anglo-Soviet relations.8 The third chapter analyses the consequences of this
approach for British policy towards Poland. Bevin sought to avoid open conflict with
the Soviet Union as much as possible in order to dispel domestic criticism of his policy
and avoid alienating the Americans. The consequence was a further distancing from
Poland’s political affairs, including a request from Bevin for a review of the policy of
exclusive British support for the PSL. Although Foreign Office officials managed to
dissuade Bevin from dropping the PSL, British criticism of the postponement of the
Polish elections and the falsification of the results of a referendum held in June was
muted. The circumspection of Bevin’s approach sat uneasily with the Foreign Office
and generated increasing frustration among the staff of the Warsaw embassy as
Mikołajczyk struggled to hold his ground in the face of an increasingly determined
campaign to undermine his position.
The campaign against the PSL reached a critical point in the months leading up to the
general elections in Poland in January 1947. The Warsaw embassy pleaded for greater
support for the PSL, including international supervision of the elections in order to
prevent the party from being eliminated entirely. At exactly the same time, throughout
the second half of the year, Bevin was engaged in negotiations with the Americans for
the fusion of the western occupation zones of Germany, the first step towards the formal
division of the country, and an unmistakable signal that the western powers were
considering the possibility of abandoning the attempt to achieve a workable system for a
regime of joint administration with the Soviet Union. Britain’s increasingly precarious
financial position meant that the arrangements for the fusion of the occupation zones
needed to be finalised as quickly as possible. Further, the dissatisfaction with Bevin’s
8 Anne Deighton, The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany and the Origins of the Cold
War (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), 35.
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foreign policy within the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) coalesced in the autumn of
1946 with the introduction of a censure motion against him. Thus, the urgent need to
reach a solution to the German problem, which would inevitably lead to a deterioration
in Anglo-Soviet relations, coincided with the climax of the internal opposition to the
direction of Bevin’s policy for its perceived anti-Soviet character. In these
circumstances Bevin became increasingly reluctant to actively support the Polish
opposition movement. He sought to avoid challenging the Soviet Union or the
communist-dominated Polish government at such a strategically delicate point in the
negotiations over Germany. He also sought to avoid exposing himself unnecessarily to
further domestic charges of anti-Soviet bias.
The fifth chapter covers the period following the Polish elections, which saw a marked
British withdrawal from Polish affairs. There seemed little chance that any intervention
by Britain could disrupt the process of consolidation of communist control in Poland.
The Polish opposition had been seriously diminished over the course of the election
campaign: the PSL had been decimated and the Polish Socialist Party (Polska Partia
Socjalistyczna – PPS) was moving closer to a merger with the PPR, leaving Britain
without a viable political force to support. Bevin had no appetite to enter into another
wrangling session over Poland with the Soviet Union, particularly since Britain and the
United States were about to open a new round of negotiations with the Soviets over
Germany. By this point, Bevin was convinced that the only way of protecting western
Germany from Soviet interference was to abandon entirely the pretence of four-power
cooperation in Germany. The implication of this step towards the formal division of
Germany was an acceptance that if the Soviet Union was to be expected not to interfere
in the west, Britain could no longer involve itself in the Soviet sphere in Eastern
Europe. A notable shift in British policy towards Poland was signalled by the
withdrawal of the first postwar ambassador, Victor Cavendish-Bentinck, whose tenure
had been associated with a policy of more active British intervention in Polish affairs.
From this point on, Bevin sought to limit relations with the Polish government to a
resolution of bilateral issues. Despite the virtually complete British withdrawal from
Polish politics, however, the Foreign Office was quick to rally around Mikołajczyk
when he faced arrest by the Polish authorities. The Foreign Office launched an
operation to help Mikołajczyk escape. The episode of Mikołajczyk’s flight from Poland
demonstrates that British officials still considered themselves responsible for ensuring
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his safety, but at the same time highlights the narrowing of the original British
commitment from broad support for the entire Polish democratic opposition movement
to protection for the physical safety of one man.
What emerges from this analysis is a picture of a struggle to formulate an appropriate
policy which would fulfil the obligations incurred by Britain to Poland in wartime in the
midst of the rapid realignment of the international system after the war. Bevin’s
recognition of Britain’s diminished capacity to exert influence in areas outside those of
vital importance to Britain – particularly where a clash of interests with the Soviet
Union was involved – occurred relatively quickly. Bevin carried out a quick reshuffle of
policy priorities and concluded that it was not in Britain’s interest to enter into conflict
with the Soviet Union over Poland. He was ready to accept the establishment of
separate zones of western- and Soviet-dominated influence in Europe, eventually
concluding that this was the only way of ensuring Britain’s security and economic
recovery, although a formalisation of this arrangement was slowed by resistance from
within the Cabinet and the PLP, as well as by American uncertainty. Bevin accepted
that one of the consequences of this reconfiguration of the international system would
be a forfeiture of British influence in the Soviet sphere. The Foreign Office officials, on
the other hand, while deeply involved in the transformation of British policy towards the
Soviet Union, were not prepared to accept the implications of these changes to the
international system for British policy towards Poland. In a sense, then, Bevin moved
ahead of the Foreign Office into policymaking of the Cold War era, whereas the
officials, with their reluctance to accept the “loss” of Poland to the Soviet Union,
remained a few steps behind.
This work is based on the premise that the role of the Foreign Office, as well as that of
political leaders was significant in determining the direction of British policy. In the
first chapter, much of the focus is on Churchill and Eden as the two main protagonists in
the negotiations with the Polish exile leaders and the Soviet Union. Churchill’s close
involvement in foreign affairs was fairly unusual for a prime minister. He frequently
conducted diplomacy through direct communication with other heads of state. Much of
the negotiations for a Polish-Soviet settlement were conducted by personal telegrams
between Churchill and the Soviet leader, Josef Stalin on the one hand, and meetings
between Churchill and Polish leaders on the other. Although Churchill tended to seize
the initiative when he wanted to push through a proposal or obtain the agreement of
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Polish leaders at crucial moments, he always consulted Eden, and his messages were
often drafted or at least reviewed before dispatch by the Foreign Office officials. Eden,
Alexander Cadogan, permanent undersecretary, Orme Sargent, deputy undersecretary,
Oliver Harvey, assistant undersecretary, Frank Roberts and Christopher Warner, heads
of the Central and Northern Departments respectively, and Owen O’Malley, British
ambassador to the exile government, held meetings and were in regular communication
with Polish leaders.9 Churchill tended to erupt into this orderly way of conducting
business when he sought to obtain a particular result, in which case he was not content
to allow the civil servants to proceed, but rather took control himself in order to speed
up the process. For the most part, however, the Foreign Office concurred with the
direction of policy towards Poland; it was the work of the officials that ensured
underlying consistency and continuity in British policy, since Churchill’s involvement
often occurred in intense, sporadic bursts. It was the officials’ assessment of the PSL’s
strength, for instance, that underpinned the decision to urge Mikołajczyk to join the new
provisional government.10
Once the Labour government came to power, a more conventional way of conducting
foreign affairs was restored. The new prime minister, Clement Attlee, did not often
involve himself directly in foreign policy. Bevin allowed the Foreign Office to take the
lead on matters concerning Polish affairs. There was almost complete continuity
between the pre and postwar periods in the Foreign Office personnel. Sargent and
Warner were promoted to permanent and assistant undersecretary respectively in
February 1946. Warner in particular remained closely involved in Polish affairs. Robin
Hankey, chargé d’affaires in the British embassy in Warsaw for eight months after the
war, returned to London to take over as head of the Northern Department; Hankey’s
assistant was Denis Allen, who had been responsible for Polish affairs as first secretary
in the Central and Northern Departments during the war. Patrick Hancock, who joined
the Northern Department after the war, also dealt with Polish affairs.
9 The Foreign Office Central Department was responsible for Poland until the beginning of 1945, at
which point it was transferred to the purview of the Northern Department.
10 TNA: PRO FO 371/47594/N7295/6/G55, Moscow to Foreign Office, 21 June 1945; N7297/6/G55,
Moscow to Foreign Office, 21 June 1945; TNA: PRO FO 371/47595/ N7312/6/55, Moscow to Foreign
Office, 22 June 1945; N7508/6/55, Foreign Office Minutes, 2 July 1945.
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Historiography
There has been no thorough study, based on all the available sources, of British policy
towards the Polish government-in-exile from 1944 to 1945. In the literature on
diplomatic relations within the Grand Alliance, Poland is most commonly dealt with
only insofar as it was a source of discord. While the effect of the Polish issue on the
relationship between the three great powers has been the focus of much scholarly
attention, the actual substance of British policy towards Poland is seldom covered.11
Studies of British wartime foreign policy often assume that British policy vis-à-vis
Poland was formulated with reference only to the Soviet Union. This approach ignores
the importance of issues in the Anglo-Polish relationship which shaped British policy,
including Britain’s political commitments to the exile government and the importance
of retaining the participation of Polish troops under British command. Studies that
situate Poland only in the context of great power relations also tend to overlook the
Polish government itself. There is an implicit assumption that the Polish government’s
foreign policy, its strategies for gaining influence and the effect of internal divisions on
its position had little impact and therefore do not merit examination.
Even works which specifically address the theme of Anglo-Polish relations during the
war seldom offer a comprehensive analysis of the aims and intentions underlying British
policymaking. There are a number of studies that chronicle the course of relations
between Britain and the Polish exile government without examining the factors that
shaped British policy. Antony Polonsky’s introduction to his documentary study, The
Great Powers and the Polish Question, 1941-1945, traces the escalating tension
between the Soviet Union and Britain over the Polish issue but does not attempt to
analyse the process of British policymaking.12 Similarly, Victor Rothwell includes a
11 Works which take this approach include: Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin: The War They
Fought and the Peace They Sought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); Remi Nadeau, Stalin,
Churchill and Roosevelt Divide Europe (New York: Praeger, 1990); Robin Edmonds, The Big Three:
Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin in Peace and War (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1991); Lloyd C. Gardner,
Spheres of Influence: The Great Powers Partition Europe, From Munich to Yalta (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee,
1993); David Reynolds, et al, eds., Allies at War: The Soviet, American and British Experience, 1939-
1945 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994); Keith Sainsbury, Churchill and Roosevelt at War: the War They
Fought and the Peace They Hoped to Make (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), 2nd ed.
12 Antony Polonsky, ‘Introduction’, in The Great Powers and the Polish Question, 1941-1945: A
Documentary Study in Cold War Origins (London: London School of Economics, 1976), 11-48.
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section on British policy towards Poland during the war in Britain and the Cold War,
1941-1947 which essentially chronicles the evolution of British policy.13
In Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the Polish Government in Exile, George
Kacewicz analyses the Anglo-Polish relationship during the war. This work does not
fully exploit the available archival sources held at Britain’s National Archives.
Although Kacewicz does make use of the minutes and papers of the War Cabinet, he
does not refer to the files of the Foreign Office, without which it is impossible to gain a
full understanding of the formulation of British policy towards Poland.14 The most frank
and revealing comments by officials, the secretary of state and the prime minister were
often noted in the relatively private channel of the internal minutes of the Foreign
Office. Likewise, Edward J. Rozek’s Allied Wartime Diplomacy: A Pattern in Poland
was published in 1959 before the release of British public records from the wartime
period in the mid-1970s and thus does not provide a full account of British policy.15
Anita J. Prażmowska’s Britain and Poland, 1939-1943: The Betrayed Ally covers the
earlier period of the war, providing an indepth analysis of the policies pursued by both
the British and Polish governments and including careful consideration of all the factors
which influenced the direction of those policies. Prażmowska demonstrates that Polish
leaders pursued a strategy of attempting to link Polish military assistance to a guarantee
of British support and a prominent role in the postwar peace negotiations. She conveys
the constant tension between the British commitment to Poland and the pursuit of closer
cooperation with the Soviet Union. Prażmowska’s detailed account of Polish military
contributions and the political results Polish leaders hoped these contributions would
yield, as well as the pattern of British response provides a basis for a sound
understanding of the dynamics of Anglo-Polish relations in the last years of the war and
in particular the sense on both sides that Britain had accrued a debt to the Polish
government which remained to be discharged.16 Prażmowska’s essay on Churchill’s
relations with the Polish government in a collection edited by R.A.C. Parker, Winston
Churchill: Studies in Statesmanship further elucidates the Polish exile leaders’ pursuit
of political influence. This essay establishes the origins of Churchill’s involvement in
13 Victor Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War 1941-1947 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1982).
14 George Kacewicz, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the Polish Government in Exile, 1939-1945
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979).
15 Edward J. Rozek, Allied Wartime Diplomacy: A Pattern in Poland (New York: Wiley, 1958).
16 Anita J. Prażmowska, Britain and Poland, 1939-1943: The Betrayed Ally (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995).
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the Polish issue, beginning in June 1940, after the fall of France, when he intervened to
ensure that Polish troops were evacuated to Britain, where they were reequipped and
furnished with the facilities necessary to carry on with recruitment and further
training.17
Bernadeta Tendyra’s doctoral thesis is a study of the internal politics of the government
of Władysław Sikorski, Mikołajczyk’s predecessor as prime minister. She focuses on
the effect of internal opposition to Sikorski’s policies on the government-in-exile’s
foreign relations and postwar domestic objectives. She seeks to ascertain whether
Sikorski could have succeeded in maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union
throughout the war if he had managed to overcome this opposition. She concludes her
study in 1943, the year of Sikorski’s death.18 Evan McGilvray’s study, A Military
Government in Exile: The Polish Government-in-Exile, 1939-1945, A Study of
Discontent, includes a short chapter on the 1944-45 period but the coverage is cursory
as he concludes that by this point the exile government no longer had any relevance for
Britain. He does not cover British planning for postwar Poland, which was the primary
focus of British diplomatic activity by this point in the war.
There are also several works which focus specifically on the Polish forces who served
under British command during the war. Mark Ostrowski’s doctoral thesis details the
dilemma which faced Polish servicemen in 1945 as they chose between repatriation to
Poland and resettlement in Britain. Ostrowski’s starting point is that the British
government treated these troops with extreme callousness. He argues that the British
government was fully aware of the security situation in Poland after the war,
particularly that returnees were often subject to imprisonment or deportation, but
officials nevertheless waged a deliberate disinformation campaign, concealing or
minimising news from Poland and exerting relentless pressure on Polish troops to return
home. After the war, the British government assumed responsibility for the nearly
250,000 Polish servicemen (and their dependants) who had served under British
operational command.19 This was a huge challenge – and one for which no advance
17 Prażmowska, ‘Churchill and Poland’, 110-23.
18 Bernadeta Tendyra, ‘General Sikorski and the Polish Government in Exile, 1939-1943: A Study of
Polish Internal Émigré Politics in Wartime’, (PhD dissertation, London School of Economics and
Political Science, 1999).
19 Anita J. Prażmowska, ‘Polish Refugees as Military Potential: Policy Objectives of the Polish
Government in Exile’, in Refugees in the Age of Total War, ed. Anna C. Bramwell (London: Unwin
Hyman, 1988), 219.
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planning had taken place. Repatriation for as many as possible was the policy objective
pursued by the British government, and officials did sometimes express frustration over
the many difficulties with which they had to contend. Ostrowski has a tendency,
however, to take these expressions of irritation as an indication of wider British policy.
Nevertheless, he provides a detailed study of the development of British policy vis-à-vis
the issues of repatriation and resettlement. Michael Hope’s The Abandoned Legion: A
Study of the Background and Process of the Post-War Dissolution of Polish Forces in
the West covers much of the same material as Ostrowski’s thesis.
The diaries and memoirs of the former members of the Polish government-in-exile are
helpful in completing the picture of wartime Anglo-Polish relations. Particularly
valuable is the carefully recorded diary of the Polish ambassador to Britain, Edward
Raczyński. In 1944 Raczyński was present at almost all the meetings held between
representatives of the British and Polish governments. He also met frequently with
Foreign Office officials. He was thus well-placed to give a full account of the
negotiations for a resolution to the Polish-Soviet dispute in 1944. Raczyński vividly
recounts the pattern of Churchill’s cajoling and threats as the negotiations wore on.20
Jan Ciechanowski’s memoir covering his time as Polish ambassador to Washington
contains useful insights but his observations on British policy were made from a
distance and he naturally focuses on American policy. His account ends in July 1945.21
Mikołajczyk’s memoir sheds light on his discussions with Churchill and Eden in 1943
and 1944. Mikołajczyk also records how Churchill persuaded him to return to Poland to
join the new government. Mikołajczyk’s memoir, published in 1948, reflects the
difficult circumstances in which it was written, immediately following his escape from
Poland, and must therefore be treated with some circumspection as a source.22
Equally, the statements in the memoirs published by British leaders and policymakers
cannot always be accepted at face value. Written and published in the political climate
of the Cold War, these accounts seek to obscure any aspects of British policy that would
suggest that Britain might have done more to save Poland from falling into Soviet
clutches. There is a tendency to claim that the British foresaw that the wartime alliance
20 Edward Raczyński, In Allied London (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962).
21 Jan Ciechanowski, Defeat in Victory (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1947).
22 Stanisław Mikołajczyk, The Pattern of Soviet Domination (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co.,
1948).
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with the Soviet Union would collapse with the end of hostilities, and that the Soviet
Union would move aggressively to assert total control over Poland, leaving Britain
powerless to exert any influence over the shape of the postwar settlement there.
Chief among these memoirs is Churchill’s own account of the war years. Churchill
presents a sanitised version of his relations with the Polish government-in-exile,
depicting himself as the steadfast champion of Polish interests, valiantly challenging the
Soviet Union but ultimately defeated by an intransigent Stalin and an uninterested
President Franklin Roosevelt. There is no hint of the constant tension and conflicting
interests which the British had to negotiate in their relations with the Polish
government-in-exile on one side, and the Soviet Union on the other. In Triumph and
Tragedy, the sixth volume of Churchill’s history of the war, published in 1954, he seeks
to emphasise his firm commitment to preventing Soviet abuses wherever possible. In
the early 1950s at the height of western panic over the “communist menace”, there were
obvious advantages (of which Churchill was certainly not unaware) in establishing a
reputation as the seer who had foreseen the Soviet threat before all others.
For instance, Churchill records his alarm at the Soviet failure to fulfil the Yalta
agreements to broaden the Polish government to include all parties and to admit foreign
observers into Poland. He recalls his attempt to persuade Roosevelt to make a joint
Anglo-American representation to Stalin. Churchill records that he did not realise at the
time how seriously Roosevelt’s health had deteriorated and how remotely involved he
was in the day-to-day duties of governing. Consequently, Roosevelt’s aides drafted the
responses which Churchill received in the president’s name. ‘The tendency of the State
Department was naturally to avoid bringing matters to a head while the President was
physically so frail.’ Churchill’s mild language does not mask the admonishment. A few
lines later he writes: ‘These were costly weeks for all.’ In other words, had it not been
for the American delay, Churchill might have succeeded in securing the admission of
foreign observers to Poland, whose presence would have halted or at least curbed the
abuses occurring there. On 11 March 1945, Roosevelt replied to Churchill’s request for
a direct Anglo-American approach to Stalin at the highest level. Roosevelt preferred to
allow the British and American ambassadors to appeal first to Soviet foreign
commissar, Vyacheslav Molotov before making an approach directly to Stalin.
Knowing that ‘there was a deadlock in Moscow’, Churchill agreed to Roosevelt’s wish
only ‘with much reluctance’ as ‘no progress of any kind had occurred’ since the Yalta
23
conference and ‘[t]ime was all on the side of Lublin, who were no doubt at work to
establish their authority in such a way as to make it impregnable.’ Britain could ‘make
no progress without American aid, and if we got out of step the doom of Poland was
sealed.’23 Churchill suggests that had Britain been powerful enough to pursue an
independent foreign policy without having to defer to the US, he would have adopted a
far tougher stance. Without making an explicit statement, he hints that the overall
international situation and the fate of Poland in particular might have evolved quite
differently had Britain been the steward of Anglo-American policy towards the Soviet
Union.
Churchill’s account reflects his desire to avoid giving the impression that he was duped
into trusting the Soviets. It was the case that Churchill sent a series of messages to
Roosevelt in March 1945, urging the adoption of a more robust Anglo-American stance
in response to Soviet obstructionism on the Three Power Commission, the body set up
at Yalta to reach a preliminary agreement on the composition of the Polish provisional
government. British doubts about Soviet intentions in Poland did become more acute in
the months following the Yalta conference. The Foreign Office revisited its assessment
of Soviet policy and concluded that the Soviet preoccupation with security was leading
the regime to take excessive measures to ensure that a Polish government which would
be “friendly” to the Soviet Union was put in place. Officials concluded that a change of
tactics was required: the British must handle the Soviets more firmly, and take an
uncompromising position on the limits of what was acceptable. What this amounted to
was a different strategy for dealing with the Soviets, not an indication that the British
had abandoned the idea of collaboration with the Soviets in implementing a solution to
the Polish issue altogether.24 Further, Churchill’s proposal for a direct approach to Stalin
reflected his suspicion that while the Soviet leader himself was generally reasonable and
trustworthy, there was a hardline, anti-western faction in the Kremlin which asserted
itself periodically.25 Churchill might have hoped that by making Stalin aware of Anglo-
American displeasure over the lack of progress by the Three Power Commission, he
would be able to intervene and break the deadlock. Thus, Churchill’s March messages
to Roosevelt were not an indication that he had completely lost faith in the Soviet
23 Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Volume VI: Triumph and Tragedy (London: Cassell,
1954), 367-68, 373.
24 Folly, Churchill, Whitehall and the Soviet Union, 148-50, 160-1, 166.
25 Ibid., 83, 85, 135, 138, 144-5.
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Union, but rather a reflection of a broader change in thinking within the British
policymaking establishment about the most effective way of eliciting Soviet
cooperation. Finally, Churchill had an extremely poor opinion of the “Lublin Poles”,
considering them incapable of governing.26 He shared the Foreign Office assessment
that no postwar Polish government would be viable without the inclusion of
Mikołajczyk. Thus it is unlikely that he actually foresaw, as he implies in his memoirs,
that the Lublin government would succeed in establishing total control over the
country.27
Eden also implies that his view of the Soviet leadership was mainly one of distrust. He
makes frequent reference in his memoirs to his scepticism about the Soviet Union
generally and about Soviet promises regarding the future of Poland specifically. Eden
highlights instances where he expressed doubt about Soviet sincerity in his diary or
correspondence. He refers, for instance, to Mikołajczyk’s optimism following a talk in
May 1944 with Oskar Lange, a Polish expatriate professor of economics at the
University of Chicago who acted occasionally as an unofficial emissary on behalf of
Roosevelt. In his memoir, Eden notes that he and Churchill warned the Polish exile
leaders not to be overly optimistic about Lange’s report that Stalin had promised to stay
out of Polish domestic affairs.28 In fact, at the time, Lange’s report from Moscow
created a surge in optimism back in London about the chances for a resolution to the
Polish-Soviet dispute.29 Eden gets in a few sly digs at Churchill as well, suggesting that
the prime minister was more inclined than he to take a ‘cheerful view of U.J.’30
Frank Roberts, who, as head of the Foreign Office Central Department during the war,
worked closely with the Polish government-in-exile, gives an interpretation similar to
that of Churchill. In his account of the Yalta conference, Roberts argues that Churchill
took ‘the lead in fighting the Polish case’, but was undermined by Roosevelt’s lack of
support. Roberts concludes that ‘diplomacy is a matter of documents, and war is a
matter of where armies end up.’ It was the Red Army which ‘decided the fate of the
26 Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations (hereafter DOPSR) (London: Heinemann, 1967), vol. 2, doc.
239.
27 TNA: PRO FO 371/47594/N7295/6/G55, Moscow to Foreign Office, 21 June 1945; N7297/6/G55,
Moscow to Foreign Office, 21 June 1945.
28 Eden, Anthony [Earl of Avon], The Eden Memoirs: The Reckoning (London: Cassell, 1965), 465.
29 TNA: PRO FO 371/39400/C6694/8/G55, Foreign Office Minutes, 20-21 May 1944; C7370/8/G55,
Minute by Roberts, 30 May 1944; FO 371/39402/C8476/8/G55, Foreign Office Minutes, 30 May 1944.
30 U.J. was a short form for ‘Uncle Joe’, the nickname bestowed upon Stalin by Churchill and Roosevelt.
Eden, The Reckoning, 466.
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world and above all that of Eastern Europe.’31 Again, Roberts’s account reinforces the
image of Britain being brushed aside helplessly by the overwhelming might of the Red
Army.
A substantial number of secondary works take their cue from these early memoirs in
arguing that the British tried their best against impossible odds to secure a satisfactory
agreement before the Red Army had established complete control over Poland but were
simply overtaken by the course of events. Many of the histories of the origins of the
Cold War accept as a given that the outcome of the European settlement was decided by
the position of the military forces at the end of the war.32 Other historians are more
critical, taking the position either that the British deliberately pushed Mikołajczyk into
an unsatisfactory settlement in spite of their clear understanding of Soviet postwar plans
for Poland,33 or, finally, that they were foolish enough to believe Stalin’s assurances that
Poland would regain its independence after the war.34
All three of these interpretations imply that the British government had clear
foreknowledge of the shape that the international system would take by the late 1940s,
with an escalation of tension between the Soviet Union and its former allies, and the
31 Frank Roberts, Dealing with Dictators: The Destruction and Revival of Europe, 1930-1970 (London:
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1991), 75-77.
32 Elisabeth Barker, Churchill and Eden at War (London: Macmillan, 1978), 247, 260; Rothwell, Britain
and the Cold War, 358, 361; Martin Kitchen, British Policy Towards the Soviet Union (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1986), 272-3; Geir Lundestad, ‘The United States, Great Britain and Eastern Europe: The
Period from Yalta to Potsdam’, in Paola Brundu Olla, ed. Yalta: un mito che resiste; relazioni e
comunicazioni presentate al convegno internazionale organizzato dalla Provincia di Cagliari, 23-26
aprile 1987 (Rome: Ateneo, 1987), 191; Sean Greenwood, Britain and the Cold War, 1945-91
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 8. Another variation on this argument, following the line set out by
Churchill in his memoirs, is that Britain would have taken a stronger line to defend Poland against the
Soviet Union had the Americans been prepared to offer their support. See, for example, William Hardy
McNeil, America, Britain, & Russia: Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941-1946 (New York, Johnson
Reprint Corporation, 1976), 557; Norman A. Graebner, ‘Yalta, Potsdam, and Beyond: The British and
American Perspectives’, in Ann Lane and Howard Termperley, eds., The Rise and Fall of the Grand
Alliance, 1941-45 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), 227-8.
33 Works which put forward this interpretation are: Dilks, Epic and Tragedy, 29-30; Ostrowski, ‘To
Return to Poland’, 164-8; Hope, Abandoned Legion (London, 2005), 14; McGilvray, Military
Government In Exile, 133, 144-5. This is also the implication of more general sweeping statements which
frequently appear in the literature, such as: ‘The military and moral dilemmas posed by Soviet conduct
were so acute that the line of resistance for the West in 1945 was to write Eastern Europe off as a
hopeless case.’ Norman Davies, Europe East & West (London: Pimlico, 2007), 39.
34 John Charmley, Churchill: The End of Glory. A Political Biography. (London: John Curtis, 1992), 558-
61, 591, 614-15; Norman Davies, Rising ’44: ‘The Battle for Warsaw’ (London: Macmillan, 2003), 160-
1. Sean Greenwood, Titan at the Foreign Office: Gladwyn Jebb and the Shaping of the Modern World
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), 189. In contrast to the argument he sets out in Britain and the Cold
War, 1945-91, here Greenwood argues that ‘[W]here the British are open to criticism was in allowing a
kind of desperate optimism to blunt their critical faculties towards the Soviet Union not only at Yalta, but
long before.’
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hardening of spheres of influence into mutually hostile, strictly divided power blocs. All
three ignore the extent to which the formulation of British policy towards Poland rested
on the belief that some measure of cooperation with the Soviet Union would continue.
Britain was not without doubts about how easily achievable this would prove to be, but
detailed analysis of Soviet priorities and intentions led British political leaders and
policymakers to conclude that the Soviet Union would have to pursue postwar
collaboration with its western allies. Highly critical accounts of British policy towards
Poland at the end of the war often point to British frustration with Soviet obstructionism
after the Yalta conference as a sign that Churchill knowingly forced Mikołajczyk into a
doomed venture.35 If British policy in the immediate post-Yalta period is considered in
the context of the preceding year, however, a different picture emerges. The British had
subjected Soviet policy to close scrutiny and concluded that in spite of bouts of
infuriating and sometimes bewildering obstreperousness, ultimately the long-term
Soviet intention was to pursue continued cooperation. Further, Britain had weathered
difficult periods in its relations with the Soviet Union and had always eventually
managed to reach a reasonably satisfactory compromise.
My understanding of the development of British policy towards the Soviet Union during
the war owes a great deal to Martin Folly’s work, Churchill, Whitehall and the Soviet
Union. It was this study that helped me to piece together the assumptions that
underpinned the British approach to the negotiations with the Soviet Union over Poland.
Folly shows that the British expectation that the Soviet Union would pursue ongoing
collaboration with its wartime alliance partners was based on extensive analysis carried
out mainly by the Foreign Office. The British concluded that the Soviet Union’s far-
reaching reconstruction needs could only be met with western assistance, and thus
would oblige the Soviets to pursue postwar cooperation. This conclusion was supported
by the British assessment of Stalin as a realist who would prioritise the best interests of
the Soviet state over adherence to revolutionary ideology. Stalin’s realpolitik, and his
awareness of the limits of western tolerance, would ensure that the Soviets would not
allow their security obsession to spill over into a bid for expansion, especially as the
westward advance of the Soviet armed forces brought with it new temptations in this
regard. Folly shows that the British thesis of a ‘cooperative Soviet Union’, was genuine,
and not merely ‘an empty set of phrases designed to sustain the temporary wartime
35 Davies, Rising ’44, 446, 453, 629-31.
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relationship.’36 It was a thesis that was subject to doubt, certainly, and was frequently
revisited and revised following particular events or changes in Soviet behaviour but it
nevertheless held good until the end of the Churchill coalition government, which is the
point at which Folly’s study ends. David Reynolds’s analysis in From World War to
Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International History of the 1940s has also
been very helpful in furthering my understanding of British expectations of ongoing
postwar cooperation with the Soviet Union, particularly during the transition period in
the months following the war.37
Churchill again set the tone for secondary literature on the postwar period. He depicts
Mikołajczyk’s departure from London as the end of close British involvement with the
democratic Polish political parties. ‘It is difficult to see what more we could have done’,
he concludes blandly.38 He does not mention the promise of support which he made
when Mikołajczyk left for Moscow to participate in the negotiations for the formation
of the new Polish government.39 Historians have for the most part followed this line of
interpretation in assuming that Britain bore no particular responsibility for the outcome
of the political settlement in Poland. In explaining the omission of Poland from his
study of British policy in Eastern Europe after the war, Rothwell states that the
exclusion is justified because Poland had ‘almost completely lost the importance in
British foreign policy which it had had during the war.’40 The assumption that Poland’s
significance diminished to nothing is not usually stated so bluntly but it is clearly shared
because there has been no work published on British policy towards Poland during the
immediate postwar period.41
This interpretation rests on the assumption that Anglo-Polish relations during the war
had no bearing on the period from 1945 to 1947. In fact, the end of the war did not bring
36 Folly, Churchill, Whitehall and the Soviet Union, 6.
37 David Reynolds, From World War to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International History of
the 1940s (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), chapters 13-15.
38 Churchill, Triumph, 564, 507.
39 TNA PRO: FO 371/66090/N658, Annex to ‘British Policy Towards Poland – Mr Churchill’s
Conversation with M. Mikołajczyk, 15 June 1945’.
40 Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War, 2.
41 Works on British postwar foreign relations which either omit Poland entirely or state that Britain had
no further involvement there include Christopher Mayhew, ‘British Foreign Policy since 1945’,
International Affairs, 26, no. 4 (1950); Elisabeth Barker, Britain in a Divided Europe, 1945-1970
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972); F. S. Northedge, Descent from Power: British Foreign Policy,
1945-1973 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1974); James L. Gormly, From Potsdam to the Cold War: Big
Three Diplomacy (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1990); Robert Self, British Foreign
and Defence Policy Since 1945: Challenges and Dilemmas in a Changing World (Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 2010).
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with it an end to British responsibility for the Polish issue. The Labour government
inherited not only the problems of looking after the Polish servicemen and their
families, as well as the logistical challenges of dissolving the exile government and
arbitrating the transfer of power from the London government to the new provisional
administration in Warsaw, it also inherited the commitment to support the democratic
opposition parties as they struggled to retain a share of power in the new Polish
government. This thesis intends to fill the gap in the existing literature by presenting a
full analysis of British postwar policy towards Poland with an emphasis on the outcome
of the British government’s commitment to support the democratic opposition in light
of earlier promises.
The secondary literature of relevance to this second part of my thesis is fairly limited.
The third volume of Alan Bullock’s biography of Ernest Bevin, covering his time as
foreign secretary, provides a helpful starting point for its sweeping survey of British
foreign policy in the second half of the 1940s, as well as conveying Bevin’s broad
overall approach to the problems of the period.42
Anne Deighton’s The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany and the
Origins of the Cold War has been crucial in clarifying the stages by which Bevin
gradually abandoned the objective of establishing lasting cooperation with the Soviets.
The plan for four-power administration of Germany, agreed at the Potsdam conference,
fairly soon proved unworkable. Bevin and the Foreign Office concluded that the
solution was a merger of the western zones – the first step towards the formal division
of the country. Deighton also explains that Bevin pursued a dual policy: he continued to
seek an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union even after he himself no longer
believed it to be achievable while he waited for the US – and to some extent his own
government – to accept that four-power administration of Germany would not be
feasible in the long-term. Bevin’s approach to the German problem had direct
implications for his policy towards Poland: his willingness to accept the creation of
spheres of Soviet and western influence carried with it the implication of non-
interference in the countries within the Soviet sphere.43
42 Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 1945-1951 (London: Heinemann, 1983).
43 Deighton, Impossible Peace, 7-8.
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There are a number of works which have been essential to my understanding of the
Labour Party’s attitude towards the Soviet Union and the communisation of Eastern
Europe.44 This overview of the currents of thought within the Labour Party was
essential to understand that Bevin’s stance put him at odds with a significant swathe of
the party. Particularly valuable has been Bill Jones’s The Russia Complex, with its
detailed account of the coalescing of the internal opposition to Bevin’s policy.45
I have relied on several studies of the political situation in postwar Poland.
Prażmowska’s Civil War in Poland, 1942-1948 provides an extremely detailed analysis
of the fierce jostling for position that occurred among the political parties and the
underground resistance groups in Poland both during and after the war.46 Krystyna
Kersten’s The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943-1948 is another
excellent study.47 John Micgiel’s essay on the suppression of the opposition in Poland is
particularly helpful for the detail it provides on the Soviet presence in Poland between
1944 and 1946.48 Other works which focus on Polish internal politics are Poland, 1939-
1947 by John Coutouvidis and Jaime Reynolds,49 and Padraic Kenney’s Rebuilding
Poland: Workers and Communists, 1945-1950.50 Although limited to the 1943-1945
period, Polonsky and Bolesław Drukier’s The Beginnings of Communist Rule in Poland
44 Works that cover internal Labour Party politics and the prevailing attitude within the party towards the
Soviet Union are: Michael R. Gordon, Conflict and Consensus in Labour’s Foreign Policy, 1914-1965
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969); Robert J. Jackson, Rebels and Whips: An Analysis of
Dissension, Discipline and Cohesion in British Political Parties (London: Macmillan, 1968); Hugh B.
Berrington, Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons, 1945-55 (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1973);
Kenneth Harris, Attlee (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982); Kenneth O. Morgan, Labour in Power,
1945-1951 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984); Trevor Burridge, Clement Attlee: A Political Biography (London:
Cape, 1985); Raymond Smith and John Zametica, ‘The Cold Warrior: Clement Attlee Reconsidered,
1945-7’, International Affairs 61, no. 2 (1985); Peter Hennessy, Never Again: Britain, 1945-1951
(London: Vintage, 1993); Robert Pearce, Attlee (London: Routledge, 1997).
45 Bill Jones, The Russia Complex: The British Labour Party and the Soviet Union (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1977).
46 Anita Prażmowska, Civil War in Poland, 1942-1948 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2004).
47 Krystyna Kersten, The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943-1948, trans. John Micgiel
and Michael H. Bernhard, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
48 John Micgiel, ‘“Bandits and Reactionaries”: The Suppression of the Opposition in Poland, 1944-1946’,
in The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944-1949, eds. Norman Naimark and
Leonid Gibianskii (Oxford: Westview, 1997): 93-110.
49 John Coutouvidis and Jaime Reynolds, Poland, 1939-1947 (Leicester: Leicester University Press,
1986).
50 Padraic Kenney, Rebuilding Poland: Workers and Communism, 1945-1950 (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1997).
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(1980) also provides some helpful detail on the initial attempts by the PKWN to
strengthen its position.51
Sources
The dilemmas and debates over Poland within the British government from 1944 to
1947 are extensively documented in the files of the Foreign Office, War Office,
Cabinet, Records of the Prime Minister’s Office, and the private office papers of
Anthony Eden and Ernest Bevin, all of which are held at Britain’s National Archives
Public Record Office in Kew.52 The section on Mikołajczyk’s escape in the final chapter
is based primarily on files just released in May 2013. I have supplemented the
government files with reference to the papers of Winston Churchill and Ernest Bevin
(Churchill Archives Centre, University of Cambridge), and Oliver Harvey (British
Library).
It has frequently been noted that Bevin disliked committing his thoughts to paper and
conducted much of the daily Foreign Office business verbally instead. Further, Bevin
was not as actively engaged with Polish affairs as Eden had been. In order to get a sense
of Bevin’s views on a particular issue, it has often been necessary, therefore, to rely on
the comments by Foreign Office officials in the minutes reporting Bevin’s viewpoint or
decision on a particular issue. I found the diary of Captain George Leggett, who was the
interpreter for the Anglo-Polish exchanges at the Potsdam conference, to be very
valuable for its precise observations of Bevin’s approach in the negotiations. Leggett’s
son deposited his father’s diary at the Churchill Archives Centre in early 2014. To the
best of my knowledge, at the time of writing, it has not been consulted by other
researchers.
This thesis draws on a number of published primary sources: the first series of
Documents on British Policy Overseas, produced by the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, the Foreign Relations of the United States series produced by the State
Department’s Office of the Historian, and Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations, 1939-
51 Antony Polonsky and Bolesław Drukier, The Beginnings of Communist Rule in Poland (London:
Routledge, 1980).
52 Anthony Eden’s private office papers are copies of the original papers held at the University of
Birmingham.
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1945, compiled by the Sikorski Institute in London. Of the contemporary accounts of
the wartime period by British policymakers, the diaries of Cadogan and Harvey are the
most valuable.53 The diaries of John (Jock) Colville, Churchill’s assistant private
secretary, and those of his private physician, Lord Moran are also useful for the insights
provided by two men who spent a considerable amount of time in close proximity to the
prime minister.54 The memoirs of Arthur Herbert Birse, who served as personal
interpreter for the British ambassador to Moscow, Archibald Clark Kerr, and also acted
as interpreter between the British and Soviets at the Moscow, Tehran and Yalta
conferences, are particularly useful for their observations of Churchill and Stalin’s
attitude towards the PKWN politicians at the second Moscow conference in October
1944.55
The private written accounts from the postwar period devote very little attention to the
Polish problem. Of some use are the biography of Pierson Dixon, who served as
principal private secretary to Bevin from 1945 to 1947, the memoirs of Gladwyn Jebb,
assistant undersecretary of state in the Foreign Office who worked very closely with
Bevin from 1946 on, and again Birse’s memoirs for his account of the Potsdam
conference and the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Berlin.56
Cavendish-Bentinck, the British ambassador to Warsaw, did not publish a memoir,
although the American ambassador Arthur Bliss Lane’s I Saw Poland Betrayed, does
refer to joint Anglo-American initiatives in Poland and conveys the sense of mounting
frustration on the part of both ambassadors at the increasing reluctance of their
governments to intervene in a meaningful way in Polish affairs.57 Lane’s successor as
ambassador, Stanton Griffis, also published a memoir, which includes information on
53 David Dilks, ed., The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan (London: Cassell, 1971); John Harvey, ed.,
The War Diaries of Oliver Harvey (London: William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd., 1978).
54 John Colville, The Fringes of Power: Downing Street Diaries, 1939-1955 (London: Hodder and
Stoughton, 1985); Lord Moran, Churchill at War, 1940-45 (London: Robinson, 2002), revised ed.
55 A.H. Birse, Memoirs of an Interpreter (London: Michael Joseph, 1967).
56 Hugh Dalton, High Tide and After. Memoirs, 1945-1960 (London: Frederick Muller, 1962); Birse,
Memoirs; Piers Dixon, Double Diploma: the Life of Sir Pierson Dixon, Don and Diplomat (London:
Hutchinson, 1968); Lord Gladwyn, The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
1972).
57 Arthur Bliss Lane, I Saw Poland Betrayed: An American Ambassador Reports to the American People
(New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1948).
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Mikołajczyk’s escape.58 The Italian ambassador Eugenio Reale’s memoir makes
reference to meetings and discussions with British embassy officials.59
Although the focus of this dissertation is on British policy towards Poland, I have
supplemented the British source base with Polish sources in some sections. At the
Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum in London, I have made use of the papers of the
wartime Polish exile government, primarily the files of the Prime Minister’s Office.
These files contain useful accounts, from the Polish perspective, of the wartime
meetings with British leaders. I have consulted Mikołajczyk’s private papers, which are
held at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. Mikołajczyk’s papers for the period
under investigation are somewhat sparse because of the circumstances in which he fled
Poland in 1947. The most valuable source for this work has been his private diary,
which contains useful detail on the pressure he faced from within the exile government
not to accept the Soviet demands for territorial and political changes during the
negotiations in 1944. Finally, at the Archiwum Akt Nowych I have consulted the
records of the PPR Central Committee and at the archive of the Polish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych), I have consulted the files of the
British Department, including a record of Modzelewksi’s meeting with Bevin in April
1947.
58 Stanton Griffis, Lying in State (New York: Doubleday, 1952).
59 Eugenio Reale, Raporty: Polska, 1945-1946 (Warsaw: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1991).
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Chapter 1: Britain and the Polish government-in-exile, January 1944-June 1945
Introduction
British policy towards the Polish government-in-exile during the last year and a half of
the war was influenced by three main considerations. First, there was the need to fulfil
Britain’s commitment to the restoration of a free and independent Poland. Second,
British policymakers were conscious of the potential impact of their decisions on the
morale of the Polish troops fighting under British command. Third, the overriding
importance of the Anglo-Soviet relationship meant that Britain had to accommodate
Soviet objectives regarding Poland’s political and territorial future. The tension at the
centre of Britain’s relationship with its Polish and Soviet allies has given rise to
considerable controversy and recrimination in the existing work on the subject.
There are three main assessments of British policy towards the Polish government-in-
exile in the last year and a half of the war. The first interpretation holds that British
policymakers had a precise idea of Soviet postwar plans for Poland but because the
western allies needed to keep Stalin fighting beyond Soviet borders, they made every
necessary sacrifice to secure this objective, including that of Poland’s political and
territorial future. This interpretation suggests that the British policymaking
establishment acted with reprehensible cynicism, knowingly pushing the Polish leaders
into a disadvantageous settlement. The Polish government-in-exile was simply an
irrelevant nuisance to Britain, to be dispensed with as quickly as possible.60 The second,
more moderate assessment concludes that the British attempted to fulfil their
commitments to Poland but were overtaken by the progress of the war as the Red Army
occupied the country, leaving no reasonable alternative but to allow the Soviets to
dictate Poland’s future. This interpretation implies that Britain was overwhelmed by
sheer helplessness, with no means to exert influence on the course of events.61 The third
interpretation contends that the British were ridiculously naïve to trust that Stalin would
allow the existence of an independent Poland after the war, ignoring all the warning
60 See, for instance, Dilks, Epic and Tragedy, 29-30; Ostrowski, ‘To Return to Poland’, 164-8; Hope,
Abandoned Legion, 14; McGilvray, Military Government In Exile, 133, 144-5.
61 For example, Barker, Churchill and Eden at War, 247, 260; Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War, 358,
361; Kitchen, British Policy Towards the Soviet Union, 272-3; Lundestad, ‘The United States, Great
Britain and Eastern Europe’, in Olla, ed. Yalta: un mito che resiste, 191; Greenwood, Britain and the
Cold War, 8.
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signals because they were so determined to preserve the alliance with the Soviet Union
beyond the end of the war.62
There are elements of truth in all of these interpretations. British policy vis-à-vis Poland
was formulated within the larger context of Anglo-Soviet relations. British
accommodation of Soviet demands was partly dictated by the military situation. The
absence of a British military presence in Eastern Europe did inevitably limit British
influence in the region. Finally, Britain did misinterpret Soviet intentions vis-à-vis
Poland, particularly towards the end of the war. None of the three arguments, however,
provides a complete picture of British policy and none takes into account the analysis
and assumptions which underpinned that policy. Further, all three rely on the clarity of
hindsight, on the assumption that British policymakers foresaw – or should have
foreseen – that the continuation of the Grand Alliance was doomed to failure even
before the war was over, that the British simply tried to work with the Soviets as
constructively as possible until victory over Germany had been achieved but were under
no illusions that cooperation would continue once this shared objective had been
secured. As Martin Folly argues, however, this approach ‘judge[s] British actions in
terms of the subsequent course of Anglo-Soviet relations’ and assumes that the highly
negative Cold War British perception of Stalin’s practices and intentions was already set
as early as 1941.63
Folly shows that a set of assumptions about Soviet motivations and intentions
developed over the course of the war which was largely shared across the British
policymaking establishment. First, the British understood the Soviet Union to be driven
by an obsession with security, which explained its insistence on establishing a large
buffer zone between its western frontier and Germany, as well as “friendly”
governments in neighbouring states. This does not mean that British policymakers were
not anxious about the lengths to which the Soviets might go to satisfy these security
concerns, particularly as the Red Army’s westward advance opened up new possibilities
for expansion in 1944. But it was hoped that these expansionist instincts could be reined
in. The expectation that Britain would be able to exert a restraining influence on the
Soviet Union rested on the second fundamental assumption about Soviet policy: the
62 Charmley, Churchill, 558-61, 591, 614-15; Davies, Rising ’44, 160-1; Greenwood, Titan at the Foreign
Office, 189.
63 Folly, Churchill, Whitehall and the Soviet Union, 1-3.
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thesis of a ‘cooperative Soviet Union’, which held that the Soviets had opted to pursue a
policy of ongoing collaboration with the western powers. The Soviets would have little
choice but to opt for cooperation because of the immensity of the country’s
reconstruction needs, which, the British assumed, would require western assistance after
hostilities had ended. This conclusion in turn rested on the British assessment of Stalin
as a realist who grasped that lasting cooperation with the western powers was in the
interests of the Soviet state.64
British perceptions of the Soviet Union had clear implications for its policy towards
Poland. Britain saw the Soviet security obsession as the main impetus behind its foreign
policy; Britain accepted that Poland was of particular strategic significance for the
Soviet Union and therefore regarded the Soviet demand for territorial and limited
political concessions from the government-in-exile as understandable. In attempting to
negotiate a postwar settlement for Poland on this basis, however, British policymakers
ran up against strong opposition from the Polish government-in-exile. Polish leaders did
not share the British willingness to accommodate Soviet security concerns. As
Mikołajczyk explained to Eden, Polish suffering and sacrifice, coupled with its military
contribution to the allied war effort, had generated expectations about the position the
country would occupy after the war.65 There was a deeply rooted resistance in Polish
policy to accepting an outcome so profoundly unfair. It seemed both morally
indefensible and politically impossible to be forced by the ally to whom the Polish
government had committed all its military forces to cede territory and make political
concessions to their old enemy whose nearly two-year occupation had been scarcely less
brutal than that of Nazi Germany.
British mediation efforts collided with this determined Polish defence of their national
interests. Throughout the first half of 1944, Churchill, Eden and the Foreign Office
attempted to persuade the government-in-exile to accept the Soviet demands for frontier
changes in exchange for a guarantee of Poland’s political independence. The refusal of
the Polish government to proceed on this basis was a source of great frustration to
British leaders. Nevertheless, British policymakers retained a clear sense of obligation
64 Ibid., 6. Melvyn Leffler argues that Truman and some of his closest advisors, including Averell
Harriman, were also ‘favorably disposed’ towards Stalin at the end of the war. ‘Bringing it Together: The
Parts and the Whole’, in Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory, ed. Odd Arne
Westad (London, 2000), 43.
65 TNA: PRO FO 954/19B/587, Eden to Churchill, 24 December 1943.
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to the Polish government-in-exile, arising both from the 1939 guarantee and from the
significant Polish military contribution to the British war effort. British officials were
particularly conscious of the sacrifice made by the Polish government in agreeing to
British requests for the dispersal of Polish forces across various far-flung theatres of
command and away from Poland. British officials were aware of the hopes and
expectations with which the Polish government had extended the entirety of its military
resources to Britain; they were equally aware of the impossibility of Britain fulfilling
these expectations. Apart from this uncomfortable sense of an unmet moral obligation,
the British military, with its perpetual scarcity of resources, continued to rely on the
large contingent of Polish forces under its command. As the negotiations for a Polish-
Soviet agreement dragged on throughout 1944 and tensions escalated commensurately,
the need to retain the participation of these troops was an additional source of pressure
on British policy. This influence was particularly evident at certain key junctures:
during the Warsaw uprising, at the time of Mikołajczyk’s resignation in November 1944
and in the post-Yalta period, when the British government was at pains to emphasise its
continuing loyalty to the exile government in order to avoid disquiet among the troops.
Britain is often accused of the worst kind of cynicism for accepting Polish military
assistance, only to circumvent or ignore the debt to Poland once it became incompatible
with Britain’s relationship with its more important Soviet ally.66 This interpretation
either overlooks entirely British analysis of the Soviet Union, which was such a crucial
element in the formulation of policy towards Poland, or dismisses the underlying
assumptions on which this policy was based as preposterous or insincere.67 British
leaders recognised that the terms proposed for a resolution of the Polish-Soviet dispute
fell far short of Polish expectations; indeed the terms fell short of Britain’s own earlier
conditions. Partly, British willingness to accommodate the additional Soviet demands
reflected the changing military situation as the year 1944 progressed, but it was also
based on extensive analysis of Soviet motivations, actions and intentions. In the buoyant
period following the Moscow and Tehran conferences, when British leaders felt that
they had succeeded in establishing a greater degree of trust with Stalin, there was
genuine optimism among British policymakers that a satisfactory resolution of the
66 See for example, Ostrowski, ‘Return to Poland’, 216; Davies, Rising ’44, 161.
67 Folly describes this inclination in the historiography to dismiss statements of trust or confidence by
British leaders and policymakers in the Soviet Union as purely cosmetic, intended only for the purpose of
keeping the alliance together, and not sincerely meant. Churchill, Whitehall and the Soviet Union, 3, 6.
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Polish-Soviet dispute was within reach. Over the course of the year, as the initial round
of negotiations failed and Soviet demands augmented steadily, British doubts about
Soviet intentions towards Poland deepened. Particularly after the Yalta conference, it
became increasingly clear that the Soviet Union intended to exert greater control over
the political future of Poland than Britain had anticipated a year earlier. Nevertheless,
the British assumption that the Soviet need for postwar assistance would have a
restraining influence on its foreign policy continued to have a powerful influence on
official British thinking right up to the end of the war. This interpretation of future
Soviet intentions coloured British policy towards Poland, even in June 1945, when
Mikołajczyk and a few other minor politicians from outside the PKWN returned to join
the provisional government. The British acknowledged that this limited representation
was an unsatisfactory outcome, but these misgivings coexisted alongside the conviction
that the Soviet need for ongoing Anglo-Soviet cooperation would allow Britain to
continue to exert influence over Poland’s political future.
British Mediation Attempts, December 1943-March 1944
At the Tehran conference, Churchill and Roosevelt agreed that the Curzon line should
become Poland’s new eastern border, while its western border would be shifted
westward at German expense to the Oder line. The British were not averse to these
territorial changes partly because they did not consider them to contravene Polish
interests provided that Poland was compensated fairly with territory in the west, and
partly because they saw the changes in the context of the Soviet preoccupation with
security. Over the course of the war, as British leaders and diplomats had developed
closer relations with the Soviet regime, British analysis had concluded that Soviet
foreign policy was largely conditioned by security fears. Poland was a particular source
of concern for the Soviet Union because of its geographical position as the bulwark
against German aggression; therefore it was not entirely surprising that Soviet demands
would be more far-reaching there. As Churchill commented after Tehran: ‘Considering
that Russia has lost perhaps thirty millions of citizens in the two devastating wars of the
last twenty-five years, they have the right as well as the power to have their western
frontier properly secured.’68 British policymakers also considered it important to show
68 TNA: PRO PREM 3/355/7, Churchill to Eden, 12 January 1944.
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the Soviets that they understood and were prepared to accommodate these security
concerns. The conclusion was that if Soviet distrust could be broken down, they would
have less reason to fear for their security and would exercise restraint in their handling
of the Polish situation.69
After Tehran, Churchill assumed responsibility for persuading the Poles to accept the
territorial agreement reached by the Big Three at Tehran.70 The prevailing view among
British policymakers was that rapid and wholesale acceptance by the Polish government
of the proposed territorial changes could stave off Soviet interference in Polish internal
affairs. In November Eden had submitted a memorandum to the War Cabinet which
argued that the issue of frontiers was the ‘main difficulty’ in the Polish-Soviet conflict.
He predicted that the Soviet government would not insist on the inclusion of members
of the Soviet-based Union of Polish Patriots (Związek Patriotów Polskich – ZPP), the
rival Polish authority to the London government, in the new Polish government,
maintaining that this condition was not particularly important for the Soviets.71 Stalin
had hinted that he would be unwilling to resume relations with the Polish government in
its present form, declaring at Tehran that although the Soviet Union desired good
relations with Poland, he ‘separated Poland from the Polish Government in exile’, and
doubted that the Polish government in London ‘was ever likely to become the kind of
government it ought to be.’72 Nevertheless the British government judged that
immediate Polish acquiescence to the territorial changes would still suffice to placate
Stalin, whose rumblings about the Polish government they hoped were simply empty
threats designed to ensure that he obtained his territorial desiderata.
The British interpretation of Soviet intentions towards Poland derived in part from the
mood of cautious optimism which prevailed following the Moscow and Tehran
conferences, which had been productive and successful overall, with the Soviets
appearing less suspicious of Britain and the US, more inclined towards collaboration.
Particularly encouraging had been Molotov’s pronouncement that the Soviet Union did
not favour the division of Europe into spheres of influence. This shift in Soviet
69 TNA: PRO CAB 65/45, WM(44)11thCA, 25 January 1944; Folly, Churchill, Whitehall and the Soviet
Union, 114. Interestingly, Mikołajczyk perceived the desire on Churchill’s part to ‘gain the trust’ of the
Soviet Union. PISM PRM/121, 6 March 1944.
70 Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers. The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran,
1943 (hereafter FRUS Tehran), (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1961), 604.
71 TNA: PRO CAB 66/43/28, WP(43)528, 22 November 1943.
72 FRUS Tehran, 598.
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behaviour towards the end of 1943 seemed to confirm the British analysis that the
Soviet Union was edging towards a policy of closer cooperation with the western allies.
Eden and his officials believed that they had reached a better understanding of the
always difficult to fathom Soviet mind-set at the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference
in October 1943.73 They concluded that British and American exclusion of the Soviet
Union from strategic planning and other important decisions had stoked Soviet distrust
and been the cause of much of the obstreperousness and hostility exhibited by the Soviet
leadership. Folly calls this strand of thinking in the British assessment of the Soviet
Union the ‘sensitivities thesis’.74 The willingness of Eden and the American secretary of
state, Cordell Hull to make the long journey to Moscow to meet Molotov, and Anglo-
American frankness over the course of the discussions had helped to assuage Soviet
insecurity and boost their confidence; their more cooperative approach was seen as the
direct consequence.75
Eden came away from Moscow with a strong sense of the importance of treating the
Soviets as equals. Folly argues that after Moscow, the Foreign Office ‘concluded that
Stalin was testing British attitudes with his frontier demands.’ The demands were ‘a test
of sincerity, with future collaboration in mind.’ British officials believed Stalin to be
‘experiment[ing] with cooperation’ to ‘see how far his allies would meet his basic
security requirements.’76 This conclusion was strengthened by Stalin’s generally more
agreeable demeanour at Tehran,77 and by the positive Soviet press and radio coverage of
the conference, which proclaimed a ‘new spirit of Allied cooperation’.78 The British
concluded that the Soviets had opted for cooperation at the end of 1943, but that this
decision was still a provisional one, and could be reversed. While the nascent spirit of
cooperation was still fragile, therefore, it was important for the British to tread carefully,
73 Oliver Harvey, Eden’s private secretary, recorded in his diary that Stalin had been ‘bearish but
mellowed’ in a meeting with Eden on the issue of supply convoys, which had been a long-running source
of Anglo-Soviet discord. Harvey diary, 22 October 1943. On the convoy issue see Martin Gilbert, Road to
Victory: Winston S. Churchill, 1941-1945 (London: Heinemann, 1989), 289-90, 311-12.
74 For example, Clark Kerr attributed the more cooperative Soviet attitude at the conference to the sense
that they were included for the first time on an equal basis by their British and American counterparts.
Folly, Churchill, Whitehall and the Soviet Union, 96, 89.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid., 104-5.
77 Reynolds describes, for instance, how Stalin moderated his negotiating style from Tehran onward. In
1941-2, visitors including Harriman, Beaverbrook, Eden and Churchill ‘were all subject to the one, two,
three treatment, in which a bruising middle meeting was sandwiched between cordial opening and closing
sessions.’ This tactic was less in evidence after Tehran. Reynolds, World War to Cold War, 240.
78 Vojtech Mastny, Russia’s Road to the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 132.
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not to stumble into a misunderstanding which might cause the Soviets to retreat again.79
A resolution of the Soviet-Polish dispute that accommodated Soviet territorial demands
would go some way towards showing the Soviets that Britain was sensitive to their
security concerns. At the same time, the more cooperative Soviet approach suggested to
the British that the Soviets might finally be ready to compromise and restore relations if
the Poles would concede the territorial issue. As Folly argues, ‘one of the consequences
of the increased faith in Soviet cooperativeness that followed the Moscow and Teheran
Conferences was that Churchill, Eden, the FO and the Labour ministers saw hopes for a
reasonable settlement of the Polish problem if the Poles did make a concession.’80
At the end of December 1943, while convalescing from a bout of pneumonia in
Marrakech, Churchill asked Eden to open talks with the Polish government-in-exile
aimed at resolving the conflict. Churchill emphasised that it was of ‘the utmost
consequence to have friendly recognition by Russia of the Polish Government and a
broad understanding of the post war frontiers’ before the Soviet armies crossed the
frontiers of prewar Poland.81 More sceptical of the ‘Soviet sensitivities thesis’ to which
Eden and the Foreign Office subscribed, Churchill worried that the possibilities for
territorial expansion would prove too tempting and eventually outweigh the Soviet
desire for cooperation with the western powers.82 Churchill’s messages during the
weeks of his convalescence in late December and early January indicate that he believed
that only a small window of time remained before the arrival of the Soviet armies onto
prewar Polish territory, and that this period offered the best chance to conclude a fair
territorial settlement and thereby obtain a firm assurance that the Polish government-in-
exile would be allowed to assume responsibility in Poland after the war.83 The longer
the London Poles prevaricated on the frontier issue, the higher the risk of Stalin
establishing a rival Polish government in Warsaw.84
79 Reynolds, World War to Cold War, 114, 118.
80 Folly, Churchill, Whitehall and the Soviet Union, 135.
81 TNA: PRO FO 371/34590/C15105/258/55, Churchill to Eden, 20 December 1943.
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84 TNA: PRO PREM 3/355/7, Churchill to Eden, 12 January 1944.
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Churchill instructed Eden to proceed on the basis of the agreement reached at Tehran:
Poland’s eastern frontier would follow the Curzon line, excluding the city of Lwów,
while in the west, Poland would be compensated with East Prussia to the line of the
Oder, including most of Oppeln.85 Eden set out the proposed territorial changes at the
first of a series of meetings with Mikołajczyk, the foreign secretary, Tadeusz Romer and
Raczyński, on 20 December.86 Mikołajczyk’s attempts to negotiate the terms of a
settlement were hampered by a deep division within the exile government, with one
faction, grouped around the president, Władysław Raczkiewicz, and the commander-in-
chief of the Polish armed forces, General Kazimierz Sosnkowski, implacably opposed
to any compromise with the Soviet Union. This faction insisted that Poland must have
its prewar borders restored; and they would accept no challenge to the authority of the
government-in-exile. Mikołajczyk and Romer, on the other hand, believed they would
have to negotiate with the Soviet Union. Mikołajczyk concluded that Poland had very
little leverage in the circumstances. He was prepared to cede some territory in eastern
Poland in return for a Soviet guarantee of Polish sovereignty. Mikołajczyk’s views were
deeply unpopular both with his own government and with the Polish military
authorities. Even within his own party, a splinter group emerged which threatened to
break off and bring Wincenty Witos, the prewar  Peasant Party (Stronnictwo Ludowe –
SL)87 leader to London to replace Mikołajczyk.88 Thus, Mikołajczyk’s position was
tightly circumscribed and the talks dragged on inconclusively for several weeks.89
As a compromise, Eden proposed that the Poles express a general readiness to discuss
territorial changes with the Soviet Union without making explicit reference to the
Curzon line. The exile government edged slightly closer towards acceptance of the
changes but the cession of Lwów was a sticking point, and the division within the
Polish government was a major obstacle.90 Romer went as far as proposing that the
Polish government could provide a secret assurance to the Soviets regarding the cession
of the eastern territories, leaving the final arrangements until after the war. Cadogan was
85 TNA: PRO PREM 3/355/7, Churchill to Eden, 4 January 1944.
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not certain whether Romer was actually speaking on behalf of his government, or just
floating his own idea.91 The Poles’ prevarication in spite of the rapidly changing
military situation in Eastern Europe worried Eden. He feared that they did not grasp the
‘realities of the situation’ and resorted to requesting assistance from Churchill, who sent
a strongly-worded message for Eden to deliver to the Polish government.92 The prime
minister maintained that the proposed settlement would constitute a ‘full discharge’ of
all Britain’s ‘promises and obligations to Poland.’ If the Polish government did not
accept the settlement, Churchill would ‘certainly not take any further responsibility for
what will happen in the future.’ Churchill cautioned the Polish government not to expect
Britain to enter into a dispute with the Soviet Union if the Polish government were to
reject reasonable proposals.93 Churchill adopted a similarly uncompromising approach
when he returned from Marrakech, determined to take control of the stalled
negotiations.94
This type of strong, slightly threatening language from Churchill has contributed to the
perception that he treated the Poles callously. I would argue, however, that his tough
approach in early 1944 reflected his belief that the Polish government-in-exile needed to
act quickly to secure a firm agreement with the Soviet Union. Churchill’s messages to
Eden during this period serve as a kind of barometer of his fluctuating confidence in
Soviet intentions. Right up until the end of the European war a strong Anglo-Soviet
partnership remained Churchill’s objective but he did not always share Eden’s ideas
about how best to elicit Soviet cooperation. Whereas Eden favoured ‘an open-handed
approach as opposed to tough quid pro quo bargaining as the better way to achieve a
working partnership . . . Churchill wavered between the two poles.’95 Churchill’s
conviction that Stalin was subject to ‘dark forces’ within the Politburo also played on
his mind. Churchill considered Stalin to be reasonable and reliable, but worried that he
would not be able to resist domestic pressure to take advantage of the possibilities for
expansion which were beginning to open up as the Red Army advanced westward. As
Folly argues, Churchill’s ‘geopolitical outlook’ led him ‘to try to pin the Soviets down
to agreements, while he had something to negotiate with.’ He was ‘apprehensive about
91 TNA: PRO FO 371/39385/C303/8/G55, Minute by Cadogan, 7 January 1944.
92 TNA: PRO PREM 3/355/7, Eden to Churchill, 24 December 1943; Eden to Churchill, 9 January 1944;
Eden to Churchill, 12 January 1944.
93 TNA: PRO PREM 3/355/7, Churchill to Eden, 12 January 1944.
94 TNA: PRO PREM 3/355/7, Churchill to Roosevelt, 6 January 1944; Record of a meeting attended by
Eden, Cadogan, Mikołajczyk, Romer, and Raczyński, 20 January 1944.
95 Reynolds, World War to Cold War, 238.
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the possibilities open to the Soviets and determined to limit them where it was in his
power to do so.’96 These underlying doubts compelled Churchill to err on the side of
caution and insist that the Polish exile government reach an agreement without delay.
The Poles’ apparent failure to grasp the logic of his approach and respond in the way he
wanted caused Churchill to lose patience and resort to threats in the hope that fear
would push them towards an agreement, where reason (as he saw it) had failed.
On 10 January the British government received two indications about the possible
formation of a new Polish government in Warsaw under Soviet auspices. A ZPP
statement referred to the need to replace reactionaries with new leaders in moments of
crisis. Then, in New York, Oskar Lange, the University of Chicago economist who had
met with Stalin in 1943 at Roosevelt’s request and who later returned to Poland to join
the provisional government in 1945,97 stated that Polish-Americans favoured the
establishment of a new government that would not ‘allow reactionaries once more to
seize power in Poland’ and would adopt a political platform ‘analogous to that’ of the
ZPP. Lange specified that at least half the members of the new government should be
composed of people who had remained in Poland under the German occupation.98 On
11 January, the Soviet Union issued a statement attacking the Polish government as
unrepresentative of the Polish people and levelled the accusation that it had ‘proved
incapable of establishing friendly relations with the USSR’ and of failing to ‘organis[e]
an active struggle against the German invaders in Poland itself.’99
These hints that the Soviet Union was preparing to recognise the ZPP served to heighten
the British conviction of the need to reach a settlement, although it was not clear to
policymakers at this stage whether the Soviets were simply resorting to pressure tactics.
Over the course of two difficult meetings with Mikołajczyk, Romer and Raczyński,
Eden managed to persuade the Polish government to issue a conciliatory response to the
Soviet statement of 11 January. The Polish reply, issued four days later, was extremely
restrained, suggesting only that Poland and the Soviet Union convene for discussions
96 Folly, Churchill, Whitehall and the Soviet Union, 134-5.
97 Prażmowska, Civil War in Poland, 132; Kersten, Communist Rule in Poland, 183.
98 TNA: PRO FO 371/39385/C424/8/G55, Moscow to Foreign Office, 10 January 1944.
99 The Soviet Union issued this statement in response to a Polish statement of 5 January, which was
intended to signal the Polish government’s desire for improved relations with the Soviet Union. Sargent
had rearranged the Polish statement ‘to avoid any suggestion of a challenge’ and Eden removed the last
sentence, which appealed to the allied governments to uphold the principles of international law. TNA:
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with the participation of Britain and the US. Eden was pleased with the Polish
communiqué, commending the ‘sensible and courageous decision’ taken by the Polish
leaders.100 Instead of responding in kind to the Polish message, however, the Soviets
issued a harsh rejoinder. Since the Poles had ‘avoided and ignored’ the frontier question
in their statement, the Soviet Union understood this as a rejection of the Curzon line and
refused to open official negotiations with the Polish exile government.101
Eden was initially infuriated by the Soviet response. Having succeeded – with difficulty
– in persuading the Polish government to issue a moderate statement, he ‘had received .
. . a blow in the face from the Soviet Government.’ Eden warned Feodor Gusev, the
Soviet ambassador to Britain, that progress would never be made if the Soviet Union
continued to deliberately misconstrue the Polish government’s statements.102 The
British embassy in Moscow, however, offered a more reassuring analysis of the Soviet
response which chimed with the overarching British interpretation of the post-Tehran
Soviet attitude. In the view of John Balfour,103 Clark Kerr’s deputy, the Soviet
government had not ruled out negotiations with any of the London Poles but only with
the exile government in its present form. Balfour argued that it would be in the Soviets’
long-term interest to reach a settlement with representatives of the London government
such as Mikołajczyk or Romer, rather than impose ‘a solution of their own through the
medium of a small group of dissident Poles’ in the Soviet Union, which ‘would
inevitably implant the seeds of future trouble and defeat the avowed objective of the
Soviets which is to ensure the existence on their flank of a Poland permanently
animated by the wish to maintain friendly relations with the U.S.S.R.’ Further, the
Soviets knew that the imposition of a unilateral settlement would have ‘a very
deleterious effect’ on relations with Britain and the US. According to Balfour, ‘thanks
to the atmosphere of confidence now established,’ the maintenance of strong Big Three
relations was a priority for the Soviets.104
Over the next few days, however, the Soviet demand for changes in the composition of
the Polish government caused consternation as British policymakers struggled to
100 TNA: PRO PREM 3/355/7, Eden to Churchill, 15 January 1944.
101 TNA: PRO PREM 3/355/7, Moscow to Foreign Office, 16 January 1944.
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interpret the messages emanating from Moscow. As the Soviets expressed increasing
hostility towards the Polish exile government, Balfour worried that he had misread
Soviet intentions. He observed that the Soviet Union was beginning to treat ‘the Polish
question exclusively as a matter affecting Polish-Soviet relations without reference to
wider European considerations’. The Soviets seemed to be going back on Molotov’s
assurance at Moscow that the Soviet Union ‘did not favour the division of Europe into
spheres of influence’. Balfour suggested that the British government remind the Soviets
of their Moscow pronouncements and point out that unilateral action in Poland would
be incompatible with the agreement reached there, particularly at a time when the
Soviets were ‘enjoying all the advantages of full participation with the United States
and [Britain] in settling problems relating to the rest of Europe and the world at
large.’105
There followed an anxious discussion of the problem in the Cabinet. Ministers
questioned whether the Soviet Union really intended to allow the establishment of an
independent Polish state. Eden observed that the Soviets were exhibiting ‘a progressive
stiffening’ in their attitude towards the Polish government. Ministers worried that if a
Polish-Soviet settlement were not reached soon, the consequence would be strained
relations, or even ‘estrangement’ between the Soviet Union and the western powers. It
fell to the British government to facilitate an agreement as quickly as possible, before
the advance of Russian troops weakened the bargaining position of the Polish
government. The Cabinet judged that if an agreement could be concluded quickly,
‘there was no ground for holding that Russia would not in fact adhere’ to it, primarily
because the Soviets ‘had much to gain by maintaining the good relations established at
the Moscow and Teheran Conferences.’ Ministers concluded that there was good reason
to think that the Polish problem was resolvable because ‘[g]enerally . . . Russia wanted
to co-operate with the United States, and with this country.’106
Balfour’s messages and the subsequent Cabinet discussion help to shed light on the way
assumptions about the Soviet Union affected British policy towards Poland. Balfour’s
comments illustrate the way in which the thesis of a cooperative Soviet Union
105 Balfour acknowledged that a British draft declaration on spheres of influence had not actually been
adopted at the Moscow conference but he noted that when it was discussed Molotov made a ‘clear
pronouncement to the effect that the Soviet Government did not favour division of Europe into spheres of
influence.’ TNA: PRO FO 371/39387/C905/8/G55, Moscow to Foreign Office, 20 January 1944.
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influenced British policy towards Poland. Doubts generated by a particular Soviet action
were outweighed by the conclusion that the ultimate Soviet intention was to establish a
collaborative relationship with the western powers. More specifically, the British
believed that the Soviets understood that any aggressively expansionist moves in Poland
would undermine the chances of this collaboration; and on this basis the British
concluded that Soviet behaviour could be moderated. This view was particularly in
evidence in the relatively buoyant post-Tehran months.
The Cabinet agreed that a direct approach from Churchill to Stalin would have the
highest chance of persuading the Soviets to moderate their approach towards the Polish
exile government.107 Churchill adhered to the strategy of acknowledging Soviet security
concerns and providing reassurance that these would be taken into account in any
agreement. He then emphasised Britain’s objections to Soviet interference in Poland’s
political affairs, attempting to persuade Stalin to withdraw his demand for changes in
the Polish government.108 On 3 February Clark Kerr reported that after meeting with
Stalin and Molotov, he ‘had no hope of moving them’ from their refusal to deal with the
Polish government in its present form. The Soviet leaders had ‘made a litany of the need
of reconstructing’ the existing government. On the other hand, they had ‘made it equally
clear’ that they would be willing to resume relations with a reconstituted government.109
A message from Stalin to Churchill on 4 February seemed to confirm Clark Kerr’s
assessment. The territorial issue stood out as the overriding Soviet concern. Stalin stated
that ‘the very first question which must be completely cleared up . . . is that of the
Soviet-Polish frontier.’ He declared that the Soviet Union would be satisfied with
official Polish acceptance of the Curzon line. Stalin’s message also suggested that he
sought only limited changes to the composition of the Polish government. Although he
insisted that he could not reestablish relations with the government in its present form,
he allowed that ‘the removal from it of pro-fascist imperialist elements and the inclusion
of democratic-minded people’ would facilitate the resolution of outstanding disputes
with the Soviet Union and the renewal of normal Soviet-Polish relations.110
107 Ibid.
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Churchill and Eden found this response relatively encouraging. Eden noted that ‘Stalin’s
immediate reactions to your message are certainly more favourable than might have
been expected’. In his conversation with Clark Kerr, Stalin had at last named the
individual members of the Polish government to whom he objected: Sosnkowski, the
commander of the Polish armed forces; Stanisław Kot, the minister of information; and
General Marian Kukiel, the minister of defence. Eden found the limited scope of the
changes reassuring. He also noted that for the first time the Soviet Union seemed
prepared to offer the Poles a firm commitment regarding compensation in the west in
return for acceptance of the Curzon line.111 The Foreign Office, on the other hand,
accepted the demand less readily. They objected that the Soviet claims against
Sosnkowski, Kukiel and Kot were unfounded. They noted that Kukiel and Kot were
both ministers who favoured a Polish-Soviet rapprochement. Kukiel, for instance, had
done much to prevent members of the Polish army from engaging in anti-Soviet
activities. The Foreign Office thought the removal of Sosnkowski was particularly ill-
advised. Since his appointment as commander-in-chief, he had restricted himself to
military duties and refrained from interfering in politics. ‘The removal of the
commander-in-chief of the Polish forces, who enjoys the confidence of his troops and
who particularly distinguished himself in fighting against the Germans during the Polish
and French campaigns, must prove a considerable embarrassment not only to the Polish
Government but to us’.112
Thus British policy shifted – albeit somewhat reluctantly – to accommodate the Soviet
demand for changes in the Polish government. Acceptance of this new Soviet condition
actually amounted to a reversal of British policy, although this was not openly
acknowledged. Two months earlier, the memorandum submitted by Eden to the Cabinet
had rejected changes to the composition of the Polish government as unjustifiable. The
memo had concluded that Britain should accede neither to Soviet demands for the
removal of any members of the Polish government nor to the inclusion of
representatives of the ZPP. Eden’s memo concluded that the Polish exile government
111 TNA: PRO PREM 3/355/8, Eden to Churchill, 5 February 1944.
112 TNA: PRO FO 371/39392/C2567/8/55, Foreign Office to Moscow, 13 February 1944.
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did not contain any members ‘to whom the Soviet Government could legitimately
object’.113
The shift in the British position was partly due to the changed military situation. The
advance of the Red Army weighed on British minds, lending a sense of urgency to the
need for a settlement, as Churchill, Eden, the Foreign Office, and the Cabinet all noted
at different times. The position of Soviet forces was not, however, the only
consideration that shaped British policy. Churchill and Eden continued to regard the
Polish issue within the larger context of Anglo-Soviet relations, believing that the
Soviet commitment to postwar cooperation meant that they would not push past what
the British considered to be acceptable in Poland. The addition of political demands was
an unwelcome development but the changes requested were fairly limited, and could
therefore be understood as part of the Soviet preoccupation with security and
accommodated without too much fear that the Soviets were actually intent on pursuing
more far-reaching aims.
This assessment of Soviet intentions towards Poland was also in evidence in the
thinking of the Foreign Office. Overall, the Central Department was inclined to be
slightly more reticent about agreeing to Soviet conditions regarding Poland’s future,
preferring whenever possible to delay taking final decisions on both territorial and
political matters until after hostilities had ended. Officials considered it impractical to
expect the Polish government to reconstruct itself until after the liberation of Warsaw,
and they had stronger reservations about the Soviet demands for the removal of
Sosnkowski, Kukiel and Kot. Nevertheless, officials shared the view of Churchill and
Eden that Stalin’s desire for good relations with his western allies would ultimately
require him to act with restraint in Poland. They believed that Stalin understood that
acting with impunity in Poland would come ‘at the cost of fostering distrust of Soviet
policy and methods in this country and throughout the world.’114
The British also envisaged their own close ongoing involvement in whatever settlement
was reached. Eden, for instance, commented that he appreciated that the British
government was asking the Polish exile government ‘to take [a] very big leap in the
113 TNA: PRO FO 371/39385/C409/8/G55, Foreign Office Minutes, 11 January 1944; FO
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dark’ by acceding to the Soviet conditions in return only for ‘the intangible benefits’
offered by Stalin in the future. British responsibility to the Polish government obliged
them to remain closely involved in the negotiations for a settlement and to provide a
guarantee of whatever agreement was reached between Poland and the Soviet Union.115
Churchill and Eden felt a keen sense of urgency to secure an agreement as soon as
possible; Stalin had seemed amenable in his message of 4 February; the British must not
allow the momentum to lapse. Accordingly, they resumed discussions with Polish
leaders on 6 February, the day after Stalin’s message was received in London. Since the
last meeting with Churchill and Eden, Mikołajczyk had received news that the PPR had
established a National Council (Polski Komitet Narodowy – PKN) in Warsaw under
Soviet auspices to represent the pro-Soviet underground groups in opposition to the
Polish underground loyal to the exile government. This clearly constituted a challenge
to the authority of the London government and Mikołajczyk feared that the PKN would
set up a Polish government after Soviet troops had crossed the Curzon line. He
suggested that this step revealed ‘the real intentions of the Soviet Government with
regard to Poland.’ Herein lay the biggest obstacle to an agreement. As far as
Mikołajczyk was concerned, the establishment of the PKN was an obvious act of Soviet
treachery. This sign of Soviet untrustworthiness increased Mikołajczyk’s reluctance to
enter into a territorial agreement, which the Soviets would be liable to break at will. As
he explained to Churchill and Eden, if he ‘were honestly convinced that the Russians
were acting in good faith,’ he would be willing to give the territorial changes ‘serious
consideration.’ Mikołajczyk did not believe that it was ‘only the frontier line . . . in
question, he was convinced that his Government were in reality defending the
independence of Poland itself.’ In the view of Churchill and Eden, on the other hand,
the best strategy was for the exile government to come quickly to an agreement with the
Soviets in order to forestall the possible establishment of a rival government. Eden
commented that ‘all this talk about a Committee would automatically cease if agreement
were reached on the lines of Stalin’s latest telegram.’ Churchill warned that ‘if matters
were allowed to drift, such a Committee would undoubtedly be established and the
Polish Government would have no say in the matter.’ He remained convinced that the
territorial issue was the overriding Soviet concern. He was sure that the ‘demands for a
115 TNA: PRO PREM 3/355/8, Eden to Churchill, 5 February 1944.
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reconstitution of the Polish Government were trifles compared with the frontier question
and would fade away if the latter were settled.’116
On 16 February, Churchill and Eden succeeded in extracting the agreement of the Polish
government to the redrawing of the frontier between Poland and the Soviet Union with
the caveat that the final demarcation of frontiers would be settled at the peace
conference. The Polish government refused to make any public declaration about its
willingness to cede territory, particularly since the territory which Poland was to receive
as compensation in the north and west could not be announced publicly or even defined
precisely. Privately, however, they agreed to accept the Curzon line as the new frontier.
The Polish government also agreed to issue orders to the underground army, the Home
Army (Armia Krajowa – AK) instructing local commanders to reveal themselves to the
Soviet commanders upon the arrival of the Red Army, and to cooperate in operations
against the German forces. Finally, the Polish government pledged to ‘include among
themselves none but persons fully determined to cooperate with the Soviet Union.’117
In spite of these concessions, the Soviet Union rejected the Polish proposals at the end
of February. Clark Kerr reported that he had spent a ‘dreary and exasperating’ evening
in discussions with Stalin and Molotov. Stalin had dismissed the Polish reply with a
‘snigger’ and periodic snorts of derision. In particular he protested that the Polish
government still had not explicitly accepted the Curzon line. Stalin understood the
omission of a specific reference to Lwów and Wilno to mean that the Poles were not
prepared to make this concession. He declared that he had little hope of settling the
matter on the basis of Churchill’s message. When Clark Kerr asked Stalin if he had any
constructive suggestions, he maintained that his position had not changed; he sought
only two things: clear and open acceptance of the Curzon line and reconstruction of the
Polish government.118 As far as Clark Kerr was concerned, the only positive sign to
emerge from this discouraging discussion was that Stalin had ‘left the door still open’ to
further talks. Also, he had not actually departed from his original demands. Clark Kerr
noted, however, that ‘in refusing to budge an inch to meet the Polish case he had ranged
116 TNA: PRO PREM 3/355/8, Record of a Meeting Held at Chequers, 6 February 1944; Raczyński, In
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himself with the more extremist of his advisers’.119 Clark Kerr’s reference here to
‘extremists’ within the Kremlin shows the persistence of the British view that Stalin was
essentially realistic and reasonable but was subject to the influence of hard-line
elements within the Soviet administration. It was partly this analysis of the workings of
the Soviet regime that encouraged Churchill to keep chipping away at Stalin in the hope
that he could detach the Soviet leader from his supposedly more difficult colleagues.120
The period of intense negotiations in late 1943 and early 1944 highlights the gulf which
separated the Polish government-in-exile from its British ally. British policymakers
wanted to secure a good settlement for Poland. Had they been indifferent, they would
not have devoted such considerable effort to the issue; Churchill, for instance, would
not have persisted in his efforts in February and March in the face of repeated rebuffs by
Stalin. The British believed that a reasonable agreement was within reach but they also
feared that the window of opportunity might close. They were optimistic that the Soviet
desire for ongoing collaboration meant that Stalin would agree to a fair settlement with
the Polish government-in-exile but this optimism was always edged with doubt.
Protracted negotiations, with a concomitant rise in tensions would not increase the
chances of a good deal. Thus, Churchill and Eden grew increasingly frustrated by the
Polish leaders’ unwillingness to accommodate Soviet demands, and particularly by their
apparent refusal to acknowledge the limits of British power to determine the final
outcome of the situation. Without a military presence in the region, British influence
was circumscribed. Likewise, Britain could exert pressure on the Soviet Union to offer
fair terms to Poland, but there could be no question of allowing the Polish issue to
weaken the Anglo-Soviet alliance, which in turn would undermine the successful
prosecution of the war. As Churchill explained to the Polish leaders during the difficult
meeting on 16 February, ‘he was addressing himself to a very powerful Ally which had
broken the German army as no other nation could have done. We would have to march
together with them through what would be a very bloody year.’121 Churchill and Eden
often felt that the Poles were ‘ask[ing] too much’, rendering the British task
‘impossible’, as Eden noted rather despairingly in the course of the negotiations.122
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What Churchill and Eden underestimated or simply disregarded – although Foreign
Office officials understood better – was the difficulty of Mikołajczyk’s position.123 His
legitimacy in the eyes of both the Polish underground movement and the population
would be undermined by acquiescence to the Soviet demands. What struck Eden and
Churchill as Polish stubbornness or unreasonableness was actually a reflection of this
intractable difficulty. Mikołajczyk and Romer themselves understood that a territorial
concession was probably the only way of securing a Soviet guarantee to respect Polish
political independence – even if they had little faith in Soviet promises. But they also
understood that the strength of popular resistance to such a concession meant that they
could not announce acceptance of the Curzon line publicly and hope to retain their
political legitimacy. By agreeing to the Soviet conditions in mid-February, Mikołajczyk
and Romer actually went beyond what their own government was prepared to accept.
Three of the four political parties represented in the exile government (i.e. all except the
SL) had refused to authorise Mikołajczyk to accept the terms proposed by the British as
the basis for a Polish-Soviet agreement. He and Romer accepted the proposals anyway
in the hope that they would be able to secure the agreement of the government and the
underground authorities later on.124
The Negotiations Lapse, March-July 1944
Churchill persisted in his attempt to elicit Stalin’s agreement to a Polish-Soviet deal
throughout the spring of 1944. He provided Stalin with more specific assurances as to
the willingness of the Polish government to accept the Curzon line, but Stalin replied
that the leaders of the exile government were ‘incapable of establishing normal
relations’ with the Soviet Union.125 More serious misgivings began to set in about
Soviet intentions in Poland at this point. In a Cabinet discussion on 6 March, it was
pointed out that Stalin’s most recent telegrams seemed ‘to confirm the doubts that had
originally been felt’ as to Soviet sincerity in the negotiations with the Polish
government. The Cabinet agreed that it was important that Churchill clarify the British
123 The Foreign Office had  a sharper awareness of the situation: ‘The Polish Ministers . . . are showing
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position: the Soviet Union should have no doubt that Britain would continue to
recognise the Polish government in London ‘as the Government of the Ally for whom
[it] had declared war upon Hitler’. Moreover, Britain bore responsibility for persuading
the Polish leaders to make concessions to the Soviet Union. Having ‘taken the line that
certain of the Russian demands were reasonable,’ the British government ‘were now
under an obligation to protect the Polish position against Russian intransigence.’ The
Cabinet recognised that Mikołajczyk and Romer had agreed to the Soviet conditions as
a result of British pressure. Now that the Soviet attitude had ‘stiffened’ just ‘as the Poles
moved towards a compromise’, Britain had to stand by the terms agreed.126 The Cabinet
decision indicates that the British approach to the Polish-Soviet dispute was not merely
one of acquiescence to each new Soviet demand. The sense of responsibility towards the
Polish government exerted a discernible pressure on British policymakers.
Concern about the morale of Polish troops stiffened British resolve to maintain support
for the exile government. At the beginning of March, General Harold Alexander,
supreme allied commander in Italy, reported that Churchill’s speech in the House of
Commons on 22 February concerning the possibility of changes to Poland’s borders had
caused upset among Polish troops at a time when the Second Corps was holding 30
miles of the front. Eighty per cent of the troops came from homes located east of the
Curzon line. The commander of the Polish Second Corps, General Władysław Anders,
had threatened that he would reject the authority of the Polish government if it made
any territorial concessions to the Soviet Union. ‘In such a case’, warned Alexander,
‘[Anders’s] supporters might be numerous enough to necessitate removal of the Corps
from the line.’127 In response, Churchill reaffirmed British support for the Polish
government-in-exile in the House of Commons. He denied that Britain had recognised
any of the territorial changes which had occurred in Poland since the outbreak of the
war and stated that if no amicable agreement on Poland’s future frontiers could be
reached, a settlement would have to await the peace conference at the end of the war.128
Churchill continued his correspondence with Stalin throughout March and April on the
Polish issue, pressing the Soviet leader to reconsider his refusal to reach a settlement
with the government-in-exile. On 11 April, Churchill announced to the Cabinet that the
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Red Army had concluded an agreement with Polish underground forces with the
approval of their respective governments providing for operational subordination of the
Polish underground to Soviet forces but also containing provisions which recognised the
existence of the Polish authorities in London and Warsaw. Churchill regarded this
development ‘as full of hope.’ He was sure that the ‘stiff terms’ of his last
communication to Stalin had influenced the Soviet leader. Churchill felt that his views
about the Soviet Union had been vindicated: ‘despite the somewhat intransigent tone
adopted by the Russians in their diplomatic correspondence . . . they might in practice
prove much more accommodating’.129 The rather triumphant tone of Churchill’s
announcement to Cabinet underscores the resilience of his belief that the Soviets
ultimately intended to pursue cooperation with Britain; the Soviet regime was liable to
succumb to the temptations of expansionism as opportunities opened up but once Stalin
realised that he had overstepped Britain’s limits, he would pull back. This was a view
broadly shared by the Central Department. In a memorandum of 27 March summing up
the British position on the Polish-Soviet dispute, Roberts argued that Britain had made
its attitude ‘crystal clear’ to the Russians in the March exchanges. Although no firm
agreement had been secured, Roberts thought Churchill had probably ‘succeeded in
impressing upon Stalin the need for restrained Soviet behaviour’.130
This interpretation of Soviet intentions was reinforced by reports from the Moscow
embassy in May. Following several meetings with Stalin and Molotov, Lange reported
to Clark Kerr that the ‘[w]hole tenour’ of Stalin’s remarks about Poland led him to
conclude that the Soviet leader regarded ‘the question of Poland’s future strictly from
[the] standpoint of Soviet security.’131 According to Lange, Stalin had remarked
frequently that ‘he had no intention of interfering in the domestic affairs of Poland.’
Further, in reply to Lange’s question regarding the possibility of a resumption of
relations with the exiting Polish government, Stalin had ‘remarked without hesitation
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“the door to an understanding is never closed.”’132 In the view of the Central
Department, Lange’s conversations provided ‘a not unencouraging picture’. Officials
were pleased to note that the Soviets were ‘still well disposed’ towards Mikołajczyk,
and concluded he was the ‘chief hope of effecting a reconciliation with Stalin’. Because
Sosnkowski was particularly objectionable to the Soviets, the Foreign Office now
accepted that it would be necessary to arrange his removal.133
The other important conclusion which the Foreign Office drew from Clark Kerr’s
account of Lange’s discussion with Stalin was that the Soviets understood the weakness
of the ZPP, which would not be capable of garnering enough support among the Polish
population to form a viable administration. The ZPP’s shortcomings would prevent
Stalin from shutting the London Poles out of the postwar political settlement altogether.
Foreign Office officials acknowledged that the Soviet Union was steadily trying to
weaken the Polish exile government’s position and erode its bargaining power, but
judged that the Soviet Union had ‘clearly not ruled out the possibility of collaboration
with M. Mikołajczyk himself and with other well-disposed members of his
administration should this eventually prove the best way of restoring stable conditions
in Poland.’134
As a result of this analysis, the Foreign Office concluded that the possibility of a Polish-
Soviet rapprochement was ‘much more favourable than it ha[d] been for some time
past.’ Officials concluded that with a renewed Red Army advance in Poland imminent
the Soviets needed a Polish administration with a substantial support base in the country
with whom they could cooperate. In the view of both Mikołajczyk and the Foreign
Office, the Soviets had realised that the ZPP could not count on the necessary local
support. Mikołajczyk received reports from fellow SL members inside Poland which
described the ZPP’s influence as ‘non-existent’.135 The time had come therefore to give
Mikołajczyk ‘a judicious push’. The Foreign Office recognised that Mikołajczyk
himself understood the need to reach an accommodation with the Soviets, and was
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prepared to scale back Sosnkowski’s role but he continued to face strong opposition
from within his government.136 Churchill and Eden urged Mikołajczyk to push ahead
with plans to remove Sosnkowski as a sign of the London government’s desire to
cooperate with the Soviet Union. Mikołajczyk promised that an announcement to this
effect would be made within a week’s time.137
Another promising sign of a possible Polish-Soviet rapprochement was an approach at
the end of May by Moscow to Mikołajczyk proposing direct negotiations to try to
resolve the differences between the two governments. The talks, initially conducted
between the chairman of the Polish National Council, Stanisław Grabski and Viktor
Lebedev, the Soviet ambassador to the Czech government-in-exile, were held in secret;
of the Polish exile administration Mikołajczyk and Romer alone knew they were
underway. Romer informed only Churchill and Eden of the talks; the Foreign Office
was also aware that they were happening. In early June, it appeared that the negotiations
were nearing a successful conclusion. At the request of the Soviets, the leader of the
Czech government-in-exile, Eduard Beneš confirmed the terms reached between
Grabski and Lebedev, and reassured Mikołajczyk that the Soviet government had ‘full
confidence’ in him and intended to reach an agreement before the resumption of the
offensive on the eastern front. Moscow repeated its reservations about certain members
of the London government but also stated that the ZPP and the PPR would ‘present no
obstacle’ to an agreement with the exile government. Churchill was clearly delighted,
commenting that the news was ‘almost too good to be true’ and ‘the best we have ever
had’ from Poland. He was certain that the newly cooperative Soviet attitude was a result
of the opening of the second front in northwestern Europe. ‘I have good hopes that the
Second Front will bring about better relations between Russia and the Western Allies
than has ever been possible before’, he commented.138
This promising news did not, however, translate into the much desired agreement. Upon
his return from a trip to the US to see Roosevelt, Mikołajczyk took over from Grabski.
Mikołajczyk requested an immediate resumption of diplomatic relations, a joint strategy
136 TNA: PRO FO 371/39400/C7370/8/G55, Minute by Roberts, 30 May 1944; FO
371/39402/C8476/8/G55, Foreign Office Minutes, 30 May 1944.
137 TNA: PRO FO 371/39402/C8477/8/G55, Record of Meeting at No. 10 Downing Street on
Wednessday 31st May, 1944.
138 Eden, The Reckoning, 439-40; TNA: PRO FO 371/39402/C8479/8/G55, Eden to Churchill, 6 June
1944; Churchill to Eden 11 June 1944; FO 371/39403/ C8860/8/55, Foreign Office to Moscow, 8 July
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for the Polish underground and the Red Army, administrative cooperation between
representatives of the Polish government in Poland and the incoming Soviet military
authorities, and a postponement of frontier changes until after the war. Lebedev initially
suggested that the Soviet government would accommodate these requests, although he
repeated that the Curzon line was the only acceptable frontier. Mikołajczyk told Eden
that up to this stage the discussions had been ‘friendly and even cordial’. Lebedev had
shown ‘every desire to reach agreement and confidence that this would be possible. At a
further meeting on 23 June, however, Lebedev’s ‘tone completely changed’, and he
presented a new set of terms on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis, after which there had been
no further contact. Neither Eden nor the Polish ministers could account for the sudden
change in Lebedev’s attitude, which ‘was clearly the result of fresh instructions from
Moscow’. The situation was complicated by the secrecy in which the talks had taken
place. In the circumstances, Britain could not intervene publicly in this particular set of
negotiations.139 Eden urged Mikołajczyk and Romer to make a significant gesture to the
Soviet Union which would signal their desire for the resumption of talks, suggesting
that they press ahead with the replacement of Sosnkowski. Although Mikołajczyk and
Romer agreed with Eden’s suggestions, by 11 July no progress had been made in their
implementation.140
Review of British commitments to Poland
In July 1944, just as the Polish-Soviet negotiations foundered once again, Eden and the
Foreign Office examined the extent of their commitments to the Polish government. In
April, after the British-mediated talks had broken down, Eden had requested a review of
the secret protocol of the Anglo-Polish Treaty of August 1939 with a view to its
possible publication. At the same time, Central Department officials undertook a review
of the correspondence with the Polish government concerning the interpretation of the
secret protocol. These exchanges had taken place at the time of the negotiations for the
Anglo-Soviet Treaty in the spring of 1942 and during later talks with the Polish
government regarding their proposal for a new Anglo-Polish agreement to replace that
of 1939. During the course of the review, officials unearthed forgotten commitments to
139 TNA: PRO FO 371/39403/C8860/8/55, Foreign Office to Moscow, 8 July 1944.
140 TNA: PRO FO 371/39404/C9097/8/G55, ‘Record by O’Malley of a Conversation at Dinner at the
Foreign Office on the 29th June [1944]’; FO 371/39404/C9172/8/G55, Eden to O’Malley, 11 July 1944.
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the Polish government. Eden was dismayed by the accumulation of promises, which
included a reaffirmation of Britain’s commitment to a postwar settlement based on the
principles of the Atlantic Charter and a pledge not to enter into an agreement with a
third party injurious to Polish interests. Article 3 of the protocol itself specified that any
undertakings of assistance against aggression given by either of the signatories ‘should
at no time prejudice either the sovereignty or territorial inviolability of the other
Contracting Party.’
Even more worrying from the point of view of the Foreign Office was Eden’s more
recent assurance of 17 April 1942 to Raczyński that ‘His Majesty’s Government do not
propose to conclude any agreement affecting or compromising the territorial status of
the Polish Republic.’ Eden had also reassured Raczyński that Britain did not recognise
any territorial changes effected in Poland since August 1939 and would not do so in any
future agreement with the Soviet Union. Eden had repeated these assurances to Sikorski
a few days later, adding that under no circumstances would the Soviet-German
demarcation line of 1940 be confirmed in the proposed Anglo-Soviet agreement.
Another cause for concern in the Foreign Office was a note from Eden assuring
Raczyński that the British government regarded Article 2(b) of the Secret Protocol as
constituting recognition of the importance of the independence of Lithuania to Poland.
Eden lamented: ‘I am bewildered as to why I ever wrote the letter of 6 May 1942.’141 In
August, Eden submitted a brief to the War Cabinet advising against the publication of
the protocol. Officials feared that publication would raise Soviet suspicions about
British policy generally. They also worried that in Soviet eyes, Article 3 would
undermine British legitimacy as mediator in the Polish-Soviet territorial dispute. Of
grave concern was the likelihood that if the secret protocol were published the Polish
government would press for the publication of the subsequent exchanges with deeply
damaging consequences for Anglo-Soviet relations.142
141 Allen returned to the 1942 correspondence and reported that at the time the Polish ministers had been
in a ‘condition of considerable strain and excitement’ because of Britain’s negotiations with the Soviet
Union. Had Britain not extended the assurance about Lithuanian independence, the Polish government
would have been unlikely to agree to the Anglo-Soviet treaty at all. Under the terms of the Anglo-Polish
treaty, the British were obliged to consult the Polish government before concluding any agreement with
the Soviet Union. TNA: PRO FO 371/39436/C11513/62/55, Minute by Allen, 4 August 1944.
142 TNA: PRO FO 371/39435/C5598/62/55, Foreign Office Minutes, May-June 1944; ‘Correspondence
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The Central Department’s policy review in the summer of 1944 highlights the
haphazard way in which British commitments to the Polish exile government had
accumulated over the course of the war. The commitments to Poland, often extended in
moments of crisis, or in response to specific objections and concerns raised by the
Polish government, were not particularly well recorded, remembered or incorporated
into overall policy planning by the Foreign Office. Further, there was a clear sense that
Polish concerns must not be allowed to intrude upon the priority of maintaining strong
Anglo-Soviet relations. On the other hand, Eden and the Foreign Office officials were
not cavalier about Britain’s obligations to Poland either. The policy review served as a
reminder to policymakers of the extent of British commitments to Poland. That this
sense of obligation continued to be an important factor in shaping British policy towards
Poland emerges in an important Foreign Office paper, prepared by Warner, analysing
Soviet policy across Europe, which was submitted to the Cabinet on 9 August. The
section on Eastern Europe noted Britain’s particular responsibility towards Poland, and
asserted the importance of maintaining British support for Mikołajczyk. Britain also
needed to make clear to the Soviets that ‘a fair deal for Poland’ was ‘essential to future
good relations between Britain and Russia’.143
The Warsaw Uprising
On 26 July Mikołajczyk and Romer flew to Moscow to meet with Stalin.144
Mikołajczyk was convinced that he had to make an attempt to reestablish Polish-Soviet
relations himself, without resorting to intermediaries. Existing concerns about the Soviet
military presence in Poland were now compounded by worries about relations between
the Red Army and the AK in the liberated territories.145 Stalin agreed to Mikołajczyk’s
visit but then immediately proceeded to recognise the PKWN as the only lawful
administration in Poland and insisted that Mikołajczyk meet with its leaders when he
1944; FO 371/39436/C11513/62/55, Foreign Office Minutes, 4-6 August 1944; Memorandum submitted
to the War Cabinet by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 10 August 1944.
143 TNA: PRO CAB 66/53, WP(44)436, 9 August 1944
144 Roosevelt proposed the idea during Mikołajczyk’s visit to the US; Mikołajczyk asked Churchill to act
as intermediary and suggest the idea to the Soviets. TNA: PRO FO 371/39404/C9289/8/G55, Report by
O’Malley, 13 July 1944; Foreign Office Minutes, 13-14 July 1944; Eden to Churchill, 17 July 1944;
Stalin’s Correspondence, vol. 1, doc. 299.
145 In Wołynia the Red Army had already disarmed the local AK units and arrested their leaders.
Prażmowska, Civil War in Poland, 98.
60
arrived in Moscow. This step made plain that Mikołajczyk would have to reach an
accommodation with the PKWN; there could be no possibility of a wholesale
reinstatement of the exile government.146
Nevertheless, the talks began reasonably well. The PKWN representatives and the
Soviet leaders agreed to Mikołajczyk remaining prime minister. Although the PKWN
initially proposed the creation of a new government in which only four cabinet posts
would be allocated to representatives of the London government, they seemed prepared
to compromise.147 Churchill was encouraged by the initial results of the talks. At the top
of a message from Stalin that Churchill forwarded to Roosevelt, Churchill commented:
‘This seems to me the best ever received from UJ.’ Stalin reported that the talks were
proceeding well; he stressed the importance of a Polish regime which would be well-
disposed towards the Soviet Union but he also acknowledged ‘the importance of the
Polish question for the common cause of the allies’.148 Mikołajczyk too was reasonably
optimistic, reporting back to London that Stalin seemed to want a broad-based Polish
government. He also promised more extensive territorial compensation in the west than
Mikołajczyk had anticipated.149
This apparently promising beginning collapsed because the political talks were eclipsed
by the Warsaw uprising, which began on 1 August while Mikołajczyk was in Moscow.
The uprising diminished Mikołajczyk’s bargaining power in the negotiations regarding
Poland’s future government since he was obliged to shift his focus to the military
situation and attempt to persuade Stalin to assist the insurgents.150 The outbreak of the
uprising stoked Polish-Soviet antagonism: the Soviets objected to the failure of the AK
to inform Soviet headquarters about the action beforehand; the Soviets provided almost
no help to the AK, although Soviet troops had reached the outskirts of Warsaw by the
time the uprising began.151 The AK was counting on the continuation of the Red Army’s
offensive but instead Soviet forces halted to regroup, citing supply problems and the
146 Prażmowska, Civil War in Poland, 98-100.
147 Harvey diary, 13 & 15 August 1944.
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German reinforcements sent in to reestablish control of the city.152 A number of
historians argue that Marshal Konstanty Rokossovski’s army group was actually
dangerously exposed with overstretched communication and supply lines, at least
during the first two weeks of the uprising.153 The Red Army did resume its advance in
early September, only to draw to a halt on the right bank of the Vistula river. This
stoppage and Stalin’s refusal (up until mid-September) to make ammunition drops to the
insurgents, in spite of his promise to Mikołajczyk that he would do so, were politically
motivated.154 As Prażmowska argues, ‘while never stated explicitly [the AK’s] defeat
by the German forces made the task of bringing the PKWN much easier.’155
The British government regarded the uprising mainly as an ill-timed inconvenience,
which would spoil Mikołajczyk’s chances of reaching an agreement with Stalin and the
PKWN.156 The uprising also put a strain on Anglo-Polish relations. Britain refused
Polish requests for military assistance for the AK while at the same time British military
authorities continued to make full use of Polish manpower across several theatres of
war.157 Further, shortly before the uprising began, General Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski,
the AK commander, asked that the Independent Polish Parachute Brigade be sent to
Warsaw to support the insurgents. The parachute brigade was an elite unit of 2,000 men,
which the Polish government had always intended to participate in the liberation of
Poland in conjunction with the national uprising. At the beginning of 1944, however,
the British War Office had requested permission to use the parachute brigade in the
invasion of France. Sosnkowski had agreed only reluctantly to the request, as the Polish
152 Over 63 days of fighting, 15,000 insurgents and between 120,000–200,000 civilians were killed;
17,443 AK fighters were taken prisoner, along with their commander-in-chief and five generals. Once the
Germans had retaken Warsaw, all its remaining residents were rounded up and forcibly removed or
executed, and the Germans began to systematically raze the city to the ground. Prażmowska, Civil War in
Poland, 102-6; The Oxford Companion to Military History, s.v. ‘Warsaw Uprising’ (by Christopher
Bellamy) http://www.oxfordreference.com [accessed 4 January 2014].
153 Jan Ciechanowski, The Warsaw Rising of 1944 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 250-
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154 DOPSR, vol. 2, doc. 189.
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high command had planned to reserve the parachute brigade for the invasion of Poland.
This brigade was the only military unit reserved solely for action in Poland. Sosnkowski
did not, however, want to pass up the chance for Polish soldiers to take part in what was
likely to be an important military operation, in keeping with the Polish government’s
strategy of seeking political guarantees in exchange for its military contributions. The
British military authorities refused Bór-Komorowski’s request to release the brigade
because it was already designated for use in operations in northwest Europe.158 Britain
also rejected Bór-Komorowski’s request that the Royal Air Force bomb German
airfields around Warsaw on the grounds of the high potential losses involved in flying
over German-held territory as far as Warsaw. On 4 August Britain did order an air
operation from Italy but the RAF suffered high losses in the course of this operation,
leading to unwillingness on the part of the military to undertake any further supply
drops over Polish territory.159
Polish military leaders deeply resented the withholding of the parachute brigade and the
suspension of supply flights from Italy. The news of the lack of British support for the
uprising also rippled through the ranks. In early August, the British commander-in-chief
of the allied armies in Italy reported that the situation in Warsaw was ‘affecting the
whole state of mind and morale of the Polish Corps who are at this moment undertaking
an important operation and one on which a great deal of my future plans depends. I feel
sure that they will be much comforted if they knew we were doing all we could to help
them.’160 On 8 August, the Foreign Office warned that the Polish military authorities
had threatened to withdraw their cooperation. These reports of unrest among the troops
were instrumental in the reversal of the initial British decision not to attempt Warsaw
operational flights.161
The uprising also complicated Anglo-Soviet relations. Stalin termed the uprising ‘a
reckless and fearful gamble’ and ‘a purely adventuristic affair’ and refused Churchill’s
158 The British eventually used it in a poorly-planned operation at Arnhem in November, which ended in
retreat and the loss of nearly a quarter of the brigade. Ibid., 95-6.
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increasingly urgent pleas for arms and ammunition drops to the insurgents.162 The
Soviets also refused to allow British and American planes to use Soviet landing strips to
stop and refuel.163 Churchill struggled to accept the Soviet refusal to fly in supplies
when their armies were ‘only a few score miles away’. He warned Roosevelt that if ‘the
German triumph in Warsaw is followed by a wholesale massacre no measure can be put
upon the full consequences that will arise.’ After Stalin refused permission for
American and British planes to use Soviet airstrips, Churchill wanted to apply heavier
pressure on the Soviets. In a message to Roosevelt, he argued that the success of the
military operations in western Europe gave the US and Britain more leeway to take a
strong approach.164 He also suggested to the Foreign Office that all further supply
convoys to the Soviet Union be suspended until the use of the airfields was permitted.165
On 4 September, Churchill went so far as to plead with Roosevelt to authorise the US
air force to drop supplies on Warsaw using Soviet airfields without formal consent.166
On 9 September, the Soviets finally agreed to cooperate in assisting the insurgents, and
beginning on 13 September Soviet planes did make some small drops of supplies. On 18
September American aircraft also dropped supplies and were permitted to fly on to
Soviet bases. After that, however, the Soviet government refused to permit further
shuttle flights to land at Soviet bases.167 This assistance came too late to alter the
outcome of the Warsaw rising, which collapsed at the beginning of October.
The Warsaw uprising is frequently cited as the juncture at which British policymakers’
perceptions of the Soviet Union took a sharp downturn.168 Ultimately, however, and
with varying degrees of confidence, officials continued to adhere to the belief that
Britain would be able to bring about a satisfactory settlement for Poland. Soviet actions
during the uprising certainly aroused anger and consternation in the Foreign Office, and
raised doubts about long-term Soviet intentions. Roberts was worried by the deliberate
162 FRUS, 1944, vol. 3, 1374-1377; Stalin’s Correspondence, vol. 1, docs. 321, 311, 316, 317.
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Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence (London: Barrie & Jenkins, 1975), docs.
424 & 426; Kimball, Churchill & Roosevelt, vol. 3, doc. C-760.
165 The Foreign Office persuaded Churchill that this step would be counterproductive. Woodward, British
Foreign Policy, vol. 3, fn. 215.
166 Secret Wartime Correspondence, doc. 431.
167 Woodward, British Foreign Policy, vol. 3, 218-221.
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Soviet attempt to use the uprising to undermine Mikołajczyk’s position.169 The uprising
led other officials to rethink their ideas about the most effective negotiating style to
employ in the face of Soviet intransigence. Warner, for instance, advocated the adoption
of a harder approach. He recommended that the British government inform Stalin that
Soviet ‘behaviour in this matter [was] totally lacking in the spirit of collaboration which
we would expect from Allies.’ Continued British silence in the face of Soviet actions
would only encourage further ‘uncollaborativeness’.170 British policymakers credited
the stiffly worded note from the Cabinet with persuading the Soviets to make supply
drops over Warsaw and lift the restriction on Anglo-American use of their airstrips.
Eden commented to Churchill that the Soviet policy reversal was ‘really a great triumph
for our persistence in hammering at the Russians’. Eden complimented Churchill on his
sound judgement in perceiving that Stalin had not ‘understood the significance of his
refusal on world opinion. The violence of our representations has made him understand
and he has now come round.’171
As far as Churchill himself is concerned, there is no doubt that he was genuinely
distressed by the situation in Warsaw. His messages to Roosevelt vividly convey his
angry dismay at how little the Soviets were prepared to do to help – although, contrary
to the version of events given in his memoirs, in October he accepted Stalin’s insistence
that military difficulties alone had prevented the Soviets from liberating Warsaw.172 The
uprising did not, however, profoundly alter Churchill’s assessment of Soviet postwar
intentions in Poland. Folly argues that Churchill continued to hope that ‘an appeal to
Stalin, backed by the increase in prestige brought by victories in Normandy, would
bring success.’173 Churchill’s own statements in the late summer and autumn of 1944
support this interpretation. As he argued in his message to Roosevelt on 18 August, he
thought that ‘the glorious and gigantic victories’ in France gave the western allies
169 TNA: PRO FO 371/39410/C11186/8/55, Foreign Office Minutes, 25 August 1944.
170 TNA: PRO FO 371/39410/C11277/8/G55, Minute by Warner, 29 August 1944.
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records that at the time Churchill accepted Stalin’s assurances about the purely military considerations
behind Soviet inaction. ‘P.M. accepted this and said he had never believed the reports to this effect.’
Harvey diary, 11 October 1944.
173 Folly, Churchill, Whitehall and the Soviet Union, 136.
65
greater leverage to take a firmer line with Stalin.174 This argument was in accordance
with his existing view that Stalin responded better to a tougher approach.175
Thus, British perceptions of Soviet policy towards Poland remained essentially intact
even after the uprising. The Cabinet paper on Soviet policy in Europe set out the British
position in the late summer of 1944: while acknowledging that the Soviets would apply
stringent conditions to the postwar settlement in Poland, there had been ‘signs that the
Russians [were] ready to welcome a new régime in Poland with a broad basis of popular
support in the democratic Peasant and Socialist parties.’176 The main shift in British
policy was a greater inclination to employ a tougher, less accommodating approach in
negotiations with the Soviets. Rather than feeling disillusioned, the British drew
reassurance about long-term Soviet intentions from their rapid about-face in response to
the firmly worded Cabinet message. Far from a sense of despair setting in, Churchill
and Eden set off for Moscow in October 1944 believing that ‘this was the moment to
push ahead with the Polish-Russian business’.177
The Moscow Conference: Britain Pushes for a Settlement
In Moscow, Churchill and Eden resolved to bring the months of inconclusive
negotiations, stony silences and diplomatic spats to a final conclusion. This time, they
were determined that a firm agreement should not again elude them. At the first meeting
attended by Mikołajczyk on 13 October, Stalin laid out the Soviet terms for an
agreement: the London government would have to be prepared to cooperate with the
PKWN and accept the Curzon line.178 In an attempt to reach a compromise, Churchill
proposed agreement on the Curzon line ‘as a point of reference’, with the final
settlement to be agreed at the peace conference. Stalin refused the idea.179 In a private
meeting with the Polish leaders the next day Churchill adopted an unusually harsh
approach. He asserted that the Curzon line was ‘the crux of the situation’. If the Poles
could accept the border change, all the other issues, including the composition of the
174 Kimball, Churchill & Roosevelt, vol. 3, doc. C-760.
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176 TNA: PRO CAB 66/53, WP(44)436, 9 August 1944.
177 TNA: PRO FO 371/39499/C12788/1077/G55, Eden to Churchill, 13 September 1944.
178 TNA: PRO PREM 3/434/2, ‘Record of Meeting at Spiridonovka House’, 13 October 1944; CAB
121/454, Eden to Sargent, 12 October 1944; Eden to Foreign Office, 14 October 1944.
179 PISM A/48/2/C5, 14 October 1944.
66
Polish government, could be easily resolved as ‘Stalin clearly regarded these as
subsidiary and would be able to persuade the Lublin Poles to adopt a reasonable
attitude.’ Churchill maintained that this was Mikołajczyk’s ‘last chance of retrieving the
situation’ and warned that Britain would not extend further assistance to the exile
government if he failed to seize this opportunity.
When Mikołajczyk resisted, Churchill lost his temper. He castigated Mikołajczyk for
having scuppered the agreement which had so nearly been reached at the beginning of
1944, warning that ‘[t]he world was growing tired of Polish quarrels’; there were more
important issues at stake than Poland’s eastern provinces. Then he raged: ‘“You’re no
Government . . . You’re a callous people who want to wreck Europe. I shall leave you to
your own troubles. . . You have only your miserable, petty, selfish interests in mind.”’
Referring to Anders’s recent suggestion that after the defeat of Germany, the western
allies should attack the Soviet Union, Churchill added: ‘“If you want to conquer Russia,
we shall let you go your own way. You ought to be in a lunatic asylum!”’180 Churchill
eventually managed to persuade Mikołajczyk to accept the Curzon line without Lwów
but he refused to formalise an agreement with the Soviets on the spot, choosing to return
to London to consult his government. Churchill and Eden, who had been hoping that
Mikołajczyk would proceed directly to Lublin, impressed upon Mikołajczyk ‘the urgent
necessity of speed’.181
There is a virtual consensus that, as Roy Jenkins notes in his biography of Churchill, the
prime minister behaved with ‘peculiar harshness’ towards the Polish leaders in
Moscow.182 There is no question that Churchill tried to bully Mikołajczyk. As in early
1944, however, the source of Churchill’s outburst seems to have been great frustration.
He continued to have faith in Stalin’s word at this point, and Mikołajczyk’s ongoing
reluctance to reach a settlement after all the months of squabbles and setbacks infuriated
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him.183 With hindsight, it is clear that Churchill misjudged Stalin’s intentions but he
seems to have genuinely believed that the Curzon line remained the crucial issue for the
Soviet leader.184 He was also contemptuous of the Lublin Poles, dismissing them as
incapable of governing. He believed that Stalin did not actually intend to install them in
power but was just using their presence in Moscow to apply pressure on the London
Poles to accept his territorial conditions. He told Mikołajczyk that if the Polish
government agreed to the frontier, Stalin would withdraw support for the Lublin
group.185 Similarly, Eden reported to the Foreign Office that the PKWN had made a
very bad impression, and implied that they did not have Stalin’s full support. Eden
described how Churchill had ‘chided them’ and appealed to them ‘to adopt a less
cantankerous and more friendly and constructive attitude’, and had been supported by
Stalin.186 Birse, who served as interpreter at the meeting, also recalled that as the Polish
leaders spoke at length, ‘Stalin kept looking at Churchill and smiling mischievously’.
According to Birse’s account, when Churchill grew so impatient that he stood up and
deliberately clattered the glasses and plates on the tea tray, ‘Stalin laughed outright and
told the Poles that we had had enough.’187
Mikołajczyk’s refusal to accept the Curzon line without caveats or further consultation
both infuriated and bewildered Churchill. Contemporary accounts of his behaviour at
the meeting on 14 October seem consistent with the reaction of someone who cared
about the problem, believed that a solution was possible and could not quite believe that
he was still unable to bring the Poles round to seeing the situation from his point of
view.188 Mikołajczyk records that at the end of a particularly angry exchange, Churchill
turned and left the room. Returning after a few minutes, he put his arm around
Mikołajczyk’s shoulders. ‘[W]e were both on the point of tears’, recalls Mikołajczyk.189
A tearful Churchill might simply have been an appealing dramatic device for
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Mikołajczyk’s memoirs but Moran also recorded in his diary: ‘It is plain that the P.M.
has got the Poles on his conscience.’ Churchill told Moran: ‘“I was pretty rough with
Mikolajczyk . . . He was obstinate and I lost my temper.”’ Moran’s account supports the
suggestion that Churchill grew angry because he felt that the Polish leaders were letting
their last chance at an agreement slip away.190
It is worth pointing out that the extent of Churchill’s involvement with the Polish exile
leaders was unusual. Notoriously mercurial and easily bored, it was not easy to sustain
Churchill’s interest in any particular issue for long.191 Yet he remained closely involved
with Polish affairs throughout his entire time in office. It is difficult to pinpoint
precisely, but it seems that Churchill’s particularly attentive interest in Polish affairs
originated with events at the beginning of the war, starting with the evacuation of Polish
troops from France in June 1940. The Polish military contribution at a time when
Britain was desperately short of resources lent special importance to the Polish
government-in-exile. Further, it is possible that for Churchill personally, this
demonstration of support might have held particular significance. Churchill had not yet
established his position as unassailable war leader in 1940. On the contrary, having only
just taken on the premiership – and not by any means as the favourite to succeed Neville
Chamberlain – Churchill was in a weak position within the Cabinet.192 At the end of
May, as France’s defeat appeared imminent and the British Expeditionary Force (BEF)
was trapped around Dunkirk with the initial expectation that only 30–50,000 men would
be rescued, Churchill only just managed to persuade the rest of the Cabinet that Britain
should fight on, rather than seeking a negotiated peace with Germany.193 Thus, the
Polish offer of assistance, with the commitment to the British war effort that it carried,
must have served to bolster Churchill at least to some extent at a moment when he was
particularly beleaguered. Further, Churchill held Sikorski in particularly high regard and
the two leaders developed a close relationship.194 In any case, the Polish exile leaders
and servicemen captured Churchill’s attention and remained part of his thinking
190 Moran, Churchill at War, 245.
191 Anthony P. Adamthwaite, ‘British Diplomacy Before the Conference in the Crimea’, in Olla, ed.
Yalta: un mito che resiste, 46; Prażmowska, ‘Churchill and Poland’, 117.
192 Lord Halifax, then foreign secretary had been the first choice of Chamberlain, the king and the
Conservative party. David Reynolds, ‘Churchill and the British “Decision” to Fight On in 1940: Right
Policy, Wrong Reasons’, in Richard Langhorne, ed. Diplomacy and Intelligence During the Second
World War: Essays in Honour of F.H. Hinsley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 148.
193 Important members of the government, including Halifax and David Lloyd George believed Britain
ought to seriously consider a negotiated peace. Ibid., 149-50.
194 Prażmowska, ‘Churchill and Poland’, 117.
69
throughout the war. This is not to suggest that Churchill behaved irreproachably
towards the Polish government: he was certainly motivated by a degree of cynicism in
his attempts to mediate a Polish-Soviet settlement. He did not want the British
government to be accused of having reneged on its promises to an ally; nor did he want
to risk losing the participation of Polish troops. Nevertheless, although the precise
reasons were never made explicit, Churchill assumed virtually complete responsibility
for reaching a settlement and continued to push for a resolution right up to the end of his
time in office.
Moscow to Yalta, November 1944-February 1945
Upon his return to London, Mikołajczyk encountered greater than anticipated hostility
to the Moscow proposals from his government; he was obliged to resign on 24
November.195 A new government was formed under the socialist Tomasz Arciszewski,
which maintained an entirely uncompromising stance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.
Churchill hoped that this government would collapse, paving the way for Mikołajczyk’s
return. In a message to Stalin, Churchill maintained that he did not believe the
Arciszewski government would have ‘a long life’ and ‘should not be surprised’ to see
Mikołajczyk ‘back in office with increased prestige and with the necessary powers to
carry through the programme discussed between us in Moscow.’ To Roosevelt,
Churchill wrote that Mikołajczyk retained the support of important sections of the
Polish political parties in London. Churchill therefore hoped that Mikołajczyk’s return
to power might still be possible in the New Year.196
Nevertheless, Churchill granted recognition to the Arciszewski government, although its
adamant refusal to negotiate with the Soviet Union meant that the British government
maintained only the stiffest formal contact. Churchill’s decision to recognise the new
government belied all his threats to dispense with Mikołajczyk, who was infinitely
preferable to Arciszewski in the British view. The Polish troops were a key factor in this
decision. Churchill disagreed with a warning from Clark Kerr that British recognition of
the new Polish government would lead to serious difficulties with Stalin. In Churchill’s
195 Mikołajczyk diary, 16 December 1944, Stanisław Mikołajczyk Papers, Box 13, Folder 17, Hoover
Institution Archives; DOPSR, vol. 2, docs. 248, 250, 259; TNA: PRO CAB 121/454, Foreign Office to
Moscow, 24 November 1944; FRUS, 1944, vol. 3, 1335-1336.
196 TNA: PRO CAB 121/454, Churchill to Roosevelt, 16 December 1944.
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view, Britain could not avoid granting recognition to the new government as long as
Polish forces were fighting under British command. Eden agreed, noting that it was in
Britain’s ‘own interests’ to maintain relations with the government to which Polish
forces owed allegiance.197 Churchill explained to Stalin: ‘We have practical matters to
handle with the Polish Government, and more especially the control of the considerable
Polish armed forces, over 80,000 excellent fighting men, under our operational
command. They are now making an appreciable contribution to the United Nations’ war
effort in Italy, Holland and elsewhere.’198 As long as the British government continued
to rely on these troops, it could not break off relations with the exile government.
On 4 January 1945, the Soviet Union recognised the PKWN as the provisional
government of Poland, a clear signal that the Soviet authorities intended to have nothing
more to do with the London government.199 The British government publicly announced
that it would continue to recognise the London government, although it was anxious not
to prolong circumstances in which Britain and the Soviet Union maintained relations
with different Polish governments.200 The Foreign Office briefly considered the
possibility of pushing for Mikołajczyk’s return to power in order to strengthen the
London government. Officials quickly rejected this idea, concluding that since the
Soviet recognition of the PKWN as the provisional government, an agreement between
the Lublin and London governments was probably now out of the question. Sargent
argued that in the circumstances the rebuilding of the London government would ‘be
throwing down the gauntlet to Stalin’. Instead he proposed that Britain ought to try to
secure the inclusion in the Lublin government of Mikołajczyk and other political leaders
while that still remained an option. ‘This would mean’, concluded Sargent, ‘that instead
of reinforcing the present London Government we would be prepared to see it
disintegrate.’201
British policy was set out in a brief prepared by Warner just before the Yalta
conference. He argued that with the Red Army on the verge of occupying all of Poland
and placing the administration of the country in the hands of the Lublin government,
Britain needed to reach an arrangement with the Soviets which would include some of
197 TNA: PRO FO 371/39418/C16777/8/G55, Churchill to Eden, 26 November 1944; Eden to Churchill,
26 November 1944.
198 Stalin’s Correspondence, vol. 1, doc. 362.
199 TNA: PRO FO 371/47576/N568/6/55, Soviet Communiqué of 5 January 1945.
200 DOPSR, vol. 2, doc. 797, fn. 293.
201 TNA: PRO FO 371/47575/N198/6/G55, Foreign Office, Minutes, 8 January 1945.
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the London Poles. Otherwise, he warned ‘we may expect that a ring-fence will be put
round Poland and neither we nor the rest of the world will have any say in, or even any
knowledge of, what happens there.’ Britain’s ‘ultimate objective must clearly be to
secure eventual free elections in Poland.’ In order to achieve this, Britain must not be
cut off from access to information from inside Poland. Secondly, it was essential that
Britain reach an agreement with the Soviet Union on an interim regime in Poland which
would be broadly representative and stable enough to avoid the risk of the country
sliding into civil war. The interim government would also have to be ‘sufficiently
respectable and satisfactory . . . to enable us and the U.S. . . to transfer recognition to
them without shocking public opinion here and in the States and without losing the
loyalty of the Polish forces fighting with us.’ Britain’s objective should therefore be to
secure Soviet agreement to a government containing adequate representatives of the
three centre and left-wing parties in Poland, including Mikołajczyk and a few other
representatives of the London government.202
In early January, Arciszewski attempted to persuade Mikołajczyk to rejoin the exile
government. Mikołajczyk clearly did not want to associate himself with Arciszewski.
He described his successor as a ‘hopeless case’. Arciszewski continued to refuse to
enter into any agreement with the Soviets or the Lublin committee; instead he pinned
his hopes on the military defeat of the Soviet Union, although how this would be
achieved and by whom was not specified.203
By the time of the Yalta conference, British policymakers were moving towards an
acceptance that there would be some kind of postwar division in Europe into eastern and
western spheres of interest. The rigidly divided, tightly controlled system which
emerged by the late 1940s, however, was not envisioned. Eduard Mark and Warren
Kimball argue that Roosevelt was willing to accept some form of ‘open spheres’, in
which the Soviet Union would ‘exercise only enough authority to protect its physical
security’ rather than establish a traditional sphere of influence, which would imply that
it would also dominate the ‘internal policies and economic affairs’ of the constituent
202 Eden approved this memo, requesting that a copy be sent to Churchill and that another be brought to
Yalta. TNA: PRO FO 371/47577/N1038/6/G55, ‘Brief on Poland’, 27 January 1945.
203 Mikołajczyk diary, 4 January 1945, Stanisław Mikołajczyk Papers, Box 13, Folder 17, Hoover
Institution Archives.
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countries.204 Folly argues that Churchill broadly shared this view. The percentages
agreement concluded by Stalin and Churchill at Moscow is an indication of Churchill’s
thinking. Rather than an outright surrender to Soviet demands, the percentages
agreement was intended to ensure that Britain and the US would continue to have some
influence in the areas which were acknowledged as being of primary importance to the
Soviets, namely Romania and Hungary.205 Although Poland had not been included in
the percentages agreement, the British and the Americans adopted a similar approach
here.
At Yalta, the issue of the Polish-Soviet frontier was finalised: the Curzon line with the
exception of Lwów would constitute the border. The three powers established that
Poland would receive substantial territorial compensation in the west, although the
precise border was to be determined at the peace conference. The main dispute centred
on the composition of the Polish government. The Soviet Union insisted that the
provisional government form the nucleus of the new regime, with the addition of some
representatives from the London government, while the British and Americans hoped to
assemble an entirely new government.206 The communiqué issued at the end of the
conference was a compromise between the two positions which stated that the
provisional government already functioning in Poland should be reorganised ‘on a
broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and
from Poles abroad.’ This new ‘Polish Provisional Government of National Unity’ would
be pledged to hold ‘free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of
universal suffrage and secret ballot.’207 Moltov, Averell Harriman, (now ambassador to
Moscow), and Clark Kerr were to form a Three Power Commission to oversee the
formation of the new government.208
204 Warren F. Kimball, The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman (Princeton: Princeton
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The Final Stage of Negotiations, Spring 1945
The Three Power Commission, set up at Yalta to iron out the details of the Polish
settlement, encountered difficulties from the outset. Part of the problem lay in the vague
language of the Yalta declaration, which the Soviet Union interpreted differently than
did the western allies. Stalin saw the agreement as ‘a face-saving formula by which the
Western powers accepted his control of Poland’,209 whereas Britain and the US
considered the terms to constitute a genuine agreement.210 From the first meeting,
Molotov threw up a series of obstacles, including attempting to block Mikołajczyk from
joining the new administration.211 Churchill proposed to Roosevelt that they each send
messages to Stalin protesting Soviet obstructionism, which Churchill feared was a tactic
to ‘drag the business out while the Lublin Committee consolidate their power.’212
Churchill complained that Molotov was ‘attempting to bar practically all our candidates
for the consultations’. Churchill feared that Molotov intended ‘to make a farce of
consultations with the “Non-Lublin Poles” – which means that the new government in
Poland would be merely the present one dressed up to look more respectable.’ Finally,
he warned that if the British and American governments ‘do not get things right now, it
will soon be seen by the world that you and I by putting our signatures to the Crimea
settlement have under-written a fraudulent prospectus.’213
The disagreement over the composition of the Polish government was exacerbated by
the news that the Red Army had arrested 16 leaders of the underground, including the
AK’s former commander-in-chief, Colonel Leopold Okulicki.214 With these arrests, the
Soviet Union eliminated in one swoop the leaders of the non-communist political parties
209 Polonsky, ‘Stalin and the Poles’, 472. Kimball puts forth a similar argument. Kimball, Churchill &
Roosevelt, vol. 3, 585-7.
210 Churchill referred to ‘misunderstandings . . . about the interpretation of the Yalta decisions’ in a
message to Roosevelt in late March, 1945. Similarly, he complained that Stalin ‘persists in his view that
the Yalta Communique merely meant the addition of a few other Poles to the existing administration of
Russian puppets’. Kimball, Churchill & Roosevelt, vol. 3, docs. C-925, C-926.
211 FRUS: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Europe, vol. 5 (Washington: United States Government Printing
Office, 1967), 123-124, 134, 142-144, 147-150.
212 Messages to Stalin were sent on 29 March by the Americans and on 31 March by the British. Kimball,
Churchill & Roosevelt, vol. 3, docs. R-730, C-929.
213 Kimball, Churchill & Roosevelt, vol. 3, docs. C-925, C-926; FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, 123-124, 134, 142-
144, 147-150.
214 The underground leaders went voluntarily to meet with NKVD representatives. According to
Prażmowska, they hoped to secure the legalisation of the underground, so that it could take part in the
political life of the liberated territories. The leaders included Jan Stanisław Jankowski and the chairman
of the Council of National Unity, Kazimierz Pużak. On 27 and 28 March, they went to Pruszków, from
where they were immediately taken to Moscow. Prażmowska, Civil War in Poland, 115-16.
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of the Polish underground. The British and the Americans had been seeking information
about the whereabouts of the underground leaders from Molotov since their
disappearance at the end of March. Only on 4 May did Molotov finally confirm their
arrests. The following day Eden and the US secretary of state, Edward Stettinius
announced that in light of Molotov’s announcement, the Three Power Commission
would not continue discussions on the Polish issue.215
At the end of May, Roosevelt’s successor, Harry Truman, sent his adviser, Harry
Hopkins to Moscow to try to breach the impasse. Hopkins succeeded in obtaining
Stalin’s agreement to invite Mikołajczyk, Grabski or Jan Stańczyk,216 as well as five
independent Poles from inside the country to Moscow for consultations with the Three
Power Commission.217 Mikołajczyk tentatively agreed to go to Moscow under these
terms but the matter of the underground leaders remained an obstacle.218 Clark Kerr
reported that Stalin could not be persuaded to release any of the arrested leaders in
advance of consultations. The British government elected to proceed with the
consultations anyway.219
Churchill pushed Mikołajczyk to go through with his decision to join the new Polish
government. On 2 June, Churchill assured Truman that he was ‘quite ready to put
additional pressure on Mikołajczyk if he makes needless difficulties.’220 On 6 June,
Hopkins and Harriman reached a final agreement on the list of Poles to be invited to
Moscow for consultations. Stalin refused to allow any of the substitutions requested by
Mikołajczyk and he would accept no more than three representatives from London.221
Of these Mikołajczyk was the only politician of any standing.222 Although the Foreign
Office acknowledged that these terms represented a ‘marked retreat from the position
that we have hitherto held’, Britain elected to approve the consultations anyway.
215 TNA: PRO FO 371/47590/5247/6/55, Foreign Office Report, 7 May 1945; DOPSR, vol. 2, doc. 353.
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Mikołajczyk and Stańczyk confirmed that they were still prepared to go, although
Mikołajczyk declared that he had little hope for the Moscow discussions. He believed
Stalin’s exclusion of two of the four main political parties was an indication of the
unlikelihood that a settlement would be reached. Privately, Foreign Office officials
shared his doubts. Clark Kerr was instructed to give Mikołajczyk ‘all the support we
properly can in his difficult negotiations in Moscow.’ Officials surmised that this was
the least they could do given that ‘this settlement will inevitably be “based upon” the
present Warsaw Government.’ Sargent noted: ‘I do feel that we owe it to Mikołajczyk
to see that he does receive encouragement and support from H.M. Ambassador in this
forlorn adventure on which he is embarking at our instance.’223
Just days before Mikołajczyk was due to leave for Moscow the trial of the underground
leaders opened. When Mikołajczyk wavered at this point, Churchill offered him the
continued support of the British government if he went through with his plan to join the
new Polish government.224 In light of the ruthlessness with which Stalin later extended
control over Poland, Churchill’s decision to push Mikołajczyk into returning has been
cast as a cynical act of sacrifice designed to ensure a superficially acceptable settlement
of the Polish issue in order to avoid a political scandal for Britain. Again, however, this
interpretation assumes that the pattern of Cold War hostility was already firmly set by
the spring of 1945, usually as part of a narrative arc which sees the immediate post-
Yalta period as the beginning of the end of the Grand Alliance, the point at which
unilateral Soviet action in Red Army-occupied areas led the British to realise that
collaboration with the Soviet Union would not extend past the end of the war.225 There
was a change in the language used both by Churchill and in the Foreign Office after
Yalta, which has been interpreted as an indication that Britain was ready to break with
the Soviets.226 Officials began to refer to the need for a ‘showdown’ with the Soviet
223 TNA: PRO FO 371/47593/N6696/6/55, Richard Law to Churchill, 8 June 1945; Foreign Office to
Moscow, 9 June 1945; 10 Downing Street to Foreign Office, 9 June 1945; N6840/6/55, Foreign Office
Minute, 13 June 1945.
224 TNA: PRO FO 371/66090/N658, Annex to ‘British Policy Towards Poland – Mr Churchill’s
Conversation with M. Mikołajczyk, 15 June 1945’.
225 For a summary of the evolution of the ‘Yalta myth’ in the British historiography of the origins of the
Cold War see Donald Cameron Watt, ‘Britain and the Historiography of the Yalta Conference and the
Cold War’, in Olla, ed. Yalta: un mito che resiste, 411-55.
226 Warren Kimball, for instance, argues that the immediate post-Yalta period was a key juncture for
Churchill. He argues that March 1945 was the point at which Churchill’s ‘ambivalence’ towards the
Soviet Union ‘disappeared’. As evidence, Kimball cites Churchill’s calls for the US and Britain to
‘confront’ the Soviets. Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman, 174, 181.
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Union; Churchill made highly critical comments about the Soviets in his messages to
Roosevelt.227
In the months following the Yalta conference, doubts certainly set in within the British
policymaking establishment about Soviet intentions across Eastern Europe. It was here
that Soviet actions ‘generated most doubts and pessimism’ and called into question the
British thesis of a ‘cooperative Soviet Union’ most sharply. Misgivings about Soviet
actions multiplied but did not bring about an abrupt reversal of British policy. Rather,
there was a reassessment and modification of the existing line of policy. The Foreign
Office concluded that Soviet security objectives were more far-reaching than had
initially been anticipated. But the extension of Soviet control over Poland was
interpreted in the same way it had been for months: as the lynchpin in the Soviet cordon
sanitaire against the possible resurgence of Germany, the Soviets could not risk an
“unfriendly” Polish government but now they were going to extreme lengths to prevent
such an outcome. The Foreign Office concluded that the solution was to handle the
Soviets more firmly. Britain needed to make clear to the Soviets that they could not
simply disregard the views and interests of their allies. Soviet behaviour in the post-
Yalta months generated considerable concern and uncertainty, but ultimately
policymakers believed that a more robust approach could still succeed in compelling
Soviet moderation, primarily because it was counting on allied assistance for its postwar
reconstruction needs.228 The British calculated that Soviet obstructionism over the
composition of the Polish government could be overcome if Britain and the US took a
firm line on the matter. Thus, there was a clear expectation on the part of the British
government in June 1945 that Britain would remain involved in the process of
determining Poland’s political future.
The second strand of British policy towards Poland concerned the future of the Polish
troops fighting under British command. In the wake of protests from the Polish military
authorities following the publication of the Yalta communiqué, Churchill had promised
British citizenship and a ‘refuge . . . somewhere in the British empire’ for those soldiers
who did not wish to return to Poland.229 Although this promise was made spontaneously
227 Folly, Churchill, Whitehall and the Soviet Union, 142-3, 158-9.
228 Ibid., 148-50, 160-1, 166.
229 TNA: PRO WO 106/3973, VCIGS to Field Marshal Alexander, 13 February 1945; General Harding to
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– without prior Cabinet consultation – in response to Anders’s report of unrest in the
Polish Second Corps, it nevertheless reflected Britain’s strong and ongoing sense of
obligation to these servicemen.
February 1945; FO 371/47579/N1884/6/55, Record of a meeting between Churchill and Anders, 21
February 1945.
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Chapter 2: From the Three Power Commission to the Moscow Council of Foreign
Ministers, June-December 1945
Introduction
After the end of hostilities in Europe, the British assumption that cooperation with the
Soviet Union would continue remained essentially intact. It had become clear that
relations were unlikely to run smoothly and easily but ongoing analysis of extensive
Soviet reconstruction needs buttressed the long-standing assumption that Stalin could
not afford to risk a breakdown in relations with his western alliance partners. The most
notable shift in British policy was a move towards the ‘frankness school’ of diplomacy,
in other words, a conviction that long-term cooperation with the Soviet Union could
only be established by an unyielding quid pro quo approach to negotiations, rather than
one of patient forbearance. This remained, broadly, the position of both the Foreign
Office and the British political leadership throughout the spring and summer of 1945.230
British policy towards Poland in the immediate postwar period was shaped partly by
this assumption that the Soviet Union would continue to pursue cooperation with its
wartime alliance partners. Soviet agreement to the inclusion of Mikołajczyk and several
of his supporters into the new Polish provisional government in June suggested to the
British that the Soviet Union had accepted that the PSL231 would have a prominent role
in Poland’s new government. The officials of the Foreign Office Northern Department,
who were not without serious reservations about the composition of the new
government, nevertheless took Soviet acceptance of Mikołajczyk’s inclusion as a sign
that the Soviet attitude towards Poland was beginning to change. British acceptance of
the agreement was also influenced by Mikołajczyk, who was confident that strong
popular support coupled with the weakness of the PPR would allow the PSL to become
the leading Polish political party.
The British position towards the Soviet Union did not change substantially after the
Labour party’s election victory at the end of July 1945. Both Attlee and Bevin had
230 Folly, Churchill, Whitehall and the Soviet Union, 140, 164-5.
231 To differentiate the existing Peasant Party from the party of the same name which had been formed in
September 1944 under the aegis of the PKWN as a rival to his party, Mikołajczyk changed the name of
the wartime SL to Polish Peasant Alliance (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe – PSL). Prażmowska, Civil War
in Poland, 137-8.
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served in the wartime coalition government. As deputy prime minister and minister of
labour respectively, both sat on the Armistice and Postwar Committee and were
therefore intimately familiar with, and supportive of, the government’s foreign policy
and the plans for addressing postwar problems.232 Both Attlee and Bevin had supported
Churchill and Eden’s line of policy towards the Soviet Union during the war, and when
Labour came to power both operated on the basis that cooperation with the Soviet
Union would continue. This expectation was bolstered by the enthusiasm within the
wider Labour party for the adoption of a ‘socialist foreign policy’ in Britain, based on
close Anglo-Soviet cooperation.233 Attlee was inclined towards an ‘internationalist
approach’ to foreign affairs, with the United Nations organisation as the guarantor of
international security in the postwar world. He was prepared to consider the Soviet point
of view even on contentious issues involving important British interests.234 Bevin’s
approach to foreign policy was guided more by a traditional, bipartisan sense of the
importance of defending British interests abroad. His attitude towards the Soviet Union
was ‘wary and suspicious, but not automatically hostile.’235
It has been asserted that Bevin was a committed cold warrior almost from the time he
took up his position as foreign secretary.236 Certainly by early 1946 Bevin’s distrust of
the Soviets was rising – and later on it was largely his initiative that led to the
establishment of a unified bloc in western Europe – but his views changed gradually
over the second half of 1945, rather than in an abrupt mid-year reversal. Working on the
assumption that Anglo-Soviet cooperation would continue, Bevin initially rejected the
idea of a division of the continent into separate blocs. He was not willing to consign
Poland to a Soviet sphere of interest. At Potsdam, Bevin took up exactly where
Churchill and Eden had left off in pushing the Soviets to withdraw their troops from
Poland and the PPR leaders to adhere to their commitment to hold early elections and
guarantee full political freedom.237 On the whole, however, Attlee and Bevin did not
232 For instance, Bevin told Molotov in October 1945 that he had supported all of Churchill’s decisions at
the Tehran and Yalta conferences. Deighton, Impossible Peace, 14.
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235 Morgan, Labour in Power, 235.
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take the same highly personal interest in the Polish settlement as Churchill and Eden.
For the most part, Polish matters devolved back to the Foreign Office after the change
of government. Further, as relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated later in the year,
Bevin’s initial willingness to confront the Soviets over conditions in Poland dissipated.
Following the disastrous breakdown of the first meeting of the Council of Foreign
Ministers in London, he sought to extricate the Polish issue from the larger context of
Anglo-Soviet relations as part of an effort to limit the sources of disagreement with the
Soviets.
Bevin’s move to compartmentalise the Polish issue was at odds with the view of the
Foreign Office and the Warsaw embassy. Both the embassy and the Northern
Department strongly urged that the issue be raised directly with the Soviets. Already by
the end of the summer the course of events in Poland had become a source of serious
concern for the Foreign Office. Once staff had been dispatched to the newly
reestablished Warsaw embassy,238 British diplomats could observe first-hand what was
happening in Poland, rather than relying on reports from the Polish underground. Soviet
involvement in Poland was evident: NKVD officers were attached to the Polish security
police and the Red Army was an obvious presence.239 The Warsaw embassy staff, led
by some very senior diplomats with prewar experience of Poland, including the
ambassador, Cavendish-Bentinck,240 and Hankey, the chargé d’affaires,241 were quick to
perceive the ruthlessness with which the Soviet-backed PPR was suppressing its
political opponents.242 The diplomatic corps in Warsaw reported back to the Northern
Department that political freedom in Poland was eroding rapidly. The Foreign Office
Northern Department concurred with the Warsaw embassy about the direction of events
in Poland. Although they initially believed that the PPR’s slim proportion of popular
238 Due to the systematic destruction of Warsaw during the war, there was an extreme shortage of space
and the British embassy was initially a makeshift arrangement on the fourth floor of the Hotel Polonia.
The hotel had been used as a German military headquarters and had therefore not been destroyed after the
uprising. Patrick Howarth, Intelligence Chief Extraordinary: The Life of the Ninth Duke of Portland
(London: The Bodley Head, 1986), 206.
239 Prażmowska, Civil War in Poland, 119-22.
240 Cavendish-Bentinck served in the British legation at Warsaw from September 1919 to January 1922,
with the rank of third, and then second, secretary. Born in 1897, he had worked in the Foreign Service
from the age of 18, with postings in Paris, the Hague, Athens and Santiago. He had spent the war years in
the Foreign Office, serving as chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee for most of the period.
241 Hankey had served in the Warsaw embassy from November 1936 until the outbreak of war in
September 1939. He was posted to Warsaw again as chargé d’affaires in the summer of 1945.
242 Patrick Howarth, who served as press attaché in the Warsaw embassy after the war described its staff
as being ‘of outstanding quality’. Intelligence Chief Extraordinary, 206. John Colville noted that Hankey
‘spoke Polish well’ and described John Russell, second secretary in the embassy as an ‘able and vigorous
diplomat’. Strange Inheritance (Salisbury: Michael Russell, 1983), 176-7.
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support would oblige the party to cooperate with the PSL, they soon recognised that if
left unchecked, it meant to exclude its opponents from government and establish one-
party rule.
British attempts to intervene in Poland’s domestic political situation were complicated
by the ongoing presence of the former Polish government-in-exile, which remained in
London after the war. Following the transfer of recognition, the Foreign Office had to
contend with a cascade of administrative and logistical matters arising from the
liquidation of a government which had operated in London for five years. At the
beginning of July 1945, Britain effectively took on the role of caretaker for all the
functions previously carried out by the government-in-exile. As a result, British officials
were immediately drawn in to conflict with the Polish provisional government, which
sought to muscle in on all the affairs of the former exile government. British insistence
on staving off interference by the new Polish government raised the ire of Warsaw and
embroiled the British in lengthy and often acrimonious disputes. The new Polish
government accused Britain of dishonourably persisting in propping up the exile
administration, taking advantage of geographical circumstances to deny the Warsaw
regime access to the property, funds, accounts, records and citizens to which it
considered itself rightfully entitled. In some instances – particularly in cases concerning
government assets – this irritation was genuinely felt. Often, however, the Polish
government used these disputes as a pretext to deflect criticism, terminating any
discussion of the internal situation in Poland with accusations that Britain had reneged
on existing agreements by continuing to support the exile government. Frequent
complaints appear in the Foreign Office files about the Polish tactic of derailing any
attempts by British officials to discuss internal abuses with a litany of often hyperbolic
or invented grievances against Britain. Britain’s position as unofficial arbiter in the
transfer of power between the exile and provisional governments thus complicated
British interventions in the Polish domestic political situation.
When Britain transferred recognition from the exile to the provisional government, the
British government inherited responsibility for almost a quarter of a million Polish
servicemen who had served under British operational command.243 Churchill’s
spontaneous post-Yalta promise that no Polish servicemen would be forced to return to
243 Prażmowska, ‘Polish Refugees’, in Bramwell, ed., Refugees in the Age of Total War, 219.
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Poland had not been accompanied by any detailed planning. The Foreign Office was left
to devise a strategy to facilitate repatriation, or settlement in Britain or its empire, for
the Polish servicemen, whose numbers were augmented by their dependants who were
living in refugee camps mainly in the Middle East and British East Africa at war’s
end.244 The problem of this overwhelming number of displaced people – most of whom
had assumed that their dislocation would be temporary but who were now facing
permanent exile – was an enormous challenge, a challenge which was exacerbated by
the competing claims of the former exile government and the new provisional
government in Warsaw for jurisdiction over these people. For instance, when
representatives of the Polish provisional government began to demand control of
refugee camps and contact with Polish forces, the British government was unprepared.
Having assumed responsibility for the welfare of these displaced Poles, the Foreign
Office had no desire for the added complication of involving the Warsaw government.
British officials instinctively sought to stave off interference with Polish citizens under
British jurisdiction and insisted on retaining the officials from the former exile
government who made possible the administration of essential services for this large
number of people. At the same time, the British government was at pains to show that it
was not continuing to support the exile government as a rival authority to Warsaw. Thus
British policy was often incoherent and contradictory, frequently failing to satisfy the
new Polish government and leaving British officials in the UK and abroad in a state of
confusion. Inevitably, the absence of advance planning significantly increased the
amount of time required for the Foreign Office to smooth out the complications.
The chaos which arose in the aftermath of the transfer of recognition absorbed a large
amount of the attention of the Foreign Office. The issue of the Polish armed forces has,
however, been used to explain British reluctance to intervene in internal Polish affairs
244 Most of these refugees were the dependants of Polish servicemen who had ended the war as part of the
Polish Second Corps, led by Anders. “Anders’s army” had been formed in the Soviet Union in 1941. It
was composed of former prisoners of war who had been deported to the Soviet Union after the Soviet
occupation of eastern Poland, as well as from the approximately 1.5 million Polish civilians who had been
deported to work in Soviet labour camps and collective farms beginning in February 1940. In 1942,
Anders’s army was evacuated from the Soviet Union to Persia, where they came under British
jurisdiction. The number amounted to over 115,000 Polish servicemen and their dependants. The troops
were placed under the authority of the British Middle East command and moved to Palestine, where they
were merged with General Kopański’s Carpathian brigade and formed the Second Corps. The majority of
the women and children were in camps in British East Africa by the end of the war. The overall number
of Polish refugees under British jurisdiction was increased by Polish forced labourers in Germany who
ended up in displaced persons camp, as well as Polish POWs captured by the Germans, and, finally
approximately 2,000 inmates of German concentration camps. Keith Sword, Identity in Flux: The Polish
Community in Britain (London, 1996), 23-5.
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after the war. According to this line of argument, the British government pursued a
deliberate and consistent policy of minimising the seriousness of the internal situation in
Poland in order to avoid discouraging servicemen and their families from returning.245
Repatriation for as many as possible was certainly the preferred British option, and
officials were at times frustrated and overwhelmed by the scale of the task before them,
giving rise to despairing or annoyed comments in the internal correspondence. But these
occasional expressions of irritation should not be read as a guide to British policy.
Rather than serving as a disincentive to intervene in Polish domestic affairs, the desire
of the British to divest themselves of the burden of responsibility for the Polish armed
forces added to the importance of ensuring an improvement in conditions in Poland. For
the most part, the Foreign Office actually treated repatriation and the internal Polish
political situation as separate issues.
Three Power Commission
Prior to the formal recognition of the Polish provisional government, Britain was in a
reasonably good position to exert influence on the outcome of the postwar settlement in
Poland. During the brief window of time between mid-June and 5 July, Britain had a
chance to insist that certain conditions be met before granting recognition to the new
government, particularly regarding the composition of the Cabinet and the holding of
elections. During the negotiations under the auspices of the Three Power Commission,
for instance, Britain could reasonably have demanded the inclusion of a greater number
of members of the democratic parties in more important positions in the new
government, thereby increasing the chances that the PPR would not be able to secure
complete control.
Britain did not press harder for these conditions for two main reasons. First, in the early
summer of 1945, Churchill, Eden and the Northern Department officials believed that
the PPR’s support base was insufficient to allow it to rule without the cooperation of the
democratic parties, particularly the PSL – a view shared by Mikołajczyk.246 They hoped
that the inclusion of the democratic elements would, in turn, curb the excesses of the
245 Ostrowski, ‘Return to Poland’, 16, 190-2; Hope, Abandoned Legion, 13.
246 TNA: PRO FO 371/47595/N7312/6/55, Moscow to Foreign Office, 22 June 1945; Polonsky, ‘Stalin
and the Poles’, 475; Prażmowska, Civil War in Poland, 142, 148.
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PPR and result in a more moderate government. Second, the British believed that it was
no longer tenable for Britain to continue to support the London government. The exile
administration had been regarded as a liability to the British government since
Arciszewski had taken over at the end of November 1944 and the decision to transfer
recognition had implicitly been taken when Churchill succeeded in persuading
Mikołajczyk to go to Moscow. In the view of British leaders and policymakers, there
was no alternative but to proceed with recognition of the new government once
Mikołajczyk’s inclusion had been secured.
On 21 June, agreement was reached in the negotiations for the formation of the
reorganised Polish provisional government of national unity (Tymczasowy Rząd
Jedności Narodowej – TRJN). It was to be composed of 20 members, with Mikołajczyk
holding the positions of both vice-premier and minister of agriculture. In total six
ministerial portfolios were assigned to Mikołajczyk and his supporters. Mikołajczyk
also secured a promise that Karol Popiel, leader of the Labour Alliance (Stronnictwo
Pracy – SP), which had been excluded from the talks at Soviet insistence, would be able
to join the government at a later date. The National Alliance (Stronnictwo Narodowe –
SN), which had also been excluded from the Moscow negotiations, was not represented
in the new government.247
The British government accepted the settlement with some misgivings. Clark Kerr
described the result as ‘not quite so good as we and Mikołajczyk might have hoped.’ He
particularly regretted that Mikołajczyk had not obtained the premiership.248 Further,
Bolesław Bierut, the leading member of the PPR central committee and chairman of the
KRN, refused Mikołajczyk’s appeal to eliminate the Ministry of Public Security
(Ministerstwo Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego – MBN), which had been established by
the Soviet authorities and was supervised by an NKVD general, Ivan Alexandrovich
Serov.249 The MBN controlled the newly established security police (Urząd
Bezpieczeństwa – UB).250 Clark Kerr was encouraged, however, by Mikołajczyk’s
optimism that having been legalised, his party could now become the strongest in
247 TNA: PRO FO 371/47594/N7298/6/G55, Moscow to Foreign Office, 21 June 1945; N7299/6/G55,
Moscow to Foreign Office, 22 June 1945; N7310/6/55, Moscow to Foreign Office, 22 June 1945; FO
371/47595/N7537/6/G55, Foreign Office to Moscow, 25 June 1945.
248 TNA: PRO FO 371/47595/N7312/6/55, Moscow to Foreign Office, 22 June 1945.
249 The MBN’s nominal head was the minister for public security, Stanisław Radkiewicz. He was
considered ineffective, hence Serov’s appointment as advisor. Prażmowska, Civil War in Poland, 121.
250 Micgiel, ‘“Bandits and Reactionaries”’, 94.
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Poland. Further, Clark Kerr also regarded as a positive indication the fact that the
various Polish factions had been able to work out a settlement among themselves; the
outcome had not been dictated by the Soviets.251
The Northern Department, on the other hand, saw less reason for optimism. In
particular, officials did not share Clark Kerr’s assessment of the fairness of the
distribution of power in the new government. The department was reluctant to accept
the complete exclusion of the SN, which had commanded considerable strength in
prewar Poland. Officials observed that the exactly equal distribution of government
posts between the PPS, PPR and Mikołajczyk’s Peasant Party was misleading since the
PPS and the PPR could ‘almost be counted as one’. Neither Mikołajczyk nor his
supporters held any of the ‘key’ posts in the government and communist deputy
ministers had been appointed in each case where the portfolio was held by a non-PPR
supporter. Finally, the crucial Ministries of Information, Industry and Security were
held by PPS or PPR members who had spent most of the war, if not longer, in the
Soviet Union.252
Despite these reservations, the Foreign Office authorised Clark Kerr to accept the
settlement, with several caveats. Britain reserved the right to withhold recognition from
the new government until it had been ‘properly formed’ according to the stipulations of
the Yalta agreement by committing itself ‘to hold free and unfettered elections as soon
as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot, in which all democratic
and anti-Nazi parties [would] have the right to take part and put forward candidates’.
The Foreign Office also instructed Clark Kerr to pressure the Polish and Soviet
governments to grant an amnesty to former members of the Polish underground,
including the 16 underground leaders who had received long sentences in Moscow on
21 June. Clark Kerr raised this issue with Bierut, who replied that he had already asked
the Soviets to transfer them to the custody of the new Polish government; the request
had been refused because their crimes had been committed against the Red Army.
At a meeting of the Commission on 22 June, Clark Kerr formally accepted the
settlement after having extracted a pledge from Bierut to abide by the Crimea decision
251 TNA: PRO FO 371/47595/N7312/6/55, Moscow to Foreign Office, 22 June 1945; N7374/6/55,
Moscow to Foreign Office, 22 June 1945.
252 TNA: PRO FO 371/47596/N7766/6/55, Foreign Office Minutes, 4 July 1945.
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in its entirety.253 Four reasons explain Britain’s acceptance of the Moscow settlement.
First, was the conclusion of the Foreign Office that the PPR lacked popular support, was
weak and could not afford to exclude Mikołajczyk due to the overwhelming popularity
of his party among the Polish population. This assumption was strengthened by an
admission from Bierut and Edward Osóbka-Morawski254 that their position within
Poland was not secure and that they needed Mikołajczyk and his party to strengthen the
legitimacy of the government. Bierut acknowledged – with considerable understatement
– that ‘the enthusiasm with which the Poles had welcomed [the] liberating Red Army
had waned’, giving way to discontent with the Soviets. Osóbka-Morawski disclosed that
conditions in Poland were ‘chaotic’. Within the last few weeks 700 Red Army men and
2,000 Warsaw government militiamen had been killed.255
Second, the Foreign Office believed that the inclusion of Mikołajczyk and his
supporters would alter the character of the provisional government. While officials
would have preferred a more even distribution of power between the two factions, they
predicted that the inclusion of the opposition politicians would have the effect of
moderating the approach of the PPR. Third, Mikołajczyk himself was satisfied with the
arrangements. He was ‘facing the situation with calm confidence’, wrote Clark Kerr.
Foreign Office officials regarded Mikołajczyk as reasonable and practical; his
conviction that popular support would allow the PSL to become the strongest political
party in Poland reassured British officials that the Moscow agreement did not simply
constitute a PPR takeover with a few cosmetic trimmings. Fourth, officials drew
reassurance from apparent Soviet acceptance that Mikołajczyk would have an important
and ongoing role in the future Polish government. Clark Kerr reported that Moltov had
‘seemed well pleased with developments’ and had been ‘most affable to Mikolajczyk’.
Northern Department officials thought that they detected the beginning of a change in
the Soviet attitude towards Poland, although they were more cautious than Clark Kerr,
and remained worried by reports of widespread arrests by the NKVD in Poland.256
Finally, acceptance of the new government was the first step in the process of phasing
253 TNA: PRO FO 371/47595/N7369/6/G55, Moscow to Foreign Office, 23 June 1945.
254 Osóbka-Morawski belonged to the Workers’ Party of the Polish Socialists (RPPS – Robotnicza Partia
Polskich Socalistów) – a splinter group of the PPS which had allied itself with the PPR.
255 Bierut and Osóbka-Morawski made this statement to Mikołajczyk. Osóbka-Morawski  repeated it to
Clark Kerr directly. TNA: PRO FO 371/47594/N7295/6/G55, Moscow to Foreign Office, 21 June 1945;
N7297/6/G55, Moscow to Foreign Office, 21 June 1945.
256 TNA: PRO FO 371/47595/ N7312/6/55, Moscow to Foreign Office, 22 June 1945; N7508/6/55,
Foreign Office Minutes, 2 July 1945.
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out the former Polish government-in-exile, whose continued presence in London was
beginning to give rise to a range of difficulties for the British authorities. Britain granted
recognition to the new government with effect from 6 July. Churchill’s note specified
that Britain considered recognition of the Yalta decisions to include the provision to
hold free elections as soon as possible with the participation of all the democratic
parties.257
Sargent’s ‘Stocktaking’ Memorandum
In his influential and much-scrutinised ‘Stocktaking after VE Day’ memorandum,
Sargent set out a broad overview of the recent direction of Soviet policy, together with
recommendations for the most effective British response. Sargent’s memo is sometimes
regarded as an early milestone in the emergence of a Cold War mentality within the
British policymaking establishment. Sargent did clearly acknowledge that relations with
the Soviet Union had become more difficult and that the Soviet military occupation of a
large part of Eastern Europe was causing concern. He also cited the risk that Stalin’s
security obsession would drive him to establish ‘an ideological Lebensraum in those
countries he considers strategically important.’ For the moment, however, the Soviet
Union had ‘been so weakened by the war’ that Stalin was ‘hardly in a position to force
through ruthlessly his policy of ideological penetration against definite opposition.’
Sargent saw evidence of Soviet restraint in Poland, where Stalin had ‘not pressed
matters to extreme and [had] actually compromised, though it may well be that he has
only made a temporary retreat.’ Sargent’s recommendation was not for Britain to end
the pursuit of cooperation with the Soviet Union, or to withdraw from involvement in
Eastern Europe, but rather to take the initiative and challenge the Soviet Union over
their actions across the region, in order to ‘prevent the situation crystallising to our
permanent detriment.’258 Sargent also adamantly rejected the idea of a compromise
agreement involving British recognition of exclusive Soviet interests in certain
countries: ‘it is inconceivable that we should adopt this course.’ In Sargent’s view,
Britain had to ‘[make] it abundantly clear to the Soviet Government that the policy of
257 TNA: PRO FO 371/47596/N7711/6/55, Churchill to Osóbka-Morawski, 5 July 1945.
258 Sargent specifically referred to Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.
He noted that ‘perhaps for the moment Roumania and Hungary [are] beyond our reach.’ TNA: PRO FO
371/50912/U5471/5471/70, ‘Memorandum by Sir O. Sargent’, 11 July 1945.
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Anglo-Soviet co-operation must apply fully in Central and South-Eastern Europe as in
the rest of the world’. At the same time, Sargent emphasised that it must be made clear
to the Soviets that the British government considered ‘this plain-speaking’ necessary in
order to effect a change in Soviet behaviour precisely because Britain attached such
great importance to continuing Anglo-Soviet cooperation.
Sargent’s memorandum highlights the core assumptions that underpinned British policy
towards Poland immediately after the war. First, it shows that the British were banking
on ongoing cooperation with the Soviet Union. Although they were frankly worried
about the direction of Soviet policy, the belief persisted that Soviet economic weakness
would act as a kind of restraining hand on its foreign policy.259 Sargent thought he
already detected evidence of Soviet restraint in Poland, which suggests that Clark Kerr
and the Foreign Office officials were sincere in their belief that the Soviet admission of
Mikołajczyk into the provisional Polish government did constitute a shift – or at least
the possibility of a shift – in Soviet policy towards Poland. Finally, in its outright
rejection of the creation of exclusive spheres of interest in Europe, the memorandum
clearly shows that Britain assumed that it still had a significant role in Eastern Europe
generally and Poland specifically.
Potsdam Conference
The overriding British concern at Potsdam was to see the revival of German industry
and the resumption of trade between the eastern and western regions of the country. The
British military government was already struggling to cope with the difficulties in
Britain’s northwestern zone of occupation, which included some of the most devastated
cities, along with the highest concentrations of urban population and heavy industry. In
order to restore the region to self-sufficiency, German industry had to return to
production; and trade had to resume with the areas under Soviet occupation which had
always been a vital source of foodstuffs and raw materials for western Germany.
259 Although Eden did begin to worry that the assumption that the Soviet Union was counting on western
assistance for its reconstruction needs had begun to be taken for granted. TNA: PRO FO
371/50912/U5471/5471/70, Minute by Cadogan, 11 July 1945.
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Otherwise, the British occupation authorities would be faced with mass starvation in
their zone.260
The difficulties in the British occupation zone were exacerbated by the Soviet transfer
of German territory east of the Oder and western Neisse rivers – an area amounting to
21 per cent of German territory including the entire province of Silesia – to a semi-
official Polish administration. The permanent transfer of this territory to Poland would
withdraw it from the authority of the Allied Control Commission (ACC) in Germany,
thereby excluding it from the area from which reparations could be drawn, reducing the
total area from which the British and Americans could obtain food supplies for western
Germany and giving a proportionate advantage to Russia in excess of its fair share.
Further, the local Polish authorities had already begun to expel the German population
from the disputed territory, with a consequent influx of displaced persons into the
western zones of Germany.261
The British were also disturbed by the unilateral nature of the Soviet action, which
established de facto control of this territory before the final delimitation of the Polish-
German frontier at the peace conference, as had been agreed at Yalta. In keeping with
the increasing sense that it was necessary to take a stiffer approach in their dealings with
the Soviet Union, the British worried that acquiescence to the Oder-western Neisse
boundary would be perceived by the Soviet Union as ‘a sign of weakness’ and ‘provoke
other excessive demands elsewhere.’262 When discussion of the Polish-German frontier
opened at Potsdam, Truman and Churchill insisted that the final decision on the Polish-
German frontier must await the peace conference and until then the demarcation lines
for the zones of occupation in Germany must stand as previously agreed. Churchill
argued strenuously against the cession of this territory. He objected to Poland becoming
a de facto fifth occupying power in Germany. Churchill vehemently objected to having
‘a mass of population’ amounting to eight and a quarter million German citizens,
‘thrown’ into the British zone. He argued that the Soviet Union could not be allowed to
siphon off food and supplies from its zone while at the same time demanding materials
260 Bullock, Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 22.
261 TNA: PRO FO 371/47592/N6328/6/55, Foreign Office Minutes, 5-15 June 1945; FO
371/47593/N6767/6/55, Moscow to Foreign Office, 9 June 1945; Foreign Office Minutes, 14 June 1945.
262 TNA: PRO FO 371/47600/N8810/6/G55, Foreign Office Brief: ‘Poland’s Western Frontier’, [n.d.];
Foreign Office to Washington, 12 July 1945; FO 371/47593/N6767/6/55, Foreign Office to Washington,
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from the British and American zones. Britain would require payment in the form of
food in exchange for supplies from the Ruhr.263
For the Northern Department and the Warsaw embassy, the Potsdam conference
presented an opportunity for the British delegation to extract political concessions from
the Polish provisional government. Foreign Office officials were alarmed by reports of
oppression and abuses which had begun to reach London, including the exclusion of the
Labour and National Democratic parties from the elections, a PPR attempt to force
Mikołajczyk to fuse his party with the communist-sponsored Peasant Alliance
(Stronnictwo Ludowe – SL) and increasing NKVD control over political activity. Allen,
the Northern Department’s Polish specialist who was in Potsdam as part of the Foreign
Office contingent, had two private conversations with Mikołajczyk following the
latter’s arrival in Berlin, which confirmed the reports from Warsaw. Conditions had
deteriorated even within the last few days, Bierut had reneged on many of the
undertakings he had made during the negotiations in Moscow, and Mikołajczyk was
now encountering difficulties in organising the PSL.264
Foreign Office officials saw Potsdam as a chance to extract concessions from the Soviet
and Polish governments by linking British acceptance of the territorial desiderata to
guarantees of political freedom inside Poland. Britain should capitalise on the Polish
government’s desire to secure the former German territories in the west in order to
obtain guarantees regarding early and free elections. The westward extension of the
Polish-German frontier was of the very highest importance to the PPR. The acquisition
of this territory would do much to enhance the new government’s prestige among the
population as well as serving to boost the country’s economy. The Foreign Office
recognised that Britain had some leverage which it could apply at Potsdam to improve
the internal situation in Poland. Sargent recommended that the British delegation press
the PPR to allow the Labour and National Democratic parties to participate freely in the
263 FRUS: Diplomatic Papers. The Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), 1945, vol.2 (Washington: United
States Government Printing Office, 1960), 209-221.
264 TNA: PRO FO 371/47603/N9609/6/G55, Allen to Warner, 25 July 1945; N9720/6/G55, Foreign
Office Meeting at the Foreign Secretary’s Residence, 25 July 1945; FO 371/47602/N9107/6/55, Warsaw
to Foreign Office, 23 July 1945; N9170/6/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 24 July 1945; FO
371/47601/N8963/6/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 19 July 1945; Foreign Office Minutes, 21 July 1945.
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elections. He argued that Churchill and Eden would ‘much regret it’ if they failed to
broach the matter.265
British leaders met with representatives of the provisional Polish government three
times on 24 and 25 July.266 In the first two meetings with the Polish delegation,
Churchill and Eden pressed the PPR leaders regarding the participation of all the
political parties in the elections but in neither case did they link British acceptance of
the frontier to the fulfilment of these conditions.267 The next morning, Churchill met
with Bierut alone. Churchill warned that the Polish government must establish a free
and open society with an independent judiciary and an end to ‘police government’.
George Leggett,268 who served as the interpreter for the British meetings with the Polish
government at the conference, noted in his diary that although Churchill delivered ‘quite
a severe lecture’, he ‘did not adduce any specific instances to illustrate his remarks’,
with the result that ‘the discussion was maintained on the level of broad generalities and
high sounding phrases, so that it was not difficult for the dialectician Bierut, to give
plausible answer in equally imprecise terms.’269 Bierut promised that Poland would
‘develop on the principles of Western democracy’. Bierut assured Churchill that the Red
Army was in the process of withdrawing from Poland and that the NKVD played no
role in the country.270
The Foreign Office was unconvinced by Bierut’s assurances. Allen expressed his hope
that ‘some good’ might come out of Churchill and Eden having raised ‘most of the
disturbing developments reported in recent telegrams from Warsaw’ but declared his
suspicions that ‘in the case of Bierut at least a great gulf is fixed between his words [at
Potsdam] and his actions in Poland.’ Upon receipt of the records of the Anglo-Polish
talks at Potsdam, Warner expressed his dissatisfaction: ‘I am still very unhappy about
the tussle between our friends in Poland and the Communists, which is, I fear, reaching
a crucial stage at this moment.’ Warner considered it essential to secure an agreement
before the delegations left the conference: ‘If we can get nothing at Potsdam I am afraid
265 TNA: PRO FO 371/47601/N9024/6/G55, Sargent to Cadogan, 24 July 1945.
266 TNA: PRO FO 371/47601/N9025/6/G55, Terminal to Foreign Office, 22 July 1945; FRUS Potsdam,
Vol. II, 249, 335-6.
267 TNA: PRO FO 371/47602/N9389/6/G55, Potsdam, 24 July 1945; N9536/6/G55, 24 July 1945.
268 Churchill Archives Centre (CAC), LEGT 1/1, Leggett diary, 22 June, 25 & 29 July 1945; Richard
Leggett, Obituary of George Leggett, [n.d.] http://www.trinhall.cam.ac.uk/alumni/keeping-in-
touch/obituaries/detail.asp?ItemID=2328 (accessed 27 March 2014).
269 CAC, LEGT 1/1, Leggett diary, 25 July 1945.
270 TNA: PRO FO 371/47603/N9536/6/G55, 25 July 1945.
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M. Mikołajczyk will have lost the game. What is obviously required is a sanction of
some sort to use, if as is possible M. Bierut’s airy words amount to nothing.’ He
proposed that the British delegation should link its acceptance of Poland’s territorial
desiderata to the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the NKVD and the establishment of
‘proper internal political conditions in Poland.’ Another possible sanction would be for
Britain to withhold Polish state property: ‘everything the Poles want our consent to’.
His final suggestion was to raise the issue of the withdrawal of the Red Army from
Polish territory directly with the Soviet Union. Sargent put Warner’s suggestions to
Cadogan at Potsdam, urging that the British delegation extract ‘formal assurances of a
satisfactory nature’ from the Poles and the Soviets ‘in full conference’ backed by the
threat of sanctions if these assurances were not fulfilled.271
Churchill and Eden left the conference on 25 July and returned to London for the next
day’s announcement of the results of the general election. The Conservative party was
defeated and Attlee and Bevin took over at Potsdam. Bullock argues that the Labour
leaders suffered the disadvantage of parachuting in at the end of the conference with
little time to orient themselves and a reluctance to interrupt the course of negotiations
which had already been in progress for 13 days. By the time Attlee and Bevin reached
Berlin, writes Bullock, ‘the general feeling among the Western delegations . . . was one
of impatience to reach a settlement and get away. The last thing anyone wanted was for
the late arrivals to make difficulties just when the negotiations were coming to the point
of decision, and when the Americans had already made up their minds what they were
prepared to settle for.’272 This description to some extent reflects the circumstances in
which the Polish-German border issue was settled. Truman and the secretary of state,
James Byrnes met privately with Molotov on 29 July and declared that they were ready
to accept the Soviet demarcation of the frontier if the Soviets would agree to the
American proposals on reparations, as well as to the admission of neutral and ex-enemy
states to the nascent UN organisation – an issue of central importance to the US
government.273 It was not actually the case, however, that Attlee and Bevin ‘parachuted
in’ to the conference. Attlee had accompanied Churchill and Eden to the conference and
been party to the proceedings from the outset. Further, the Labour leaders were fully
271 TNA: PRO FO 371/47603/N9536/6/G55, Allen to Warner, 25 July 1945; Warner to Sargent, 27 July
1945; FO 371/47603/N9539/6/G55, Sargent to Cadogan, 30 July 1945.
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briefed on the issues. Leggett noted ‘the sound, well-informed and realistic way’ in
which Bevin and Attlee tackled the issues, getting ‘down to the root of every question’
and refusing to be distracted ‘by any red-herring digression.’ Bevin and Attlee covered
much of the same ground as Churchill and Eden but ‘in telling fashion, tying their
verbal opponents down to definite, committing answers.’274 Bevin managed, for
instance, to pin Bierut down to holding elections no later than early 1946; he also
elicited a promise from Bierut to allow foreign press representatives to report on the
elections.275
Bevin made his decision on the Polish-German border based primarily on discussions
with Mikołajczyk. The frontier issue was politically important not only for the PPR, but
also for the PSL. There was widespread support for a border further to the west among
the Polish population; it would therefore have been politically disadvantageous to the
PSL, the party with strong links to the west, if the British and Americans disputed the
frontier demarcation. Mikołajczyk told Bevin that Anglo-American agreement to the
proposed frontier would help to discredit the PPR’s argument that the west was hostile
to Poland. Mikołajczyk also stressed the importance of early elections, which could only
be conducted freely once the Red Army and the NKVD had withdrawn from Polish
territory. The Soviets, however, would not budge from the disputed area until a firm
decision had been reached on the exact demarcation of the frontier. In Mikołajczyk’s
view, elections had to be held swiftly in order to secure Poland’s political independence.
‘Poland will be independent if we have speedy elections; the elections in turn are
dependent upon the fixing of the frontiers and the removal of Soviet troops from Polish
territory’.276 Initially, Bevin was disinclined to accept the border until he had received a
‘definite statement’ from the Polish delegation on the date of the elections and a
guarantee that all political parties would be free to participate. Clark Kerr, who had
covered the same points in great detail over the course of two private meetings with
Mikołajczyk, reinforced the importance of meeting Polish territorial claims to avoid the
PPR ‘using our hesitation as an instrument of propaganda to show that all good things in
Poland came from Russia while we and the Americans are unsympathetic and
274 CAC, LEGT 1/1, Leggett diary, 29 & 30 July 1945.
275 TNA: PRO FO 371/47603/N9922/6/G55, Record of a Meeting at the Foreign Secretary’s House,
Potsdam, 31 July 1945.
276 TNA: PRO FO 371/47603/N9720/6/G55, 25 July 1945; N9659/6/G55, Clark Kerr to Bevin, 30 July
1945; Record of Conversation between Bevin and Mikołajczyk, 31 July 1945.
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niggardly.’277 On 31 July at the final meeting with the entire Polish delegation, after
Bierut had committed to a date for the elections, Bevin agreed to accept the border.278
Ultimately, then, Bevin did not simply acquiesce to the territorial changes because an
agreement had been reached by the US and the Soviet Union in his absence. Once the
deadlock on the question of reparations had finally been broken in the US-Soviet talks,
it would have been more difficult for Bevin to attach supplementary conditions
concerning internal political freedom in Poland. The decisive factor in his decision,
however, seems to have been the effect on Milołajczyk’s position. It was only after his
talk with Mikołajczyk and subsequent discussion with Clark Kerr that Bevin actually
acceded to the agreement reached by the American and Soviet delegation.
Bevin’s instructions to Cavendish-Bentinck before his departure for Warsaw serve as
another indication of the new foreign secretary’s initial conception of British postwar
policy towards Poland. Bevin cautioned that he was ‘by no means convinced’ that the
PPR intended to ‘establish a truly representative régime’ in Poland. On the contrary,
Bevin’s impression was that they aimed to establish ‘a regime much nearer to the Soviet
model.’ He instructed the new ambassador to do all he could to support the opposition
factions led by Mikołajczyk in their efforts to establish a democratic, representative
government in Poland with freedom for all parties to participate in the elections. ‘It is
my intention to use every lever that may be available to this end’, Bevin asserted. Bevin
also called up Churchill’s promise to support Mikołajczyk. Bevin emphasised that this
was not a promise which had expired when Churchill left office; it was not a promise
made by the Conservative party; it was a matter that went beyond politics. Accordingly,
Cavendish-Bentinck ‘should not hesitate’ to insist on Britain’s right to be kept fully
informed of the situation in Poland, especially ‘regarding everything relating to the
creation of conditions for the holding of elections’ on the basis laid down in the Yalta
agreement. Further, Cavendish-Bentinck could be open about Mikołajczyk and
Stańczyk’s ‘special position’ in the regard of the British government.279 Thus, when
Bevin first took office it is clear that he envisioned an active, interventionist approach to
policy in Poland.
277 Mikołajczyk had also repeated the same points in a private meeting with Eden. CAC, LEGT 1/1,
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Eden and Mikołajczyk, 25 July 1945; Clark Kerr to Eden, 26 July 1945; N9659/6/G55, Clark Kerr to
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British Policy after the Transfer of Recognition
Once recognition had been extended to the new Polish government Britain had to face
the considerable logistical and administrative difficulties of dissolving the government-
in-exile in London. Not only did derecognition involve the liquidation of the exile
government’s administrative machinery in the UK and abroad, the British government
bore ultimate responsibility for the fate of the members of the Polish armed forces under
British command, as well as their families. After the Yalta conference Churchill had
promised that any Polish servicemen who did not want to return to Poland would be
granted British citizenship and allowed to settle in Britain or its empire. With the end of
hostilities in Europe and the dissolution of the government-in-exile, the British
government had to confront the implications of Churchill’s promise and determine how
it would be fulfilled in practice.
In a memorandum to Churchill written just days before the withdrawal of recognition,
Sargent had outlined the problems that were likely to arise. He foresaw that the British
government would have to perform a delicate balancing act in order to avoid ‘the
dislocation and hardship to the very large number of Poles here and abroad which would
ensue from a complete breakdown of the administrative machinery of the London Polish
Government’, while at the same time safeguarding the British government against the
accusation of ‘preserving the hold of the London Polish Government upon the Poles
outside Poland and the Polish Armed Forces.’280 Although the Foreign Office predicted
precisely the difficulties with which it would have to contend, no clear policy had been
formulated prior to the transfer of recognition. Officials were forced to address the
competing claims of the former government-in-exile and the new government in
Warsaw without an overarching policy to guide them. The scope of Britain’s
commitments and the tangle of rival, mutually hostile authorities quickly became
overwhelming. Officials had to consider everything from the fate of Polish state
property and Polish foreign legations to a solution for the resettlement of Polish
servicemen and displaced persons.
British policy evolved on an ad hoc basis in response to questions as they arose, with
new issues frequently leading to different, sometimes contradictory directions in policy.
Officials instinctively sought to prevent the intrusion of a new set of Polish officials into
280 TNA: PRO FO 371/47597/N7778/6/G55, Sargent to Churchill, 29 June 1945.
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the administration of foreign legations and in particular to the refugee camps until a
final decision had been reached on the question of Polish resettlement. Above all,
British officials refused to countenance the interference of the Warsaw government with
the Polish armed forces under British command. At the same time, officials were
sensitive to accusations from Warsaw that Britain was surreptitiously continuing to
support the government-in-exile as a rival authority. They therefore took steps to
remove the responsibilities of the former government-in-exile, to diminish its character
as an organised body, and to establish British supervision over all of its ongoing
activities. British policy was thus characterised by a mixture of guarding against
unwanted intrusion from Warsaw in the winding up of the affairs of the London Polish
government and a desire to ward off accusations from the Warsaw government that
Britain was sponsoring a rival administration.
Without a coherent policy, British consular and embassy staff lacked instructions as to
how to contend with representatives of the new Polish government, who quickly
appeared and demanded control of the administration of Polish refugee camps under
British jurisdiction and of state property at Polish foreign legations. Consequently, the
Foreign Office was inundated with requests for guidance from its legations abroad. The
exchanges between Reader Bullard, the British ambassador in Tehran and the Foreign
Office illustrate the confusion which reigned. Bullard was the first to alert the Foreign
Office to the potential for disruption if the new Polish government became involved in
the administration of the refugee camps. Bullard expressed alarm at the possibility of a
Polpress representative, who claimed to have received authorisation from Warsaw, and
whom Bullard described as ‘not the most desirable of men’ who had ‘been identified
with a particularly fanatical pro-Lublin policy’, interfering with the Polish refugee
population in Persia. Only upon receipt of Bullard’s telegram, it seems, did it occur to
the Foreign Office that the difficulties encountered in Tehran were ‘likely to arise in
connection with many of the Polish posts abroad.’ Officials agreed that the ‘continuance
of an adequate organisation at all places where there are Polish refugee settlements’ was
of ‘deep concern’. Acting with the approval of the Treasury, the Foreign Office began
planning to instruct its representatives abroad that the British government would
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continue to make the necessary financial provisions for Polish refugee settlements and
that the existing administrations should be maintained as far as possible.281
On 6 July, Bullard appealed to the Foreign Office for further guidance on a different
issue. He assumed that property and funds employed for the benefit of Polish refugees
should be excluded from the transfer of Polish government property to the new
government. In response, the Foreign Office sent a circular telegram instructing its
embassies that funds designated for the care of refugees should be withheld from the
new Polish government and should ‘remain so far as possible under [the] administration
of existing Polish officials.’ Since the British government provided the funds for these
camps, the Foreign Office did not intend to hand control over to the new Polish
government until satisfied of its ability to ‘assume responsibility and appoint suitable
officials.’282 Embassies were instructed to avoid dealing with the representatives or
chargés d’affaires who were likely to be appointed by the provisional Polish
government ad interim. These appointees were likely to be ‘totally inadequate . . . not
only from the political point of view but for [the] administration of refugee settlements
and affairs.’ At the same time, embassy and consular staff were also to avoid dealing
with officials of the former exile government ‘over anything but practical issues.’283
While the British government did not want interference from the new Polish
government, it was careful not to ‘strengthen or perpetuate [the] hold of [the] “London
Poles”’.284
Only after receiving a flurry of queries from diplomatic staff on the most mundane
issues did the Foreign Office begin to remove the diplomatic privileges previously
enjoyed by the representatives of the government-in-exile at its foreign legations. On 17
July the Foreign Office warned Bullard not to allow the Polish chargé d’affaires in
Tehran to abscond to Cairo with a radio transmitter at the request of a Polish army
general. Similarly, on 24 July the Foreign Office instructed the British ambassador to
Cairo, Lord Killearn to cease the practice of sending official packages on behalf of the
Polish legation using British diplomatic facilities. Nor was he to provide official stamps
allowing Polish couriers passage through Palestine with deliveries of documents and
281 TNA: PRO FO 371/47597/N7811/6/55, Tehran to Foreign Office, 30 June 1945; Foreign Office
Minutes, 6 July 1945.
282 TNA: PRO FO 371/47598/N8121/6/55, Tehran to Foreign Office, 6 July 1945; Foreign Office to
Tehran, 8 July 1945; FO 371/47599/N8498/6/55, Tehran to Foreign Office, 12 July 1945.
283 TNA: PRO FO 371/47599/N8513/6/55, Foreign Office to British embassies, 7 July 1945.
284 TNA: PRO FO 371/47600/N8577/6/55, Foreign Office to Beirut, 26 July 1945.
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parcels. On 28 July Rome was instructed to arrange for the ACC to deny use of cipher
facilities to the former Polish legation. Evidence of an absence of clear policy emerges
in the wording of the telegrams from Killearn and Bullard. Killearn noted that ‘[h]aving
no instructions to the contrary’ he was continuing authorisation for these services to the
Polish legation. Bullard expresses sheer bewilderment: ‘I do not know whether the
Polish army abroad whose property the transmitter was is regarded as still having a legal
existence.’285
Out of this confusion the broad lines of a policy began to emerge. The Foreign Office
sent definitive instructions to its foreign legations on 28 July, nearly a month after the
transfer of recognition. The guidelines issued were clearly aimed at removing authority
from officials of the former London government while simultaneously trying to stave
off interference by the new government. In order to counter accusations from Warsaw
that the British government was supplying the former government-in-exile with funds to
carry on propaganda campaigns against Warsaw and Moscow, the Foreign Office was
anxious to show that funding provided by Britain was limited to essential welfare
services. An Interim Treasury Committee (ITC) for Polish Questions was established in
July to administer the affairs and liquidate the machinery of the former Polish
government. The committee, chaired by Wilfrid Eady, second secretary of the Treasury,
was also charged with ensuring that Polish civilians in Britain and abroad who had been
dependent administratively and financially upon the London government should not
suffer as a result of the disappearance of the former exile government.286 Polish foreign
missions were to limit their staff to the absolute minimum necessary to administer the
camps, schools and hospitals under their control. All these facilities were to be regarded
as under the jurisdiction of the ITC and a suitable officer appointed to supervise their
activities and expenditure. Similarly, Polish officials of the former London government
had their diplomatic status withdrawn. On the other hand, representatives of the Warsaw
government were not to be authorised to take part in the administration of Polish
welfare organisations without the approval of the ITC.287
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Future of the Polish Armed Forces
Of urgent concern to the British government after the transfer of recognition was the
need to reach a decision on the fate of the Polish servicemen who had fought under
British command throughout the war. By mid-July no concrete policy had emerged.
Churchill’s post-Yalta pledge dictated that the ex-servicemen would not be repatriated
against their will but beyond this commitment the British government had devised no
practical means for their resettlement in Britain or its overseas territories. Nor was there
a plan in place as to what should be done with the troops in the meantime. On 12 July
Warner noted: ‘There is not yet any decision of policy here as to whether we wish as
many of the Poles in this country and in the forces to return home.’288 Until a clear
policy was in place, Churchill reminded the Foreign Office:
It is essential and necessary to our honour that we should continue for the time
being and until we can see how matters work out to remain responsible for the
maintenance of the Polish Armed Forces and other Poles at home and abroad for
whom we are at present responsible through the London Polish Government. We
must not divest ourselves of this responsibility.289
For the most part, like Churchill, Foreign Office officials regarded Britain’s promise not
to forcibly repatriate any Polish citizens under its jurisdiction as a point of principle. On
27 June Hankey submitted a ‘plea’ to Allen requesting that the British government ‘give
the best possible deal to the Poles in London’ when recognition was withdrawn.
‘Inconvenient as their view on Russian-Polish relations may be, deeply as Lublin hate
them’, wrote Hankey, ‘the fact remains that they are our friends and if and when many
of them return to Poland . . . the view they take of us will be coloured by the sort of
arrangement which we make for them.’ Hankey expressed particular concern that no
one should be forcibly repatriated. If the British government were to repatriate Polish
citizens, it would have to ‘accept a certain responsibility for their welfare in Poland and
I have grave doubts whether any American or British Embassy in ever likely to have
sufficient influence in Poland to give any sort of guarantee for their safety if the
Russians change their mind about them at some future date.’290
288 TNA: PRO FO 371/47600/N8896/6/55, Foreign Office Minutes, 12 July 1945.
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In the absence of a clear policy decision, however, and as the enormity of the task of
resettling such a large number of people became clear, officials sought to avoid raising
expectations within the Polish exile community. In particular, it was not clear whether
Churchill’s policy would extend only to combatants or to other categories of Polish
displaced persons as well. Until these ambiguities had been resolved, the Foreign Office
was anxious to avoid making any statement which might ultimately prove misleading.
For instance, the Foreign Office instructed its legation in Lebanon not to encourage
Poles ‘to expect that they may be able to obtain British hospitality or nationality’,
cautioning that it was ‘impossible to say how we shall apply [Churchill’s promise] until
we have [a] clearer idea of the scale of the problem.’291
Until the policy regarding resettlement and repatriation had been finalised, the
immediate concern of British officials was to limit the access of representatives from
Warsaw to Polish troops. In mid-July representatives of the new Polish government in
Paris requested authorisation from the British embassy to send a delegation to the
British zone of occupied Germany in order to accelerate the return of Polish deportees.
The British Control Commission in Germany replied that ‘the Polish situation’ was ‘not
entirely easy’ in the occupation zone and requested that the Paris embassy instruct the
Polish delegation to make an official application through the Foreign Office. This was
clearly intended as a delay tactic.292 On 28 July the British embassy in Paris reported to
the Foreign Office that the Polish mission, which had requested permission three weeks
earlier to visit the British zone in Germany had in fact been ‘sitting in Paris ready to go
all [the] time’. The Paris embassy protested that to ask the delegation to resubmit its
request through London after so much time had elapsed would make the British appear
‘ridiculous’ and requested that the Foreign Office consider the application as a matter of
urgency. But the Foreign Office refused to grant representatives of the Warsaw
government access to the Poles in Germany. Warner explained that there had been
warnings of a complete breakdown in discipline in the Polish displaced persons camps
if the transfer from the existing liaison officers to emissaries from Warsaw were not
conducted with the utmost care. ‘We have’, asserted Warner, ‘therefore no intention of
being rushed in this matter’ particularly as the Polish mission had approached the Paris
291 TNA: PRO FO 371/47600/N8577/6/55, Foreign Office to Beirut, 26 July 1945; N8896/6/55, Foreign
Office Minutes, 12 July 1945.
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embassy directly ‘without a word being said to His Majesty’s Government.’ Matters
concerning the Poles in Germany were to be discussed in the first place between the two
governments.293 Thus, in this interim period, before Britain had arrived at a firm policy
on the repatriation issue, the Foreign Office approach was to do nothing to discourage
as many Poles as possible from returning, but at the same time restricting access by the
Warsaw authorities to the troops.294
Within the Polish exile community there was considerable pressure to reject
repatriation. This was especially true for members of the Polish Second Corps in Italy,
most of whom came from parts of eastern Poland which had been incorporated into the
Soviet Union. Within the corps, opting for repatriation was equated with sympathy for
the communist regime in Warsaw, and was therefore regarded as a ‘betrayal of the
national cause’. The tone was very much set by Anders, who was implacably hostile to
the Soviet Union. Part of the pressure on the servicemen to reject repatriation also came
from the Polish authorities in London. The former exile government, which remained in
existence, although no longer recognised by any of the major powers, ‘aimed to act as a
thorn in the side of the Warsaw regime’, by calling international attention to its abuse of
power. Keith Sword describes the attempt by the former exile government to hold on to
its influence over the Polish community in Britain, in effect to create a ‘state-in-exile’.
The exile government wanted ‘the émigré settlement to have a mass character’ in order
to bolster its position. According to Sword, the underlying reason for the former exile
government’s refusal to accept derecognition and dissolve itself was the conviction that
it would soon return to Poland ‘in view of the presumed imminence of confrontation
between Stalinist Russia and the West.’ Thus the former exile authorities sought to keep
the Polish armed forces intact and ready for the expected return to Poland.295
The ongoing existence of a fully-equipped and organised Polish fighting force led by a
virulently anti-communist officer corps under British command and to which Britain
persistently denied Warsaw access created tension in Britain’s relationship with the
provisional Polish government. Britain intended to brook no interference by the Warsaw
government with Polish troops under its jurisdiction. At the same time there was no
293 TNA: PRO FO 371/47603/N9582/6/55, Paris to Foreign Office, 28 July 1945; Foreign Office to Paris,
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desire to exacerbate the tension in Britain’s relationship with the provisional
government by giving free rein to the Polish high command. The British government
was obliged to refute a volley of accusations from Warsaw that Britain was conspiring
against the new government with its enemies by continuing to provide assistance to the
Polish underground. There was suspicion that Polish forces in Italy had provided
supplies to the underground, thus provoking the protests from Warsaw. After this
incident, which was followed closely by a proposal from the Polish high command to
further build up their forces with a view to challenging the Soviet Union, the British
government moved quickly to reduce the influence of the Polish high command. The
War Office Allied Forces Committee had already withdrawn recognition of Bór-
Komorowski as commander-in-chief of the Polish armed forces and of General Kukiel
as minister of national defence. The Ministry of National Defence was to be liquidated
entirely. On 13 July, Anders’s request for permission to transfer 12,000 men from
camps in France to the Polish Second Corps in Italy was refused. On 17 July a formal
ban was instituted on any further expansion of the corps.296 A British military liaison
mission was to be placed in the General Staff Headquarters to ensure that the British
government had proper supervisory control over all the activities of the Polish high
command.297 By 19 July all units of the Polish armed forces in the UK and overseas had
been brought under the direct control of the War Office in Britain and British theatre
commanders abroad. All the ships of the Polish merchant marine were placed under
charter to Britain.298
By early August the Foreign Office had settled on a policy which conformed to
Churchill’s pledge while still aiming at repatriating the greatest possible number of
Poles. The Foreign Office concluded that it would be justified in actively encouraging
Polish citizens to opt for repatriation if the Polish government could be prevailed upon
to promise favourable conditions for returnees. Contrary to some accounts of British
repatriation policy, however, the British government did not try to obscure the reality of
the situation inside Poland in an attempt to trick more ex-servicemen to return.299 In a
memorandum of 9 August, Warner argued that Britain must obtain from the Warsaw
government assurances as to the situation which repatriated Poles could expect to find
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upon their return. According to Warner, ‘these Poles [must] have an opportunity of
making a proper decision, in full knowledge of the facts and do not through the fault of
His Majesty’s Government suffer unnecessarily owing to any mishandling of the very
complicated business of arranging for a proper choice.’ To this end the Foreign Office
requested that the Warsaw government furnish the fullest possible statement of the
conditions to be offered for all those who returned. It should contain definite pledges
covering the Potsdam assurances. The Warsaw government should be encouraged to
proceed with its plans to issue an amnesty, which should be as far-reaching as possible
in order to reassure potential returnees who had supported the London Polish
government. If Warsaw could be persuaded to provide these guarantees, Britain would
have honoured its commitment to the ex-servicemen as well as divesting itself of the
responsibility for providing for a large proportion of them. 300
It soon became clear to the Foreign Office, however, that the Warsaw government was
using the issue of the unrepatriated troops as a stalling tactic to avoid discussion of
serious internal issues. The Warsaw government had no desire to see the return of large
numbers of servicemen who would bolster support for the PSL. Three weeks of talks in
London with a Polish military mission under General Izydor Modelski on the
repatriation issue brought no progress because the Polish military leaders would not
agree to accept all those who wished to return. Warner noted that the Polish government
sought the return only of those troops who would support the PPR. He dismissed as a
‘propaganda line’ the claim that Warsaw sought to repatriate Polish troops ‘en masse’
and were only prevented from doing so by British sluggishness coupled with
interference by the former government-in-exile. Warner concluded that the repatriation
issue had become an excuse for the Polish government to delay elections. When
Cavendish-Bentinck had pressed Bierut on the timing of the elections, reminding him
that he had committed at Potsdam that they would be held not later than February,
Bierut had replied that they could not take place until the Poles who were abroad had
returned home. As a result of the slow progress of repatriation, at the present rate it
would not be possible to hold elections until the middle of 1946. Warner noted that the
War Office could actually repatriate Polish troops much faster if the Polish government
were prepared to accelerate their reception. Mikołajczyk confirmed Warner’s
300 TNA: PRO FO 371/47603/N10002/6/55, Foreign Office Minutes, 8 August 1945; FO
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interpretation and added that the Polish government was anxious not to have the troops
sent back armed and organised in their units. He advised Bevin and Warner to press
ahead with the repatriation preparations in spite of the obstacles thrown up by
Modelski’s mission.301
Internal Situation in Poland
After the Potsdam conference, the British government sought to extend its support to
Mikołajczyk as the struggle between the PSL and the PPR escalated. The Foreign Office
had been alarmed by the news that the PPR had forced Popiel out as leader of the
Labour party, instituting instead Felczak, the leader of the pro-communist dissident
faction of the party. ‘This is pretty shocking’, minuted Warner. ‘[I]f Bierut & co. bring
off this manoeuvre . . . and the similar manoeuvre which we understand from M.
Mikołajczyk they are trying to put over in regard to the Peasant Party, there will be no
real representation of three out of the four recognised democratic parties in Poland’.302
Mikołajczyk had made clear at Potsdam that the strength of the PSL lay in ‘the belief on
the part of his Communist colleagues, that His Majesty’s Government were wholly
behind him.’ Clark Kerr had impressed this point upon Bevin, stressing that
‘Mikołajczyk gather[ed] prestige from every moment he spen[t] in [Bevin’s] presence.’
The Foreign Office requested that the Warsaw embassy staff find out from Mikołajczyk
how Britain could be of most help. The Foreign Office suggested making use of the
Polish government’s expressed desire to see the rapid repatriation of the armed forces
and the return of the merchant marine as a way of applying pressure on the provisional
government to fulfil the assurances given at Potsdam concerning political freedom in
Poland.303
At this point, however, Mikołajczyk believed his position to be strong enough that he
could withstand the pressure from the PPR without the application of sanctions by
Britain. On 15 August Roberts was able to catch a few minutes alone with Mikołajczyk
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at a reception at the Polish embassy in Moscow, where members of the Polish
government were engaged in negotiations on reparations with the Soviet Union.
Mikołajczyk explained that the PSL’s position had been bolstered by Anglo-American
acceptance of Poland’s western frontier, while at the same time the PPR ‘was getting
very little from their Russian friends.’ The Soviets were insisting on further
modifications of the Curzon line in their own favour; an apparently generous offer of a
15 per cent share in Soviet reparations from Germany had been negated by Soviet
insistence on large deliveries of goods from Poland in exchange; and the Red Army was
continuing to strip the country as it withdrew. ‘As a result of the above developments
Bierut and his friends were seriously embarrassed’. Mikołajczyk said that a statement
by Attlee or Bevin at the earliest opportunity in Parliament recapitulating assurances
given by Bierut in Moscow and Berlin would be very helpful. If the situation had not
improved in a month or two, then the application of sanctions would be useful.
Mikołajczyk urged the British government not to use the repatriation issue as a weapon
against the PPR. Western influence in Poland would be enhanced and Mikołajczyk’s
own position improved with the swift return of the greatest number possible. He was
afraid that if time were lost on this issue, Bierut might fill the vacant lands with ‘so-
called Poles’ from the Soviet Union.304 In fact, Mikołajczyk urged the British
government not to be waylaid by the Polish government’s stalling tactics over the
repatriation of Polish servicemen. He predicted that the Polish government ‘would not
dare to obstruct further’ if Britain announced that all the arrangements, including
transport, had been finalised for the return of the troops.305
In spite of Mikołajczyk’s confidence, conditions deteriorated in Poland throughout the
summer and fall of 1945. In early September Cavendish-Bentinck summarised the
political situation in Poland. The assurances given by the Polish government at Moscow
and Potsdam had not been carried out despite a series of warnings from Cavendish-
Bentinck.306 Arrests of opponents of the PPR were continuing. Soviet forces remained
scattered across Poland, providing support for the activities of the Polish security police,
which was in turn directed by the NKVD. These NKVD advisors constituted ‘the
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backbone of police terror,’ directing the arrests that were occurring daily.307 Hankey
described the country as a ‘polizeistaat’ because the security police controlled
‘everything’ in ‘every district’.308 British efforts to secure an amnesty for former
members of the Polish underground army had amounted to little. The upshot would be
the release of some 4,000 persons incarcerated on political charges. Given that the
number of persons being held for political reasons was approximately 40,000, and given
that the term ‘political crimes’ was itself ‘elastic’, the Foreign Office concluded that the
amnesty would only ‘touch the fringes of the problem’ and was ‘worthless from the
political standpoint’.309
A few days later Cavendish-Bentinck reported on a disturbing speech by the vice-
minister of justice in which he declared that the ‘courts of justice must state decisively
on whose side they will be in their everyday work. They must understand that there is
no room for courts of justice which have regard for formal truth.’ The vice-minister had
threatened that if the courts refused to ‘take up a firm attitude in the interests of the vital
matters of the state’, the government would be compelled to establish others in their
place. Cavendish-Bentinck maintained that the PPR leaders were ‘totalitarian in mind’
and would ‘not abandon power without a struggle’. They would do their utmost to
ensure that the election results were in their favour and if they did not obtain the desired
outcome, they would ‘stage some coup de main’ in order to hang on to power. ‘I
submit’, wrote the ambassador, ‘that the possibility, if not probability, of the verdict of
the electorate being set aside should be taken into account.’ The PPR had already
proposed that all political parties should agree upon a list of candidates to be submitted
to the electorate – the ‘electoral bloc’ – which would inevitably be arranged so as to
ensure that the PPR and the parties affiliated to it would hold a majority. If the PSL
leadership acquiesced to pressure from the PPR and joined the bloc, warned Cavendish-
Bentinck, the Polish government would be able to claim that free elections had taken
place and Britain would ‘have no further locus standi for intervention in Polish internal
politics and would have to watch the Communists gradually strangle their political
opponents’. In light of this information, Warner ventured that the situation in Poland
had reached a critical juncture, requiring the British government to set aside its
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preoccupation with the repatriation of Polish citizens under its jurisdiction and apply
heavier public pressure on Warsaw. ‘I rather doubt whether we should hold our hand
any longer on this account. If the courts are communised a crucial phase in the struggle
will have gone against us.’310
Council of Foreign Ministers, London
In view of the deterioration of conditions inside Poland, Cavendish-Bentinck strongly
urged that Bevin make clear to Byrnes and Molotov at the upcoming meeting of the
Council of Foreign Ministers in London that the British government was ‘far from
satisfied’ that the promise of free and unfettered elections could possibly be carried out
effectively in an atmosphere of police terror, persecution of political parties and a
regimented press. Bevin should push the Americans and the Soviets to press the Polish
government on these issues. Finally, he suggested that Bevin use the conference as a
chance to insist on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Polish territory. Warner agreed
with Cavendish-Bentinck’s approach; Foreign Office thinking was moving along the
same lines; officials had already suggested to Bevin that he take advantage of the
upcoming meeting to urge Byrnes to adopt a more active approach to the domestic
political situation in Poland. Following Cavendish-Bentinck’s suggestion, Warner, in
conjunction with Cadogan, proposed the tabling of a resolution at the meeting
committing the four powers ‘to assure complete equality of treatment to all democratic
parties in Poland.’311
Bevin accepted the proposal and the Foreign Office officials drew up the wording of the
resolution and devised a careful strategy to counter Soviet negotiating tactics. The
Foreign Office suspected that the Soviets might try to derail any discussion of the
internal political situation in Poland with accusations that Britain was purposely
obstructing the liquidation of the former Polish government-in-exile and the transfer of
command of the Polish armed forces abroad. Shortly before the Council meeting, the
Foreign Office had received a note from Osóbka-Morawski, which contained ‘a series
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of vague, unsubstantiated and exaggerated accusations about the activities of the former
Polish Government in London’. The Foreign Office concluded that the Polish
government had undertaken this initiative in concert with the Soviet government and
saw it as a signal that Molotov would attempt to obstruct British efforts to raise the
issue of political oppression in Poland by insisting on a discussion of the liquidation of
the former London government and the return of the Polish armed forces.312 If the
Soviets were to repeat these charges, the British would rebuff them by insisting that
these were bilateral Anglo-Polish issues, which were in any case beyond the
competence of the Council. The British would then resolutely steer the discussion back
to the issue of conditions inside Poland, which, they would insist ‘was of considerably
greater importance.’ Bevin also intended to challenge the Soviet Union over the
withdrawal of the Red Army and the NKVD from Polish territory.313
This initial determination to take a strong line on the internal situation in Poland
dissipated as the meeting, which opened in London on 11 September, progressed. The
first task of the Council was to draw up peace treaties for the German “satellite” states
of Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland.314 The atmosphere at the conference
quickly soured due to disagreement over the peace treaties for the Balkan states. On 20
September, the British delegation showed the resolution on Poland to the Americans,
who were reluctant ‘to add another to the causes of friction in the Council.’ The
prevailing tension and the lack of American support for the initiative prompted Bevin to
shelve the resolution on Poland. Informing Cavendish-Bentinck that the British
delegation had not tabled the resolution, Warner promised that they would still try to
raise the issue but added that ‘until the Council extricates itself from a very, very sticky
Balkan morass’, he could not ‘prophesy success’. Cavendish-Bentinck strongly urged
the British delegation to push ahead and table the resolution. Mikołajczyk had recently
requested that the Council issue a public statement reaffirming the Yalta agreement and
expressing a resolve that the forthcoming elections in Poland would take place freely
with full liberty for all democratic parties with some supervision by representatives of
the three signatories to Yalta. Cavendish-Bentinck warned that if the resolution were not
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tabled, Bierut and his followers would conclude that Britain had ‘lost interest in
Poland’.315
The Foreign Office agreed that the opportunity to raise the Polish issue in the formal
context of the Council should not be missed. Warner assured Cavendish-Bentinck: ‘We
are not letting the matter rest . . . and shall press it again in season and out of season. . .
[F]rom Moley [Sargent] downwards have no doubt that it would really be disastrous if
the present meeting breaks up without something being done on the lines we have
suggested.’ At the end of September, as the conference drew to a tense and
unsatisfactory close, Sargent proposed raising the question of Poland after all, noting
that it was doubtful whether this could make the atmosphere any worse than it already
was. Sargent suggested that Bevin and Byrnes inform Molotov that they intended to
instruct their respective ambassadors to protest to the Polish government about the
conditions in which the elections were being prepared. Bevin, however, objected. He
minuted: ‘I believe that if I do anything like this I shall make it worse for our friends in
Poland. I am convinced that I shall do better by dealing direct with Poland and pursue
steadily the policy I am now doing.’ Sargent tried again two days later: ‘[I]f
Mikołajczyk, Stańczyk, & Co. are in any danger, this danger may be increased if we
allow the Polish Government wrongly to think that we are no longer interested in the
fight that these men are putting up in Poland.’ Bevin did not budge, noting that
Sargent’s suggestion was the ‘wrong tactic.’316
Thus the line of policy advocated by the Foreign Office and the Warsaw embassy
collapsed as the first Council meeting broke apart acrimoniously. There is no
satisfactorily complete explanation for Bevin’s refusal to raise the issue of Poland with
the Soviets but it is possible to piece together the main components of the reasoning
underpinning his policy. One source of serious discord at the conference was Soviet
animosity over what it perceived as western intrusion on its sphere of interest in Eastern
Europe by the Anglo-American refusal to recognise the Romanian and Bulgarian
governments.317 These circumstances help to explain Bevin’s comment that raising the
315 TNA: PRO FO 371/47608/N12609/6/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 17 September 1945; Warsaw to
Foreign Office, 18 September 1945; Foreign Office Minutes, 22 September 1945; N12827/6/55, Warner
to Cavendish-Bentinck, 22 September 1945; N12851/6/55, Foreign Office Minutes, 15-20 September
1945.
316 TNA: PRO FO 371/ 47608/N12827/6/55, Warner to Cavendish-Bentinck, 22 September 1945; FO
371/47610/N13705/6/55, Foreign Office Minutes, 26-28 September 1945.
317 Deighton, Impossible Peace, 37.
110
issue of the Polish political situation with Molotov would only undermine
Mikołajczyk’s cause. As Bevin’s comments in the Foreign Office minutes imply, he
might have feared that any British objection to the state of affairs in Poland would be
regarded by the Soviets in the same light as British views on Romania and Bulgaria, and
might ultimately have the opposite of the desired effect, potentially leading the Soviets
to exert tighter control over Poland.
It seems more likely, however, that by this point Bevin was already moving towards the
conclusion that Eastern Europe would be dominated by the Soviet Union, and for
Britain to do more than issue mild protests about conditions there would be to risk a
deterioration in relations which it could ill afford.318 There is some evidence that
Bevin’s thinking was starting to move in this direction. In an aide-mémoire to the
Americans ahead of the London meeting, referring to the ‘Balkan and Danubian
area’,319 Bevin raised the possibility that ‘the time has come to decide whether or not to
acquiesce in this block of countries remaining indefinitely in the Soviet sphere of
influence’.320 He did not refer explicitly to Poland, but his message serves as an
indication of the way his views towards the region were beginning to take shape. The
message also suggests that he was seeking to limit potential sources of conflict in
Britain’s relationship with the Soviet Union. Even after the disastrous end to the
London conference, Bevin had not yet given up hope of establishing cooperation with
the Soviet Union. The outcome of the conference, however, was an unmistakable
indication that relations with the Soviets would be far from easy, and it is very likely
that it reinforced his sense of the importance of eliminating as many sources of conflict
as possible. At this point, Britain also had very low expectations about long-term
American involvement in Europe.321 The abrupt termination of Lend-Lease in August
1945 seemed to signal a US intention to withdraw back into semi-isolation. Uncertainty
about American intentions added to Bevin’s sense of the importance of keeping
relations with the Soviets on an even keel.322 Bevin’s desire for an improvement in
Anglo-Soviet relations was very much in evidence at the interim Council of Foreign
Ministers meeting in Moscow in December 1945, where ‘all three participants . . .
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indulged in an orgy of inessential concessions’ and Bevin sought to impress upon Stalin
‘the peaceful . . . and progressive nature of British policy’.323 I would argue that this
imperative to restore Anglo-Soviet relations, particularly in light of apparent American
unreliability, explains Bevin’s change of tactics on the Polish question at the London
meeting. From this point on, it is evident that he sought to begin the process of
disentangling Poland from Anglo-Soviet relations.
Turning point
After the conference, Bevin met with Cavendish-Bentinck when the latter was in
London. Cavendish-Bentinck summarised the situation in Poland prior to his arrival in
London. The PPR was consolidating its grip on the administrative structure of the state,
with all but a few of the key posts occupied by their nominees. The press was restricted,
particularly the papers belonging to the democratic parties, which struggled to publish.
The Soviet and PPR-controlled security forces had created ‘an atmosphere of terror’.
Soviet troops remained scattered across the country, including in areas where their
presence was unnecessary to protect the lines of communication with the Soviet zone of
occupied Germany. ‘It is clear to me’, concluded Cavendish-Bentinck, ‘that the Polish
Communist clique who have the Government of this country in their hands have no
intention of abandoning power if the elections should go against them.’ The PPR leaders
regarded the election as ‘an obstacle which will be quietly surmounted.’ There was little
hope that the election would be free. ‘Nobody, not even M. Mikołajczyk, believes
that.’324
Cavendish-Bentinck recommended a two-pronged British initiative aimed at both the
Soviet and Polish governments. Cavendish-Bentinck would inform Bierut that the
British government expected elections to be held in Poland no later than February, in
accordance with the undertakings which he had given at Potsdam. He would also insist
that Popiel’s Labour party should not be forced to merge with Felczak’s ‘stooge’
Labour party. At the same time, Britain should press the Soviet government on the
timetable for the withdrawal of their troops from Poland, and of the Soviet officers
attached to the Polish security police. Bevin authorised Cavendish-Bentinck to proceed
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on the lines that he proposed. Clark Kerr was instructed to make the approach to the
Soviets.325 Bevin’s response to Cavendish Bentinck’s proposals serves as an indication
of his thinking on Poland towards the end of 1945: he sought to continue British support
for Mikołajczyk and the PSL with the aim of seeing a democratic government
established in Poland. He was anxious, however, to extricate the Polish issue from the
increasingly fraught context of the Anglo-Soviet relationship. Bevin’s decision to
delegate to Clark Kerr the task of pressing for the withdrawal of Soviet troops is telling
in this regard. While perfectly appropriate diplomatic protocol, it also suggests a desire
to prevent the Polish issue from further embittering his own increasingly poor relations
with the Soviet leaders.
At a meeting several days later, Cavendish-Bentinck found Bierut unwilling to commit
to the British requests. Bierut insisted that elections could not take place until the Polish
nationals abroad had not only returned but had been given a chance to resettle in the
country. In addition, there was the need to resettle the large number of Poles from the
eastern regions which now belonged to the Soviet Union. Bierut predicted that this
repatriation and resettlement process would only be complete in time to hold the
elections by the middle of 1946. Cavendish-Bentinck attempted to impress upon Bierut
that the British government could ‘repatriate Polish nationals at a considerably faster
rate than the Polish authorities are prepared to receive them’. Bierut demurred, claiming
that Poland lacked the rolling stock required to transport the returnees within the
country. On the issue of the forced merger of Popiel’s party with Felczak’s Zryw
Narodowy group, Bierut insisted that the number of political parties needed to be
reduced. The ‘excessive’ number of parties in prewar Poland had led to the collapse of
the parliamentary system. He refused to provide a definite assurance that the two parties
would not be forced to merge.326
The PPR also stepped up its attacks on the PSL in the autumn of 1945. Gomułka
delivered a speech to PPR delegates in Warsaw in which he vilified Mikołajczyk while
the latter was in Québec attending a UN conference. Gomułka claimed that the PSL
received support from extremist elements and denounced Mikołajczyk as the ‘trojan-
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horse by which reactionaries were trying to enter or divide the Government’, claiming
that these forces would use any method necessary, however criminal or violent, to attain
political power. He urged the PSL to purge from its ranks all conservative and fascist
elements and to unite with the SL.327 Offering his analysis of both his meeting with
Bierut and Gomułka’s speech, Cavendish-Bentinck warned that the internal situation in
Poland had reached a turning point and the PPR appeared determined to crush the PSL
as an independent political force. He concluded that the PPR would resist ‘to the death’
the establishment of ‘democratic rights, as they are understood in western Europe’. He
warned that the PSL would have to ‘choose between co-operation with the P.P.R. on the
latter’s own terms or face implacable opposition’.328
In early December, the Polish government launched an anti-British propaganda
campaign with a twofold purpose. It served both as a useful means for the Polish
government to avoid questions regarding the internal political situation and it was
designed to discredit Mikołajczyk as a stooge of the British government, which was
depicted as hostile to Polish interests. Cavendish-Bentinck noted that ‘a real set-back to
British popularity in Poland [would] have a marked effect on Mikołajczyk’s
popularity.’329 In a press interview published on 3 December following his return from
London, Rzymowski launched a concerted attack against the British government. The
attack consisted of a concoction of genuine grievances, misrepresentation of unresolved
issues and outright fabrication. He condemned Britain for resisting the allocation of the
western territories to Poland and accused it of seeking to undermine all of Poland’s most
vital national interests. Rzymowski raised the recurring issues of repatriation and the
final liquidation of the government-in-exile. Rzymowski also claimed that the British
Treasury had submitted a substantial bill to Poland for repayment of the cost of
maintaining, paying and equipping the Polish armed forces. In contrast, Stalin had not
requested any payment for the cost of maintaining and equipping the Polish army in the
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Soviet Union because the ‘Poles had paid with their blood for arms supplied to them for
the common struggle.’330
Similarly, when the first train-load of Polish troops arrived from Italy, Marshal Rola-
Żymierski issued an order condemning the return of the soldiers as individuals without
arms or equipment. In fact, the soldiers had been sent back with their personal arms and
equipment. In contrast, Rola-Żymierski pointed out that Polish troops had returned from
Russia fully armed and still grouped in fighting formations. ‘Every effort is being made
to represent the return of these men as an example of British meanness unworthy of
their sacrifices at Tobruk and Monte Cassino’, concluded Cavendish-Bentinck. Finally,
on 7 December at the PPR congress in Warsaw, Gomułka delivered a speech which was
a ‘savage but veiled attack on M. Mikołajczyk and was also . . . strongly anti-British’.
Like Rola-Żymierski, Gomułka contrasted the British approach unfavourably with that
of the Soviet Union, which was assisting with the reconstruction of power plants and
drainage systems.331
The Polish provisional government used the attacks on the west to deflect attention
away from developments inside the country. Rzymowski’s interview coincided with
reports from Warsaw of an escalation in abuses perpetrated by the security forces,
including arbitrary arrests and indefinite detention with no recourse to legal advice or
trial. The prisons were overcrowded due to the increasing number of arrests by the
security police; prisoners were held in unsanitary conditions and were not allowed
contact with their families. This period also marked an intensification of the attacks
against the PSL, including the murder of the secretary-general of the party. Mikołajczyk
confirmed that the PSL was coming under attack with increasing frequency. At the end
of November, Mikołajczyk told Cavendish-Bentinck that he had a ‘ceaseless fight to
keep any clubs or organisations formed under the auspices of his party from being
closed by the Security Police.’ Two weeks later, Cavendish-Bentinck reported that
Mikołajczyk was ‘permanently engaged in getting his supporters out of prison.’332
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Thus, it became clear by the end of 1945 that the PSL was not strong enough to
withstand PPR pressure tactics without firm support from the western powers. Already
divisions were evident between the different centres of British policymaking as to how
Britain should respond. The diplomats in the Warsaw embassy, observing the direction
of events in Poland first-hand, were anxious to see the implementation of a firm strategy
to discourage the PPR’s abuse of power. The Northern Department supported this
direction of policy and officials did their utmost to persuade Bevin to follow this line.
Within his first half year in office, however, Bevin’s view of the likelihood of ongoing
Anglo-Soviet cooperation had shifted. While at this point he believed he had no choice
but to continue to pursue an improvement in relations, the difficulties he had
encountered at the first Council of Foreign Ministers meeting quickly led him to
conclude that this could only be achieved by removing all the points of friction except
those which were essential to British interests. His approach was therefore to deal with
Polish issues outside the framework of Anglo-Soviet relations as far as possible, a tactic
which was to render British support for the PSL less valuable as the PPR’s pressure
campaign intensified the following year.
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Chapter 3: The Electoral Bloc to the Referendum, January-June 1946
Introduction
The political situation in Poland began to change more quickly in early 1946. The
PPR’s pressure campaign against the PSL, begun in late 1945, intensified; the PSL’s
refusal to join the PPR-led electoral bloc at the end of February deepened the division
between the two sides, and the last pretence of cooperation was dropped. The PSL’s
decision precipitated increased levels of repression against the party and its supporters.
PSL officials and local leaders were harassed, beaten and arrested; several high-ranking
party members were murdered. PSL offices were closed. PSL members of the
provisional government were pushed out of office in contravention of the Moscow
agreement, which stipulated that a prescribed balance of cross-party representation be
maintained. There began to be serious concern for Mikołajczyk’s safety. Foreign Office
officials responded to the deteriorating conditions with an affirmation of their strong
sense of ongoing commitment to the democratic opposition in Poland. The Foreign
Office was unequivocal about its responsibility towards Mikołajczyk. At the end of
May, for instance, Hankey minuted that if Britain stopped supporting Mikołajczyk, he
would be murdered or arrested. ‘That would be our fault’, he stated simply.333
At the same time, a far-reaching reevaluation of British policy towards the Soviet Union
was taking place in the Foreign Office. Alarmed by apparent Soviet ambitions for
expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean and the crisis over the Soviet refusal to
withdraw from northern Iran,334 the Foreign Office reassessed its views of Soviet policy
and intentions. The general conclusion across the British policymaking establishment
was that the lines between Soviet security concerns and Soviet imperialism were
becoming increasingly blurred. Such was the concern about Soviet expansionist
ambitions that the Foreign Office established a Russia Committee in March 1946 to
collate information on Soviet actions in different areas in order to coordinate a British
counterstrategy.335 Bevin’s own views about Soviet intentions were broadly in line with
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those of his officials but he did not adopt an overtly confrontational approach. At this
stage he even sought to avoid discussion of the direction of Foreign Office policy in
Cabinet,336 partly because significant sections of both the Cabinet and the wider Labour
party objected to a foreign policy which they perceived as anti-Soviet, and partly
because Bevin himself still held out some hope that Anglo-Soviet relations could be
restored to a better footing.337
This internal opposition was one factor which influenced Bevin’s policy towards
Poland. It served to reinforce the importance of limiting the number of areas of Anglo-
Soviet disagreement, an approach which Bevin had already begun to adopt after the first
Council of Foreign Ministers meeting. Open confrontation must be restricted to areas of
key British interest. There must be no public set-to with the Soviet Union over Poland.
Similarly, Bevin sought to limit open criticism of the Polish provisional government. In
the same way that much of the Labour party favoured strong relations with the Soviet
Union, there was an inclination to regard the new Polish government as progressive, a
tendency which was strengthened by the visit of a parliamentary delegation to Poland
early in 1946.338 Bevin appears to have been influenced by the Labour delegates, who
reported favourably on the dynamism of the PPS and the PPR. In February, the Foreign
Office and Cavendish-Bentinck were obliged to prevail upon Bevin not to withdraw
British support for the PSL. This incident underscores the way in which Bevin’s
approach was beginning to diverge from that of his officials. In the view of the Northern
Department, the reassessment of Soviet intentions strengthened the importance of
resisting abuses by the Soviet Union or by the Soviet-supported Polish government. For
Bevin, on the other hand, rising doubts about the prospect of long-term Anglo-Soviet
cooperation pushed him further towards the conclusion that the country was “lost” to
the Soviet sphere.
Another important constraint on British policy towards Poland was the position of the
US. At this stage Bevin was essentially pursuing a dual strategy towards long-term
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cooperation with the Soviet Union: continuing to work towards an improvement in
relations and outwardly maintaining the impression of unity, while at the same time
beginning to prepare for a possible breach in relations, most importantly regarding a
possible division of Germany.339 Keeping up the impression of cooperation with the
Soviets was particularly important as long as American intentions remained unclear. In
early 1946, Anglo-American relations were slightly chilly, and the US still appeared
determined to achieve better relations with the Soviet Union. The importance of keeping
British policy consistent with that of the US was reinforced by British financial
dependence on the Americans, following the agreement of an American loan to Britain
in December 1945. The immediate postwar period saw a resurgence of American
isolationist sentiment, and widespread resentment both among the public and in
Congress at having to extend further loans abroad.340
Consequently, Bevin was reluctant to intervene on behalf of the PSL except in
conjunction with the Americans. Every proposal to protest the provisional government’s
abnegation of its obligations under the terms of the Yalta, Moscow and Potsdam
agreements was vetted first with the State Department. On several occasions, when the
US proved unwilling to act jointly with Britain in a demarche in Warsaw, or at least to
proceed along similar lines, Bevin chose not to continue. This need to remain in
lockstep with the State Department stands in contrast to the wartime and immediate
postwar period, when Britain pursued its own policy towards Poland, largely
independent of the US. Overall, British policy towards Poland in the first half of 1946
lacked resolute initiative. This approach was particularly evident in Britain’s weak
response to the PPR’s pre-referendum campaign of intimidation and to the falsification
of the referendum results. British equivocation occurred at a time when the Polish
opposition badly needed robust international support.
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Electoral Bloc
In early 1946, the PPR pressed forward with the idea of a single electoral list of
government parties at the elections. The PPR general secretary, Władysław Gomułka
had first raised the idea of an electoral bloc at the end of September 1945 at a joint
meeting of the PPR Central Committee and the PPS Executive Committee.341 The PPS
did not immediately agree to the bloc because there was serious disagreement within the
party regarding the extent to which it should cooperate with the PPR. The postwar PPS
was a weak and fragmented party, a conglomeration of rivalrous splinter groups which
had formed after the prewar PPS was dissolved in September 1939. The PPS was rent
by internal divisions as different factions, each with competing visions of the party’s
postwar future, vied for control over the leadership. Ultimately, Józef Cyrankiewicz,
who was appointed secretary-general of the party in November 1945 and who favoured
close cooperation with the PPR, prevailed in this power struggle to secure control of the
leadership.342
On 4 November, the PPS Supreme Council resolved to join the electoral bloc,343 and at
a meeting of the Executive Committee at the beginning of April 1946, Cyrankiewicz
managed to outmanoeuvre his opponents and a general resolution was passed in favour
of joining the bloc.344 Although dissenting elements remained in some branches of the
party, from this point onward the leadership of the PPS was committed to cooperation
with the PPR.345 Having secured the cooperation of the PPS, in the first months of 1946
the PPR began to apply increasingly intense pressure on Mikołajczyk to agree to include
the PSL in the bloc. Mikołajczyk’s response was to stall for as long as possible in order
to avoid the repression which would inevitably follow an outright refusal to
cooperate.346 He made vague, general statements stressing the importance of democratic
elections but stopped short of giving a definitive response.
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The Foreign Office objected to the idea of the bloc, ‘both on principle and in [the]
special case of Poland’, noting that a single electoral list ‘reduces elections to a
plebiscite and is in complete conflict with the principle of representative government’.
Further, in Poland, a single list of candidates would not ‘conform to the Polish
Government’s pledge to hold free and unfettered elections in accordance with the Yalta
Agreement’ and would ‘merely result in [a] continuation of the present administration in
a reconstituted form’.347
At the PSL party congress, no definite decision was reached as to whether to accept the
single electoral list. It was agreed that the final decision would depend on the attitude of
the other parties towards the PSL and would be conditional upon the fulfilment of four
minimum conditions: an end to attacks by the security police on the PSL, a cessation of
attacks on the composition of the PSL, an equal allocation of posts in the administration
and in official organisations, and equality of rights with regard to the purchase of
newsprint and the free expression of opinion. Cavendish-Bentinck reported approvingly
that Mikołajczyk had skilfully extricated himself from a difficult position by postponing
the decision. To have declared that he intended to fight the election as the leader of the
opposition would have made it virtually impossible for him to remain in government
and would have resulted in the unrestrained persecution of the PSL throughout the
country. On the other hand, to give in to the single electoral list would have amounted to
surrender in the eyes of his supporters and considerably weakened his position.348
Negotiations regarding the single electoral list began between the PPR, the PPS and the
PSL on 7 February.349 As the negotiations progressed, Cavendish-Bentinck became
increasingly concerned for Mikołajczyk’s safety. He pointed out that the strength of the
PSL depended entirely on Mikołajczyk and there was no other leader who could easily
replace him. A worried letter from Cavendish-Bentinck to Allen reveals the extent to
which the PPR’s violent repression had weakened the PSL. According to Cavendish-
Bentinck, a couple of possible replacements for Mikołajczyk had either been
incarcerated or killed. Further, Mikołajczyk’s life was ‘what the insurance companies
347 TNA: PRO FO 371/56432/N695/34/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 14 January 1946; Foreign Office to
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describe as a “poor risk”’. The ambassador declared that he would be ‘pleasantly
surprised’ if Mikołajczyk were ‘not bumped off before the elections’.350 Mikołajczyk
himself ‘seemed . . . rather nervous and more worried’ than the ambassador had ever
seen him. He anticipated that his refusal to join the electoral bloc would result in his
forcible removal from the government, along with the other PSL ministers, Władysław
Kiernik, Czesław Wycech and Tadeusz Kapeliński, followed by ‘more violent attacks
on [the PSL] and increased persecution of its members.’ As the tension heightened over
the PSL’s refusal to join the single list, Cavendish-Bentinck asked Mikołajczyk what
step would be of greatest help to him. Mikołajczyk responded that a statement in the
House of Commons expressing the British government’s opposition to a single electoral
list would be of most value.351
British Policy Review
It was at just this point, however, that Bevin began to question the strategy of
supporting the PSL exclusively and instructed the Foreign Office to undertake a review
of British policy towards internal political developments in Poland. Following a
meeting in early February with Zygmunt Modzelewski, the Polish vice-minister of
foreign affairs, Bevin expressed anxiety that the British government was over-
committed to the PSL, and was encouraging Mikołajczyk to take an unduly intransigent
position on various issues, including that of the single electoral list. Bevin’s concern
extended beyond Poland to all of the Soviet “satellite” countries. He sought to avoid
giving the impression that the British government was exclusively committed to
supporting the political parties which were widely regarded as anti-Soviet.352
It is difficult to identify any particular aspect of Bevin’s discussion with Modzelewski
that might have prompted him to request the policy review. The main issues covered
were the Warsaw government’s objection to the continued presence of the Arciszewski
government in London, the slow pace of troop repatriation and the negotiations for an
Anglo-Polish financial agreement which were then in progress. Bevin’s only
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instructions immediately after the meeting were to ask Allen to approach the War Office
and the Treasury about the feasibility of Modzelewski’s suggestion to make a payment
of £10 to Polish servicemen upon their return to Poland. Sargent’s letter to Cavendish-
Bentinck does suggest a link between the meeting and the policy review request:
‘Between you and me, the Secretary of State after his interview with Modzelewski . . .
directed that we should not get ourselves into the position of committing ourselves too
exclusively to support of certain political parties or groups which would tend to be
regarded as pro-British elements and as definitely opposed to the Soviet orientation’.353
Bevin’s doubts appear to have derived in part from the report he received from the
members of a British parliamentary delegation, comprised mostly of Labour MPs,
which visited Poland in January.354 In the report which it issued upon returning to
Britain, the delegation commented favourably on the progress already achieved by the
Polish provisional government in rebuilding Polish industry, agriculture, housing,
commerce and social welfare institutions out of the destruction and chaos which had
prevailed in the country at the end of the war. The delegation came out in support of the
presentation of a single list of candidates to the electorate, emphasising the need for
national unity in Poland in order to facilitate much needed ongoing economic
reconstruction. ‘It appears at the moment that the main need of the Polish people is to
learn the art of co-operation in politics’, the report concluded.355 Cavendish-Bentinck
reported that the Labour delegates, having spent most of their time with members of the
PPS, had come away with a positive view of the government, coupled with the
impression that Mikołajczyk’s followers lacked the energy of the PPR and PPS
supporters.356
The British delegates’ impression of PSL weakness was partly due to the constant
presence of minders from the security police who kept Mikołajczyk’s supporters away
from the members of the delegation. Cavendish-Bentinck noted that the presence of the
353 M.E. Pelly et al, eds., DBFPO, Series I, vol. 6: Eastern Europe, August 1945– April 1946 (London:
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security police deterred people from speaking frankly to members of the delegation.
There was little or no opportunity for delegates to venture off by themselves or to
arrange meetings with opposition supporters autonomously. Cavendish-Bentinck
reported that the embassy had had a ‘good deal of trouble’ with the Polish government,
which had attempted to determine the delegation’s entire itinerary. Only ‘after a great
deal of weary work’ by Hankey had the Warsaw embassy been able to arrange for the
delegation to visit places of its own choosing. Cavendish-Bentinck tried to preserve the
independence of the delegation by assigning to it two Polish-speaking members of the
embassy staff. It was not, however, possible to entirely avoid the undesirable scenario
he had foreseen when the idea of the delegation was first conceived: the delegation was
‘bear-led by representatives of the Polish government and carefully sheltered by the
Security Police’. It had proved impossible to prevent the Polish government from
sending their own representatives on the delegation’s tour ‘without an unusually
flaming row’ and so the embassy had acquiesced.357
It is difficult to determine the exact effect of the delegation’s report on the direction of
Bevin’s policy. He initialled the document, so it is clear that he read it. The timing of
Sargent’s private letter to Cavendish-Bentinck in mid-February informing the
ambassador that Bevin had raised the possibility of withdrawing support for the PSL
suggests that the report might have had some influence in this respect. Also of
significance was the delegation’s impression of the role of the Soviet Union in Poland:
‘We had no evidence of direct Russian interference in Polish internal affairs’, stated the
report. While the delegates acknowledged the ‘openly expressed dislike of the Russians’
among the Polish population, they downplayed its significance, attributing the
animosity to ‘the facts of Polish history’, and the poor conduct of some of the Soviet
troops in Poland.358
This conclusion was in keeping with the commonly held view in the Labour party,
which acknowledged that although the Soviet Union was exerting tighter control over
Eastern Europe than the British had hoped, Soviet actions were explicable in view of
their legitimately-held security concerns. The British response, according to this point
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of view, should be to assuage Soviet fears by making a concerted effort to improve
relations. Essentially, a considerable proportion of the Labour party, as well as the
Cabinet, adhered to the wartime and immediate postwar view of the prospects for
ongoing cooperation with the Soviet Union, whereas Bevin’s experience of trying to
reach accommodation with the Soviets in late 1945 and early 1946 had led him to
conclude that this was an unlikely scenario. By this point rumblings of discontent were
beginning to roll through the Labour party over Bevin’s failure to achieve better
relations with the Soviet Union. The first UN General Assembly meeting, held in
London, had become mired in conflict, with Bevin and Andrei Vychinsky, the Soviet
deputy foreign minister trading shots over Greece and Iran.359 On 21 February Bevin
had to report the disappointing outcome of the meeting to the House of Commons in the
context of a planned debate on Anglo-Soviet relations. The debate plainly showed that
there was a widespread refusal on the part of the House ‘to believe that the conflict with
the Soviet Union had gone beyond the point where conciliation was still possible.’ It
was clear to Bevin that he had to tread carefully, providing reassurance to MPs about
the prospects of Anglo-Soviet cooperation but without yielding on points that were
essential to British interests.360 Thus, even as his own views were beginning to change,
Bevin sought to maintain the façade of Anglo-Soviet cooperation.
In the course of the Commons debate, instead of making a formal objection to the single
electoral list in Poland as Mikołajczyk and the Foreign Office had hoped, Bevin
confined himself to recalling the Polish government’s pledges at Yalta and Potsdam to
hold free and unfettered elections. This statement, which made no reference at all to the
single list was of significantly less use in helping Mikołajczyk to withstand PPR
pressure to agree to join the electoral bloc.361 Bevin’s performance in the debate and his
indication to Sargent that he was anxious to avoid the impression that Britain was
exclusively supporting the anti-Soviet political parties in Eastern Europe, suggest that
he was sensitive to internal criticism of his foreign policy and was seeking ways to
counter the charges against him. The delegation’s favourable view of the Polish
government, and its conclusions about the benign quality of Soviet involvement in the
country can only have served to reinforce Bevin’s decision to consider a change in
British policy in Poland as part of a broader attempt to assuage his critics.
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Foreign Office counteroffensive
The Foreign Office sought to counter the effect of the delegation’s report and thwart
Bevin’s attempt to change the course of British policy towards Poland. The Foreign
Office did not want the Polish opposition to splinter into too many different factions and
sought to ensure that all opposition groups rallied around Mikołajczyk, whose victory it
considered ‘the only hope of ejecting the present administration.’362 From the Foreign
Office point of view, Bevin’s prevarication could not have occurred at a worse time.
Near the end of February 1946, the Foreign Office concluded that ‘the critical moment’
was ‘rapidly approaching’ which would decide whether free elections would be held in
Poland.363 It was now vitally important to shore up Mikołajczyk’s position and reaffirm
British support for the Polish opposition.364
In a memo to the secretary of state, Sargent sought to steer British policy towards
Poland back to its previous course. He conceded that the British government should ‘be
careful not to become associated too closely with one particular party’ in all the
countries within the Soviet sphere of influence but warned that ‘if we do not give a
certain amount of support and encouragement to the non-totalitarians they will lose
heart and abandon the dangerous game of opposing the Communist pressure to which
they are being continually subjected.’ Crucially, he added that ‘it may well be said that
it is only the knowledge that the British and American Governments are interested in
their safety that preserves them from being liquidated out of hand by the local
Communists.’ Further, Sargent clearly indicated the Foreign Office’s ongoing sense of
commitment to Mikołajczyk personally: ‘These considerations apply in particular to
Poland, where we are under an obligation to Mikołajczyk, since when we urged him
against his will to go to Poland and enter the Government we promised to do our best to
see that he came to no harm.’365
By mid-March, Sargent and Allen had managed to persuade Bevin that no revision of
British policy towards Poland was necessary. Sargent reaffirmed the aim of British
policy as continuing ‘to work for the weakening of Communist predominance in Poland
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and for something approaching a representative regime. . . . In deciding upon the extent
and manner of our support to Mikolajczyk, our criterion must be . . . whether our action
will do the anti-Communist cause, represented by Mikolajczyk’s party, good or
harm.’366 Nevertheless, although officials succeeded in restoring British policy, the
foreign secretary’s period of indecision coincided with a pivotal moment in Poland as
Mikołajczyk fought for his party’s survival. Mikołajczyk had been hoping for a much
more forceful display of international support for the PSL’s right to contest the elections
independently. The Foreign Office itself regarded such a show of support as essential to
the survival of the Polish opposition, as evidenced by Sargent’s memo. Bevin’s House
of Commons statement, however, had suggested that Britain did not intend to interfere
beyond perfunctory reminders and pro forma protests in internal Polish affairs. The
British failure to show robust support for the PSL at this juncture weakened
Mikołajczyk’s position and helped to embolden the PPR, with a significant increase in
the frequency and severity of attacks on the PSL between February and May 1946.367
Breakdown of electoral bloc negotiations
Although Mikołajczyk strung out the tripartite negotiations for as long as possible, by
the end of February, the talks had broken down. The PSL rejected the terms offered by
the PPR and the PPS, which stipulated that the PSL would have 20 per cent of the seats
in a single list. The PPR and its satellites would have 70 per cent of the seats and
Popiel’s SP would have the remaining 10 per cent. Instead, Mikołajczyk proposed that
the PSL should have a 75 per cent majority and be entitled to elect the president, the
prime minister and the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies. Mikołajczyk told
Cavendish-Bentinck that he had deliberately proposed terms which he knew would be
unacceptable to the PPR because he was determined that there should not be a single list
of candidates.368
Following the collapse of the negotiations with the PSL, the PPR formed a four-party
bloc with the PPS, the Democratic Alliance (Stronnictwo Demokratyczne – SD), and
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the communist-sponsored SL, which had been created in September 1944 as a rival to
Mikołajczyk’s party. The formation of the bloc marked the formalisation of the division
between the PPR-led group and the PSL, and brought about an intensification of the
struggle for political control between the two. The spring of 1946 saw an increase in
PPR attacks on the PSL. Between February and April, 21 PSL activists were murdered;
in May alone 25 were murdered; the killings were almost certainly carried out by the
security apparatus.369 On 10 March at the National Convention in Warsaw of the
Peasants’ Self-Help Association, “delegates” planted by the PPR staged a violent
demonstration against Mikołajczyk. Two days later, security police raided the party’s
headquarters, confiscated equipment, seized documents and arrested several people.
Also in mid-March, the PSL newspaper, Gazeta Ludowa was ordered to restrict its
circulation to 62,500, down from its previous circulation of 85,000. The PPR were
increasingly using the people’s courts, which had originally been set up to deal with
misdemeanours and petty crimes, to justify the imprisonment of PSL members.
Cavendish-Bentinck reported ‘a marked increase in widespread arrests by the Security
Police.’ Finally, in the face of Mikołajczyk’s objections, the PPR had begun recruiting
from among communist supporters in order to establish a people’s militia, intended to
act as a reserve police force.370 Concurrent with its other repressive tactics, the PPR
began to edge the PSL ministers out of government. Mikołajczyk expected that he and
the other PSL representatives would be ejected at any time.371
At the end of March, the British government learned that the Polish government was
planning to hold a referendum at the end of June in which the electorate would be asked
to vote on three issues: the abolition of the Senate; nationalisation of industry and the
implementation of land reform; and the extension of Poland’s western frontier to the
Oder-Neisse line. The timing of the referendum would inevitably require a
postponement of the elections. The British Foreign Office regarded the whole exercise
as nothing more than a stalling tactic to further delay the elections. Cavendish-Bentinck
warned that the PPR’s intention might be to use the referendum to avoid holding
elections at all. He insisted that the announcement of the referendum necessitated some
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form of response from Britain, since the resulting postponement of elections was, as the
Foreign Office noted, a ‘clear breach’ of Bierut’s promise, given at Potsdam, that
elections would be held by February 1946.372
In view of the referendum announcement and the PPR’s increasingly repressive tactics,
Cavendish-Bentinck urged a review of British policy towards Poland. He summed up
the political situation in stark terms. Power was concentrated in the hands of a small
number of communist leaders who relied on the security police to maintain their control
over the population. The PPR themselves had admitted to Cavendish-Bentinck that they
would receive only approximately 20 per cent of the vote in free elections but they had
also ‘made it abundantly clear’ that they had no intention of relinquishing power. The
majority of the population supported Mikołajczyk but were ‘in terror of the security
police and of other means by which the administration can make life intolerable for
them’. The PPR was systematically reneging on the Yalta, Moscow and Potsdam
agreements: they had postponed elections and had changed the balance of power within
the government by gradually edging out the PSL members. The intention of the PPR
was to continue putting off elections using various ruses such as the referendum, while
strengthening its hold on the country via the security police and control over the
administrative machinery. In these circumstances, Cavendish-Bentinck envisaged two
possible courses of action. Britain could either make pro forma protests but essentially
accept that the present Polish administration would remain indefinitely in power or it
could attempt to solicit both American and Soviet support in applying pressure to see
the fulfilment of the undertakings made at Yalta, Moscow and Potsdam.373
The Foreign Office dismissed the idea of trying to enlist Soviet cooperation in applying
pressure on the Polish administration on the grounds that it was ‘highly improbable that
the Soviet Government would fall into line with any suggestions which we might put to
them on this score’. If Britain were to force the issue, the most likely outcome would be
a standoff with the Soviet government. It was important to avoid the Polish question
becoming ‘once again . . . . a direct issue between the Soviet Union and the Western
democracies’. The response to Cavendish-Bentinck’s message underscores how
important it had become to Bevin to keep the Polish issue separate from Anglo-Soviet
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relations. There is a particularly telling comment in the Foreign Office minutes which
indicates that officials were aware that changes in the Polish internal situation could
only – or at least with the best chance of success – be brought about via British pressure
on the Soviets: ‘In fact, though not in form, the Polish situation is already an Anglo-
Soviet issue, but the existence of the Polish Provisional Government as a pawn serves at
least to prevent a deadlock developing directly between the Russians and ourselves (and
the Americans) of the kind which overshadows the whole field of Big power
relations.’374
In addition to concerns about the Anglo-Soviet relationship, Bevin did not want to take
any action on Poland until after elections had been held in Greece.375 Bevin faced strong
opposition from within the Labour party to his Greek policy. A British occupation force,
originally sent in by Churchill at the end of 1944, continued to support an unpopular
right-wing government against a coalition of former anti-fascist resistance groups in
order to prevent the communist-led National Liberation Front (EAM) from seizing
power in Athens. Bevin had managed to withstand calls for the withdrawal of British
forces but nevertheless, an indefinite military occupation of Greece was unsustainable
and a lasting solution depended on a resolution of the political conflict.376 Thus, Bevin’s
priority was to see elections held in Greece as soon as possible.377
The ongoing presence of British troops in Greece and British support for one political
faction over another undermined Britain’s moral authority in complaining about the
conduct of affairs in the countries of Eastern Europe. Bullock points out that ‘Soviet
propaganda agencies took full advantage of the awkward situation in which the British
found themselves in Greece’ and ‘[w]henever Russian actions in Eastern Europe were
questioned, Molotov’s stock retort was to demand the withdrawal of British troops from
Greece’.378 Further, in January 1946, the Soviet Union had brought a formal complaint
about the presence of British troops in Greece before the UN Security Council.
Although the Security Council dropped the issue from the agenda on 6 February without
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taking a vote, this incident highlights the sensitivity which surrounded the Greek issue
and its potential to complicate British relations with the Soviet Union in particular.379
Given the Soviet tactic of obstructing any discussion of the situation in Eastern Europe
with barbed ripostes about Britain’s position in Greece, Bevin regarded as futile any
attempt to intervene in the case of Poland until the Greek elections were safely out of
the way. In keeping with Bevin’s strategy of limiting Anglo-Soviet conflict to areas
which affected Britain’s vital interests, the need to orchestrate the election of a (non-
communist) government that could command sufficient authority to restore political and
economic stability in a country deemed vital to Britain’s strategic interests took
precedence over an intervention in Poland.
Anglo-American representations in Warsaw
Once the Greek elections had taken place on 31 March, the Foreign Office did try to
initiate a joint Anglo-American approach to the Polish provisional government to insist
that they fulfil the Yalta, Moscow and Potsdam undertakings. The Foreign Office also
hoped to force the Polish government to ease its campaign of repression against the
opposition. The Foreign Office viewed the matter with some urgency. The time had
come to ‘make a concerted effort to arrest the present unsatisfactory trend of
developments’, minuted Allen. ‘It is certain that if we allow the situation to deteriorate
much longer without taking any steps to place our views on record there will be no
prospect of saving the cause of democracy in Poland.’ After a discussion with Bevin, it
was agreed that a joint protest should be coordinated with the US. The Foreign Office
hoped that a united front would have more clout.380
In a memorandum to the State Department, the Foreign Office urged that Britain and the
US take action ‘to prevent the Polish Provisional Government gradually producing a
situation in which any hope of moderately free elections will be frustrated for good and
the dictatorship of a Communist minority is permanently established.’ Specifically, the
Foreign Office proposed to raise with the Polish government the suppression of the
democratic opposition, the activities of the security police, and the changes in the
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balance of government. Britain also pressed the State Department to consider
demanding the abolition of the Ministry of Public Security and the transfer of control of
the security police to Kiernik as minister of the interior. Finally, the memorandum noted
that representations were unlikely to be effective unless accompanied by the threat of
sanctions. To this end, the British and American governments should make clear that
any form of financial assistance to Poland would be withheld. John Balfour, now chargé
d’affaires in the British embassy in Washington, stressed to Dean Acheson,
undersecretary of state, and C. Burke Elbrick, assistant chief of the Division of Eastern
European Affairs, the importance the British government attached to the proposals in
the memorandum. Balfour told the State Department officials that his government had
concluded that ‘drastic action on the part of the British and American Governments
[was] necessary’ to avoid the complete elimination of the democratic opposition.381
Consultations with the State Department, however, did not yield the desired effect.
Instead of ‘a full onslaught in one comprehensive joint formal approach’, the Americans
elected for ‘only . . . rather half-hearted informal representations as a first step.’382 The
State Department instructed Lane only to urge the Polish government to fulfil the
commitments agreed at Yalta, Moscow and Potsdam and to issue a public statement
confirming that early elections would be held. No mention was made in the American
protest note about the imbalance in the Polish provisional government or the tactics of
the security police.383
The Foreign Office had planned to ‘make the strongest representations’ possible to the
Polish government.384 Instead, however, because of the great importance Bevin attached
to keeping ‘in step’ with the Americans, the Foreign Office fell into line with the State
Department and accordingly instructed Cavendish-Bentinck to make parallel
representations in concert with Lane. The Foreign Office cautioned Cavendish-Bentinck
‘to keep the form, tone and content of your representations in general conformity with
[Lane’s] and to avoid giving the impression that you are being more vigorous,
acrimonious or comprehensive in your approach than your United States colleague.’385
381 FRUS, 1946. Eastern Europe; the Soviet Union, vol. 6 (Washington: United States Government
Printing Office, 1969), 420-422 & 423-424.
382 TNA: PRO FO 371/56437/N5184/34/55, Foreign Office Minutes, 20 April 1946.
383 TNA: PRO FO 371/56437/N5184/34/55, Washington to Foreign Office, 18 April 1946; FRUS 1946
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384 TNA: PRO FO 371/56437/N4987/34/55, Foreign Office to Washington, 11 April 1946.
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Cavendish-Bentinck delivered the British aide-mémoire to Modzelewski on 24 April. In
order not to diverge from the American line, he avoided any mention about the changes
in the balance of the Polish provisional government or the activities of the security
police.386
Foreign Office officials were clearly disappointed with the soft, circumspect American
approach, which fell far short of the initial British suggestions. This episode highlights
the divergence that was becoming more pronounced between Bevin and his officials.
The instinct of the Foreign Office was to respond to the political repression in Poland
with the strongest possible protest, whereas Bevin’s primary consideration was not to
break ranks with the US. Bevin’s unwillingness to deviate even slightly from the
American line of policy meant that the British protest over the course of events in
Poland was equally weak and ineffective, failing even to cover what the Foreign Office
considered the minimum objections.
In April 1946, the British were planning their strategy for the Paris meeting of the
Council of Foreign Ministers, which began at the end of the month. By this point, Bevin
had moved towards an acceptance of the need for some form of division between the
western and Soviet occupation zones of Germany. Because the Soviets were bound to
object to any move of this kind, it was imperative for the British to first secure
American cooperation. The British tactic was to gradually ‘apprise the Americans of
Soviet intentions’ in order ‘to show the Americans how hard it would be to work
constructively with the Russians.’ Britain must not be seen as the first power to abandon
the Potsdam process. Rather the decision should come from the US in response to
Soviet intransigence.387 The prevailing American view at this point was one of
resentment that Britain seemed inclined to drag the US into a conflict with the Soviet
Union. As Norman Graebner argues, to the US, it seemed that ‘Britain, without
legitimate cause, was making itself the Soviet Union’s special antagonist and seeking to
enlist the support of the United States.’388 It follows, therefore, that Bevin adopted the
same approach in his policy towards Poland, seeking to avoid being more aggressive in
his reproaches of the Polish government than the Americans were prepared to be.
386 TNA: PRO FO 371/56438/N5384/34/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 24 April 1946.
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388 Graebner, ‘Yalta, Potsdam, and Beyond’, in Lane and Termperley, eds., Rise and Fall of the Grand
Alliance, 234.
133
American credits to Poland
The force of the Anglo-American protests was further undermined by the US decision
to extend credit to the Polish government in return for a public assurance that the
referendum was not intended as a replacement for the elections and that free and
unfettered elections would be held in accordance with the Yalta agreement before the
end of 1946.389 The Foreign Office was caught completely off guard by the news.
Cavendish-Bentinck had first alerted the Foreign Office at the end of January that a
mission from the Polish government had gone to Washington in the hope of securing a
credit agreement.390 Over the course of the discussions about the joint protest, Foreign
Office officials had stressed to the Americans the importance of withholding all
economic assistance to Poland, and the State Department had given Halifax a clear
assurance that the US would not extend any credits or financial aid.391 The Foreign
Office reacted with dismay to the news that the State Department planned to go ahead
after all, calling the decision ‘extraordinary’ and ‘disastrous’. The issue was deemed
potentially damaging enough that Halifax was instructed to intervene in a last-minute
attempt to reverse the State Department’s decision before the agreement was formally
announced.392
It appears from the Foreign Office files that Halifax judged it too late to intervene and
the State Department formally announced the credit agreement with Poland on 24
April.393 The American government extended credit in the amount of $50 million to the
Polish government for the purchase of US surplus property held abroad. In addition, the
Export-Import Bank of Washington would extend an additional credit of $40 million to
the Polish government. This credit was limited to use for the purchase in the US of coal
wagons and locomotives. Poland was the principal European coal-producing country
and the US regarded its supplies as essential to rebuilding Western European industry
and reducing European reliance on American coal. In exchange for the credit, the Polish
389 TNA: PRO FO 371/56437/N5350/34/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 22 April 1946.
390 TNA: PRO FO 371/56505/N1000/287/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 22 January 1946.
391 TNA: PRO FO 371/56437/N4987/34/55, Foreign Office to Washington, 11 April 1946; FO
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392 TNA: PRO FO 371/56437/ N5194/34/55, Foreign Office Minutes, 22 April 1946; FO
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government promised that the wagons would be used to transport coal to Western
Europe and the Balkans.394 The Americans had also secured Polish commitments that
the referendum would not serve as a substitute for elections and that elections would be
held before the end of 1946. Crucially, the Polish government promised to provide
compensation for requisitioned or nationalised American property. The Polish
government also undertook to abide by the principles of trade set out in the Mutual Aid
Agreement of 1942, to carry out the United States-Polish Commercial Treaty of 1931,
and to participate in an international trade and employment conference, which the US
was planning. Halifax reported that the State Department considered it a particular
success to have secured Polish participation in this conference, which was part of the
State Department’s broader campaign to establish freer world trade. The Polish
government also undertook not to adopt any ‘measures which would prejudice the
objectives of the conference’. Halifax pointed out, however, that this success was
tempered by ‘the vaguely worded Polish commitment’.395
The general Foreign Office view was that the State Department had secured real
concessions relating to American economic interests in Poland, but had settled for
political assurances which were entirely without value. There was also anger at the way
in which the State Department had ‘thoroughly let down’ their British counterparts. In a
confidential letter to Balfour in Washington, Warner wrote that the Foreign Office was
‘very much taken aback and distressed by the Americans’ behaviour’ and could not
understand ‘their lack of frankness’. In the view of the Foreign Office, the American
decision had totally undermined the British and American protest notes. The Americans,
wrote Warner, had ‘[led] us to think that they would make parallel representations of the
strongest kind to the Polish Provisional Government’ but instead had ‘disclos[ed] at the
very last moment that they were giving them credits in return for quite insufficient – and
indeed I am afraid worthless – assurances.’ Warner’s frustration was unmistakable.
‘How on earth did the Americans come to be so completely unrealistic – especially after
the detailed discussions with us and between the two Ambassadors in Warsaw – as to
the points which required covering?’ He sought an explanation for the sudden change of
tactics in language which departs from the usual crisp, formal Foreign Office style:
394 TNA: PRO FO 371/56438/N5445/34/55, Washington to Foreign Office, 25 April 1946.
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371/56439/N6076/34/55, Halifax to Bevin, 2 May 1946.
135
Were the State Department deliberately concealing from us the fact that they had a
Credit Agreement on the stocks and were they therefore leading us down the lane
in the conversation with Acheson and Elbrick? . . . Or was there sudden high level
intervention? . . . Or was there a lack of liaison inside the State Department? Or
what?
Warner’s letter contains a note of desperation. He recognised that the American move
had the potential to irrevocably damage the Polish opposition movement. He pointed
out that the opposition in Poland was stronger and better organised than in the other
countries of the Soviet sphere. The opposition was ‘well led and not cowed.’ But
without Anglo-American support, that opposition would not be able to withstand
communist pressure indefinitely. ‘Are we, in spite of this, in spite of the Yalta
Agreement and in spite of the encouragement given to Mikołajczyk at Moscow to think
he and his colleagues would receive the support of the United States Government and
ourselves, to allow the tiny Communist minority to increase their hold on Poland?’ It
was by no means clear, he continued, that the Soviet Union was prepared to use the Red
Army openly to keep the Polish communists in power. If, however, ‘we and the
Americans do not play our part and the opposition is driven completely underground we
may well have a bloody civil war in Poland’.396
Warner’s frustration might have arisen from more than just the American about-face. In
effect, Foreign Office policy towards Poland was beginning to fall apart. Instead of
adopting a strongly interventionist approach with the new administration and lending
substantial support to Mikołajczyk, British policy faltered uncertainly. Just at the
moment when Mikołajczyk needed an unequivocal show of international support during
the negotiations for an electoral bloc, Foreign Office officials instead had to focus their
attention on persuading Bevin not to abandon the PSL altogether. Then, having secured
approval to make a protest to Warsaw over its campaign of repression against the PSL,
this initiative also foundered on what the Foreign Office clearly perceived to be
American cowardice and bad judgement, compounded by Bevin’s increasing
unwillingness to part ways with his US counterparts on any major policy initiative.
Cavendish-Bentinck was equally scathing of the American decision on the credit deal,
which he considered an indication of very poor judgement as well as having been
executed with terrible timing. In his view, the intention of the Polish government was
396 TNA: PRO FO 371/56438/N5398/34/55, Warner to Balfour, 1 May 1946.
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unequivocally to ‘remain in power by gradually liquidating or terrorising all opposition’
and only pressure could possibly dissuade them from following this course. Persuasion
would not work. He also pointed out more specific weaknesses in the agreement,
including the American failure to obtain an assurance from the Polish government that
wagons would not be used to transport coal to the Soviet Union.397
The State Department blindsided not only the Foreign Office but also their own
ambassador. The credit deal had been negotiated in Washington by Oskar Lange, now
Polish ambassador to the US, Stefan Litauer, counsellor in the Polish embassy in
Washington, and Ludwik Rajchman, chairman of the Polish Supply and Reconstruction
Mission in North America. Lane had urged the State Department not to extend any
credits to the Polish government. The ‘present Polish ruling clique’ had shown ‘[l]ack of
good faith . . . on so many occasions’. Therefore to accept their assurances, he warned,
‘would . . . imply a lack of understanding on our part of [the] entire situation’ in Poland.
He concluded by urging the cancellation of the credit deal: ‘With the greatest
earnestness of which I am capable I beg the Department not to approve the extension of
any credit facilities at this time.’398 In Lane’s view, the State Department’s decision to
go ahead with the extension of credits rendered him irrelevant. He told Cavendish-
Bentinck that the way in which the State Department had concluded the agreement
would lead the Polish government to believe that the American embassy could be
ignored while Lange, Litauer and Rajchman would be ‘able to persuade [the] United
States Government to do anything that those in power here [in Warsaw] desire.’399
Mikołajczyk also regretted the American decision. The extension of credit served to
strengthen the position of the provisional government, while weakening his own. He
told Lane that the credit had ‘given the impression that the present Polish Government .
. . is not viewed with disfavour by the United States Government.’400
It immediately became apparent that the extension of credit had in no way moderated
the PPR’s repression of the opposition. Allen noted that ‘[t]he Americans have got
nothing out of the Polish Provisional Government in the political sphere in return for
their recent credits’ except a statement by Osóbka-Morawski that elections would take
place in the autumn, an assurance which the Foreign Office deemed ‘quite worthless’.
397 TNA: PRO FO 371/56438/N5507/34/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 26 April 1946.
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Crucially, they had received no guarantee that the interval before the elections would
not be used to ‘paralyse’ the opposition.401
Anglo-American schism
In spite of its frustration with the State Department’s decision to proceed with the credit
deal, the Foreign Office still made an attempt to secure American agreement to make a
joint protest to the Polish government over the persecution of the PSL. In May, the
Foreign Office proposed to take ‘concerted action’ to prevent the PPR from ‘crippling’
the opposition.402 The need to intervene became increasingly urgent as the PPR stepped
up its attacks on the PSL in the run-up to the referendum. The PSL had chosen to use
the referendum as an opportunity to demonstrate its support among the population by
urging the electorate to vote ‘no’ to the question regarding the retention of the Senate.
Official government propaganda on the other hand urged the voters to answer ‘yes’ to
all three referendum questions. Thus the referendum had developed into a showdown
between the PPR-led electoral bloc and the PSL. Cavendish-Bentinck reported that
security police had shut down six more PSL district offices, for a total of nine forced to
close. In other places, instead of closing offices, the security police were arresting local
party leaders.403 In mid-June, Mikołajczyk reported an increasing number of clashes
between the PSL and the security police. He also detailed some of the steps undertaken
by the government to ensure that the desired results were returned in the referendum,
including the complete control by the PPR of the local committees responsible for
supervising the voting.404 Hankey summed up these reports, minuting that ‘there is a
serious danger of a bust-up in Poland if elections are not held. It is obvious tension is
increasing.’ He concluded that the referendum was ‘obviously a political weapon aimed
at [Mikołajczyk]’ and that the PSL was ‘being increasingly discriminated against and
liquidated piecemeal’.405 On 29 June, the day before the referendum, Mikołajczyk held
a press conference in which he detailed the mass arrests of PSL party members and
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supporters across Poland. In the last three weeks, over 1,200 had been arrested, with 700
arrested in the Poznań region alone.406
The Americans, however, again proved unwilling to take a hard line. In early June,
Clark Kerr,407 who had been transferred from Moscow to Washington, reported that the
State Department intended to wait for the report they had requested from Lane on the
recent spate of political arrests in Poland and the attempts to disrupt the PSL before
deciding whether to make representations in Warsaw. This news prompted Hankey to
comment that it was ‘clearly useless waiting further for the Americans.’ He proposed
that Britain go ahead and make the representations it had been contemplating since the
spring without the Americans.408 Later in June, Llewellyn Thompson, the new State
Department chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs, informed Clark Kerr that
it might be impolitic for the US and Britain to make further representations in Warsaw,
since ‘continued special interest’ in the PSL might backfire on Mikołajczyk, who was
already subject to accusations of acting as a stooge of the Western powers. Allen noted
that the ‘State Department’s knees [were] again weakening’ and Hankey concluded that
‘Mr Thompson had obviously been got at.’409
The State Department did briefly suspend its credit agreement and the transfer of
surplus supplies after the Polish government censored the telegrams of American press
correspondents and failed to uphold its promise to publish the exchange of notes
between the Polish ambassador in Warsaw and the State Department regarding the
credit agreement. The arrangement was, however, restored at the end of June after a
brief interval.410 Reporting the decision, Clark Kerr noted that the State Department did
not intend to withhold the extension of credits until fair elections had taken place. The
restoration of the credit agreement again caused consternation in the Foreign Office.
The British were disappointed by the American decision, particularly given the timing
406 TNA: PRO FO 371/56442/N8431/34/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 29 June 1946.
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immediately prior to the referendum. ‘[T]he very worst moment the Americans could
have chosen’, commented Hancock.411
The British government, which had been engaged in its own negotiations for an Anglo-
Polish financial settlement since the end of 1945, announced that it would refuse to
ratify the agreement until the Polish government had fulfilled the terms of the Yalta
agreement and the undertakings given by Bierut at Potsdam. Specifically, Bevin sought
satisfactory assurances that free elections would be held in 1946. Bevin specified that
the agreement would not be ratified if ‘there were indications that measures had been
taken to suppress any of the existing political parties, to hamper their normal activities
or to place any one or more of these parties in an unfavourable position by comparison
with others as regards freedom of organisation or facilities for assembly and public
expression.’412 Bevin had consulted Byrnes over the British decision to attach political
conditions to the financial agreement and the secretary of state had agreed with the
proposal.413 Therefore the American cancellation of the suspension of its own credit
deal was twice as infuriating. The Foreign Office pointed out to the State Department
that the timing was bound to ‘weaken [the] effect of [the] British move and suggest
divergence of view between the two Governments’. An attempt by Clark Kerr to
persuade the State Department to reverse its decision proved fruitless.414
The conclusion of the Anglo-Polish financial agreement brought to an end months of
wrangling over a string of difficult outstanding issues. The British government agreed to
make no claim for repayment of the £73 million spent on equipping and supplying the
Polish armed forces in the West, and to leave in abeyance the question of the repayment
of military credits in the amount of £47.5 million for the payment of salaries to
members of the Polish armed forces, although Britain reserved the right to reopen
discussion of this question. Crucially, Britain agreed to return the Polish gold that had
been deposited with the Bank of England for safekeeping during the war, with the
exception of £3 million which would go towards repayment of the £32 million advanced
by Britain for the maintenance of the Polish civil administration in the UK, including
411 TNA: PRO FO 371/56442/N8260/34/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 25 June 1946; Foreign Office
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welfare and educational services for Polish refugees. Another £10 million was to be
repaid in 15 annual instalments, the first payment of which was to be made five years
after the date of the entry into force of the agreement. Britain agreed to forgive the
remaining balance of this debt. Britain also agreed to transfer to the Polish government
all remaining assets of the former Polish government-in-exile, with the exception of
properties and materials in use for services provided to Polish citizens in the UK.
Finally, Britain agreed to transfer surplus goods to the value of £6 million to the Polish
government.415
These terms, which included a ‘greatly scaled down’ debt416 and the return of a greater
proportion of Poland’s gold, represented a considerable retreat from the British
government’s initial negotiating position and a significant victory for the Polish
provisional government.417 Further, although the Anglo-Polish agreement had only been
signed and not ratified, the Polish government was able to present the signing of the
agreement, together with the American resumption of the transfer of surplus stocks to
Poland, as an important success. The Polish government simply did not announce
publically that British ratification of the agreement was conditional upon the fulfilment
of political conditions. Cavendish-Bentinck reported that both agreements were ‘being
well advertised in the press’, and that both ‘promise[d] great triumph for the
government.’418 Thus, contrary to British intentions, the conclusion of the long-delayed
Anglo-Polish financial agreement just before the referendum served to strengthen the
position of the provisional government, to confer legitimacy upon it and, as Mikołaczyk
had commented to Lane, to give the impression that it was ‘not viewed with disfavour’
by western governments.
Overall, in the run-up to the referendum, British policy was characterised by a lack of
consistency and increasingly, by a division between Bevin’s views and those of his
officials as to the best course of policy. The decision to refuse ratification of the
financial agreement sent a clear signal that Britain intended to insist on the fulfilment of
the Yalta and Potsdam commitments. On the other hand, Bevin was unwilling to adopt
415 TNA: PRO FO 371/56423/N8303/27/55, Anglo-Polish Financial Agreement, 24 June 1946.
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the Foreign Office’s recommendation that ratification be delayed until elections had
actually been held – the ‘most effective condition’, which Britain could impose.419
Similarly, the State Department’s unwillingness to issue a joint Anglo-American protest
to the Polish government over the attacks on the PSL, and particularly its decision to
reinstate the credit agreement, appears to have been a genuine source of frustration for
Foreign Office officials. The Foreign Office urged that the British government go ahead
and make representations to the Polish government without waiting for the US to do the
same but Bevin was reluctant to act unilaterally and ultimately Britain made no protest
over the attacks on the PSL.
Spain and the Security Council
Faced with the increasing likelihood that Mikołajczyk and the other representatives of
the PSL would be thrown out of the Polish government, Cavendish-Bentinck proposed
that in the event of their expulsion, the British and American governments should
consider bringing the Polish government’s non-fulfilment of the Yalta agreement and of
the undertakings given at Moscow and Potsdam before the UN Security Council.420
Mikołajczyk ‘strongly endorsed’ Cavendish-Bentinck’s proposal as the most effective
way of averting widespread disorder and violence throughout Poland, which he believed
would erupt if his party were ejected from the government.421
The Foreign Office was initially receptive to this strategy. Officials drafted a telegram
to Washington, setting out a proposed line of argument in detail. They constructed the
case as follows: first, the composition of the Polish government was not ‘solely a matter
of domestic jurisdiction’ because ‘it formed the subject of international obligations’.
Second, in return for diplomatic recognition by Britain and the US, the Polish
provisional government had undertaken to maintain the balance of representation within
the government until elections had taken place. Therefore Mikołajcyzk’s expulsion
would constitute a breach of the Yalta agreement and of the commitment made in
Moscow in June 1945. Third, following diplomatic recognition, the Polish provisional
419 Hankey made this recommendation and Sargent agreed that it would be the most effective course of
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government had undertaken in writing to hold free elections as soon as possible and
Bierut had repeated this assurance orally to Bevin at Potsdam. Britain could therefore
make the case that the repeated postponement of the elections constituted a further
breach of international obligations. Further, the Polish provisional government had used
the delay to suppress political activity, thus violating the commitment to hold free
elections in which all democratic parties could take part openly. Crucial to the case
would be to show that the breach of these agreements created a situation which
constituted a threat to international peace and security. The Foreign Office proposed to
link the internal political situation in Poland with the large number of displaced Polish
citizens who felt unable to return to the country:
the continued presence abroad of members of Polish Forces and of Polish civilian
refugees, which according to the Polish Provisional Government constitutes a
factor giving rise to international friction . . . is the direct result of the failure of
the Polish Provisional Government to fulfil its international obligations, since it is
precisely because these obligations appear not to have been fulfilled in letter or in
spirit that so few Poles abroad have been prepared to return to Poland. It is
therefore the Polish failure to fulfil obligations which has created international
friction.422
The Foreign Office instructed Balfour in the Washington embassy to explore the
proposal with the State Department as soon as possible after Cadogan, now British
representative to the UN, had been consulted. At this point, however, the plan was
abruptly terminated. Cadogan rejected the proposal outright on the grounds that it
conflicted with the more pressing priority of Spain.423
In the spring of 1946, Britain was engaged in an attempt to foil the Soviet campaign to
impose economic and diplomatic sanctions against Spain in order to bring down the
fascist regime of General Francisco Franco. Britain objected to any measures which
might weaken the Spanish government, believing that any destabilisation could spark
another civil war, opening the way for the communists to seize power. The British
government was far more anxious to avoid a communist regime and the concomitant
extension of Soviet influence in western Europe than to see the removal of Franco.
Britain also had strategic and trade interests in Spain, which would be jeopardised by
any destabilisation or radicalisation of its government. The Soviet Union had first
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proposed an economic and diplomatic blockade against Spain at Potsdam. The British
successfully thwarted this initiative by making the case that Spain did not pose a threat
to international peace and security. Instead, a communiqué was issued condemning the
Franco regime and denying Spain entry to the newly established United Nations
Organisation. The French government then revived the issue in December 1945,
proposing to take the Spanish case to the UN on the grounds that Franco’s regime posed
a threat to international peace. The Quai d’Orsay retracted its proposal under pressure
from Britain and the US, only for Poland, at the behest of the Soviet Union, to take it up
again, submitting a formal complaint to the Security Council in April 1946.424
The Security Council had referred the Spanish question to a five-member sub-
committee at the end of April, which was due to report back to the Council at the end of
June.425 Cadogan planned to argue against intervention on the grounds that ‘the action
of a regime in any country is, par excellence, a matter of domestic jurisdiction.’ He
insisted that he could not then immediately put forth the opposite argument in the case
of Poland without undermining the British position on Spain. Besides, he continued, the
internal affairs of a country could only become a matter for the Security Council if that
country was deemed to pose a threat to international peace, which was not the case with
Poland. ‘I am sorry to be unhelpful, but one has to consider the position in relation to
other questions’, concluded Cadogan. The majority of Foreign Office officials disagreed
with Cadogan’s reasoning, stressing that an issue ceased to be purely domestic once it
had been made the subject of an international agreement. If Mikołajczyk were ejected,
the Polish government would be in breach of the Yalta agreement and of the
undertakings given at Moscow and Potsdam. Nevertheless, Sargent acquiesced,
conceding that it would be ‘impolitic’ to raise the matter with the Spanish question
looming.426
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425 The sub-committee was originally instructed to report to the Security Council before the end of May.
Ultimately, however, the Security Council debated the issue only on 26 June. The Council decided to
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it is seized, in order that it will be at all times ready to take such measures as may become necessary to
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426 TNA: PRO FO 371/56440/N7034/34/55, Cadogan to Sargent, 23 May 1946; Foreign Office Minutes,
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Bringing the Polish issue before the UN Security Council in the spring of 1946 would
have served as a timely warning to both the Polish provisional government and the
Soviet Union that Britain did not intend to overlook violations of the Yalta agreement
and the Moscow and Potsdam commitments. The Foreign Office initially seized on
Cavendish-Bentinck’s proposal as a potentially effective means of bringing pressure to
bear on the Polish government. Allen minuted that ‘a little discreet “whispering” on
these lines might have a healthy effect in Warsaw.’ Officials went so far as to state that
if Mikołajcyzk were expelled from the government and the PSL dissolved, the British
government ‘might have no option’ but to take the issue to the Security Council. The
Foreign Office certainly gave every indication that it intended to proceed with the plan.
Officials developed the exact lines of the argument they intended to put forward in some
detail, devoting considerable time and attention to the issue. The draft telegram to
Washington underwent a series of revisions and there was a considerable amount of
discussion in the internal minutes about the importance of building a watertight case
stressing the international dimension of the Polish issue. In his letter to Cadogan
explaining Cavendish-Bentinck’s proposal, Sargent had closed with a request for advice
as to how to broach the subject with the Americans, indicating that he did not expect
Cadogan to reject the idea outright. Even Cadogan himself acknowledged that ‘one
might be able to make out a fairly plausible case’, and he agreed that there was
‘certainly an international aspect of this question, owing to the undertakings given to us
and other Powers by the Polish Government.’ 427 Thus it is clear that Cavendish-
Bentinck’s proposal was scrapped not because it lacked merit but because Cadogan
judged that it would interfere with higher priorities.
427 TNA: PRO FO 371/56438/N5837/34/55, Foreign Office Minutes, 7-14 May 1946; FO
371/56439/N6206/34/55, draft telegram to Washington; Sargent to Cadogan, 18 May 1946; FO
371/56440/N7034/34/55, Cadogan to Sargent, 23 May 1946.
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Referendum
In the final weeks before the referendum, it became increasingly clear that the Foreign
Office and the embassy in Warsaw were often at odds with the government in their view
of the appropriate policy to pursue in Poland. A private letter from Hankey to
Cavendish-Bentinck reveals the ongoing anxiety amongst officials that Bevin would
decide to withdraw British support for the PSL. Hankey questioned whether, given that
the referendum presented ‘full opportunity for intimidation and faking of results,’ it had
been ‘unwise’ for the PSL ‘to make it an occasion for an apparent trial of strength’. He
explained his concern: ‘What I am afraid will happen is that the results will be
favourable to the Communists and our masters may then say to you and me “What is all
this about the strength of the non-Communist Parties in Poland? Surely our Embassy
and the Northern Department are, after all, mistaken”’. Hankey worried that the results
of the referendum would be misinterpreted by ministers and MPs who did not properly
understand the methods of intimidation and repression employed against the PSL.428
Cavendish-Bentinck’s reply suggests accumulated frustration at the government’s
unwillingness to pursue any of the initiatives he proposed and its great reluctance to
intervene on behalf of the opposition. ‘If, whenever an election takes place, conducted
with totalitarian methods, our masters are going to accept the result as representing the
feeling of the people of the country . . . then they may as well reconcile themselves to
permanent totalitarian Communist regimes in all the countries in which the Communist
Party at present hold the key posts’.429
The referendum was held on 30 June 1946 with a turnout of 85.3 per cent of the
electorate in spite of the intimidation tactics employed by the PPR and the security
police, including the arrest of thousands of PSL supporters, the disbanding of local PSL
committees and the closure of local branch offices prior to the referendum. The official
results of the referendum released by the government were falsified. These claimed that
68 per cent of the electorate had voted for the abolition of the Senate, 77 per cent for
land reform and nationalisation of industry, and 91 per cent for the western frontier with
Germany.430 The British embassy in Warsaw, on the other hand, estimated that a
majority of approximately 80 per cent voted against the abolition of the Senate in order
428 TNA: PRO FO 371/56441/N7963/34/55, Hankey to Cavendish-Bentinck, 19 June 1946.
429 TNA: PRO FO 371/56442/N8518/34/55, Cavendish-Bentinck to Hankey, 25 June 1946.
430 TNA: PRO FO 371/56443/ N9147/34/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 12 July 1946.
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to demonstrate their opposition to the present government. The embassy noted that a
‘surprisingly large proportion’ of the electorate also voted against agricultural reform
and nationalisation.431 These results, which were collected by embassy observers at
polling stations around the country, have since been roughly corroborated by documents
released after 1989. Only 26.9 per cent had voted ‘yes’ to all three questions as they had
been urged to do by official government propaganda. In response to the question about
the retention of the Senate, to which the PSL had urged voters to answer in the negative,
73.1 per cent had voted ‘no’.432
The British embassy reported back to the Foreign Office with ‘voluminous evidence’ on
various instances of fraud in the collection and tabulation of the referendum votes. For
instance, Mikołajczyk showed Cavendish-Bentinck a large wad of voting papers given
to him by a printer who had been ordered to destroy them. Mikołajczyk also reported
that plumbers had been called to unblock a drain in a school building which had been
used as a polling booth to find that it had been clogged by ballot papers. Although the
Foreign Office accepted that the results had been fabricated, the referendum did not
bring about a change in British policy. In fact, as the Foreign Office feared, from this
point on, Bevin’s support for the PSL began to weaken. This was evident immediately
after the referendum, when, for instance, Mikołajczyk requested that the British
government state publically that it did not accept the published results of the
referendum. Although Britain accepted that the referendum results had been ‘cooked’,
the reply to Mikołajczyk’s request was that ‘for the present we feel we have no locus
standi for an official pronouncement of the kind suggested by M. Mikołajczyk.’.433
Bevin also continued to tailor his policy to American requirements. He asked the
Foreign Office to get the views of the State Department before he delivered a response
in the House of Commons to a parliamentary question concerning the timing of the
Polish elections. The Foreign Office proposed that Bevin respond that the British and
American governments shared ‘a common anxiety to see the Yalta and Potsdam
Agreements in respect of Poland implemented and . . . both expect[ed] the Polish
Provisional Government to carry out its obligations under these Agreements’. The State
431 TNA: PRO FO 371/56443/N8598/34/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 2 July 1946; FO
371/56443/N8888/34/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, including ten enclosed reports on the conduct of the
referendum from embassy staff in electoral districts across Poland, 10 July 1946.
432 Prażmowska, Civil War in Poland, 196.
433 TNA: PRO FO 371/56443/N8804/34/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 5 July 1946; Foreign Office
Minutes, 9-11 July 1946; Foreign Office to Warsaw, 12 July 1946.
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Department responded that it would prefer a rephrasing of the statement to avoid the
implication that Britain and the US were ‘“ganging up”’ against the Soviet Union.434
This pattern of moderating the tone of British interventions in Poland, or abandoning
initiatives entirely at the behest of the Americans remained in evidence during the
critical period between the referendum and the elections, when Mikołajczyk most
needed international support in order to prevent the PSL from being completely
sidelined.
434 TNA: PRO FO 371/56444/N9295/34/55, Foreign Office to Washington, 12 July 1946; Washington to
Foreign Office, 12 July 1946.
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Chapter 4: From the Referendum to the Elections, June 1946-January 1947
Introduction
In the summer of 1946, Mikołajczyk announced his intention to seek international
supervision of the upcoming general elections. Mikołajczyk’s announcement came
shortly after the referendum, which the British and American governments judged to
have been conducted in unfair conditions, and whose results had been falsified.
Although the British embassy in Warsaw agreed that international supervision was
essential to ensure that the elections were conducted fairly, the Foreign Office did not
support the request. The Foreign Office’s refusal marked a retreat from its previous
position, which up to this point had almost always been indistinguishable from that of
the Warsaw embassy. The Foreign Office was increasingly torn between the line of
policy advocated by the embassy on the one hand, and Bevin’s increasing reluctance to
actively support the Polish opposition on the other. Bevin’s position was partly the
result of increasing Labour party opposition to his foreign policy, which his opponents
saw as insufficiently socialist and too anti-Soviet. This opposition, which culminated in
an open revolt in the autumn of 1946, increased Bevin’s reluctance to challenge Soviet
conduct in Poland, lest he open himself up to further charges of anti-Soviet bias.
American disengagement also affected the British approach to events in Poland, as
evidenced by the Foreign Office’s decision to drop a plan to bring the issue before the
UN General Assembly after Byrnes objected to the idea. The decline in British
involvement in Polish political affairs was also evident in the failure to exploit a serious
split within the PPS on the issue of long-term cooperation with the PPR. Cavendish-
Bentinck urged his government to make the most of the split, throw its support behind
the independent socialists, and encourage this faction to form an alliance with
Mikołajczyk’s PSL. Although the PPS split caught the interest of the Foreign Office, no
decisive intervention was made; a compromise agreement between the PPS and the PPR
was reached; and the chance passed. As the date of the elections approached, even
Cavendish-Bentinck and the embassy staff, who had always been staunch advocates of
strong British support for the PSL, began to see the elimination of the party as
inevitable. Although British diplomatic staff carefully documented the abuses which
occurred during campaigning, voting, and tabulating, Cavendish-Bentinck ultimately
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advised against further attempts to try to alter the political situation in Poland in any
significant way after the elections. Thus, the months between the referendum and the
elections marked the period during which the remaining British resolve to influence the
composition and system of the postwar Polish government ebbed away.
Mikołajczyk requests international supervision of elections
On 16 July 1946, speaking with foreign press correspondents, Mikołajczyk accused the
provisional Polish government of two violations of the Moscow agreement: the arrest of
more than 5,000 members of the PSL before, during, and after the referendum, and the
failure to appoint a member of the PSL to the Presidium of the National Council (no
PSL member had been appointed to replace Witos after his death in October 1945).
Mikołajczyk also drew correspondents’ attention to the electoral fraud committed by the
PPR during the referendum. In light of these violations, he put forward a number of
demands in connection with the upcoming general elections: every party should be
represented on the electoral committees at every level and there should be complete
freedom of pre-election campaigning.  He also announced that in the coming session of
parliament, the PSL would put forward proposals to ensure that the elections would take
place freely, including the possibility of international supervision.435
The initial response from Hankey suggests that the Foreign Office was beginning to
distance itself from the Polish opposition: ‘Mikołajczyk must feel colossally well
entrenched and backed to speak publicly as recorded.’436 That this comment came from
Hankey is of particular significance. Of all the officials in the Northern Department,
Hankey’s commitment to the Polish opposition was strongest. His reaction to
Mikołajczyk’s announcement therefore indicates that the direction of the line of policy
was towards disengagement. Indeed, just over a week later, at the end of July, the
British government formally rejected international supervision of the Polish elections as
‘unlikely to prove feasible’. The Cabinet Office informed the Foreign, Defence and War
Offices of this decision:
Apart from the difficulty . . . of securing [the] Polish Provisional Government’s
consent, British participation in any plan of supervision would have serious
435 TNA: PRO FO 371/56444/N9328/34/55, Russell to Bevin, 18 July 1946.
436 TNA: PRO FO 371/56444/N9328/34/55, Foreign Office minutes, 20 July 1946.
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objections from our point of view as committing his Majesty’s Government to an
undesirable degree of responsibility for internal developments in Poland.437
Mikołajczyk insisted that international supervision was ‘essential.’ He rejected the
Foreign Office claim that international supervision would be impracticable, repeating
that ‘it was the only possible course.’ If Poland did not receive the support of the
western democracies, the PSL would continue to be suppressed, the elections would be
rigged, and a totalitarian communist regime would be installed. Mikołajczyk predicted
that if this were to happen, there would be an increase in violence across the country;
large numbers of people would join the underground movement; the security situation
would deteriorate to the point of chaos; the government would find its own resources
inadequate to control the country and would have to request more Soviet police and
troops. Ultimately, ‘a state of smouldering civil war would ensue.’ John Russell, first
secretary in the Warsaw embassy asked what assistance, short of international electoral
supervision, Britain could provide, suggesting that it could extract certain assurances
from the Polish provisional government. Mikołajczyk replied that any assurance given
by Bierut had no value unless Britain ‘took measures to ensure its implementation.’438
Mikołajczyk also urged Britain not to let the suppression of Popiel’s Labour party go by
without protest. In a meeting with Russell, Mikołajczyk explained that the liquidation of
the Labour party ‘was a trial intended to test American and British reactions to the
Polish Government’s first direct and flagrant infringement of the Yalta Agreement.
Silence from the Western democracies would be taken as signifying if not assent, then
impotence.’ The PPR would then move against the PSL confident that there would be
no western intervention.  Mikołajczyk urged direct diplomatic intervention on the part
of the British government, preferably at the peace conference, which was then in
progress in Paris, as well as in the House of Commons and in the press.439
Russell counselled strong support for Mikołajczyk. He concluded that ‘[t]o let the
suppression of the work-party go by default would be tantamount to washing our hands
of Poland.’ He argued that Britain should ‘[p]rotest strongly’ against the pre-election
suppression of the opposition parties, and if international supervision were deemed
feasible, ‘go all out to secure it.’ Russell considered it unlikely that Russia and Poland
437 TNA: PRO FO 371/56444/N9711/34/55, Cabinet Offices to J.S.M. Washington, 22 July 1946.
438 TNA: PRO FO 371/56444/N10042/34/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 2 August 1946.
439 TNA: PRO FO 371/56444/N10034/34/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 2 August 1946.
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would consent to supervision, but this ‘need not . . . prevent us from trying.’ Russell
insisted that Britain could not ‘afford to follow a new Munich policy at this stage in
Eastern Europe.’ If international supervision proved impracticable, the British
government ‘should apply pressure now whilst there is a comparative political lull here’
and before the passage of the new electoral law on 20 August. He concluded: ‘In the
immediate future we seem more likely to lose than to win: we must, however, stake all
or we shall most certainly lose all. A new Munich in Poland to-day would be
irretrievable for many years to come, and I am sure that only the boldest of policies now
can save our position in the long-term future.’440
The Foreign Office response to Russell’s request for international supervision highlights
the way in which officials oscillated between intervention and detachment. The
Northern Department agreed to reconsider the possibility of international supervision,
and Hankey came around to supporting the idea. He commented that concerns raised
about the number of observers who would be needed to carry out the supervision had
been overblown. He noted that the Warsaw embassy had managed to produce extensive
and accurate information about the referendum with only 15 observers scattered
throughout the country. Hankey argued that it would be possible to persuade the Polish
government to grant admission to a small corps of observers, which would be enough to
allow the British government to determine whether the elections had been faked. The
presence of a British – and ideally an American – contingent of observers would, in
Hankey’s view, ‘put the Polish Government in a remarkably awkward position and to
that degree would make them more chary of faking the elections.’ Also, crucially, a
corps of observers would improve Mikołajczyk’s position and ‘give the Polish people
confidence’.441
Ultimately, however, Warner rejected the proposal on the grounds that it would be
impossible to secure Polish and Soviet agreement. Further, Warner disagreed with
Hankey about the feasibility of supplying sufficient British personnel to carry out the
task. Finally, and crucially in Warner’s view, any internationally constituted supervision
mission would have to include a Soviet contingent. The Soviets would inevitably
‘connive at falsification of local results wherever possible and refuse to endorse any
440 TNA: PRO FO 371/56444/N10034/34/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 2 August 1946; FO
371/56445/N10332/34/55, Russell to Hankey, 31 July 1946.
441 TNA: PRO FO 371/56445/N10369/34/55, draft telegram by Hankey, 7 August 1946.
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joint report on the elections which was not to their liking’. In short Britain would ‘have
responsibility without effective control’ over the electoral process. The most Britain
could offer would be to send a group of British citizens who would observe the
elections on an unofficial basis. Warner’s decision to override Hankey’s assent to the
request shows that Bevin’s preference for a non-interventionist policy was becoming
more entrenched. Bevin himself was not prepared to reconsider his initial refusal of
international supervision.442
A lengthy argument ensued between London and Warsaw as the embassy tried to
persuade the Foreign Office to agree to formal international supervision. The embassy
argued that Soviet agreement was irrelevant, and that the ‘risk of responsibility without
effective control seems . . . to be one that we have got to take.’ Warner commented that
these views seemed ‘naïve’, and that the embassy’s proposals ‘minimise[d] the practical
difficulties’ of arranging international supervision. Cavendish-Bentinck made a final
attempt to persuade Bevin of the necessity of international supervision. Bevin agreed
that the provisions of the Yalta agreement must be executed. He instructed the
ambassador to tell Mikołajczyk that Britain ‘would back his efforts to secure free
elections to the best of our ability.’ Bevin added, however, that he ‘could not promise
what was impossible’ and he was not prepared to consider international supervision.443
There were a number of reasons for Bevin’s reluctance to consider international
supervision of the Polish elections. First, rising dissatisfaction with the direction of
Bevin’s foreign policy within the parliamentary Labour party partly explains his
resistance to the idea. Bevin’s conduct of foreign policy was generally regarded as
adhering too closely to that of his Conservative predecessor, and the Labour left was
particularly disappointed by his failure to establish an amicable, cooperative
relationship with the Soviet Union. Instead of the election of a Labour government in
Britain giving rise to a dramatic improvement in relations with the Soviet Union, as
many in the party – including Hugh Dalton, the chancellor of the exchequer, and Harold
442 TNA: PRO FO 371/56445/N10369/34/55, Foreign Office to Warsaw, 10 August 1946; N10480/34/55,
Foreign Office Minutes, 16 August 1946.
443 TNA: PRO FO 371/56445/ N10377/34/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 14 August 1946;
N10429/34/55, Hankey to Warner, 16 August 1946; N10480/34/55, Foreign Office Minutes, 16 August
1946.
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Laski, the party chairman – had hoped, there had been a steady deterioration since the
end of the war.444
Bevin’s guarded, suspicious approach to the Soviet Union had become a contentious
issue within the party by the spring of 1946. Critics of Bevin’s foreign policy were
composed of two main factions: the far-left of the PLP, and those closer to the centre
who wanted Britain to lead the way in forging a ‘Third Force’ in international relations,
rather than aligning itself so closely with the US. In arguing for the necessity of better
Anglo-Soviet relations, both factions tended to minimise the gravity of Soviet actions in
Eastern Europe. The far-left regarded the sacrifice of political liberties in the region as
regrettable but justifiable given the attendant economic and social advantages of
communisation. Such significant and far-reaching changes could only be achieved
through the application of ‘firm political control’ in order to counter the inevitable
resistance from the ‘capitalist classes’. According to this interpretation, the curtailment
of political liberties was only temporary; it was a phase which would not last beyond the
inevitable transition period; and would pass once a new economic structure was safely
and firmly in place.445
A larger faction of Bevin’s critics comprised those who believed in the idea that Britain
should function as a ‘Third Force’ in international affairs.446 The Third Force argument
acknowledged that Soviet actions in Eastern Europe had been excessively brutal, but
insisted that some allowance had to be made for legitimate Soviet security concerns.
Britain and the US had done nothing to try to dispel these fears and break the cycle of
mounting hostility. Instead of slavishly following the American lead, Britain should
carve out a new direction in its foreign policy, and take the lead in establishing liberal
socialism in Europe. This would represent a viable and positive alternative to bipolar
hostility, and lay the foundation for genuine and enduring cooperation with the Soviet
Union.447
444 Jones, Russia Complex, 127-9; Bullock, Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 276; Gordon, Conflict and
Consensus, 105-6; Deighton, Impossible Peace, 13.
445 This was the view put forward by, for example, Konni Zilliacus, who was regarded as the ‘most
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fact broken with the communist line over the Soviet invasion of Finland in 1939. Jones, Russia Complex,
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Both factions subjected Bevin to a barrage of criticism at the party conference in
Bournemouth in June 1946. Laski made a ‘radically critical’ speech in which he accused
Bevin of undermining the natural kinship between the Soviet Union and the British
Labour party. He argued that Soviet actions in Eastern Europe were justifiable given
that fascist forces remained active in Europe, and blamed Soviet suspicion of the West
primarily on the atomic monopoly.448 Then in August and September 1946, the New
Statesman published a series of four articles by Richard Crossman, one of Bevin’s most
vociferous opponents, which were highly critical of his conduct of foreign affairs.449
This opposition to Bevin from within the PLP was not negligible. As Bullock notes,
between 1945 and 1950 ‘a minority on the Left of the Party kept up a persistent
criticism of the Government’s foreign policy both inside and outside the House and . . .
the principal target of this guerrilla warfare from first to last was Ernest Bevin.’ The
Soviet Union was opposed to election supervision in Poland; therefore if Bevin pushed
the issue, he risked bringing the simmering conflict over Eastern Europe to a head.
Thus, for Bevin to insist on international supervision of the Polish elections would – by
antagonising the Soviet Union – have risked further incensing the critics of his foreign
policy within the party. Although Bullock also argues that ‘Bevin was never deterred
from doing what he wanted to do by this opposition from his own back benches’, it is
unlikely that he was able to entirely ignore this vocal corps of critics when he made
foreign policy decisions.450 He must have been conscious of the need to carry his party
with him on foreign policy matters. Indeed, Bullock himself acknowledges the view of
the PLP as an important consideration in Bevin’s deliberations over whether to abandon
the idea of a unified Germany, thus creating an open breach with the Soviet Union.451
The unrest came to a head in October when 21 MPs sent a letter to Attlee calling on the
government to change the direction of its foreign policy, to follow socialist principles in
international relations, and above all not to ally Britain so closely with the US. When
Attlee did not immediately agree to meet the group, they gave a copy of the letter to the
press, and it was published in the Manchester Guardian.452 In November, a censure
motion was introduced against the foreign secretary. Fifty-eight Labour MPs, led by
Crossman, signed an amendment to the King’s Speech which criticised the
448 Ibid., 128.
449 Bullock, Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 61, 78, 90, 93.
450 Ibid., 61-2.
451 Deighton, Impossible Peace, 105-9.
452 Jackson, Rebels and Whips, 54-5; Berrington, Backbench Opinion, 56-8.
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government’s foreign policy. The amendment called on the government to ‘provide a
democratic and constructive socialist alternative to an otherwise inevitable conflict
between American capitalism and Soviet communism in which all hope of World
Government would be destroyed.’453 In the ensuing debate, Crossman charged that the
Anglo-American bloc had ‘destroyed’ the centre-left parties in Europe; he pressed again
for Britain to follow an independent ‘third alternative’ policy in cooperation with the
European left, and to refuse to join ‘any ideological bloc’.454 Although the amendment
was defeated 353–0, there were 130 abstentions. This was a ‘damaging figure’, which
meant that the amendment amounted to ‘a demonstration of disapproval’ from a
significant swathe of the centre of the party, and not just from the consistently critical
left-wing faction.455 At the time, the Manchester Guardian described the amendment as
‘the most serious public act of dissent from the policy of the Government which has so
far been committed by Labour members’.456
Bevin himself was attending a Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in New York City
when the amendment was tabled. He was angry and frustrated that this serious party
split had opened up while the Council was in session, and worried that the show of no-
confidence at home would undermine his position in the negotiations with the Soviet
Union.457 Bevin’s private secretary, Dixon, noted that the ‘case of the “Rebels” at home
has been poisoning everything.’ Upon hearing the result of the vote on the amendment,
Molotov was quick to point out that ‘an abstention equals a vote against’. Dixon
observed that: ‘This is upsetting [Bevin], though he maintains a brave face.’458
The Polish government was certainly aware of Bevin’s difficult position vis-à-vis his
own party. In a meeting with Cavendish-Bentinck a few days after the vote,
Modzelewski commented obliquely about the lack of interest within the British
government concerning the Polish elections. Modzelewski observed that Bevin had so
many other things to do that he ‘was certainly not preoccupied with the Polish
elections.’459 The Polish government cannot have failed to note that the Labour party’s
displeasure with the direction of Bevin’s foreign policy and their desire for improved
453 Quoted in Bullock, Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 328.
454 Quoted in Berrington, Backbench Opinion, 58.
455 Bullock, Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 329.
456 Quoted in Jones, Russia Complex, 139.
457 Jones, Russia Complex, 137-143.
458 Dixon, Double Diploma, 241.
459 TNA: PRO FO 371/56450/N14980/34/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 22 November 1946.
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Anglo-Soviet relations meant that Bevin would be more reluctant to antagonise the
Soviets; hence making the chance of any outside interference in the conduct of the
elections more remote.
Beyond pressure from within the PLP for a closer, less antagonistic Anglo-Soviet
relationship, a number of other factors influenced Bevin’s response to the request for
international supervision of the Polish elections. In the summer of 1946, the largest and
most pressing problem occupying Bevin’s attention was the question of the future of
Germany. The situation in the British zone had become unsustainable and needed urgent
attention. Even before the war, the urban, industrialised region which became the
British zone had produced only slightly more than half its own food; the area could not
survive on its own and badly needed to be reintegrated into a larger economic unit.
Britain could no longer afford to provide the food supplies and subsidies required to
sustain the population of its zone, as Dalton frequently reminded Bevin. Loath to take a
step guaranteed to result in a serious breach with the Soviets, and uncertain about the
reliability and longevity of the American commitment to western Europe, Bevin
agonised over this problem.460
At the Paris Council of Foreign Ministers meeting, Bevin warned that Britain could no
longer sustain the burden of maintaining its occupation zone in Germany; the Soviets
had created an impossible situation by taking reparations from their zone while refusing
to share resources or to cooperate in establishing a common import-export system.
Bevin threatened to organise the British zone separately unless the country was
reorganised as a single economic unit. In response to Bevin ‘thow[ing] down the
gauntlet’, Byrnes extended an offer to join the American zone with one or more of the
other occupation zones. As expected, the Soviets reacted angrily; Molotov made a
speech rejecting the dismemberment of Germany, and the meeting ended
inconclusively.461 While the future of Germany hung in the balance Bevin was reluctant
to take up the issue of election supervision in Poland. To put two such unwelcome
prospects before the Soviet Union at the same time might have seemed too much like a
provocation, with potentially explosive consequences. Bevin was certainly anxious
about Soviet intentions. He was beginning to see Soviet expansionism as potentially
threatening, not born of defensive security concerns, as had been the prevailing view
460 Bullock, Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 265, 271, 268-9, 309.
461 Deighton, Impossible Peace, 94-5
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during and immediately after the war, and as his critics in the PLP continued to believe.
In April 1946 Bevin had warned Attlee that Soviet expansionism ‘has engendered its
own dynamic which may prove too strong for [Stalin] . . . I don’t think he’s planning for
war but he may be unable to control the forces he’s started. We’ve always got to be
prepared for that.’462 Further, even after Byrnes’s Paris offer of a bizonal arrangement,
Bevin continued to worry that the Americans would ‘“leave him in the lurch” in
Europe’.463 Thus, Bevin chose to err on the side of caution. Profoundly suspicious of
the Soviet Union and as yet uncertain of the US’s position, challenging the Soviets over
Germany and Poland simultaneously was too risky, too likely to provoke an aggressive
Soviet reaction, as well as a potential backlash at home, recrimination from the
Americans, and the collapse of the nascent arrangements for a solution to the German
problem. Therefore a choice was necessary, and given Germany’s greater importance to
Britain, Bevin elected to stand aside in the case of Poland.
A series of other pressing foreign policy issues also absorbed Bevin’s attention in the
summer of 1946. Jewish attacks on the British in Palestine resumed, including the
blowing up of railways and bridges, the kidnapping of British officers, and in July, the
bombing of the British secretariat and army headquarters in the King David hotel in
Jerusalem, all of which created an urgent need for a solution to the Palestinian problem.
Conflict continued to simmer in Greece. Further, immediately prior to the opening of
the Paris peace conference, Bevin suffered a heart attack, and Attlee was obliged to take
the foreign secretary’s place.464 All of these factors must have conspired to push the
issue of the Polish elections even further down Bevin’s priority list.
Turning to the UN
In spite of its rejection of international electoral supervision, the Foreign Office did
agree with Russell concerning the importance of submitting representations to the
provisional Polish government before the passage of the new electoral law on 20
August, and accordingly sought to coordinate a joint approach with the US.465 Both the
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Washington, 9 August 1946.
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British and American notes were submitted to the Polish government on 19 August.466
The British note expressed concern over the irregularities which had occurred during the
referendum, drawing particular attention to the arrest of leading PSL supporters shortly
before the referendum, as well as to the restrictions imposed upon the opposition parties
during the campaign. Attention was drawn to reports that in some places, members of
the army had been obliged to vote collectively and without conditions of secrecy, as
well as to allegations of electoral fraud during the count. The British government also
protested about the suspension of Popiel’s Labour party. Reminding the provisional
government of its undertaking at Potsdam to hold free elections, the note emphasised
that all democratic parties should have equal freedom and facilities during the upcoming
general election – a condition which was ‘clearly being disregarded’. Finally, the note
specified that all parties should be represented on all electoral commissions at all levels;
votes should be counted in the presence of representatives of all parties; results should
be published immediately in each voting district; and there should be a system for
appeals in the event of electoral disputes.467
Mikołajczyk was pleased with the British and American representations but continued
to try to secure formal foreign supervision of the elections. He told Cavendish-Bentinck
that he would consider bringing the Polish situation before the UN Security Council if
the new electoral law was designed to ensure victory for the PPR and its affiliates.468
Towards the end of August, the Foreign Office considered the possibility of taking the
cases of Poland, Bulgaria and Romania to the UN General Assembly (the Security
Council idea was discarded on the grounds that the Polish situation did not constitute a
dispute which would be likely to threaten international peace). In all three countries,
attacks against opposition parties had intensified over the preceding five weeks, and the
Foreign Office sought to take a step which would reinforce the representations. ‘We
have for some time been casting about for “sanctions” with which to back up our
representations to the Polish Provisional Government’, explained Warner, ‘and we have
been considering the possibility of threatening a resort to the United Nations.’ The idea
466 TNA: PRO FO 371/56445/N10646/34/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 19 August 1946.
467 TNA: PRO FO 371/56445/N10367/34/55, Foreign Office to Paris, 13 August 1946.
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had Cavendish-Bentinck’s support; he thought that the threat of UN involvement
‘would have some effect in the case of Poland.’469
The Foreign Office proposal did not, however, win the support of Jebb, now assistant
undersecretary of state and UN advisor, who objected that Britain would have
‘considerable difficulty’ in getting the matter on the assembly’s agenda, and if Britain
were to fail, ‘it would be represented as a considerable blow.’ Likewise, it was ‘most
improbable’ that the assembly would pass any resolution or recommendation directed
against the regimes in any of the three countries. ‘Here again the failure to secure any
such recommendation would be represented as an attack on these countries which had
been repelled owing to the powerful support given to them by the Soviet Union.’
Further, such a move might result in Soviet withdrawal from the UN. Jebb’s opposition
did little to deter his colleagues. Warner noted his disagreement with many of Jebb’s
arguments; Hancock pointed out that Cavendish-Bentinck, who believed that taking the
case to the UN would give the Polish government ‘a considerable jolt’ and ‘might
influence their policy’, was better placed than Jebb to judge the likely effect. Hancock
added that an appeal to the UN was one of the few levers with which the British could
hope to influence the provisional government and they might ‘be obliged to use it.’470
By late October, the Foreign Office was prepared to proceed with the plan to bring the
matter of ‘the suppression of the liberty of the individual’ in Poland, Bulgaria and
Romania before the assembly. Warner suggested that the ‘shocking state of dictatorship
and repression of pre-electoral activities’ in the Eastern European states could be raised.
It would be ‘particularly desirable’ to draw attention to the case of Poland, given the
proximity of the elections, which seemed ‘likely [to be] faked.’ Bringing the issue
before the assembly could potentially be very effective because ‘one of the things the
Polish Government most fear and dislike is publicity at U.N.O. for their shortcomings.’
Before proceeding, however, the Foreign Office sought first to confirm with Byrnes that
the US did not have any objection to this course of action. Byrnes viewed the plan as
unwise, arguing that it would end in ‘a wrangle with Molotov over the terms of the
469 TNA: PRO FO 371/56446/N10814/34/55, Foreign Office Minutes, 14 August 1946; Warner to Jebb,
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Yalta agreement.’ He maintained that the assembly was not the right forum for such an
argument.471
The idea of bringing the issue of political repression in Eastern Europe before the UN
General Assembly does not come up again in the Foreign Office files after its rejection
by Byrnes. The scuppering of the UN plan highlights Bevin’s increasing reluctance to
deviate from the US in his foreign policy, particularly in any matter which involved the
possibility of conflict with the Soviet Union. American agreement or cooperation had
come to be regarded virtually as a prerequisite for the adoption of a particular policy.
Bevin would not take a policy step towards Poland, or indeed towards Eastern Europe
more generally, without first clearing it with the Americans. By the autumn of 1946,
negotiations were underway for the fusion of the British and American occupation
zones of Germany. These were tricky talks to navigate, as the British attempted to
persuade the reluctant Americans to take on a greater share of the cost of the bizone.472
Just as worrying for Bevin’s strategy for Germany, uncertainty remained about the
degree of US commitment. According to Deighton, ‘the Americans were still taking a
short-term and hesitant view of the bizonal discussions’.473 Thus, while the bizone
negotiations were in progress, it was particularly important not to undertake any foreign
policy initiative which might annoy the Americans and delay the process.
New electoral law
On 22 September, the National Council of the Homeland (Krajowa Rada Narodowa –
KRN) passed the new electoral law. The law contained provisions which made it
possible for the authorities to withhold the right to stand as a candidate, and even the
right to vote. Cavendish-Bentinck predicted that these provisions would be used against
the PSL ‘to the fullest extent possible’. There was no provision in the law to ensure
equal facilities for all democratic and anti-Nazi parties, or to allow them to campaign
without arrest or threat of arrest, and without restrictions on normal electoral
activities.474 Cavendish-Bentinck pointed out that a clause in the law excluding from
voting those who had any connection with the underground could be used
471 TNA: PRO FO 371/56450/N15174/34/55, Warner to Jebb, 27 November 1946.
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473 Ibid., 111.
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‘indiscriminately’ to prevent large numbers of people from voting. Similarly, a
provision in the law barring those who ‘hindered armed resistance to the enemy’ during
the war could potentially be used against members of the Home Army and its leaders.475
Shortly after the passage of the electoral law, the provisional government offered the
PSL 25 per cent of the seats in the Sejm if it agreed to join the other parties in the
electoral bloc. Mikołajczyk told Cavendish-Bentinck that he intended to refuse.476
On 11 October, the Foreign Office noted that ‘a turning point in Polish affairs’ had been
reached. The negotiations for an electoral bloc had broken down; the PSL planned to
contest the election; the electoral law had been passed; the date of the elections would
be announced shortly. ‘Everything now depends on whether or not the Polish
Communists and their satellites will be able to fake the election as they did the
referendum. It seems apparent that they will try to do so, because persecution of the
parties not co-operating with the Communists continues and there is no freedom of
electoral activity.’ The Foreign Office fully supported Mikołajczyk’s decision to turn
down the PPR’s offer to join the electoral bloc and instead to contest the elections. In
addition to destroying his credibility, to accept an offer of 25 per cent of seats would
have been ‘ridiculous’ given that the PSL enjoyed the support of approximately 70 per
cent of the electorate.477
Cavendish-Bentinck now recommended three steps, all of which were accepted by the
Foreign Office. First, Britain should continue to withhold all financial assistance from
the provisional government pending the elections. In particular, no loans or credits
should be granted. This first recommendation came at Mikołajczyk‘s request. He urged
Britain and the US to apply economic pressure on the PPR to ensure fair elections. He
asserted that ‘only . . . pressure from abroad’ would deter the PPR ‘from preventing all
political activity’ by the PSL. In Mikołajczyk ‘s view, the Polish economy was very
weak; he predicted that the situation would become ‘catastrophic’ by the spring of 1947.
An announcement that no financial assistance would be forthcoming would therefore be
a powerful lever with which Britain and the US could exert influence on the Polish
government to ensure that elections were conducted fairly and freely. Second,
Cavendish-Bentinck advised that Britain should formally warn Warsaw that only an
475 TNA: PRO FO 371/56447/N12408/34/55, Cavendish-Bentinck to Bevin, 25 September 1946.
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election in which all parties were allowed to participate freely would be regarded as
fulfilling the terms of the Yalta and Moscow agreements, and the Potsdam undertakings.
Third, the Foreign Office should encourage and facilitate as much unfavourable
commentary as possible in the British press on the lack of political freedom in
Poland.478
To exert financial pressure on the Polish government, Britain had already begun the
process of suspending ratification of the Anglo-Polish financial agreement in early
October. For the negative publicity campaign, the Foreign Office commenced
organising a parliamentary question regarding the electoral law which could serve as a
timely starting point for press stories on the wider political situation in Poland. Before
issuing a formal warning to the Polish government about the conduct of the elections,
however, the Foreign Office sought to secure State Department agreement to a joint
Anglo-American démarche. ‘[W]e should wish to keep in close step with the
Americans’, noted Hankey. Likewise, Warner was ‘a little against another note . . .
unless the Americans will send one too.’479
The State Department prevaricated over whether to issue a formal note addressed
directly to the Polish government concerning the electoral law or a press statement
instead. Both Cavendish-Bentinck and the Foreign Office took a dim view of the idea of
a press statement. Cavendish-Bentinck noted that it ‘would be regarded by the Polish
government or public as of less importance, and it would be easier for the government
to hide the issue of such a press statement in Washington from the Polish public.’480
Likewise, the Foreign Office regarded formal representations as the most effective way
of highlighting the failure of the Polish government to adhere to its pledges regarding
the elections.481 Lane eventually did manage to persuade the State Department to agree
to the presentation of a formal note to the government in Warsaw.482 On 22 November,
Cavendish-Bentinck and the US chargé d’affaires delivered the protest notes from their
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respective governments.483 The British note stressed the necessity for all political parties
to ‘enjoy equal facilities to conduct electoral campaigns freely without arrest or threat of
arrest and without discriminatory restriction of election activities.’ Further, all parties
needed to be represented on all electoral commissions at all levels.484
In light of the inadequacy of the new electoral law, Cavendish-Bentinck again pressed
his government for international supervision of the Polish elections. This time the
Foreign Office was not prepared to reconsider. First the logistical complications were
raised: there were not enough suitably qualified, Polish-speaking observers; it would be
too difficult to secure an adequate number of cars and sufficient quantities of petrol –
although none of these were issues deemed insurmountable when Hankey had
considered the possibility of sending observers a few months earlier in August. Further,
the observers might be held responsible for results which they had not been able to
check. The Foreign Office was also doubtful about the observers’ capacity to collect
hard evidence of misconduct, since any manipulation of the results would be done in
private. The Foreign Office concluded that ‘much as we dislike to disappoint Mr.
Mikolajczyk, we are in the circumstances inclined to doubt whether the disadvantages
of proposing official observers are not greater than the possible advantages.’ Although
the Foreign Office professed a willingness to ‘get as many impartial British subjects as
possible into Poland for the period of the elections’, officials now expressed scepticism
about the efficacy of unofficial observers. Even if it did prove possible to collect
evidence of fraud, it would be difficult to use that evidence in support of any kind of
protest, because of the unofficial status of the observers.485 Essentially, the Foreign
Office rendered the situation impossible – first refusing to send observers in an official
capacity, and then concluding that unofficial observers would be of little use. The
Foreign Office also sought to ascertain the State Department’s position before making a
final decision. The State Department agreed to send observers in an unofficial capacity
only. Lane asked that an expert in electoral procedure be attached to the staff of the
American embassy during the electoral period but the State Department were reluctant
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even to take this step.486 Having received the State Department’s final decision, the
British government confirmed that it too would send only unofficial observers.487
On 20 November, Cavendish-Bentinck informed Mikołajcyzk that the British
government would not be able to do more than send unofficial observers to the Polish
election. Mikołajcyzk replied that there would be little to see during the elections; the
next six weeks would be the crucial period, during which the security police would
begin a campaign of repression in order to ensure favourable results in the election for
the government. It was for this period immediately preceding the election that foreign
observers were needed. Already widespread arrests of PSL members were taking place
in order to ensure that those who were likely to be selected as candidates would be
imprisoned before the candidate lists were published. Mikołajcyzk cited the example of
the town of Wschowa, where five chairmen of the local committee had been arrested in
six months. Cavendish-Bentinck confirmed Mikołajcyzk’s claim about the increased
activity of the security police. ‘[A] campaign of repression appears to be in full swing’
he reported. Hankey commented that it appeared that the election was going to be
‘rigged before ever it takes place.’ All the Foreign Office did by way of assistance,
however, was to resolve to send British press representatives out to Poland to document
these abuses as soon as possible.488 Increasingly restricted by Bevin’s preference to
allow the US to lead on policy towards Poland, the Foreign Office gradually came to
regard a PPR takeover as inevitable. The dispatch of press representatives was a poor
substitute for official inspectors to scrutinise the election process. It sent out an
unmistakable signal of lack of interest, which the provisional government was quick to
perceive.
PPS split
In the summer of 1946, the PPS began to exert greater independence from the PPR. The
PPS leadership was unhappy about the way in which it had been sidelined by the PPR
during the referendum. Instead of treating the PPS on an equal basis, the communists
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had relegated the socialists to the position of ‘junior partner’ in the preparation and
running of the referendum.489 Further, the true results of the referendum had shown how
little support there was for the communist party among the Polish population. At the
same time, however, the PSL had proved powerless to prevent the provisional
government from falsifying the referendum results. Thus, although the referendum
confirmed the PSL’s broad support base, the final outcome represented a setback for the
party. A number of key PPS leaders therefore saw a chance for their own party to take a
more prominent role in the future government.490 The socialists reasoned that, in the
wake of the referendum debacle, Stalin would have to reconsider his support for the
PPR. The PPS, which was friendly towards the Soviet Union, but which also enjoyed
genuine support among the population, was well-placed to assume the leadership
position within a government which would be a true coalition, rather than only a
nominal one, entirely dominated by the PPR.491
Tension rose between the PPS and PPR throughout the summer of 1946, with leaders
from both parties criticising each other publically in speeches and in print. Osóbka-
Morawski asserted in a speech in Łódź that the PPS was the party best-suited to ‘hold
aloft the banner of national unity.’ He maintained: ‘If one can speak of a leading party,
it is the PPS.’492 In August, three prominent PPS members, Henryk Wachowicz,
Bolesław Drobner, and Ryszard Obrączka all declared that the party should wrest
political leadership away from the PPR, or at least should only enter into cooperation
with the PPR if it was ‘on a fully equal basis.’493 The deterioration of the PPR-PPS
relationship also led to internal conflict within the socialist party. In particular, there
was a significant faction which objected to the PPS leadership’s move towards greater
independence from the communists. This dissatisfaction culminated in a leadership
challenge by a group of 28 PPS members, led by the minister of information and
propaganda, Stefan Matuszewski, who from the early postwar period had favoured very
close cooperation with the PPR.494 The pro-PPR group planned to take control of the
party headquarters, arrest Osóbka-Morawski and Cyrankiewicz, and initiate a merger of
489 Prażmowska, ‘The Polish Socialist Party’, 349.
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the communist and socialist parties. The plotters had also apparently enlisted the
support of a prewar PPS military unit, which was brought up from Kielce to assist in the
coup attempt. The plot was discovered; the coup attempt was thwarted; the PPS
leadership expelled one of the leaders, Stanisław Skowroński , from the party, and
ejected Matuszewski from the Executive Committee, which was promptly reinforced by
several of Cyrankiewicz’s allies. Prażmowska argues that ‘the pro-Communist faction,
through its premature action had precipitated the internal consolidation of those
advocating independence from the PPR.’ By the beginning of September, this centrist
group was firmly in control of the party leadership.495
There is some evidence that at the same time as the PPS was pressing for greater
autonomy from the PPR, Stalin was becoming reconciled to the idea of allowing the
non-communist Polish political parties to occupy a larger role in government.  First, in
mid-July, Romer reported that the PPR had been warned by the Soviet government that
they would have to reach some sort of accommodation with the Polish opposition. This
was also the view of the British embassy in Warsaw. Russell reported that the
referendum results had come as a shock in Moscow, where the depth of unpopularity of
the PPR had hitherto not been well understood. Russell explained that neither the Soviet
embassy in Warsaw nor the Politburo in Moscow were particularly well-informed about
the views of the Polish population, largely because the NKVD reported only what they
thought Moscow wanted to hear. ‘I am therefore quite prepared to believe that the
Politburo . . . has issued instructions to its agents in the present Polish Government to
keep things quiet and make an arrangement with the P.S.L. if possible’, commented
Russell.496 In mid-September, Julian Hochfeld, a prominent centrist member of the
PPS,497 reported to Denis Healey,498 secretary of the Labour party’s International
495 Ibid., 349-50.
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Department, that Stalin had promised Cyrankiewicz and Osóbka-Morawski, who had
flown to Moscow to see Stalin after the coup attempt, that the PPS could have larger
representation in the government and even that a ‘genuine offer of collaboration’ could
be extended to the PSL.499 Two weeks later, Witold Kulerski, secretary of the Council
of the PPS, acting as Mikołajcyzk’s envoy in London,500 confirmed that Stalin had
‘agreed to less rigid control in Poland’, that he had consented to Matuszewski’s
expulsion from the PPS, and agreed that the party should ‘be allowed more freedom.’
According to Kulerski: ‘In general Stalin had conveyed the impression that he must
have peace in Poland and that the present regime was not conducting its affairs in a
manner which ensured this.’501
This contemporary analysis of the Soviet position is supported by the interpretations of
several historians. Prażmowska argues that there are ‘strong indications’ that Stalin
spoke directly to the PPR leadership, admonishing them not to completely undermine
the independence of the PPS.502 Likewise, Coutouvidis and Reynolds argue that the
evidence suggests that Stalin reined in the PPR after Cyrankiewicz and Osóbka-
Morawski’s trip to Moscow. According to Coutouvidis and Reynolds, Berman, who
was responsible for liaison with the Kremlin, ordered the leftist PPS group to put an end
to their attempts to take control of the leadership of the party. The authors imply that
Berman did so on instructions from Moscow.503
This shift in Soviet policy was significant, affording a potential opportunity for Britain
to step in and loosen the PPR’s grip on power by offering strong support to a more
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independent PPS. An autonomous PPS could shore up the position of the PSL, and help
to create a viable alternative to a Soviet-dominated single party Polish government.
From the point at which the other democratic political parties were either eliminated or
chose to enter into cooperation with the PPR, the objective of Foreign Office policy had
been to see the PSL form a government following free elections. The PPS’s split from
the PPR offered a means of consolidating the increasingly fragile position of the PSL if
the two parties could be brought into some form of coalition. The importance of this
chance was underlined by Mikołajcyzk , who for months had emphasised that the
political situation in Poland could be ‘saved’ if the PPS broke with the PPR.504 The
Foreign Office recognised the potential significance of this Soviet policy move, seeing
it as a chance to push for greater transparency and fairness in the Polish political
process. Warner minuted that the Soviet instructions ‘justifie[d]’ Britain’s policy of
‘pressing for the fulfilment of the Yalta pledges.’ Bevin, more concerned with
extricating Britain from Polish affairs, noted that although it was ‘right to keep up
pressure’, they must not ‘carry this policy on a moment longer than absolutely
necessary, it must not develop into a kind of amusing sport.’505
In early November, Cavendish-Bentinck, in London for consultations, stressed the
importance of the shift within the PPS. Cavendish-Bentinck reported that the
negotiations concerning the allocation of seats in the electoral bloc continued to drag on,
with the PPS refusing to give in to the PPR’s demands. Cyrankiewicz was key in
resisting PPR domination. Reale, the Italian ambassador to Warsaw, who was also a
member of the executive of the Italian Communist Party, told Cavendish-Bentinck that
the PPR was furious with Cyrankiewicz and regarded him as ‘a virtual enemy.’506 Given
the low level of support for the PPR in Poland, if ‘the rank and file of the Socialist party
[were] becoming increasingly restless under communist tutelage’, a split between the
parties had the potential to alter the configuration of the government quite
dramatically.507 Warner summarised the implications of these changes: ‘[A] break away
on the part of the Polish Socialists would be a matter of quite first-class importance for
future developments in Poland.’ The PPR were ‘in a tiny minority’, and the PPS was the
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second strongest party after the PSL. He also predicted that the reemergence of an
independent, non-communist socialist party in Poland could have important
implications for other Eastern European countries.508
Cavendish-Bentinck advised strong British support for the breakaway faction of the
PPS. He hoped that a meeting could be arranged between Bevin and Cyrankiewicz, who
was due to travel to Bournemouth in early November for an International Socialist
conference. Cyrankiewicz, however, did not attend the conference after all; Ludwik
Grosfeld served as Polish representative instead and the meeting never came to pass.509
Then, on 20 November, Cavendish-Bentinck reported that the PPS and the PPR had
reached agreement on the formation of an electoral bloc. Each of the two parties would
have 28 per cent of the seats in the new legislature; the SL would have 15 per cent; the
[Lublin] Democrat party would have 10 per cent; the other parties allied to the PPR
would have three per cent; and 15-20 per cent of seats would be allocated to the PSL.
Cavendish-Bentinck reported that there had been considerable resistance to the deal
within the PPS. Eventually, however, Stanisław Szwalbe persuaded the majority of PPS
members that ‘the party would gain by conclusion of this agreement.’ Hankey
commented that if the PPS continued to cooperate with the PPR, the two parties
together would control approximately 85 per cent of the seats, although it was
commonly agreed that the PPS and the PPR together could command a maximum of
only 25 to 30 per cent of the votes. ‘All things taken together’, noted Hankey, ‘this
would be about as monstrous a ramp as it is possible to conceive.’510
The Foreign Office was indignant at this blatant instance of manipulation but they had
missed a crucial, albeit narrow, window of time during which they might have assisted
in bringing about a different outcome. Officials continually expressed dismay at the
tactics employed by the PPR to ensure that it wielded absolute control over the political
process, in particular the increasingly brutal suppression of the PSL. Yet when a chance
presented itself for Britain to support the PPS in asserting its autonomy from the PPR,
to encourage the party to pursue an independent line of policy, and to maintain a
separate organisational existence, nothing was done. At this point, PPS leaders were not
508 TNA: PRO FO 371/56449/N14227/34/55, Warner memo, 1 November 1946.
509 TNA: PRO FO 371/56449/N14227/34/55, Warner memo, 1 November 1946.
510 TNA: PRO FO 371/56450/N14980/34/55, Foreign Office Minutes, 22 November 1946; FO
371/56450/N14974/34/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 22 November 1946; Foreign Office minutes, 22
November 1946.
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quite prepared to break entirely with the PPR, believing that ‘it was necessary that
Poland should be governed by a coalition of Communists, Socialists and a Peasant
group.’511 And for its part, the PSL remained reluctant to enter into an alliance with the
PPS as long as the socialists continued any form of cooperation with the PPR.512 Even if
the PPS and the PSL were not without mutual reservations, the British did nothing to
attempt to facilitate talks between the two parties, or to mediate between them.  Had
some form of agreement proved to be achievable, the balance of power between the
Polish political parties would have shifted dramatically.
Part of the problem was a series of delays in dealing with the issue. In September, when
the first reports of a PPS-PPR split began to filter through, the Foreign Office could not
immediately confirm the information.513 Further, the embassy in Warsaw initially
cautioned that the seriousness of the rift should not be exaggerated.514 By the time the
accuracy of the reports had been established, Bevin was in New York for the third
Council of Foreign Ministers’ meeting. Judging from the correspondence, there was a
delay of several weeks before the Foreign Office received his comments. By the time
Hankey responded to Cavendish-Bentinck on 23 November, the PPS and the PPR had
already reconciled and reached agreement. Further, when Bevin did respond, instead of
seizing the chance to offer firm support to an independent PPS, he questioned the source
of the information about the split. Having read Cavendish-Bentinck’s account of his
conversation with Reale, Bevin’s only comment was: ‘What interests me is why Reale if
a faithful Communist Party member should confide in our Ambassador; and much more
why he should retell a story to the disadvantage of . . . his Polish comrades. It is at the
least, unusual behaviour for a communist.’ Bevin wondered if there had been a split in
the Italian Communist Party.515 It is a response which suggests deep indifference to the
course of events in Poland (and indeed in Eastern Europe more broadly). While
511 TNA: PRO FO 731/56446/N10853/34/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 25 August 1946.
512 The PPS opened talks with the PSL on 23 August; they offered 25 per cent of seats in an electoral bloc
to the PSL. The PPR would also have 25 per cent, with 20 per cent for the PPS, and 30 per cent for the
remaining three parties, a ‘formula which came very close to breaking Communist hegemony.’
Mikołajczyk, however, refused to consider entering into an electoral bloc with the PPR, although he was
prepared to consider ‘limited local pacts’ or an agreement which would give a ‘decisive majority’ to the
PSL, the PPS, and the SP. Coutouvidis and Reynolds, Poland, 1939-1947, 263-4.
513 TNA: PRO FO 371/56446/N12218/34/55, Healey to Hankey, 12 September 1946.
514 TNA: PRO FO 371/56446/N11146/34/55, Foreign Office Minutes, 3 September 1946.
515 TNA: PRO FO 371/56449/N14042/34/55, Hankey to Cavendish-Bentinck, 23 November 1946.
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reasonable for Bevin to be sceptical about Reale’s motive for repeating this story,516 the
foreign secretary’s complete lack of interest in (or failure to grasp the significance of)
this change in Polish politics suggests that he regarded the issue as peripheral, and of
low priority for the Foreign Office. Bevin’s main concern seems to have been to
dispense with the whole issue as quickly as possible, as evidenced in July by his
impatient response to Warner’s exhortation to continue to press for fulfilment of the
Yalta pledges.
In spite of the PPS-PPR agreement, discord lingered between the leaders of the two
parties. The main sources of disagreement were the desire of the PPR to put PPS
candidates in an unfavourable position on the electoral lists in certain districts, and
conflict over the allocation of ministries after the elections. In order to break the
deadlock between the two parties, Stalin asked Gomułka and Cyrankiewicz to visit him
in Sochi, on the Black Sea, where he was on holiday. Stalin gave Cyrankiewicz reason
to believe that the Soviet Union supported the ongoing existence of an independent
socialist party in Poland. Stalin even went so far as to condemn the PPR leaders who
sought to establish communist dominance. Armed with these assurances from Stalin,
Cyrankiewicz was able to return to Poland and reassure his own party that the PPS
would not be subsumed by the PPR.517 Cavendish-Bentinck saw the summons of Polish
leaders to Moscow as an indication that the Soviet government understood that unless
the PPR continued to collaborate with the PPS – or at least gave the appearance of
ongoing collaboration – the communists would be unable to retain control in Poland.518
The Soviet summons indicates that Moscow had real concern about the split,
highlighting more starkly the opportunity missed by Britain. Cavendish-Bentinck’s
assessment of this episode was highly accurate: he immediately recognised the moment
when the tension which underlay the PPS-PPR relationship created an opening wide
enough that some carefully applied leverage might have split the parties apart. Likewise,
his reading of the purpose and implications of Stalin’s summons was absolutely
accurate.
516 Reale kept up good relations and met regularly – both officially and socially – with Cavendish-
Bentinck and Lane during his time as Italian ambassador in Poland. Reale described his first meeting with
his British and American counterparts on 8 October 1945: ‘Both of them are happy to cooperate with me
in spite of the fact that Italy appointed a communist as ambassador, and their governments are also not
negative about that fact.’ Reale, Raporty Polska, 12.
517 Prażmowska, ‘Polish Socialist Party’, 350-1; Eleonora i Bronisław Syzdkowie, Cyrankiewicz. Zanim
zostanie zapomniany (Warsaw, 1996), 122-3.
518 TNA: PRO FO 371/56451/N15295/34/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 27 November 1946.
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As an outcome of the Moscow meeting, Cyrankiewicz, whom the Foreign Office had
regarded as the staunchest of the socialists who opposed cooperation between the PPS
and the PPR, was appointed minister without portfolio in the Polish government. The
announcement came on the same day that the PPS-PPR agreement was published. ‘At
first sight’, observed Cavendish-Bentinck, ‘it appears that the agreement is rather a
capitulation’ by the PPS leaders.519 Hankey concluded that the PPS had been ‘bought’
or ‘at least squared’ with assistance from Moscow. ‘The heat has been turned fully on’
the opposition parties, including both the PSL and dissident socialists. Five well-known
members of the PPS who objected to cooperation with the PPR, and who might
plausibly organise independent action of some kind at the time of the elections had been
arrested. ‘[I]t is obvious’, Hankey remarked, ‘that the elections will be cooked.’520
According to Cyrankiewicz’s biographers, however, Stalin’s assurances in Sochi that
the PPS would always ‘be needed by the Polish nation’, and his exhortation that the
PPR leaders cooperate with their PPS counterparts had satisfied Cyrankiewicz that
Stalin’s intention was not the destruction of the PPS.  On the contrary, Stalin had
provided ‘just the guarantees’ sought by Cyrankiewicz and the rest of the PPS
leadership.521
PSL countermeasures
By the end of 1946, the local organisation of the PSL had been badly weakened in many
areas. PSL representatives were to be substantially kept off the local electoral
commissions (covering individual voting districts). The PSL head office was visited by
the security police almost every day. A member of the editorial staff of the party
newspaper had been arrested, together with a typist, both of whom had had contact with
the British embassy. It was becoming increasingly difficult for the PSL to maintain
contact with the British embassy.522 The PSL had been liquidated altogether in the
region523 of Radomsko on the grounds that members of the party continued to belong to
519 TNA: PRO FO 371/56451/ N15385/34/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 29 November 1946; FO
371/56451/N15793/34/55, Warsaw to Attlee, 3 December 1946.
520 TNA: PRO FO 371/56451/N15295/34/55, Foreign Office Minutes, 2 December 1946; FO
371/56451/N15713/34/55, Cavendish-Bentinck to Bevin, 3 December 1946.
521 Eleonora i Bronisław Syzdkowie, Cyrankiewicz, 122.
522 Coutouvidis and Reynolds, Poland, 1939-1947, 275-6, 297-99; TNA: PRO FO
371/56451/N15240/34/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 27 November 1946.
523 Gmina of Radomsko. Literal translation is ‘commune of Radomsko.’
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the underground.524 In the first week of December, Cavendish-Bentinck travelled to
Radom, Kielce, Kraków, Katowice and Częstochowa. He reported that measures were
being taken against prominent supporters of the PSL, particularly in the countryside. ‘It
thus seems to be’, he concluded, ‘that the Polish Government are taking preliminary
steps to prevent M. Mikolajczyk’s Polish Peasant Party from being able to bring about
any widespread movement of protest amongst their supporters.’
The embassy also received very accurate reports from throughout the country
concerning the pressure being applied to factory workers to support the present
regime.525 In his study of the industrial working class in Łódź and Wrocław in the
immediate postwar years, Padraic Kenney explains how the PPR gradually established
control of the factories by appointing personnel directors who reported directly to the
Ministry of Industry. The personnel director (personalny) ‘was an embodiment of the
PPR’s image and was a main conduit of party propaganda into the work force.’
Crucially, the personalny controlled administrative appointments, thus allowing him to
ensure that the more important posts were held by the politically reliable. The
personalny, argues Kenney, ‘could exert considerable pressure on workers in the name
of his party and the state – could become indeed the unofficial ruler of the factory.’526
British diplomatic staff collected detailed local evidence of this type of pressure.
Cavendish-Bentinck reported that the government-appointed communist supervisors in
all factories and offices were taking steps to ‘ensure that the more important and better
paid posts are held by individuals whom they believe to be reliable supporters of the
present regime’, while ‘those who openly voice opinions hostile thereto are
dismissed.’527 Similarly, in Łódź, the consul reported that workers in government-run
undertakings had been given notices of dismissal, with reemployment offered on
condition that they joined the PPR.528
At the end of November, Mikołajcyzk informed Cavendish-Bentinck of the PSL’s plans
for countermeasures against government repression. First, he intended to inform the
Yalta powers of the abuses occurring inside Poland. Both the State Department and the
524 TNA: PRO FO 371/56451/N15238/34/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 27 November 1946; FO
371/56451/N15835/34/55, Cavendish-Bentinck to Bevin, 12 December 1946.
525 TNA: PRO FO 371/56451/N15238/34/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 27 November 1946; FO
371/56451/N15835/34/55, Cavendish-Bentinck to Bevin, 12 December 1946.
526 Kenney, Rebuilding Poland, 32-33.
527 TNA: PRO FO 371/56452/N15949/34/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 7 December 1946.
528 TNA: PRO FO 371/56449/N14649/34/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 12 November 1946.
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Foreign Office initially understood that Mikołajcyzk intended to make a direct appeal to
the Yalta powers, and both objected strenuously to this step, although the Foreign
Office rather reluctantly conceded that it could not object to Mikołajczyk simply
informing the Yalta powers about conditions in Poland.529 Second, the PSL was
planning an economic boycott. The party’s supporters would be instructed not to sell
their agricultural produce or to buy other goods. The Foreign Office asked Cavendish-
Bentinck to quietly discourage Mikołajcyzk from resorting to an economic boycott. It
sought to avoid any action that carried the possibility of eliciting Russian armed
intervention. Put simply, what mattered above all was that the British government
should not appear to have in any way impeded free elections in Poland, while not
actually doing anything concrete to assist the opposition: ‘[W]e must not lay ourselves
open to the charge of having in any way hampered Mikolajczyk in his efforts to secure
free elections. But equally we must not allow him to think that we can give him more
effective help than is in practice possible.’ 530
On 27 November, Mikołajcyzk told Cavendish-Bentinck that the possibility of an
economic boycott was still under consideration. The PSL was also considering
instructing its supporters to stop paying their taxes. Mikołajcyzk dismissed Cavendish-
Bentinck’s concern that this action would result in armed Soviet intervention. Nor did
he think that the Polish population would turn against the PSL for sabotaging the
country’s economy or disrupting the food supply. Cavendish-Bentinck remained
doubtful about the potential consequences if the PSL carried out these threats. He
worried that the Polish government would arrest Mikołajcyzk and threaten to imprison
all those who participated.531
Mikołajcyzk predicted that if the elections proceeded according to PPR plans, the PSL
would be suppressed, he and the other party leaders would be arrested, the underground
movement would gain in strength, and acts of violence would start to occur by the
following spring and summer, possibly culminating in a revolution against the regime.
He warned Cavendish-Bentinck that if the majority of PSL candidates were arrested, the
529 The State Department did not even want Mikołajcyzk to inform the Yalta powers directly about the
repression of the PSL, suggesting instead that he request Bierut to transmit the information. TNA: PRO
FO 371/56450/N15057/34/55, Washington to Foreign Office, 22 November 1946.
530 TNA: PRO FO 371/56449/N14640/34/55, Foreign Office to Warsaw, 16 November 1946; FO
371/56449/N14852/34/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 20 November 1946; Foreign Office to Warsaw, 22
November 1946.
531 TNA: PRO FO 371/56451/N15238/34/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 27 November 1946.
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party might be forced to boycott the election altogether. Cavendish-Bentinck tried to
discourage Mikołajcyzk from taking this step. Likewise, he urged Mikołajcyzk not to
implement his threats of an economic boycott, or a refusal to pay taxes. Cavendish-
Bentinck asked whether ‘some other means’ could not be found for the Polish
population to ‘prove to the world that these elections did not represent their will.’
Mikołajcyzk replied simply that ‘this would be difficult.’532 Cavendish-Bentinck was
closely acquainted with the internal situation in Poland, and he knew that the PSL had
limited room to manoeuvre. He was nowhere near as naïve as this hopelessly vague and
rather pathetic plea suggests. Rather, his comment reflects the increasingly narrow
policy options open to him. Essentially, Britain sought to discourage Mikołajcyzk from
taking any measure which could actually be effective because it might elicit Soviet
intervention and therefore demand substantive western support for the Polish
opposition.
The American government showed even more limited willingness to offer further
support to the PSL. The State Department did not want to make the election rigging
public at all, fearing that any publicity would only encourage Mikołajczyk to boycott
the election and make an appeal to the Yalta powers. If the PSL did decide to contest the
election, the best moment for publicity in the view of the State Department, would be 24
hours before polling day.533 Mikołajcyzk told Cavendish-Bentinck that he had been
‘much disturbed’ upon learning that not only did Washington seek to discourage him
from making an appeal to the Yalta powers but Lane had been instructed not to even
accept the submission of any statement regarding the repression of the PSL.534 In talks
with Lane, Mikołajcyzk confirmed Cavendish-Bentinck’s observation of a ‘rapid
deterioration in the Polish internal situation’, and warned of possible civil war in the
spring. Mikołajcyzk also declared his intention to address a statement to the Yalta
powers, although he would stop short of an appeal requiring action. The State
Department conceded that Lane could accept Mikołajcyzk’s communication, ‘but [was]
not to give it any official cognisance by acknowledging it or replying to it or
commenting on it.’ The Foreign Office instructed Cavendish-Bentinck to ‘keep in line
532 TNA: PRO FO 371/56451/N15295/34/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 27 November 1946.
533 TNA: PRO FO 371/56451/N15703/34/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 7 December 1946; Foreign
Office minutes, 9 December 1946; FO 371/56451/N15704/34/55, Washington to Foreign Office, 7
December 1946.
534 Cavendish-Bentinck reported in his communication with the Foreign Office that Lane had said this.
Lane does not specify in his memoir that he had been ordered not to accept Mikołajczyk’s submission.
TNA: PRO FO 371/56452/N16289/34/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 19 December 1946.
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with Mr Lane’.535 Thus, the already limited support that Britain was prepared to offer
was further reduced by the virtually complete American withdrawal from Polish affairs.
Polish reply to British note
At the end of December, the Polish government replied to the British protest note of 20
November. The Polish government rejected any claim by Britain to the right to involve
itself under the terms of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements in the way in which the
Polish elections were being conducted. As far as the Polish government was concerned,
there were no grounds for further discussion of the subject. Instead, the Polish
government accused Britain of its standard litany of misdeeds: continuing to support
and provide funding to members of the former government-in-exile; British failure to
relinquish supreme command of the Polish armed forces, and the further recruitment of
‘a new semi-military formation under the name of a Polish Resettlement Corps’;536
failure to safeguard the property of the Polish state in Britain, transferring it instead to
members and officials of the former exile government; failure to return Polish gold;
failure to return Polish naval vessels; failure to repatriate Polish citizens who wished to
return home; failure to accept the agreed number of German refugees in the British zone
of occupation in Germany.  The letter concluded with the hope that ‘the British
Government in future will devote more attention to its own obligations.’537
The Foreign Office recognised that ‘this recital of all [the] Polish Government’s
grievances’ amounted to a diversionary tactic, designed to deflect attention away from
the abuses in the run-up to the elections. The Foreign Office speculated that the Polish
government was also acting with an eye to the eventual publication of the note, which
would help to further its anti-British propaganda campaign.538 The British reply
observed that all of the Polish government’s accusations had ‘previously formed the
subject of official discussions and some of them have been revived without apparent
535 TNA: PRO FO 371/56452/N16189/34/55, Washington to Foreign Office, 18 December 1946; Foreign
Office Minutes, 20 December 1946; Foreign Office to Warsaw, 21 December 1946.
536 The Polish Resettlement Corps (PRC) was established in May 1946 as a means of facilitating the
settlement in Britain of Polish servicemen who had decided against returning to Poland. Although
officially a military unit under British military control, the PRC was an unarmed non-combatant
formation. Keith Sword, ‘Absorption of Poles into Civilian Employment in Britain, 1945-1950’, in
Bramwell, ed., Refugees in the Age of Total War, 236.
537 TNA: PRO FO 371/56452/N16283/34/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 20 December 1946.
538 TNA: PRO FO 371/56452/N16290/34/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 20 December 1946.
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reason at this particular juncture.’ Nevertheless, each allegation was addressed
individually. Britain emphasised that it had withdrawn recognition from the former exile
government and that the ex-members who had remained in Britain had been treated as
private individuals. Britain rejected the contention that it had been obliged to hand over
supreme command of the Polish armed forces under its control. There existed no such
obligation. The Potsdam agreement went no further than committing the three
signatories to ‘assist the Polish Provisional Government in facilitating the return to
Poland as soon as practicable of all Poles abroad who wish to go’, including members of
the armed forces. The note pointed out that the majority of the armed forces had been
unwilling to return to Poland, and the British government was ‘not prepared to bring
compulsion to bear on those who are unwilling’ to go back. Repatriation of all Polish
citizens had also been delayed by the Polish government’s insistence on screening each
individual by consular staff before granting reentry. The speed of repatriation continued
to be much slower than Britain would have wished. The British government denied the
claim that the resettlement corps had any military purpose, having been formed solely
for the purpose of facilitating the integration of its members into civilian life. With
regard to the non-ratification of the Anglo-Polish financial agreement and the
consequent retention of the gold covered by that agreement, the British government
noted that ratification had been subject to a set of clearly stated conditions, the details of
which had been explained to the Polish ambassador in London from the outset. The
transfer of Germans from Poland had been delayed by the difficult conditions in the
British zone of occupation that winter. The Polish government was well aware of these
circumstances. The letter concluded with an expression of regret that the Polish
government had found it necessary ‘to make this series of accusations and allegations,
and to publish them without awaiting an answer.’
The British reply also returned to the question of the conduct of the elections, reminding
the Polish government that ‘the manner of holding elections in Poland is the subject of
international agreements and is more than a purely domestic concern. The Polish
Provisional Government are bound by the undertakings they entered into in return for
recognition as well as by the Potsdam Agreement  . . . to hold free and unfettered
elections.’ It was therefore ‘natural and proper’ for the British government to express
concern over breaches or near breaches by the Polish government of its undertakings
under the terms of those agreements.  The British government pressed the issue of the
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restricted representation on the electoral commissions, the inadequate system of
appealing in the event of an electoral dispute, and the failure to provide equal facilities
to all political parties to conduct their election campaigns freely without ‘arrest or threat
of arrest or discriminatory restrictions.’ The reports of widespread arrest were causing
‘very grave concern’ to the British government.539 Although the British reply served as
a well-timed reminder to the Polish government immediately prior to the elections, the
warning it contained was empty in that it repeated the same points as the November
note, and carried no threat of sanctions if the Polish government failed to live up to the
Yalta and Potsdam undertakings.
Run-up to elections
The month preceding the elections saw a sustained increase in attacks on the PSL. In
light of the increasing severity of these measures of repression, Cavendish-Bentinck and
Lane proposed to address another joint statement to the Polish government, again
pointing out that the conduct of the elections did not correspond to the Yalta and
Moscow agreements. In the view of both the ambassadors, it was crucial that the notes
be submitted before the elections.’ Cavendish-Bentinck submitted a draft statement for
review by the Foreign Office, as well as by the British embassies in Moscow and
Washington. Instead, however, Bevin opted to make informal representations to the
Soviet Union concerning the Polish elections. Specifically, the British ambassador to
Moscow, Maurice Peterson was to raise the ‘improper measures taken by the Polish
authorities to influence the results of the elections’, in line with the view already
expressed by the State Department. ‘You should express the hope’, continued the
Foreign Office instructions, ‘that the Soviet Government will use their great influence
with the authorities of the Polish Government block . . . to remedy the situation . . .
[T]he present complete disregard of the Yalta and Potsdam pledges will seriously
embarrass relations between our two Governments and will inevitably have a serious
539 TNA: PRO FO 371/56452/N16290/34/55, Foreign Office to Warsaw, 10 January 1947.
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effect on the improved atmosphere that has resulted from the agreements reached in
New York [at the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting].’540
Bevin himself wrote the note instructing his officials to drop the approach to the Polish
government and take the matter up with the Soviet authorities instead. Bevin’s
reasoning is not explained in the Foreign Office files but it seems significant that these
instructions were issued in the wake of the Labour rebellion. Bevin’s decision to
redirect the British protest to the Soviets and to soften its terms suggests that he sought
to avoid a public confrontation with the Soviet Union which would inevitably
antagonise his detractors in the PLP. Further, in the months immediately following the
meeting in New York, Bevin was drawing up his plan on the long-term future of
Germany. The plan proposed revisions of the Potsdam protocol which would facilitate
the handover of power back to the Germans themselves, and the implementation of
measures which would make Soviet involvement in western Germany nearly
impossible. These proposals were bound to be deeply unpopular with the Soviet Union.
It seems reasonable, therefore, to conclude that Bevin sought to limit the points of
serious contention between Britain and the Soviet Union, choosing to prioritise
Germany over Poland.541
Peterson met Molotov on 11 January. Peterson began by enumerating the Polish
government’s repression of the PSL. Molotov agreed that the elections should be free
but added that the Soviet Union had no reason to suppose that this would not occur.
Britain’s information must have come from opposition sources, observed Molotov. At
this point Peterson discarded his brief and expressed his intention to speak frankly and
personally. ‘The Soviet Government in Poland’, he said ‘seemed . . . to be over playing
their hand.’ He assured Molotov that ‘there was no conceivable risk’ that any ‘great
power in the world today . . . would support in any [Eastern European country] a
Government hostile to the Soviet Union.’ Peterson urged the Soviet government ‘to
trust more completely in democratic processes and to give up the practice of trying to
maintain minority Governments in power against the opposition of the majority.’
540 TNA: PRO FO 371/66089/N6/6/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 31 December 1946; N29/6/55, Warsaw
to Foreign Office, 31 December 1946; N451/6/55, Memorandum to Bevin, 8 January 1947; N231/6/55,
Foreign Office to Moscow, 9 January 1947.
541 Deighton, Impossible Peace, 120-21.
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Molotov promised that the Soviet government would think over what the British and
American ambassadors had said.542
Peterson’s meeting with Molotov was the final significant attempt on the part of the
British government to influence the political settlement in Poland. In the crucial weeks
leading up to the elections, Britain was already beginning the process of disengagement
from Polish affairs. Mikołajczyk perceived this withdrawal. He warned that the public
had noticed that recent BBC broadcasts in Polish had made few allusions to specific
events or to the general situation in Poland, particularly with regard to the elections.
According to Mikołajczyk, this change in the broadcasts was being ‘construed by the
public as an intimation that [Britain had] lost interest.’ Cavendish-Bentinck warned that
it was important to ‘avoid the impression that we are disinteresting ourselves from
events in Poland.’543
Essentially, Britain had written off the PSL before the elections had even taken place.
The Foreign Office’s diminishing support for Mikołajczyk and his party was reflected in
the language of the minutes, reports and telegrams. For example, a report on 10 January,
a week and a half before the elections, included the comment: ‘If we are correct in
assuming that Mikolajczyk’s party can do nothing more effectively to secure their rights
. . .’544 This statement suggests a marked diminishment in support for the PSL leader.
There was a shift in focus towards ensuring that Britain not appear to have been
negligent in meeting its commitment to see that free and fair elections were held in
Poland: ‘If this policy failed we should make it clear to the world that it was not because
we lost interest or were pusillanimous in our support but because of Soviet (and Polish)
intransigence.’545
With regard to the post-election period, Cavendish-Bentinck predicted that the PSL
would be broken up and an attempt would be made to eliminate Mikołajczyk. Instead,
the Foreign Office turned its attention to the PPS, speculating that once the party
realised that ‘if Poland is completely communised they also will be eliminated, they will
begin to stand up to the latter. While hitherto rather lacking the courage of their real
convictions and for the moment temporarily squared by the electoral agreement . . . they
542 TNA: PRO FO 371/66089/N500/6/55, Moscow to Foreign Office, 11 January 1947.
543 TNA: PRO FO 371/56452/N16562/34/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 31 December 1946.
544 TNA: PRO FO 371/66090/N658/6/55, ‘British Policy towards Poland’, 10 January 1947.
545 TNA: PRO FO 371/66090/N658/6/55, ‘Future British Policy in Poland’, 10 January 1947.
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have been showing interesting signs of restiveness in recent months.’ Cavendish-
Bentinck agreed that the PPS would begin to stand up to the PPR after the elections, in
which case they would be likely to receive strong support from the public since all hope
for better conditions would rest with the PPS ‘after the reduction of the Polish Peasant
Party to impotence.’546
Meanwhile, the PPR intensified its efforts to completely destroy the PSL. In October,
the political-education department of the Polish army had established special protection-
propaganda groups (Grupy Ochronno Propagandowe – GOP), which were charged with
disseminating pro-government election propaganda in nine electoral districts around the
Katowice and Wrocław areas in villages where a high proportion of inhabitants
supported the PSL. Acting in concert with the UB, these groups collected the names of
all PSL activists, as well as known supporters of the illegal underground bands, the
National Armed Units (Narodowe Siły Zbrojne – NSZ) and Freedom and Independence
(Wolność  i Niezawistosc – WiN). Thus, as far as the state was concerned, supporters of
the legal opposition were now equated with those who assisted illegal, armed
underground organisations. In spite of the army’s claim that PSL party cells were
disbanding or transferring their allegiance to the parties of the democratic bloc under the
influence solely of the GOPs’ ‘persuasion, [rather] than pressure’, in fact the GOPs
relied on ‘physical force and intimidation’, or threats thereof, to dissuade voters from
supporting the PSL.547
The British embassy obtained very detailed information about the activities of the
GOPs, which it called ‘flying sections.’ Cavendish-Bentinck obtained a copy of a
directive issued to the GOPs, which specified that the speeches delivered by the groups
were intended to incite the population against the PSL and to provoke the PSL ‘to acts
which would give cause for reprisal.’548 Through Mikołajczyk, Cavendish-Bentinck also
secured a copy of a propaganda booklet distributed by the GOPs to every household in
the villages they visited. The booklet extolled the virtues of the government and
denounced the PSL. He predicted that the groups would be an important tool in the PPR
election campaign in the countryside. According to Cavendish-Bentinck, the use of the
army to spread propaganda was ‘a new departure in Poland.’ In his view, ‘[t]he
546 TNA: PRO FO 371/66090/N658/6/55, ‘British Policy towards Poland’, 10 January 1947.
547 Prażmowska, Civil War in Poland, 200-201.
548 TNA: PRO FO 371/56452/N16236/34/55, Cavendish-Bentinck to Bevin, 20 December 1946.
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conception is clever for the Army as a whole is the one body in the Polish State which
has always maintained its popularity.’549
The PPR also sabotaged the PSL’s electoral structure. This was achieved largely
because the communists had managed to gain control of the local electoral
commissions, either directly or indirectly through ‘compliant members of other parties’
or through individuals recruited by the UB.550 The Warsaw embassy received detailed
reports about the PPR’s sabotage campaign. For instance, ‘[e]very effort’ was made to
prevent the PSL from submitting their lists of candidates before the deadline on 19
December. In one area, the president of the district electoral commission was
‘indefinitely absent’ when the PSL representatives applied to submit their lists, or those
responsible for delivering the candidate lists or collecting supporting signatures were
arrested.551 By the end of December, 24 PSL offices had been closed.552 According to
the government, the closures occurred when connections were found between PSL
members and the underground. There was no doubt in Cavendish-Bentinck’s mind that
this was a spurious excuse, and was simply part of the regime’s plan to ensure a
desirable outcome in the elections. Likewise, the Foreign Office concluded that this
news ‘confirm[ed] our fears of the extent to which the present regime in Poland will go
to cook the elections.’553
Michael Winch, first secretary in the Warsaw embassy, returned from Kraków just after
the new year with reports of a number of incidents of repression and malpractice, which
had been recounted in conversations ‘with a large variety of persons’ during his stay in
the city. Names of PSL members, people likely to vote for the PSL, and some socialists
had been deleted from the electoral roll on a large scale. The deputy governor of the
province of Kraków reported that 40,000 voters had been struck off the roll in the city.
In some of the villages in the province, as many as half the voters had been deleted.
There was widespread fear that the deletion of a voter’s name from the electoral roll
indicated that a charge would subsequently be levelled against the person by the public
prosecutor. Further, requests for a commitment to vote for the government bloc were
being made on a large scale in Kraków, with an accompanying threat of expulsion from
549 TNA: PRO FO 371/56452/N16323/34/55, Cavendish-Bentinck to Attlee, 12 December 1946.
550 Prażmowska, Civil War in Poland, 202; Coutouvidis and Reynolds, Poland, 1939-1947, 275.
551 TNA: PRO FO 371/56452/N16279/34/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 19 December 1946.
552 TNA: PRO FO 371/56452/N16236/34/55, Cavendish-Bentinck to Bevin, 20 December 1946.
553 TNA: PRO FO 371/56452/N16413/34/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 24 December 1946; Foreign
Office Minutes, 31 December 1946.
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one’s dwelling. Likewise, in Katowice, the British consul reported that the Polish
government had initiated a campaign to obtain at least one million signatures from
amongst the 1.7 million voters in Upper Silesia in support of the government bloc.
People who refused to sign were threatened with reprisals. Cavendish-Bentinck
surmised that the authorities were attempting to collect a huge number of signatures in
support of the government bloc ‘in order to produce these after the elections as proof
that they represent the will of the people.’ Hankey noted that the Polish government
intended to ‘spare no efforts to persuade world opinion that the elections have not been
faked.’554
The PPR used a combination of manufactured excuses and blatant intimidation to
precipitate the collapse of electoral lists. Zygmunt Żuławski, the prewar vice-chairman
of the Supreme Council of the PPS, and the leader of a small breakaway faction of the
party which had withdrawn in protest over the PPS’s agreement with the PPR,555
reported that the Chrzanow electoral list, which included his name, had been withdrawn.
The representative of the list, who had been ‘expecting chicanery’, had collected over
200 signatures. The UB visited the signatories and in the face of their threats, persuaded
all but 57 to withdraw. As 100 signatures were needed, these withdrawals precipitated
the collapse of the list. Polish Radio then announced the rejection of the list, explaining
that the PSL had no followers there and had only succeeded in gathering the necessary
signatures by means of threats and force.556 The episode of Zuławski’s electoral list
indicates that the PPR assiduously pursued even their insignificant opponents.
Zuławski’s followers were not numerous, and their ranks had already been further
diminished by threats and intimidation, leading all but two to withdraw as electoral
candidates.
On 7 January, Winch called in at the PSL headquarters. Stefan Korboński, of the
Central Executive Committee, reported that in the absence of PSL members on the
district and local electoral commissions, the presence of party representatives in the
voting booths and at the counting of the votes, was the only safeguard remaining to the
party. The general commissioner for elections had just issued a circular to the effect that
the district electoral commission must not sanction representatives unless the
554 TNA: PRO FO 371/56452/N16523/34/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 28 December 1946; Foreign
Office minutes, 31 December 1946; FO 371/66089/N557/6/55, Report by M.B. Winch, 4 January 1947.
555 Kersten, Communist Rule in Poland, 143.
556 TNA: PRO FO 371/66089/N557/6/55, Report by M.B. Winch, 4 January 1947.
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individuals concerned could present letters from the local Starost (head of county
administration) attesting to their good character. The Starosts, who did not know
personally all the people put forward as party representatives were simply passing the
lists of names on to the local security police who then summoned the prospective
representatives and refused to release them unless they agreed to work as informers. ‘In
this way . . . persons who were the last hope of the Polish Peasant Party have, in many
cases, been added to the list of their enemies. The Polish government rejected the PSL
list of candidates in ten of the largest constituencies, thus preventing approximately 22
per cent of the population from having the chance to vote for the PSL.557
Mazur, also of the PSL Central Executive Committee, told Winch about the degree of
pressure being applied to government employees. At the beginning of January,
employees at the Ministry of Health were asked whether they wanted their salary and
food cards for the month. The delivery of the cards depended on the way they intended
to vote. They were then asked to sign declarations attesting to their intention to vote for
the government bloc. Those who signed the declarations were then told that they need
not bother going to the polls because a ministry representative would go and vote for his
colleagues. The harassment and abuse was beginning to have an effect as many PSL
supporters believed that voting would be useless since the results were sure to be
falsified.558
In Gdańsk, lists of signatures with pledges of votes for the government bloc were being
collected systematically. Non-compliance would result in voters’ expulsion from their
homes, and possibly more severe reprisals. Cavendish-Bentinck predicted that by these
means the government bloc was poised ‘to build up [a] large and possibly actual
majority vote’ in Gdańsk, thus ‘rendering any later falsification of the count a mere
elaboration.’ Reports from other districts showed that the practice of collecting
signatures was widespread across the country.559
In a report of 10 January summarising the situation in Poland, the Foreign Office noted
that the Polish government was disregarding all of the conditions stipulated by the
British government in the run-up to the elections. ‘It seems certain that the elections will
be faked, as the Polish Government bloc are taking every possible measure to ensure
557 TNA: PRO FO 371/66089/N460/6/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 10 January 1947.
558 TNA: PRO FO 371/66089/N558/6/55, Report by M.B. Winch, 7 January 1947.
559 TNA: PRO FO 371/66090/N573/6/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 14 January 1947.
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their own complete success . . . The strongest measures are being taken to fake the
election.’ Mikołajczyk’s supporters had been excluded altogether from the district
electoral commissions (which collated the results and calculated the proportional
representation). In over 20 per cent of constituencies the PSL lists of candidates had
been rejected for various reasons, with 132 candidates rejected individually and 110
under arrest. PSL members had been expelled from their farms, forced out of their jobs,
and been subjected to police searches of their homes. PSL meetings had been broken up,
several branches had been suspended, the editor and key members of the editorial staff
of the main party newspaper had been under arrest since the end of September 1946, at
which point the editorial office had been closed. ‘In short the Polish Provisional
Government has so far completely disregarded its obligations under the Crimea and
Potsdam agreements to hold free and unfettered elections, or the stipulations we have
made in our notes of August 19th and November 22nd regarding the conditions obviously
necessary to ensure freedom of elections.’
Cavendish-Bentinck judged that overall the government bloc had ‘succeeded in
imposing their will far better than most observers would have thought possible some
months ago.’ This was due to several factors. First, Poland’s Soviet-trained security
forces had become very efficient. Second, ‘despair of any improvement’ among the
population was giving way to apathy. Third, it was unlikely that a ‘coordinated popular
anti-government movement’ would emerge.560
British policy planning for Poland after the elections
In a report of 10 January, the Foreign Office turned its attention to post-election policy.
The central object of British policy should remain the same: ‘to do what may be
possible to prevent the establishment of a purely totalitarian régime.’ When faced with
flagrant violations of its pledges by the Polish government, the Foreign Office
concluded that there could ‘be no question of demanding fresh elections or withdrawing
recognition’ because ‘[t]he only practical result of any of these proposals would be to
diminish our influence in Poland.’ The first proposed action would be to make a ‘strong
protest’, about the unrepresentative character of the government and the Sejm, coupled
560 TNA: PRO FO 371/66090/N658/6/55, ‘British Policy towards Poland’, 10 January 1947.
186
with ‘an attitude of latent hostility’ to the Polish government and to try to block as far as
possible the extension of credits and other facilities to Poland. The problem with this
policy was that its primary consequence would be to ‘punish the Polish people rather
than their Government’, impede the reconstruction of the country, and lose influence
with those members of the government bloc, particularly the socialists, who hoped to
prevent the country from being communised entirely. A second alternative, at the
opposite extreme, would be to issue only a mild protest and then to disengage
completely from the future course of events in Poland. ‘[W]e should then concentrate
quite cynically on cultivating the new government for what little we can get out of it in
the way of trade and consideration for British financial interests.’ Cavendish-Bentinck
opposed this course of action, on the grounds that it would weaken the opposition and
ultimately lead to Poland becoming ‘the 17th Republic of the Soviet Union.’ The
Foreign Office acknowledged that this option would be
regarded as a betrayal of our friends in Poland and would be the more unfortunate
in that we encouraged M. Mikolajczyk, M. Popiel and many other London Poles
to return in the hope that we should succeed in getting the Yalta Agreement
effectively executed. Indeed, Mr. Churchill, then Prime Minister, did undoubtedly
commit H.M.G. to M. Mikolajczyk in June, 1945, when he persuaded him to go to
Moscow and take part in the conference that resulted in the establishment of the
[Polish provisional government of national unity] . . . . Many Poles who are
friendly towards us and especially among those who returned from the West
would not forgive or forget our just shelving what we undertook on their behalf,
especially as a good many consider that they have risked their lives and liberty by
going back.561
The wording of this section of the memorandum is significant. It explicitly
acknowledged Churchill’s promise to Mikołajczyk in June 1945, as well as the gravity
of the consequences for the individuals who chose to return to Poland on the strength of
that promise. The memo makes explicit the sense of commitment which underpinned all
the Foreign Office’s efforts to influence the postwar political settlement. It also shows
that the commitment continued to weigh on the officials of the Northern department,
even as they concluded that it would be impossible to fulfil.
The Foreign Office decided that the best course of action would be ‘to make a firm,
though measured, protest’ over the conduct of the elections, and ‘thereafter to do our
best to maintain our influence in Poland by doing anything we can to assist the Polish
561 TNA: PRO FO 371/66090/N658/6/55, ‘Future British Policy in Poland’, 10 January 1947.
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people to develop trade and cultural contacts.’ Britain should maintain ‘friendly
contacts’ with the PSL and ‘very discreetly’ encourage the PPS ‘to build up Polish
resistance to out-and-out communisation and to preserve some measure of national
independence.’ In other words, a ‘scaled down’ version of the existing British policy.
Above all, appearances should be protected. The Foreign Office recommended that
Britain should ‘endeavour to make the transition from our recent policy to this new
policy in such a way that it is perfectly clear that we have done our utmost to secure the
execution of the undertakings given to us . . . and we should see that the public both
here and in Poland know where the blame lies.’562 In order to make the question of
blame unmistakably clear, an approach to the Soviet government would be necessary.
The Foreign Office proposed to recommend tripartite discussions with the US and the
Soviet Union after the Polish elections to determine whether the elections had fulfilled
the Yalta and Potsdam pledges and if not, what steps might be taken to remedy the
situation. ‘[W]e should be unlikely to achieve any practical result from any approach to
the Soviet Government, but at least we should hope to establish without fear of
contradiction where the blame lies for this state of affairs if only “for the record” and to
convince our friends in Poland and elsewhere that we have done our best.’ In other
words, the Foreign Office had no hope of influencing the conduct of elections in a way
that might actually affect the outcome, but it was very concerned to preserve the
impression that it had been loyal to the ‘right side’ in Poland, and had not been remiss in
discharging its responsibilities.
A further indication that appearances were paramount was the Foreign Office’s
intention to ratify the Anglo-Polish financial agreement and return the balance of the
Polish gold still held in the UK. This should be achieved ‘without loss of face’ by
dealing with a PPS member of the government (preferably Cyrankiewicz). ‘Such a
formula might be that while we did not regard the conditions which we had laid down
for the ratification of the Financial Agreement as having been fulfilled we no longer felt
justified in withholding from the de facto Government of Poland property which
undoubtedly belonged to the Polish people. We should thus ratify under protest.’ In
562 Ibid.
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return for ratification of the financial agreement, Britain should request an assurance
from the Polish government that opposition politicians would not be ‘penalised’.563
Elections
On election day, Cavendish-Bentinck, accompanied by the visiting British MP Aiden
Crawley, made a tour of Warsaw and the surrounding districts. Other members of the
embassy and consular staff provided a network of observers covering the main towns
and cities, and several rural districts. Polling was reportedly heavy, at around 80 per
cent, in all districts except ten in which the PSL was not represented. In these districts,
many of the voters had to be forced to the polls but even then the percentage of voters
was not high. Hardly any of the polling booths allowed for secret voting. Employees of
state organisations were ‘invariably marched to the booths in groups, often with brass
bands and banners. The majority of these, often under inescapable pressure, voted
openly.’564 In the districts observed by Cavendish-Bentinck, many of those who voted
independently did manage to evade the polling booth officials and submit a secret vote.
The chances of success depended upon ‘the courage and skill of the voter and the
standard of organisation in the polling booth. . . The usual dodge was to substitute at the
last moment the Polish Peasant Party’s number for that of the Government bloc.’
Estimates by members of the British diplomatic corps and by visiting journalists put the
true vote for the parties of the government bloc at between 20 and 50 per cent in ‘old
Poland.’ In the western territories, where the government exercised much tighter control
over the voting process, the pro-government vote was much higher.
The absence of opposition party representatives made it much easier to exert pressure
on voters in the booths, and to falsify the final results. Most of the PSL representatives
were either arrested the night before the election or they were simply thrown out of the
polling booths. At six polling stations in Warsaw where the PSL had representatives
present, the count, (which was reported by the representatives to Mikołajczyk) showed
that the votes were divided roughly equally between the government bloc and the PSL.
563 Ibid.
564 Cavendish-Bentinck accurately described the methods by which the regime controlled voting by state
employees. Kenney outlines the process by which the ‘regime engineered its victory’ in the factories:
‘party leaders worked out down-to-the-minute voting schedules; workers met at assigned places and then
marched together to the voting booth, sometimes with pieces of paper marked with a ‘3’ (the number of
the Democratic Bloc’s list) pinned to their coats.’ Rebuilding Poland, 54.
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Afterwards, however, the results in four of the six booths were changed, and one was
reversed. Similar manipulation of results occurred in Poznań.565
The results of the election announced on the morning of 21 January (two days after the
voting) were overwhelmingly in favour of the government bloc, which ‘won’ 327 seats.
The PSL had 24 seats (approximately eight per cent of the total); the Labour party had
10; the New Freedom Polish Peasant Party had seven; independent groups had four. ‘In
my opinion’, wrote Cavendish-Bentinck, ‘the elections have been neither free nor
unfettered.’ His final verdict was damning: ‘The extent . . . to which force, chicanery,
pressure and falsification were used, to bring about a result favourable to the
Communists and their friends, surpassed most expectations.’ He pointed to eight key
pieces of evidence in support of this assessment. In the constituencies where the PSL
had the strongest support, 22 per cent of the electorate had been deprived of the
possibility of voting for the party. The government and the security services had made
‘[e]very effort’ in the six weeks preceding the elections ‘to terrorise the electorate.’ The
absence of PSL representatives at the polling booths had made it very easy to falsify the
results. All state officials and employees, and all members of the armed forces had been
compelled to vote openly, where a vote cast for the PSL ‘would have entailed
immediate dismissal’ or other penalties in the case of the army. In the countryside,
‘headmen’ were ordered to bring groups of electors to the polling booths at particular
times, and to hand to each voter a slip with the number of the government bloc
candidate. Many PSL members were arrested the night before the elections and many
more were struck off the electoral registers. At the end of his post-election report,
Cavendish-Bentinck noted that he had been struck by people’s determination not to vote
for the government bloc, although they frequently had to resort to subterfuge in order to
do so, and ignoring that the results were sure to be falsified. ‘They appeared to desire to
give themselves at least the satisfaction of voting against the present regime. What their
feelings will be at seeing [the] extent to which results have been falsified remains to be
seen.’566
Nevertheless, Cavendish-Bentinck advised that British policy should move swiftly on:
‘The elections are past and no amount of protests will alter their result. I submit that it is
565 TNA: PRO FO 371/66090/N1159/6/55, Cavendish-Bentinck to Bevin, 24 January 1947.
566 TNA: PRO FO 371/66090/N934/6/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 21 January 1947; N1159/6/55,
Cavendish-Bentinck to Bevin, 24 January 1947.
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more important to look to the future and to try to prevent an iron curtain descending on
cultural connexions between Poland and the West, and on true information from the
West, and also to fight against efforts of the Polish Government to poison the minds of
people against us.’567 These comments suggest that this was the moment at which
Cavendish-Bentinck gave up on the possibility of altering the political situation in
Poland. Instead, he downgraded his objective to preventing an irrevocable breach
between Britain and Poland on a cultural level.
Conclusion
The last of the British resolve to influence the postwar Polish political settlement
evaporated just at the moment when external support became crucial to the survival of
the PSL. Crippled by the PPR’s concerted campaign of attack carried out through the
autumn and winter of 1946-7, the PSL’s only chance of retaining legal recognition as a
political party rested on support from its foreign allies. Mikołajczyk entered into the
election campaign confident of this support; at each key juncture he found it was not
forthcoming. Not only did Britain refuse to make a forceful intervention with the
Warsaw government as Mikołajczyk requested, it vetoed several PSL initiatives that
could conceivably have had an effect: an appeal to the UN, an election boycott, a
withholding of goods or a refusal to pay taxes. Similarly, the British failed to capitalise
on the PPS-PPR split to exert influence on the socialist leaders.
Throughout the period, the Warsaw embassy obtained remarkably accurate information
from a wide variety of sources, ranging from local officials, government and factory
employees, as well as a number of sources from different political parties. Further,
Cavendish-Bentinck enjoyed cordial relations with Reale, who afforded insight into
conditions within the PPR and between the PPR and Moscow, to which the British
would otherwise have had difficulty gaining access. Cavendish-Bentinck’s analysis of
the political situation was very often accurate: his reading of the falling out between the
PPS and the PPR was prescient; likewise he foresaw exactly how the PPR would chip
away at the PSL, until only remnants of the party remained, as well as the way in which
the elections would be conducted. The withdrawal of support from Bevin and for the
567 TNA: PRO FO 371/66090/N1077/6/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 27 January 1947.
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first time the Foreign Office as well, however, left the embassy emasculated, unable to
offer sufficient support on its own, until eventually even Cavendish-Bentinck and his
staff also began to accept that the PSL would be eliminated.
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Chapter 5: Mikołajczyk’s Escape, January - November 1947
Introduction
After the Polish elections, a strong sense of resignation began to seep in to British
policy, a sense that any attempt to interfere with the process of consolidation of
communist control would be futile. The Foreign Office concluded that little could be
achieved by mounting further protests or formally disputing the results of the elections.
Similarly, officials rejected the possibility of ‘further wrangling’ on the subject with the
Soviet government.568 The British response to the outcome of the Polish elections was
partly conditioned by changes in the international system. A new international order
dominated by rising tension, distrust and division between the Soviet Union and the
western powers was beginning to take shape by 1947. The turn of the year marked the
point at which the Soviets started to move aggressively to secure communist control
across Eastern Europe. The Foreign Office likened the situation in Poland to that in
Romania, where a communist regime had been installed in November 1946 by means
similar to those employed during the Polish elections: a hastily enacted electoral law
which made registration difficult for opponents of the communist-dominated
government coalition, intimidation of opposition politicians and their supporters, and
manipulation at the polls.569 Another stretch of protracted, unproductive discussions
with the Soviets over another East European state held no appeal, particularly given that
the British and Americans were about to embark on a new round of intensely difficult
negotiations with the Soviets over the more urgent question of the future of Germany
early in the year.570 By this point, Bevin’s priority was to persuade the Americans to
abandon any prolongation of the charade of four-power cooperation in Germany,
consolidate the bizone arrangements, and put in place an administrative and governance
structure  in the western zones which would be impermeable to Soviet influence. This
568 TNA: PRO FO 371/66091/N1179/6/55, Foreign Office to Washington, 1 February 1947.
569 The government bloc in Romania was the National Democratic Front (NDF). The Romanian general
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Study of the Early Cold War Era (New York: East European Monographs, 1992), 196-7; Richard J.
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570 Germany was discussed at the New York meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which sat from
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objective was made urgent by a severe economic crisis in Britain, which rendered the
burden of maintaining the British zone of Germany unsustainable. A corollary of this
first step towards the formal division of Germany was a tacit acceptance that Britain
must cease to interfere in the Soviet sphere in Eastern Europe if the Soviets were to be
kept out of the west. Ultimately, a consequence of the shifting international situation
and the pressing need to achieve a settlement over Germany was a marked British
withdrawal from Poland’s internal affairs.
Changes in personnel at the Warsaw embassy also affected British policy. Shortly after
the Polish elections, Cavendish-Bentinck was transferred out of Warsaw. A long delay
followed before the arrival of his successor, Donald St. Clair Gainer. Thus the crucial
period of communist consolidation coincided with an absence of leadership in the
embassy. Philip Broad, the chargé d’affaires who stepped in for the interim, pursued a
much more detached policy throughout the spring of 1947, seeking to improve relations
with the Warsaw government wherever possible, while allowing contact with
Mikołajczyk to lapse entirely until May. Broad’s period in charge saw an almost total
retreat from involvement in Poland’s internal political affairs. Broad’s approach was a
source of irritation to the Foreign Office, which sought to continue supporting the
Polish opposition wherever possible. The result was an unevenness in British policy,
with Bevin’s focus on Germany, Broad’s on improving relations with the Warsaw
government, and the Foreign Office lingering on the internal Polish political situation.
Inevitably, however, the basis of Foreign Office policy began to erode due to political
changes in Poland. The Polish opposition had been badly weakened over the course of
the election campaign: the PSL had been all but eliminated as a political force in
Poland, and the PPS was moving steadily towards union with the PPR, leaving the
British without a viable political alternative to the communists to which it could lend its
support. As a consequence, British attention turned instead to resolving a series of
matters which soured Anglo-Polish relations: the unfinalised western frontier of Poland,
the unratified Anglo-Polish financial agreement, the large number of displaced German
refugees from Poland’s western territories flooding the British occupation zone, and the
long-running dispute over the slow pace of repatriation of former members of the Polish
armed forces.
In spite of Britain’s withdrawal from Polish politics, however, the Foreign Office
snapped into action in the summer when it received reports that Mikołajczyk was facing
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imminent arrest. As the threat to Mikołajczyk loomed ever closer, there was a
corresponding reversal of the decline in British interest and involvement in Polish
affairs, a sense that even if all else had failed – or was on the verge of failing – at least
something could be salvaged if Mikołajczyk could be saved. Churchill’s 1945 promise
was binding; the British government was still responsible for protecting the man it had
sent back to Warsaw. The focus on Mikołajczyk’s personal safety exclusively signified
a great narrowing of Churchill’s original commitment, certainly, but there was also a
palpable sense of renewed interest. There was a consensus within the Foreign Office –
which did not always extend to the “post–Cavendish-Bentinck regime” in the Warsaw
embassy – that Mikołajczyk could not simply be left to face his fate.
Polish government post-elections
The PPR emerged from the elections firmly in control of the state apparatus in Poland.
Cavendish-Bentinck commented that the communist leaders now felt themselves ‘more
firmly than ever in the saddle.’ They were confident that within three years they would
‘have this country where they want it.’571 After the elections, a new Polish government
was formed in which the key ministries of foreign affairs, industry, public security,
education, and administration of the former German territories were all held by the PPR.
The PPS was allocated six ministries, but these were of lesser importance than those
controlled by the PPR: public administration, reconstruction, work and social welfare,
treasury, justice, maritime affairs, and international trade.572 On 5 February, Bierut –
the only declared candidate – was elected president of the republic by the newly
convened Sejm.573 In his report on the opening of the new Sejm, Cavendish-Bentinck
commented that real control of the country remained in the hands of the original nucleus
of the Committee of National Liberation formed in Lublin.574
Shortly after it opened on 4 February, the Sejm hurriedly passed a new constitution
which served to consolidate and formalise the PPR’s position of control. The Polish
authorities insisted that the new constitution closely resembled that of 1921. In reality,
however, ‘while maintaining the appearance of retaining a parliamentary, cabinet
571 TNA: PRO FO 371/66092/N2811/6/55, Cavendish-Bentinck to Bevin, 28 February 1947.
572 Prażmowska, ‘The Polish Socialist Party’, 352; Kersten, Communist Rule in Poland, 350.
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574 TNA: PRO FO 371/66092/N2811/6/55, Cavendish-Bentinck to Bevin, 28 February 1947.
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system of government, it sanctioned a new structure in the form of the national councils
and the Council of the State.’ The establishment of the national councils, which had the
task of supervising local authorities at all levels, was relatively inconsequential; the
most notable feature of the new constitution was that it created the institution of the
State Council, which consisted of the president of the republic, the marshal and the three
vice-marshals of the Sejm, and the president of the Supreme Chamber of Control
(Najwyższa Izba Kontroli – NIK). This new body straddled the dividing line between
executive and legislative authority. It could initiate legislation, declare martial law, and
sanction decrees passed by the government – and the government could rule by decree
during the nine months of the year when the Sejm was not in session. Overall, the
creation of the State Council ‘allowed real power to be concentrated in the hands of a
narrow group of people.’575
British reaction to the Polish elections
Bevin took a pointed step back from involvement in Poland immediately after the
elections when he decided against making any official comment on their conduct or
results.576 The Foreign Office prepared a statement for Bevin to read in the House of
Commons but he changed his mind and decided not to deliver it.577 The statement
merits consideration because it provides a clear indication of the direction of British
policy towards Poland after the elections. It began with criticism of the conduct of the
elections: voting had not taken place freely; the evidence showed that there had been
widespread intimidation of voters, removal of names from the register, and arrests of
both candidates and voters. As a result of the suppression of the lists of opposition
candidates in some areas, 22 per cent of the electorate had been given no choice but to
vote for the government bloc. The Polish government had resorted in many regions to
the removal of names from the candidate lists. Government officials, members of the
armed forces, and many others had been made to vote openly under considerable
575 Kersten, Communist Rule in Poland, 351-54.
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pressure. The count had been conducted entirely in secret and had taken 12 days. In
view of the circumstances in which the elections were held, the British government
could not possibly consider them free or fair, and did not regard the new government as
either democratic or representative.
At this point, the statement took a different turn. In spite of the dissatisfaction with the
conduct of the elections, there was no intention to take the issue to the UN, withdraw
the British ambassador from Warsaw, break off diplomatic relations, or impose
economic sanctions on Poland. None of these measures would succeed in ushering in a
democratic regime; the new Polish government intended to remain in power and the
Soviet Union was determined that it should do so. ‘We have to face the fact that this is
not an area where in the circumstances we can effectively insist on our rights however
well-founded. . . We must cut our coat according to our cloth.’ The statement concluded
with the assertion that Britain had been right to try to bring the two sides of the Polish
government – the exile and the Lublin factions – together. The only source of regret was
‘that through no fault of ours that attempt has failed.’578 Thus for the first time, the
British government clearly and unequivocally conceded defeat in its attempt to
influence the political settlement in Poland. The possibility of cooperation or
compromise with the Soviet Union in Poland had been closed off. The country now lay
beyond the reach of British influence; there would be no further attempts to shape its
political future.
An important reason for this attitude of pronounced detachment from the situation in
Poland was a hardening of the British position towards the Soviet Union by early 1947.
By this point, what Deighton defines as an ‘operational code, a cold-war mentality
towards the Soviet Union’ had firmly taken hold in British foreign policy. This
mentality was defined by an ever more firmly entrenched conviction that Moscow was
pursuing ‘a blend of Soviet communism and Russian imperialism: coherent, well co-
ordinated, denying co-existence with the West.’ British fears of a resurgent Germany
had been replaced by a firm conviction that the Soviet Union posed the greater threat to
British interests but ‘the worst scenario still remained that of Soviet communism fuelled
by German economic might.’ If the postwar international order was to be defined by an
adversarial relationship between the Soviet Union and the west, then it was essential
578 TNA: PRO FO 371/66091/N1535/6/55, Statement for Foreign Affairs Debate [n.d.].
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that Germany, or at least its industrialised western regions, should not be controlled or
subject in any way to influence by the Soviets. As Deighton argues, the implications of
Soviet expansionism for Europe became clear to the British before the Americans. The
British concluded that ‘if all Germany could not be secured for the West to sustain a
favourable balance of power, then at least the western part of Germany had to be made
safe for liberal democracy and free economy.’ Bevin therefore sought to persuade the
Americans of the futility of further negotiations with the Soviets over Germany in the
run-up to the Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers.579 Although there is
nothing explicit in the Foreign Office files to indicate why Bevin did not read the
statement on the Polish elections in parliament, I would argue that the decision was
linked to this larger policy which was beginning to take shape more clearly by early
1947. Bevin hoped to persuade the US that it would be preferable to secure the western
zones of Germany, even if it meant relinquishing a sizeable portion of the country to
Soviet control. By extension, this ‘hands off’ approach applied to Poland – and indeed
the rest of Eastern Europe – as well. To deliver a public scolding to the Polish
government over the handling of the elections in the House of Commons would have
implied ongoing British interest in the country’s political future and would have been
inconsistent with a policy of detachment from the Soviet sphere of interest.
Position of the PSL
After the elections, the PSL, though much diminished by months of determined
persecution, remained committed to its policy of opposition to the new regime.
Mikołajczyk successfully quashed a leadership challenge in February 1947 at the
party’s Supreme Council meeting. Three prominent party figures, Niećko, Wycech, and
Banach, with the support of a quarter of the delegates, pressed for the party leadership
to reach an accommodation with the new regime in order to prevent the peasant
movement from losing all political relevance.  The resolution was defeated by 60 votes
to 20, thus confirming the support of the majority of the party for Mikołajczyk. In
March, the leaders of the dissenting faction were expelled from the party.580
579 Deighton, Impossible Peace, 136-7, 224-5.
580 After its defeat, the rebel group formed the PSL-Lewica (PSL-Left) faction, and began publishing its
own newspaper, Chłopi i Państwo. Coutouvidis and Reynolds, Poland, 1939-1947, 301.
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Underlying the PSL’s policy of ongoing opposition to the new government was the
hope that it would prove possible to keep the core of the party organisation intact until
conditions improved or a crisis emerged which would oblige the PPR to realise that it
could not govern the country without the PSL. Mikołajczyk believed that the complete
suppression of the PSL would be met with a spike in political violence, which would
force the PPR to turn to the PSL for help. Instead, however, the political situation in
Poland slowly began to stabilise in early 1947.581 Although dissatisfied with the new
government, the majority of the Polish population were also deeply tired, and anxious to
get on with rebuilding after the war. There was little energy remaining for the fight that
would be required to oust the government, which could be achieved only at a high cost,
and might lead to nothing.582
Mikołajczyk was disappointed, and his position further weakened, by the absence of
meaningful intervention on the part of the western powers. Much of the existing
literature on the subject claims that the West severed all links with Mikołajczyk and the
PSL immediately after the election.583 Although this is an oversimplification – contact
continued until Cavendish-Bentinck left Warsaw and resumed again in May – it is true
that Britain was no longer prepared to support the PSL’s ongoing opposition to the new
Polish government in the same way. The gap between Mikołajczyk’s expectations and
British intentions comes across unmistakably in Cavendish-Bentinck’s account of their
last lunch together before his departure for London:
Mikolajczyk and other Poles rather pathetically ask whether Poland and the non-
fulfilment of the Yalta and Moscow Agreements and the undertakings given at
Potsdam could not [be] brought up in Moscow or at U.N.O. I have told
Mikolajczyk that even if the Secretary of State and Mr. Marshall brought the
Polish affair up in Moscow M. Molotov would merely maintain what he has done
heretofore, that the elections were free and unfettered and that the opinions of
H.M. Government and the United States Government are based on lies emanating
from Fascist-reactionary sources. As regards U.N.O. I told Mikolajczyk that we
had examined the possibility of bringing Polish affairs up there but so far as I
could gather this had not been found practicable. He maintained, however, that
sooner or later Poland would come before U.N.O. Thank God I shall be
cultivating banana trees and orchids in my gardens in Rio and Petropolis!584
581 Coutouvidis and Reynolds, Poland, 1939-1947, 300-1; Kersten, Communist Rule in Poland, 361-62.
582 Kersten, Communist Rule in Poland, 337.
583 Coutouvidis and Reynolds, for example, argue that ‘the West abandoned Mikołajczyk without
ceremony.’ Coutouvidis and Reynolds, Poland, 1939-1947, 300.
584 TNA: PRO FO 371/66092/N2923/6/55, Cavendish-Bentinck to Hankey, 27 February 1947.
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The ambassador’s comments – admittedly reflecting a certain ‘last-day-of-term’
insouciance as he was about to leave Warsaw to take up a new posting in Rio de Janeiro
– highlight a serious discrepancy between the views of the PSL and the British
government as to Poland’s political future.585 Even Cavendish-Bentinck, who had been
Mikołajczyk’s steadfast supporter, had accepted the shape of the new international
order: Poland now fell into the Soviet orbit, and if Molotov stonewalled on the subject
of the Polish elections in the Council of Foreign Ministers meetings, there was little
Britain could do to change the situation. The PSL had not survived the elections; the
party no longer had a place in Polish political life; Britain was not interested in piecing
together the remnants of the party to reconstitute a credible opposition force. There is
even a current of ridicule – or perhaps pity – in Cavendish-Bentinck’s tone, a sense of
disbelief at Mikołajczyk’s failure to go gracefully, at his still entertaining hopes of
overturning the new government.
Position of the PPS
The independence of the PPS eroded further after the elections. The socialist leaders
hoped that by continuing to cooperate with the communists they would gradually be
able to increase their influence in the country. According to this strategy, public support
would increase as people realised that the PPS was the only effective political party
which was not totally dominated by the PPR. The PPS set out to win support for
socialism with ‘a moderate and pluralistic economic and political programme.’ The PPS
laid out their idea of a ‘Polish road to socialism,’ which would accommodate, for
instance, a three-sector economic model including the private and cooperative sectors
alongside state enterprise. The wishes of the population would be taken into account
during the transformation process; the PPS would not seek to replicate the course of
585 According to his biographer, Patrick Howarth, Cavendish-Bentinck was ultimately prevented from
taking up his post in Rio as a result of the scandal which surrounded his divorce proceedings. He was
dismissed from the diplomatic service and spent the remainder of his career in the private sector.
Howarth, Intelligence Chief Extraordinary, 221-3. John Colville concurs that the ‘lurid publicity’
surrounding Cavendish-Bentinck’s divorce trial was an important reason for his dismissal. Colville adds,
however, in addition to the divorce proceedings, Cavendish-Bentinck’s implication in the Warsaw spy
trial, which drew criticism from the Labour left, and the press support which he received from Bevin’s
enemy, Lord Beaverbrook, taken together, explain why he was dismissed. Colville, Strange Inheritance,
193.
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events which had unfolded in Russia after the revolution.586 Cyrankiewicz, who had
been appointed prime minister after the elections, explained to Cavendish-Bentinck that
although the PPS would continue to collaborate with the PPR, they would ‘at the same
time assert their own views and oppose extreme measures.’ Cyrankewicz would be ‘as
tough as he could with the Communists without openly breaking.’587
Cavendish-Bentinck believed that the PPR ‘intended to weaken the PPS, to infiltrate it,
and in due course to make it an absolute satellite [of the Soviet Union].’ In his last
dispatch from Warsaw, the ambassador summed up the position of the PPS. He referred
to his earlier suggestion that Britain should regard the PPS as the next line of defence
after the PSL against the complete communisation of Poland. The events of the past two
months, however, had led Cavendish-Bentinck ‘to believe that this line of defence [was]
being steadily weakened and that it [would be] likely to prove ineffective.’ Although
Cyrankiewicz was the prime minister, his deputy was still Berman, ‘the Communist
“eminence grise,” a remarkably able and intelligent man.’ Further, the PPR held the
presidency of the republic and, according to the new constitution, the president could
take the chair at Cabinet meetings whenever he so desired, meaning that Bierut could
oust Cyrankiewicz at will.588 Further, Cyrankiewicz exercised no real autonomy from
the PPR. He had gone to Moscow after the elections589 because he did not want the PPR
ministers to serve as the only intermediaries between the Polish and Soviet governments
but in the end he was accompanied by PPR Politburo member and minister of industry
and commerce, Hilary Minc.590 Likewise, in the realm of foreign affairs, Cavendish-
Bentinck predicted that the socialist vice-minister for foreign affairs, Stanisław
Leszczycki, was unlikely to exercise any influence when faced with ‘such determined
communists’ as Modzelewski, now the minister. Finally, the PPS had also failed to
secure any measure of control over the all-powerful security police.591
The Foreign Office concurred with the ambassador’s assessment of the PPS’s poor
prospects. In a briefing paper on Poland prepared in advance of the Bevin’s trip to
586 Coutouvidis and Reynolds, Poland, 1939-1947, 303-4; Prażmowska, Civil War in Poland, 208;
Kersten, Communist Rule in Poland, 364-65.
587 TNA: PRO FO 371/66092/N2653/6/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 22 February 1947.
588 TNA: PRO FO 371/66092/N2811/6/55, Cavendish-Bentinck to Bevin, 28 February 1947.
589 Prażmowska, Civil War in Poland, 203.
590 Teresa Torańska refers to Minc as ‘third in command in Poland, after Berman and Bierut.’ Oni:
Stalin’s Polish Puppets, 15.
591 TNA: PRO FO 371/66092/N2811/6/55, Cavendish-Bentinck to Bevin, 28 February 1947.
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Moscow, the Foreign Office observed that Cyrankiewicz had a reputation as ‘a strong
man who was thought to be opposed to complete subservience to the Communists.’ As
yet, however, neither he nor the party had given ‘a definite sign of independence’. Until
the Foreign Office received an indication that the PPS was prepared to resist being
subsumed by the PPR, British assistance should not be forthcoming: ‘We should like to
support the Polish Socialist Party in any stand which it may be able to make against the
out-and-out communisation of Poland, but . . . we have to await some signs of
independent action before we can support the Party.’592 The risk, speculated Hancock,
was that the PPS would wait too long: ‘It may well be that before long the Communists
will begin to put the squeeze on the Socialists just as they put pressure on Mr.
Mikolajczyk and his followers when they were members of the Government. If this
happens, the Socialists may well find that it is too late for them to assert themselves.’593
The sense of detachment is again evident in the British reaction to PPS plans; the
Foreign Office officials judged the strategy to be unlikely to succeed but did not attempt
to push the leadership into more robust opposition against the PPR.
Exit Cavendish-Bentinck
The shift in Anglo-American policy away from active involvement in Polish politics
was marked by the departure from Warsaw of Lane and Cavendish-Bentinck at the end
of February. Lane resigned in protest over the conduct of the elections. In a letter to
secretary of state George Marshall requesting to be relieved of his duties Lane wrote
that, as expected, the elections had been ‘a mere formality in implementing the decision
which ha[d] been previously reached between the government bloc parties and the
Soviet Government: to retain in power the Communist-controlled minority.’ Lane
contended that his mission to Poland had come to an end and that his ‘continued
presence would be regarded as tacit acquiescence in the recent fraudulent elections.’594
Cavendish-Bentinck’s transfer had been agreed prior to the elections, although the
reason for the decision remains unclear. According to Cavendish-Bentinck’s biographer,
592 TNA: PRO FO 371/66092/N2537/6/55, ‘Brief [on Poland] for Secretary of State to take to Moscow,’
February 1947.
593 TNA: PRO FO 371/N2653/6/55, Hancock Minute, 4 March 1947.
594 FRUS, 1947. Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union vol. 4 (Washington: United States Government
Printing Office, 1972), 413-14; Lane, I Saw Poland Betrayed, 289-90; TNA: PRO FO
371/66091/N1282/6/55, Cavendish-Bentinck to Warner, 24 January 1947.
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Patrick Howarth, who was press attaché in the Warsaw embassy at the time, the Polish
government began to agitate for Cavendish-Bentinck’s removal after the referendum.
The ambassador was held responsible for the negative coverage of the referendum in the
British press, as well as for initiating the formal British protest note calling attention to
the irregularities which had occurred during the campaign and voting. After the
referendum, during a visit to London, a representative of the Protocol Department of the
Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggested that Cavendish-Bentinck be removed.
Cavendish-Bentinck was later told by another Foreign Affairs employee that the Polish
government ‘hated [him] like poison’.595 The Polish government never formally
declared Cavendish-Bentinck persona non grata but it is possible – as Howarth
suggests – that Cavendish-Bentinck’s transfer was arranged as the result of pressure by
the Polish government. 596 If this were the case, British acquiescence to the request for
Cavendish-Bentinck’s removal would have been a clear signal that Britain did not
intend to interfere in internal Polish affairs. The selection of Gainer as Cavendish-
Bentinck’s successor reinforced the signal of disinterest. Unlike Cavendish-Bentinck,
who had served in the Warsaw embassy before the war, Gainer had no experience in
Eastern Europe.597 The appointment of an ambassador with no previous experience of
the country or region to which he had been posted was an indication that he would be
very unlikely to initiate policy, or to make any demarche that would be unwelcome to
the Polish government.
Cavendish-Bentinck’s recall and the presentation of the credentials for Gainer also
constituted ‘the first formal act of de jure recognition by H.M.G. of the new regime’
since the letters would have to be made out to the president of the republic, rather than
to the president of the National Council of the Homeland – the term in use at the time
that Cavendish-Bentinck had presented his credentials to Bierut. Recognition of the new
government was already implicit in the British decision taken two weeks earlier at the
595 TNA: PRO FO 371/56448/N13701/34/55, Cavendish-Bentinck to Hankey, 24 October 1946.
596 According to Howarth, Cavendish-Bentinck also interpreted the arrest of his friend, Count Ksawery
Grocholski (see below, footnote 34), as part of a campaign by the Polish government to ‘get rid’ of him.
Howarth, Intelligence Chief Extraordinary, 218-21. Colville also recalls that the Polish government
wanted both  Cavendish-Bentinck and Lane out of the country. Colville, Strange Inheritance, 188.
597 Gainer spent the early part of his career in Scandinavia and then Cuba. Before the war Gainer served
as consul-general in Munich and Vienna; he spent the wartime period in South America as
minister/ambassador in Venezuela, 1939-44, and ambassador in Brazil, 1944-47. Warsaw was Gainer’s
last posting abroad before his retirement in 1951. The Foreign Office List and Diplomatic and Consular
Yearbook, 1952 (London, 1952), 286-7.
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end of February to drop the word ‘provisional’ from the title of the Polish government
but the presentation of Gainer’s credentials marked a formalisation of recognition.598
Russell reported that the Polish government had made ‘little attempt to conceal [its]
jubilation at the departure of the two Ambassadors.’ Lane and Cavendish-Bentinck had
‘symbolised to the Poles the Anglo-American policy of intervention in Polish affairs,
which ended with the elections.’599 Similarly, Howarth recalled that ‘[t]he departure of
Bentinck was a cause of satisfaction to the Polish Government’.600 Thus, the recall of
Cavendish-Bentinck, the appointment of Gainer, and the discarding of the ‘provisional’
qualifier were important symbolically as indications that the British government did not
intend to challenge the election results or the composition of the new government, or
indeed to attempt to alter the course of Poland’s internal affairs.
Instead, Britain sought to tie up loose ends and settle points of contention. This
approach to policy is evident in the brief that the Foreign Office prepared for Bevin
ahead of the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Moscow and his return stop in
Warsaw. The main outstanding issues included Poland’s western frontier, which Britain
had not yet recognised as definite. The Anglo-Polish financial agreement, which had
been signed in London in 1946 but never ratified, also continued to give rise to ‘ill-will
and hostile propaganda.’ Britain had refused ratification on the grounds that the Polish
government had not fulfilled its obligations under the Yalta and Potsdam agreements.
Now that the elections had been held, however, it seemed unwise to perpetuate the
situation. Also on the economic front, Bevin should try to facilitate the conclusion of an
Anglo-Polish trade agreement, which could prove mutually advantageous. He also
needed to seek compensation for British interests affected by the Polish government’s
decision to nationalise all foreign enterprises employing over 50 people.
Polish émigrés and the former members of the Polish government-in-exile who had
remained in London continued to be a source of friction between London and Warsaw.
The Foreign Office remained adamantly opposed to turning out any former member of
the exile government. Similarly, Bevin should brook no criticism of the Polish
598 TNA: PRO FO 371/66092/N2537/6/55, Foreign Office to Warsaw, 24 February 1947; FO
371/66092/N2654/6/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 27 February 1947; PRO FO 371/66092/N2586/6/55,
Hankey minute, 12 March 1947; Foreign Office to Washington, 14 March 1947.
599 TNA: PRO FO 371/66093/N6707/6/55, Memo by John Russell, 28 May 1947.
600 Howarth, Intelligence Chief Extraordinary, 221.
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Resettlement Corps, which was an essential but temporary means of helping Polish
soldiers who had not opted for repatriation to settle in Britain or abroad. Along the same
lines, Poland continued to accuse Britain of blocking Polish repatriation, which was
untrue: the British government was simply ‘not . . . prepared to bring compulsion to
bear to force those Poles to go back who do not want to.’601
A troubling new development was a series of arrests of Polish employees of the British
embassy in Warsaw and of acquaintances of British diplomats there, which were
designed both to discourage Poles from contact with the western embassies and to
discredit the British diplomatic corps. The first case to come to trial was that of Count
Ksawery Grocholski, who was accused of acting as a liaison between the underground
organisation WIN, which was hostile to the Polish government, and Cavendish-
Bentinck.602 The subsequent arrest of the chief translator employed in the British
embassy in Warsaw, Maria Marinowska,603 suggested that the practice of extracting
‘confessions’ with the aim of establishing ‘proof’ of contact between the British
embassy and local subversive organisations was likely to continue.604
The briefing paper for Bevin’s trip underscores the post-election shift in British policy.
The issues covered amounted either to irritants in bilateral relations or involved direct
attacks on British property or personnel in Poland. In each case, if the problem could be
solved, there would be a direct benefit for Britain. The internal Polish political situation,
on the other hand, was now off the table. In fact, nothing concerning the attacks on the
PSL or the marginalisation of the PPS was even included in the briefing paper.
601 TNA: PRO FO 371/66092/N2537/6/55, ‘Brief [on Poland] for Secretary of State to take to Moscow’,
February 1947.
602 Grocholski was an old friend of the Cavendish-Bentinck family. Grocholski was arrested at his
mother’s home while Cavendish-Bentinck was paying a visit. Grocholski was sentenced to death and
shot. Colville, Strange Inheritance, 187.
603 Marinowska was accused of espionage for a foreign power. She was tried in December 1947 along
with five members of the underground movement: Wincenty Kwieciński and Stanisław Sędziak (two
young officers, both of whom had distinguished themselves in the September 1939 campaign as well as in
the underground movement during the war), and three other political activists, Włodzimierz Marszewski,
of the Democratic Party, Adam Obarski, of the PPS-WRN, and Wacław Lipiński, of the National
Independence Party (Stronnictwo Niezawisłości Narodowej – SNN). Halina Sosnowska was also tried.
Marszewski and Lipiński were sentenced to death; Kwieciński, Sędziak, and Sosnowska were sentenced
to life imprisonment; Obarski was sentenced to 15 years; and Marinowksa to 12. Kersten, Communist
Rule in Poland, 420-21.
604 TNA: PRO FO 371/66092/N2537/6/55, ‘Brief [on Poland] for Secretary of State to take to Moscow’,
February 1947.
205
Bevin to Moscow and Warsaw
By early 1947, the objective of isolating the Soviet Union and consolidating Anglo-
American cooperation in the newly established bizone was the most pressing priority of
British foreign policy in Europe. Bevin set off to the Moscow meeting of the Council of
Foreign Ministers not in the hope of salvaging four-power cooperation in Germany but
with the intention of persuading the Americans to drop the pretence of joint
administration once and for all, and accelerate the process of division. A Foreign Office
briefing paper for the Moscow meeting stipulated that the priority was ‘to keep the iron
curtain down (unless we get satisfaction on all our conditions) and build up Western
Germany behind it.’605 American thinking was quite clearly moving in the same
direction. In March, Truman made his famous speech setting out the American strategy
for the containment of communism, and announcing an aid package for Greece and
Turkey. Bevin now needed to persuade the Americans that the containment doctrine
should be applied to Germany, and that this could only be achieved by the division of
the country. The Foreign Secretary went to Moscow armed with the ‘Bevin Plan’,606
which proposed conditions for an economically unified, politically decentralised
Germany that would completely neutralise Soviet influence in the country and which
the Soviets would therefore never accept. Putting forward a solution to the deadlock
over Germany – even one intentionally designed to be totally unacceptable to the Soviet
Union – had the advantage of forcing the Soviets to be the ones to reject the plan, thus
placing the blame for the collapse of four-power cooperation squarely on their
shoulders.607
The Moscow Foreign Ministers meeting is widely regarded as the point at which the
wartime Grand Alliance broke down irrevocably.608 After weeks of discussion, the
conference ended in acrimony, with Molotov accusing the British and the Americans of
reneging on the Potsdam agreements.609 The British team succeeded in persuading the
Americans that the arrangements for the bizone were preferable to any plan which
605 Quoted in Deighton, Impossible Peace, 123.
606 This was a paper on the future of Germany accepted by Cabinet on 27 February 1947. Deighton,
Impossible Peace, 120.
607 Ibid., 120-25; 224-26.
608 Ibid., 135.
609 TNA: PRO FO 800/447, Bevin to Attlee, 16 April 1947.
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would allow the Soviets to extend their influence into the western zones.610 The British
also persuaded the Americans that the rebuilding of Germany could no longer be
postponed while the Soviets prevaricated: the recovery of all of western Europe
depended on the German economy sputtering back to life. The question of economic
recovery explains Bevin’s bulldozing approach to the problem: Britain simply could not
wait any longer to be relieved of the burden of expenditure on its German occupation
zone. Britain was in the midst of a full-blown economic crisis: bad winter weather had
interrupted coal deliveries to power stations and factories, making it necessary to
implement power cuts from the beginning of February; 2 million people were
unemployed; the trade deficit had risen to 1.8 billion USD; the funds from the American
loan were quickly drying up; and convertibility of the pound was due to be introduced
in four months’ time. Bevin was under acute pressure to wind down expenditure in
Germany. These urgent economic problems account for Bevin’s remorseless insistence
on achieving a breakthrough in the negotiations at Moscow.611
These developments in British policy towards Germany had important implications for
Poland. First, the Moscow meeting marked the point at which British policy became
openly adversarial towards the Soviet Union. Bevin went to Moscow seeking to break
the stalemate over Germany, rip away the façade of four-power cooperation, and force
the issue, even at the expense of an open breach with the Soviets. By this point, the
necessary precondition for Britain to exercise any influence in Poland was some form of
ongoing Anglo-Soviet cooperation. Therefore once Anglo-Soviet relations broke down
completely, Britain forfeited the possibility of effective involvement in the Polish
political situation. Further, as the ‘cold-war mentality’ seeped into British
policymaking, it was accompanied by the sense that Poland was now beyond Britain’s
reach, thus making any substantial initiatives seem futile. The only mention Bevin made
to the Soviets about Poland at the Moscow meeting concerned the frontier, which he
insisted had been fixed too far west, and was liable to give rise to an irredentist
movement.612
To further complicate matters, Bevin still faced criticism from the Parliamentary Labour
Party, as well as from his Cabinet colleagues, over the anti-Soviet thrust of his foreign
610 It was also at the Moscow conference that France ended its policy of obstructionism on the ACC and
began to move towards greater cooperation with the US and Britain.
611 Deighton, Impossible Peace, 125, 135-39, 145.
612 TNA: PRO FO 800/447, ‘Record of a Conversation at the Kremlin on Monday, 24th March, 1947’.
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policy. The censure motion of November 1946 was only a few months behind him as he
prepared for Moscow.613 The criticism from within his own party was an important
reason why the ‘Bevin plan’ was crafted to force the Soviets to be the ones to reject his
proposals. As Deighton explains, in order to gain support for his policies from his
colleagues, Bevin ‘had to persuade them of the inevitability of standing up to the
Soviets after one last public effort to secure quadripartite agreement over Germany.’614
After the acrimonious conclusion of the Moscow conference, and mindful of the views
of his party and Cabinet colleagues, I would argue that Bevin exercised extra caution in
his dealings with the Poles, limiting the talks to fairly uncontroversial bilateral issues,
which would not provoke public criticism and reinforce the perception at home that
Bevin was completely intransigent vis-à-vis the Soviets and their satellite states.
On his return from Moscow, Bevin stopped in Warsaw to meet with Polish leaders.
Bevin made this stop reluctantly and it amounted to little more than a perfunctory
courtesy visit. Bevin waited until the last minute to accept the invitation, shortly before
he left Moscow, and decided to pay a visit only because the train schedule included a
stop in Warsaw.615 Bevin stayed for less than a day. He met with Modzelewski and
Cyrankiewicz, not with Bierut, as might have been expected according to the terms of
diplomatic protocol. Bierut was officially a non-party president who maintained at least
the pretence of a separation between the presidential office and party politics.616 He
therefore would have been the obvious person to meet if Bevin had wanted to broach
difficult or sensitive subjects regarding internal Polish affairs. Bevin met with
Modzelewski in Warsaw on 27 April 1947. Bevin avoided discussion of the internal
political situation in Poland almost entirely. Instead, the talks centred mainly on the
issues of frontiers and the Anglo-Polish financial and trade agreements. Modzelewski
opened the talks with his concerns about the reconstruction of Germany; he expressed
his hope that those countries which had been the victims of German aggression would
be restored first. Modzelewski then moved to the question of the Polish-German
frontier. He argued that Germany’s borders had been agreed at Potsdam, and the British
and Americans were now seeking a revision of that agreement. Bevin reminded
613 For a full discussion of this conflict, please see chapter 4.
614 Deighton, Impossible Peace, 127-8.
615 Bevin finally accepted the invitation on 19 April. TNA: PRO FO 371/66125/N4543/26/55, Warsaw to
Foreign Office, 18 April 1947; FO 371/66125/N4581/26/55, Warsaw to Moscow, 19 April 1947.
616 The separation was not genuine. Although Bierut had officially resigned from the PPR and set up his
offices in the old presidential palace, he continued to attend meetings of the Politburo. Anita
Prażmowska, Władysław Gomułka: A Biography (forthcoming), chapter 6.
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Modzelewski that he had never regarded the provisional frontier set at Potsdam as final
but rather as a temporary solution until a peace treaty had been drawn up. He considered
it essential that an impartial four-power commission should investigate Germany’s
frontiers with all its neighbours. The commission would also report on the situation in
the Polish reclaimed territories. Modzelewski flatly rejected the idea, stating that the
Polish government ‘could not accept this kind of committee.’
When the discussion turned to Britain’s failure to ratify the Anglo-Polish financial
agreement, Bevin simply promised to look into the matter, although he pointed out that
ratification had been delayed as a direct result of the Polish government’s failure to
carry out its undertakings regarding the conduct of the elections. Modzelewski objected
to Bevin’s criticism, pointing out that the elections had been held, an amnesty had been
granted to members of the underground, and the political situation had stabilised.
Modzelewski noted that negotiations for a trade agreement between Poland and Britain
had recently been concluded in London. He hoped that the arrangement reached would
be ratified.617
Bevin also met with Cyrankiewicz on 27 April. At Cyrankiewicz’s suggestion, the
meeting was held in private. Judging by the record of the conversation, Bevin asserted
himself somewhat more forcefully in his meeting with Cyrankiewicz than he had with
Modzelewski. Again the Anglo-Polish trade and financial agreements were the focus of
much of the discussion. Cyrankiewicz deplored the lack of understanding between the
British and Polish Socialist parties. He was upset that nothing had yet materialised from
the negotiations for a trade agreement and he questioned why the financial agreement
had not yet been ratified. This time, Bevin rebuffed the complaints by raising the issue
of the nationalisation of industry in Poland, which he declared amounted to
confiscation. He pointed out that the Labour government in Britain was also carrying
out a programme of nationalisation but that compensation was paid not only to British
owners but to foreign nationals who held interests in the enterprises. Cyrankiewicz
sought to mollify Bevin on this point. He promised that talks on nationalisation would
begin as soon as possible; he would ensure that Britain received terms ‘in no way less
favourable than those accorded to the United States Government.’ In return, Bevin
617 TNA: PRO FO 800/447, ‘Anglo-Polish Conversations: Note by Mr. Broad, His Majesty’s Chargé
d’Affaires at Warsaw, on a Conversation with the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Warsaw’, MSZ
6/47/3, 27 April 1947.
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promised that the financial treaty would be ratified on his return to London.
Cyrankiewicz also objected to the Polish Resettlement Corps and the continuation of the
work of the Interim Treasury Committee. In his view, Britain should not continue to
employ Poles in any organisation of that kind. Bevin agreed and suggested that there
should be a British organisation under the aegis of the Ministry of Labour and the
Treasury which would be under British control.618 The financial agreement was duly
ratified shortly after Bevin returned to London.619 The Resettlement Corps was already
being wound down by this point, although it did not entirely cease to operate until the
autumn of 1949.620
Agreement proved more elusive on the issue of population transfers. Bevin asked
Cyrankiewicz to halt the transfer of Germans from Poland to the western zones of
Germany. The population density in the west was ‘becoming explosive.’ Cyrankiewicz
promised nothing, retorting that the majority of Germans transferred from Polish
territory were absorbed in the Soviet zone. This was untrue: in February 1946, an
Anglo-Polish agreement had been concluded providing for the transfer and resettlement
of Germans from Poland to the British zone. Britain sent liaison teams to Poland to
oversee ‘Operation Swallow’ – the codename for the population transfer. The liaison
teams were stationed at transit camps in Szczecin [Stettin], in the north, and Węgliniec
[Kohlfurt], in the south. The conditions in the camps were so dire – with inadequate
shelter; and a shortage of food and medical supplies – that the liaison workers felt
compelled to continue the transfers, in spite of desperate overcrowding in the British
zone of Germany. By this point, there was a full-blown refugee crisis in the British
occupation zone. In 1946 alone, the British zone received more than 1.5 million German
refugees from Poland. The Polish authorities, meanwhile, were in a great hurry to clear
the western territories of Germans to allow the area to be resettled by Poles, thereby
strengthening the Polish claim to the region while the final demarcation of the frontier
remained unresolved. The problem was compounded by the weak condition of many of
the transferees: fit, adult males were allowed to remain in Poland, while the very young,
the elderly, and the infirm were shipped out. This endless stream of economically
unproductive refugees, who lacked even the bare necessities for survival, seriously
618 TNA: PRO FO 800/447, ‘Record of a Conversation between the Secretary of State and the Polish
Prime Minister at the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Warsaw’, 27 April, 1947.
619 The instruments of ratification were exchanged in London on 19 June 1947. TNA: PRO FO
371/66126/N7329/26/55, Foreign Office communiqué, 19 June 1947.
620 Hope, The Abandoned Legion, 219.
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exacerbated the food, housing, and public health crisis with which the British authorities
were struggling to cope in their zone of Germany. Bevin’s discussions with
Modzelewski and Cyrankiewicz did not lead to a resolution of the problem of
expulsions. Instead, the British called a halt to Operation Swallow in the summer of
1947.621
With regard to the Polish western frontier, Bevin repeated that the Potsdam agreement
had been provisional; he reiterated his idea of an independent commission to study the
matter. The frontier question was linked to the problem of administering Germany: the
Soviet Union had failed to supply food to the western zone and Britain could not be
expected to continue indefinitely to import food into Germany paid for in dollars.
Sidestepping Bevin’s comment, Cyrankiewicz commented that turning the port of
Szczecin into a ‘second Danzig’ would be even more explosive than the high population
density in British zone of Germany.622 In the end, the frontier question remained open
until 1970, when the West German government of Willy Brandt extended de facto
recognition of the Oder-Neisse line under the terms of the Treaty of Warsaw.623
Thus, with the exception of Bevin’s reminder to Modzelewski that the Anglo-Polish
financial agreement had been delayed because of the Polish government’s
obstructionism over the elections, Bevin made no mention of the internal political
situation in either of his meetings in Poland. Bevin’s visit to Warsaw might have been
used as an opportunity to seek a guarantee from the government regarding an end to the
harassment of PSL members, or a pledge that the PPS would not be obliterated. The
total absence of these issues from the discussion – as well as Bevin’s indecision over
whether to make the visit and the lack of an attempt to arrange a meeting with Bierut –
suggests a strong sense of disengagement on Bevin’s part, a process of going through
the motions rather than trying to broach any issues of substantial importance. I would
argue that Bevin sought to limit the number of conflicts with the Soviet Union and its
621 Under the terms of the agreement, 1,000 Germans would be sent by sea, and 1,500 by rail from
Szczecin per day; from Węgliniec, 3,000 per day in two trainloads, or up to 5,500 per day if capacity
allowed. The agreement stipulated that only those in good health were to be transferred; heavily pregnant
women were not to be transferred; and families were not to be split up. Matthew Frank, Expelling the
Germans: British Opinion and Post-1945 Population Transfer in Context (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2007), 12, 245-61.
622 TNA: PRO FO 800/447, ‘Record of a Conversation between the Secretary of State and the Polish
Prime Minister at the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Warsaw, on 27th April, 1947’.
623 Encyclopedia of the Cold War, ed. Ruud van Dijk (New York, 2008), s.v. ‘Poland’ (by Douglas
Selvage), 701.
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satellite states at this point. He had to face his Cabinet colleagues on his return to
London, and make his final pitch to convince them that Soviet intransigence made
ongoing cooperation in Germany a futile prospect. He would not have wanted a flare-up
of tensions with the Polish government to complicate the situation, and add fuel to his
critics’ accusations that he was simply blindly anti-Soviet.
Contact resumes with Mikołajczyk
Another clear indication of the change in British policy was the lapse in relations with
Mikołajczyk. From the time of Cavendish-Bentinck’s departure from Warsaw at the end
of February until 7 May, when Russell met Mikołajczyk at PSL headquarters, there was
no contact between any member of the British embassy staff and the PSL leader. After a
year and a half of consistent and regular contact between Mikołajczyk and British
officials, this interval represented a dramatic change. Russell acknowledged that Britain
had neglected Mikołajczyk: ‘I must confess that I felt slightly uncomfortable at first as,
whichever way you cut it, we have in effect . . . dropped Mikolajczyk since the
elections.’624 Philip Broad, who took charge of the Warsaw embassy for the months
between Cavendish-Bentinck’s departure and Gainer’s arrival, justified the lapse on the
grounds that it would have been too ‘dangerous’ for Mikołajczyk to be associated with
British diplomats at a time when the government they represented was ‘publicly
condemning as a fake the elections which had just returned his political opponents to
power’. This reasoning seems disingenuous, given that the Warsaw embassy had
maintained much closer and more frequent contact with Mikołajczyk at times when
British criticism of the Polish government had been far more sustained and vociferous.
A more likely explanation lies in Broad’s next sentence: ‘Conversely, it did not seem
desirable at that time for this Embassy to continue to associate itself too openly with the
most determined enemy of the Government to which it was accredited.’ Mikołajczyk
admitted to Russell that ‘he had been hurt by the severance of relations’ and he
immediately accepted an invitation to a forthcoming reception at the British embassy to
mark Gainer’s arrival. Asked whether he would not be embarrassed by this invitation,
Mikołajczyk replied that ‘so far from being embarrassed, he would welcome such an
624 Coutouvidis and Reynolds incorrectly attribute this comment to Gainer. In fact, Gainer did not arrive
at his posting in Warsaw until 4 June 1947. See Coutouvidis and Reynolds, Poland, 1939-1947, 300.
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invitation as it would show to his friends, as well as his enemies, that he and his party
had not been forgotten by their former allies.’
Mikołajczyk told Russell that the Polish people had been disappointed by British policy
after the elections. Mikołajczyk acknowledged that Britain was ‘not in a position to
afford [the Polish people] much physical assistance or to intervene actively between
them and their new masters’ but he did not understand why Britain suddenly felt
compelled to ‘whitewash’ the situation. Since the elections, ‘the people of Poland had
seen no gestures out of England but of approval towards the Government which those
fake elections had imposed. … The people of Poland were mystified, disappointed and
offended by the billings and cooings that they saw going on between His Majesty’s
Government and the present Government of Poland.’ Russell explained that Britain’s
policy was now to strengthen the PPS in their struggle with the PPR but Mikołajczyk
warned that Cyrankiewicz was not trustworthy. He did not represent the views of the
rank and file of the PPS. He ‘was becoming every day further divorced from the views
of the Socialists and was tying himself up ever more inextricably with the
communists.’625 Mikołajczyk was ‘extremely alarmed’ by the trend towards the fusion
of the PPR and the PPS. He feared the PPS would soon cease to exist. Mikołajczyk’s
assessment of the position of the PPS was accurate. Three days after Mikołajczyk and
Russell’s meeting, Cyrankiewicz announced that the PPS’s objective was organisational
unity with the PPR, although, mindful of the strong dissenting faction within the party,
he softened this statement by adding that this aim would be achieved only in the long
term.626
Mikołajczyk reported that the internal situation in Poland was worse than ever. PSL
members were subjected to arrests, harassment, and censorship. The distributors of the
PSL paper, Gazeta Ludowa were regularly arrested, subscribers were visited by the
security police, the youth wing of the PSL had been broken up, and PSL members were
threatened with job loss unless they quit the party. The PSL had appealed against the
results of the elections in almost every electoral district in the country within the time
limit. Under the law, these complaints had to be investigated within a month by the
Civil Supreme Court. So far, however, the only action taken was that the government
625 TNA: PRO FO 371/66093/N5787/6/55, ‘Memorandum of a Conversation with Monsieur Mikolajczyk
on May 7th’; Broad to Bevin, 16 May 1947.
626 Prażmowska, Civil War in Poland, 207.
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had given copies of the protests to the security police who had promptly arrested all the
PSL members who had signed them.627
The Foreign Office was not pleased that Broad had allowed contact with Mikołajczyk to
lapse entirely. Hankey noted that the Foreign Office did not ‘envisage our present policy
in Poland as permitting either the Socialists or the Communists to exclude us from
having contacts with Poles of any political persuasion we please.’628 Hankey instructed
Broad along these lines, reminding him of the line of policy which had been agreed at
the beginning of the year. Hankey’s message suggests a disjunction between the Foreign
Office and the Warsaw embassy under Broad’s temporary stewardship. Broad seems to
have been operating in a void after Cavendish-Bentinck’s departure. In the absence of
specific instructions from the Foreign Office, Broad pursued his own line of policy. He
tended to be less favourably inclined towards Mikołajczyk than had Cavendish-
Bentinck and the Foreign Office. In his covering letter to Russell’s report, for instance,
Broad included a disclaimer regarding the information provided by Mikołajczyk:
‘Monsieur Mikolajczyk is an honest man and a good Pole, but it is only natural that in
conversation with a representative of His Majesty’s Embassy he should not minimise
his case. I think, therefore, that one should add a small pinch of salt to some of his
complaints against the Government’.629
Certainly, British priorities had shifted after the elections but it appears that Broad went
further than the Foreign Office intended or wanted by cutting off contact with
Mikołajczyk. Although there was a new emphasis on resolving outstanding bilateral
issues, the Foreign Office did not expect improved relations between London and
Warsaw to preclude all contact with the PSL. Broad, on the other hand, seems to have
concluded that it would be counterproductive to ruffle the new government’s feathers by
maintaining contact with its opponents during this period. Broad certainly welcomed the
thaw in Anglo-Polish relations. He noted that the improvement was already reflected in
the day-to-day dealings between the embassy and the Polish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, particularly after the decision to ratify the financial agreement, which had been
‘very well received in Poland.’ He hoped the ratification could be followed by other
627 TNA: PRO FO 371/66093/N5787/6/55, ‘Memorandum of a Conversation with Monsieur Mikolajczyk
on May 7th’; Broad to Bevin, 16 May 1947.
628 TNA: PRO FO 371/66093/N5787/6/55, Hankey minute, 29 May 1947.
629 TNA: PRO FO 371/66093/N5787/6/55, Hankey to Broad, 16 June 1947; Broad to Bevin, 16 May
1947.
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non-political agreements.630 It may well have suited Broad to shelve Mikołajczyk in
order to facilitate the conclusion of these agreements and alleviate the tension in his
routine dealings with the Polish government. It would seem that he misunderstood,
however, that fewer hassles in the conduct of mundane matters would not necessarily
lead to genuinely better Anglo-Polish relations in the long-term.
Hancock commented on this misunderstanding: ‘In the present atmosphere of an Anglo-
Polish détente, there is some danger of forgetting that the Polish Government is a
Communist dominated police regime basically hostile to the West. This is no reason
why we should not pursue our present policy of trying discreetly to strengthen the hand
of the Socialist element in the Polish Government and of liquidating the outstanding
Anglo-Polish disagreements.’631 Although the Foreign Office officials regarded the
severance of contact as a mistake on Broad’s part and were evidently glad that it had
been restored, there is no evidence that officials questioned Broad about Mikołajczyk or
prodded embassy staff to get in touch with the PSL leader. The long delay between
Cavendish-Bentinck’s departure and Gainer’s arrival in Warsaw is also difficult to
understand. The new ambassador arrived on 4 June 1947, over three months after
Cavendish-Bentinck had returned to the UK.  Gainer also took an extended period of
leave in the late summer and early autumn.632 The absence of an ambassador inevitably
contributed to the policy drift. Further, the delay in Gainer’s appointment would not
have gone unnoticed by the Polish government, and would have been interpreted as a
further indication that Britain intended to take a hands-off approach to policy in Poland.
The lapse in contact with Mikołajczyk shows that there was a split within the British
foreign policymaking establishment. On the one hand, Bevin, anxious to conserve his
political capital for the showdown with the Soviet Union over Germany, sought to avoid
any additional disagreements with the Soviets. He therefore regarded British withdrawal
from Polish affairs, which had so far generated only increased Anglo-Soviet tension, as
a necessity. He was not indifferent to events in Poland but he accepted that Britain no
longer had the influence or strength to impose a particular outcome there. British
support for the PSL must end because it would serve only to antagonise the Polish
government. While the Foreign Office Northern Department, on the other hand, had
630 TNA: PRO FO 371/66093/N6707/6/55, Broad to Bevin, 3 June 1947.
631 TNA: PRO FO 371/66093/N5787/6/55, Hancock minute, 23 May 1947.
632 TNA: PRO FO 371/66093/N7659/6/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 13 June 1947.
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conceded that the PSL was moribund as a political opposition force, it had done so only
reluctantly. The Northern Department struggled to adjust to the new direction of policy.
In particular, the officials whose association with the Polish opposition extended back to
the wartime period, found it more difficult to accept the implications of British
disengagement from Poland. The difficulty in adjusting applies most of all to Hankey,
who had served in the Warsaw embassy from 1936-39, and again as chargé d’affaires
from 1945-46 before returning to the Foreign Office, but also to Warner, the former
head of the department, by then assistant undersecretary of state. As undersecretary and
head of the department, they set the tone for their subordinates. In particular, Hancock,
who was in charge of Polish affairs in the department, shared Hankey’s approach, as
evidenced, for instance, by his comments about Broad. The ambivalence of these
officials is most clearly evident in relation to Mikołajczyk: on the one hand they
acknowledged that the PSL was a spent force, and yet bristled when Broad, a newcomer
who had arrived in Warsaw in 1946 from Allied Forces HQ in Italy, failed to maintain
contact with the PSL leader.
PPS under fire
In the spring of 1947, the PPR renewed its attempt to persuade the PPS to accept an
immediate fusion of the two parties. Although Cyrankiewicz had espoused a
commitment to eventual unification, a significant faction of the PPS, led by Osóbka-
Morawski, objected to this course, and ‘relations between the two had become very
strained.’ In particular, many socialists resented the underrepresentation of the PPS in
the government and believed that the communists were acting in bad faith.633 The issue
created a split in the party, and bitter differences were aired at the executive council
meeting at the end of June. Ultimately, Cyrankiewicz’s motion for eventual unity with
the PPR carried. Osóbka-Morawski lost his position as chair of the executive council,
thus solidifying Cyrankiewicz’s control over the leadership. Nevertheless, the PPS was
still not prepared at this point to entirely abandon its identity as a separate party and be
totally subsumed by the PPR.634
633 Prażmowska, ‘The Polish Socialist Party’, 353.
634 Prażmowska, Civil War in Poland, 206-7; Kersten, Communist Rule in Poland, 377.
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When the attempt at immediate unification failed, the PPR adopted a more aggressive
approach. In July, Gainer reported that the PPR was employing the same tactics against
the PPS that it had used to destroy the PSL. First a number of right-wing socialists were
arrested on charges of anti-state and anti-Soviet propaganda, and of collaboration with
the intelligence services of a foreign power. Other arrests soon followed, primarily of
PPS members in official positions in Warsaw and the provinces who were considered
too independent. In Gainer’s view, the PPR’s intention was to send a ‘warning to the
PPS not to err from the path of strict collaboration with the Communists.’
The result was a complete collapse of PPS policy, which had aimed to exert a
moderating influence on the PPR and eventually to overwhelm the party altogether by
virtue of their superior numbers. After the wave of arrests, however, the PPS sought
only to keep the party alive as a separate unit and hope for an improvement in the
situation. Gainer described the strategy: ‘Unable to defend themselves by the best
method, attack, the leaders seem to have decided to try to show that they are at any rate
“good boys.”’ The chief concern of the PPS leaders was to avoid any suggestion that
their members were engaged in ‘right-wing’ activities. To this end, the party chiefs had
issued a series of communiqués urging PPS members to obey the party line. In trying to
keep the party alive, however, its leaders were forfeiting their credibility as an
independent force in Polish politics. According to Gainer, ‘most of the Socialist leaders
are now prepared to go to almost any length, though with the utmost unwillingness of
heart, in acquiescing in changes which run contrary to their principles.’635
Warner and Gainer discussed the policy options at the end of July when the latter was in
London and decided to withdraw support for the PPS. Gainer argued that the basis of
the policy of supporting the PPS in the hope of strengthening their hands against the
communists had eroded completely. Cyrankiewicz might at one time have genuinely
wanted to assert socialist independence against the PPR but he was no longer making
any effort to do so. The PPS leaders were not putting up a fight to prevent the party
from being broken up. In Gainer’s view, it was by no means certain that the PPS was
capable of effective resistance. No effort was being made to organise the rank and file in
a showdown. Gainer declared that he was not ready to go on ‘final official record’ to
this effect since he had only been in Poland for two months; but he felt quite confident
635 TNA: PRO FO 371/66094/N8234/6/55, Healey to Mayhew, 10 July 1947; FO 371/66094/N8539/6/55,
Warsaw to Foreign Office, 21 July 1947; FO 371/66094/N8301/6/55, Gainer to Bevin, 11 July 1947.
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that he was right. Warner agreed that a decision regarding a change in policy needed to
be dealt with immediately. Bevin needed to be made aware of Gainer’s grave doubts.
Two days later, when Bevin met with Gainer, it was agreed that the PPS were ‘not
worth while putting our money on.’636 The other Foreign Office officials expressed no
fundamental objections to the policy change. Although Hancock favoured a
continuation of ‘discreet’ support for the PPS, and the provision of help ‘in small ways’,
even he concluded that Britain no longer had any basis on which to intervene. ‘In
general, I am afraid that we have no further means to hand of helping the Polish
Socialists. They have got to stand up for themselves. Their spirit is weak and their
prospects are bad.’637
Mikołajczyk in trouble
In the summer of 1947, rumours that Mikołajczyk would be arrested and tried in the
autumn began to circulate. The rumblings began in June, after Mikołajczyk was accused
– bizarrely – of responsibility for Sikorski’s death. The attack led to speculation that this
charge would serve as grounds for the PSL leader’s arrest.638 Fears were further
heightened by the opening of the ‘Kraków trial’ on 10 September in which several
prominent PSL members were charged with collaboration with members of the
underground opposition.639
The Foreign Office response to the threat to Mikołajczyk was immediate. From the
outset, the planning process was underpinned by a sharp awareness of Britain’s 1945
promise to protect Mikołajczyk. Unlike British support for the Polish opposition as a
whole, the Foreign Office regarded the commitment to Mikołajczyk as ongoing,
regardless of the state of the PSL or the broader political situation in Poland. This sense
of commitment is apparent both in the internal Foreign Office minutes and memos, and
in the correspondence with the Warsaw embassy. First, Bevin and his officials agreed to
take preventative measures to try to protect Mikołajczyk. Broad was instructed to
deliver a personal message from Bevin to Cyrankiewicz urging him to use his influence
636 TNA: PRO FO 371/66094/ N8539/6/55, Warner memo, 29 July 1947; N9082/6/55, Hancock memo, 2
August 1947; FO 371/66094/N9082/6/55, Hancock minute, 6 August 1947.
637 TNA: PRO FO 371/66094/N8539/6/55, Hancock minute, 22 July 1947.
638 TNA: PRO FO 371/66094/N8997/6/55, Gainer to Warner, 24 July 1947;
639 Prażmowska, Civil War in Poland, 205; TNA: PRO FO 371/66095/N10793/6/55, Warsaw to Foreign
Office, 16 September 1947.
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to prevent any action being taken against the PSL leader. The text of Bevin’s message
(which Broad was to deliver orally640) stressed that Mikołajczyk’s decision to return to
Poland had been much influenced by the ‘emphatic advice of His Majesty’s
Government’ and Britain’s moral responsibility towards him was ongoing. Any action
which endangered Mikołajczyk would be a setback to the recent improvement in Anglo-
Polish relations from which it might ‘not recover for a long time, if at all.’641 In the
instructions to Broad accompanying the statement, Warner emphasised Churchill’s
personal pledge to protect Mikołajczyk’s safety. Warner reminded Broad of the details:
when Churchill had persuaded Mikołajczyk and Stańczyk to go to Moscow and enter
into negotiations with Bierut, he had extended an assurance that the British government
would ‘back [Mikołajczyk] to the limit of their strength’ and that he ‘need have no fears
for his personal safety.’ Warner stressed that Churchill’s pledge endured beyond the
change of government in 1945: ‘this was a matter which went far beyond politics.’642
The fact that Warner took such pains to explain in detail the terms of Churchill’s pledge
to Broad, who, as chargé d’affaires in Warsaw, must have been familiar with the
background, gives further weight to the argument that Broad was not always in step
with his colleagues in the Foreign Office.
Upon hearing the rumours about the danger to Mikołajczyk, Churchill himself wrote to
Bevin to remind him of the British commitment. Churchill clearly had an acute sense
that Mikołajczyk would have been unlikely to return to Poland had it not been for
British pressure:
As you will see by consulting the records, I put the utmost pressure on him to
return there and had, at the time, every reason to believe that this was agreeable to
Stalin. If now he is going to be victimised in the Soviet manner, I shall certainly
feel it necessary to speak in good time about the matter and also to refer
particularly to Stalin’s agreeable relations with Mikolajczyk at the time Eden and
I were in Moscow in October 1944. I consider that the execution, or even the
persecution, of Mikolajczyk is a matter of the very first magnitude. I have no
640 Broad delivered the message to Cyrankiewicz on 19 September 1947. Broad reported that
Cyrankiewicz had made no comment on the substance of the message, which he ‘clearly did not like’.
TNA: PRO FO 371/66095/N10917/6/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 19 September 1947.
641 TNA: PRO FO 371/66094/N9082/6/55, Hancock memo, 2 August 1947; FO 371/66094/N8997/6/55,
Gainer to Warner, 24 July 1947; Hancock minute, 5 August 1947; ‘Message from the Secretary of State
to the Polish Prime Minister about Mr. Mikolajczyk. To be delivered orally by His Majesty’s Chargé
d’Affaires in Warsaw.’
642 TNA: PRO FO 371/66094/N8997/6/55, Warner to Broad, 11 August 1947.
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doubt you share my views, but I feel it my duty to write you this letter in order
that everything possible may be done to stop this increasing villainy.643
Bevin replied to Churchill that he was ‘very conscious of our moral obligation in the
matter of [Mikołajczyk’s] personal safety. I also share your fear that Mikolajczyk may
be arrested and tried on a trumped-up charge.’ Bevin informed Churchill in absolute
confidence about the personal message to Cyrankiewicz. Explaining his decision to
communicate his concerns privately to Cyrankiewicz rather than issue a public warning,
Bevin referred to the case of Nikola Petkov, the Bulgarian peasant leader, who was
arrested in June 1947:644
[A]ll our representations about Petkov have not prevented his trial and
execution, and the elimination of his Party. This confirms my view that if we
raise the case of a man like Petkov or Mikolajczyk here publicly, as an issue
between ourselves and those in power in the country concerned, the latter’s
reaction is to accept it as a challenge, to represent the man in question as a tool
of the western powers, and to take steps to eliminate him. So I think it would be
a mistake and dangerous for Mikolajczyk that there would be publicity at the
present time about his possible danger.
Bevin concluded by reassuring Churchill that ‘If action is taken against Mikolajczyk . . .
you may be sure that I shall take any steps likely to help.’645
Also in the summer of 1947 the Foreign Office began to plan for the possibility that
Mikołajczyk might seek asylum in the British embassy.  On 31 July, Gainer and Bevin
agreed that if Mikołajczyk sought refuge, ‘the normal procedure should be followed.’646
The Foreign Office struggled, however, to determine just what constituted ‘normal
procedure.’ The closest case to a precedent that officials could find was that of General
Nicolae Rădescu, the leader of the last, short-lived, non-communist-dominated coalition
government in Romania who was given sanctuary in the British legation in Bucharest in
March 1945 and subsequently left Romania for Cyprus.647 The Rădescu case did not
provide an exact precedent, however, because Romania had been treated as a defeated
Axis satellite power and had an Allied Control Commission in place, which gave Britain
643 TNA: PRO FO 371/66095/N11254/6/55, Churchill to Bevin, 19 September 1947.
644 Vesselin Dimitrov, Stalin’s Cold War: Soviet Foreign Policy, Democracy and Communism in
Bulgaria, 1941-48 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2008), 171.
645 TNA: PRO FO 371/66095/N11254/6/55, Bevin to Churchill, 30 September 1947.
646 TNA: PRO FO 371/66094/N8997/6/55, Warner to Broad, 18 September 1947.
647 Rădescu’s government was in power from 6 December 1944 to 28 February 1945.
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a locus standi that it did not have in Poland.648 Hancock concluded that ‘the case of
Mikolajczyk must be considered in isolation. I can find no precedent to help us.’ The
greatest difficulty in granting asylum was that the process depended on whether a
particular country recognised the concept at all. In countries where asylum was not
recognised, the authorities would be entitled to take coercive measures in order to
secure the surrender of the person seeking asylum. Unable to find any information
specifically on Polish policy, the Foreign Office took Russian diplomatic practice,
which stipulated that no right of asylum existed, as a guide. Hankey insisted that
Mikołajczyk must be fully informed in advance about the level of protection that the
Warsaw embassy could provide: ‘It would be the last straw, if, relying on our help, he
sought asylum in H.M. Embassy and we ultimately had to give him up.’649 Warner
instructed Broad along these lines, asking him to be careful to explain to Mikołajczyk
the limits of what the British embassy would be able to do to help.650
On 30 September, Mikołajczyk told D.P. Aiers, the third secretary at the British
embassy, that plans were in place to have the PSL ‘formally and legally dissolved’.
Mikołajczyk described how the party’s regional headquarters had been closed in various
parts of the country. Members of the Central Council of the PSL were frequently
summoned to the security police and there faced with the demand that they should sign
a formal renunciation of the PSL. Mikołajczyk predicted that once restrictions on the
PSL had achieved as much as possible, the ‘final drastic blow’ would be delivered. He
expected his own arrest could happen at any time.651
Broad responded with greater scepticism to Mikołajczyk. Again, this put him at odds
with his colleagues in London. In his covering letter to Aiers’s telegram, Broad
described Mikołajczyk’s assessment as ‘unduly pessimistic.’ Instead, Broad claimed
that the general consensus was that the communists intended to pursue a double policy
of ‘the outstretched hand coupled with a threat.’ For example, they might try to arrange
648 On 23 August 1944, the pro-Nazi government of Marshal Ion Antonescu was overthrown. The new
Romanian government immediately announced an end to hostilities with the Soviet Union and joined the
Allied war effort. Nonetheless, an Allied Control Commission was set up in Romania to supervise
implementation of the terms of the armistice. Saiu, Great Powers and Rumania, 1-3; Dennis Deletant,
review of Romania’s Communist Takeover: The Rădescu Government, by Dinu C. Giurescu, The
Slavonic and East European Review, 74 (2): 349.
649 TNA: PRO FO 371/66094/N8997/6/55, Hancock minute, 5 August 1947; Hankey minute, 14 August
1947.
650 TNA: PRO FO 371/66094/N8997/6/55, Warner to Broad, 18 September 1947.
651 TNA: PRO FO 371/66095/N11649/6/55, Aiers memo, 30 September 1947.
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for Mikołajczyk and other leaders to be voted out of the party executive, and be
replaced either by people willing to cooperate with the PPR or by mere stooges. Broad
predicted that only ‘[i]n the event of a peaceful pruning of the Polish Peasant Party
proving impossible’ would the Polish government ‘proceed with the total liquidation of
the Party on the lines forecast by Monsieur Mikolajczyk.’652
It is clear from the files that this idea originated from within the Foreign Office
Northern Department. The origin of the plan does not come across altogether clearly in
a recent essay published by the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS; cover name: MI6).653
Hankey was the first to propose asking William Hayter, head of the Services Liaison
Department in the Foreign Office for assistance to help Mikołajczyk escape. In the
Foreign Office minutes, Hankey noted that it would be necessary to consult Broad on
the matter, which indicates that the plan did not originate in the Warsaw embassy. The
same day, Warner reminded his colleagues that the idea of assisting in a clandestine
escape had been rejected at Bevin’s meeting with Gainer at the end of July, thus
underlining that the initiative lay with the Foreign Office.654
Mikołajczyk’s escape
Having determined that the Warsaw embassy would be unlikely to be able to provide
sufficient protection for Mikołajczyk, the Foreign Office began making plans in August
to help him disappear underground or to escape from Poland altogether if necessary.
The Northern Department approached the SIS to devise several different possible means
of escape.655 The request for SIS assistance indicates Mikołajczyk’s importance for the
Foreign Office since the service did not often agree to take on operations of this kind. In
the immediate postwar years, the SIS was in the midst of restructuring and readjusting
to the shifting circumstances and priorities of the period. For example, the Foreign
Office initially restricted SIS involvement in the Soviet sphere of interest in order to
avoid antagonising Moscow. Only gradually, as the residual optimism about continuing
postwar Anglo-Soviet cooperation faded, did the service’s work shift to focus on the
652 TNA: PRO FO 371/66095/N11649/6/55, Broad to Bevin, 3 October 1947.
653 Gill Bennett, ‘Escape from Eastern Europe’, https://www.sis.gov.uk/our-history/pusd-records/escape-
from-eastern-europe.html [accessed 21 February 2014].
654 TNA: PRO FO 1093/445, Minutes by Hankey, Warner, and Sargent, 15 August 1947.
655 Throughout the discussions relating to the plans for Mikołajczyk’s escape, the SIS is referred to
obliquely as ‘Mr Hayter’s friends’.
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countries of the emerging communist bloc. In 1947, therefore, the SIS had not yet
gained a firm foothold in Eastern Europe. In his history of the service, Keith Jeffery
explains the state of British postwar foreign intelligence gathering in the Soviet sphere:
‘Such intelligence sources as there had been were mostly swept away, the overt
collection of information was gravely impaired, and the demands on SIS escalated to
include the most trivial details of everyday life in these obsessively well-protected
countries.’ On the other hand, the SIS’s record of success during the war, together with
the postwar incorporation of the Special Operations Executive – with its focus on
subversion and sabotage – into the service, encouraged a greater readiness within the
organisation to undertake special operations, such as the exfiltration of individuals from
the communist bloc.656
The SIS agreed to help arrange Mikołajczyk’s escape because of his importance as a
political figure, and also, according to Jeffery, to test the security and feasibility of safe
routes for their own agents out of Poland.657 Terence Garvey, the Foreign Office
assistant to the SIS chief, told Warner and Hankey that helping Mikołajczyk escape
would carry the risk of compromising the organisation’s network in Poland.658 The SIS
would be prepared to organise the operation, even at the expense of losing their
network, although they would regard it as a ‘somewhat expensive price to pay’ if the
sole aim were ‘the humanitarian one of saving Mikolajczyk’s skin.’ If, on the other
hand, ‘they were told that the necessity of the operation arose from Mr. Churchill’s
personal guarantee of Mikolajczyk’s safety and that the Foreign Office considered it
essential that this guarantee should be redeemed, they would feel that they had to do
their best.’659
The SIS devised several possible escape routes for Mikołajczyk, the most promising of
which involved two stages: clandestine escape from Poland to Czechoslovakia,
followed by removal from Czechoslovakia to the American zone of Germany. The SIS
judged, however, that even this plan carried only ‘a rather better than even chance of
success’ given the ‘considerable risk (Mikolajczyk’s whole future and perhaps life;
656 Keith Jeffery, MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service, 1909-1949 (London: Bloomsbury,
2010), 567-8, 655-6, 667.
657 Jeffery, History of the Secret Intelligence Service, 667.
658 The position of Foreign Office assistant to the SIS chief was new, created in 1946 following a
reorganisation of the chief’s personal staff. It became the main link between SIS and the Foreign Office.
Jeffery, History of the Secret Intelligence Service, 621.
659 TNA: PRO FO 1093/445, Garvey minute, 23 September 1947.
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exposure of ourselves) if it failed.’660 The uncertain chances of the plan’s success
prompted the Foreign Office to consider other options. Hankey asked Broad whether
Mikołajczyk could be evacuated using the embassy aircraft.661 In Broad’s view the risk
of compromising the embassy was too great, and he doubted whether ‘even our great
responsibilities to [Mikołajczyk] would justify us in incurring it.’ For the same reason,
Broad advised against offering Mikołajczyk refuge in the Warsaw embassy. Moreover,
Broad objected even to raising the subject of escape with Mikołajczyk, on the grounds
that ‘he would be inclined to resent any such approach.’ Broad considered it unlikely
that Mikołajczyk would ever seek asylum with either Britain or the United States, and
would consider ‘any discussion concerning possible flight . . . extremely repugnant.’
Broad agreed with Warner’s assessment that Mikołajczyk was not a man who would try
to avoid trial. And if the situation did deteriorate and Mikołajczyk decided to flee,
Broad argued that there were ‘many ways open to him across the so-called “green”
frontier which would be far easier than any plan which we could ourselves devise.’662
Broad’s response was in keeping with his generally lukewarm attitude to Mikołajczyk.
Broad invoked Warner’s assessment of Mikołajczyk as a ‘brave man’ who would rather
‘stand his trial’ and ‘go down fighting’ to suggest that he and Warner were in agreement
on how to approach the matter.663 But while Warner did believe that Mikołajczyk would
be unlikely to accept, he nevertheless considered it important for the British embassy to
extend an offer of assistance. Broad, on the other hand, used Mikołajczyk’s reputation
for stoical resistance in order to justify his own reluctance to open the subject of
asylum/escape and thus to avoid involvement in an operation which he regarded as
unattractive.
Hankey was prepared to abide by Broad’s wishes: ‘I do not think we can, or should try,
to push Mr. Broad beyond where he wants to go. In a matter of this sort we must trust
his judgement.’ Still, Hankey cannot have been entirely satisfied with this course of
action, or rather absence of any action. His suggestion to use the embassy’s plane to
transport Mikołajczyk to safety is telling. This was a slightly hare-brained idea,
particularly given how closely controlled the aircraft’s movements were likely to be (as
Hankey himself acknowledged). That he made the suggestion anyway suggests a deeply
660 TNA: PRO FO 1093/445, Garvey minute, 13 September 1947; Hankey minute, 18 September 1947.
661 Gainer was away on leave during this period. He returned to Warsaw on 4 November 1947. TNA:
PRO FO 1093/445, Hankey minute, 31 October 1947.
662 TNA: PRO FO 1093/445, Hankey to Broad, 29 September 1947; Broad to Hankey, 8 October 1947.
663 TNA: PRO FO 371/66094/N8997/6/55, Warner to Broad, 18 September 1947.
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felt desire to help and possibly a degree of desperation, after learning that the chances of
an SIS rescue succeeding were not very promising.664 Hankey might also have simply
been braver and more daring by nature than Broad. Hankey had twice narrowly
extricated himself and others from dangerous situations, fleeing Warsaw in his Austin 7
with the embassy translator, his dog, and the ciphers after the German invasion in 1939,
and again from Bucharest where he remained in his post until the day the Iron Guard
took over in September 1940. In light of these experiences, his expectation of what
could be done to assist Mikołajczyk might well have been rather higher.665
Ultimately, the course of events overtook British planning. On 10 October, Mikołajczyk
was warned that he and three of his closest colleagues666 would be deprived of their
parliamentary immunity when the Sejm convened at the end of October, brought to trial
on charges of espionage and collaboration with the armed underground bands, and
condemned to death.667 Perhaps Mikołajczyk detected the British reluctance to put
themselves on the line. In the end it was to the US that he turned first for help, although
in spite of Broad’s reluctance, the execution of the operation ultimately depended as
much on the British diplomatic corps in Poland as on the American.
On the evening of 17 October, Mikołajczyk told George Andrews, the first secretary in
the US embassy, that he had received warnings from two highly reliable sources that he
would be arrested in about a week’s time. A meeting of the American diplomatic corps
convened the same evening to begin urgent discussions on how to get Mikołajczyk
safely out of Poland. The first proposal was to hide Mikołajczyk in a convoy of
American lorries which were leaving on 19 October for Berlin laden with the bodies of
102 American war dead who had been buried in Poland. The possibility of hiding
Mikołajczyk in a coffin among the fallen servicemen was suggested. Mikołajczyk
rejected this idea both because of the inauspicious political symbolism if he were
caught, and because the convoy would be too slow and his absence could not be
concealed for so many hours. A second meeting was convened the next day, which
Broad also attended. At this meeting, the diplomats lighted on a plan to smuggle
Mikołajczyk out of Poland by ship from the port of Gdynia. This route was judged to
664 TNA: PRO FO 1093/445, Hankey to Broad, 29 September 1947.
665 Obituary of Lord Hankey, The Times, 5 November 1996.
666 The other three were Stefan Korboński, a former leader of the wartime underground movement,
Wincenty Bryja, PSL treasurer, and Kazimierz Bagiński. Mikołajczyk, Pattern of Soviet Domination,
267.
667 TNA: PRO FO 1093/445, Record of Hankey’s debrief with Mikołajczyk, 27 October 1947.
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have a better chance of success because it involved crossing only one frontier. Broad
immediately dispatched the British naval attaché to Gdynia to find out whether any
ships were leaving for Britain in the coming days. The S.S. Baltavia, was due to sail
from the port of Gdynia on 21 October and it was agreed that this option offered the
best chance of escape.
On the evening of 20 October, Mikołajczyk was concealed in the back of an American
embassy lorry among a pile of Broad’s luggage bound for London. The lorry passed
nine control points on the way from Warsaw to Gdynia; at one checkpoint the guard
insisted on examining the lorry’s contents, even peering under the canvas cover with a
flashlight. The driver reported that he had stood ready during the search with a large
sum of bribery money668 in one hand and a monkey wrench in the other, ‘prepared to
use either if necessary.’669 Mikołajczyk boarded the Baltavia early in the morning of 21
October disguised in the American ambassador’s coat and hat, surrounded by a group of
Americans, while the British vice-consul in Gdańsk, Ronald Hazell distracted the Polish
guards.670 The ship sailed without incident three hours later at nine o’clock in the
morning. The ship’s British captain was also crucial in arranging the escape. He kept
Mikołajczyk hidden throughout the journey to avoid any of the four Polish crew
members recognising him.671
Over the course of planning the escape, the Americans in Poland showed greater
willingness to take risks in order to get Mikołajczyk out by any means necessary than
their British counterparts. Broad reported that the US ambassador was ‘prepared to offer
all possible assistance, short of . . . smuggling our friend across the frontier in his own
car.’672 In contrast, although he assisted in planning the operation virtually from the
outset, Broad always had an eye on limiting British involvement. For example, he
initially hoped that Mikołajczyk would be able to escape on his own. Broad reported
that he had ‘offered any necessary financial assistance in the hope that our friend would
668 In Andrews’s account, the amount was 500,000 zlotys. Griffis recalls giving the driver 100,000 zlotys.
FRUS, 1947, vol. 4, 463; Griffis, Lying in State, 173.
669 FRUS, 1947, vol. 4, 460-64.
670 The Foreign Office later returned the coat and hat by diplomatic air bag to the American ambassador.
The articles had been left in the care of the master of the S.S. Baltavia. TNA: PRO FO 1093/445, Danzig
[Gdańsk] to Foreign Office, 26 October 1947.
671 The captain was put forward for an OBE in recognition for his help in facilitating Mikołajczyk’s
escape. TNA: PRO FO 1093/445, Foreign Office Minute, 30 December 1948.
672 In his own account of the incident in his memoirs, Stanton Griffis recalled that the first plan had been
for him to carry Mikołajczyk across the Czech border in the trunk of his large Chrysler. Griffis, Lying in
State, 171-2.
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be able to make his own arrangements.’ Broad’s preference was to ‘confine our help to
getting him to the coast or a point near the frontier and then leaving him, with our
finances, to do the rest.’ Mikołajczyk was, however, ‘unexpectedly helpless’ and was
‘relying more or less completely on [the US and Britain].’ Broad warned that both the
American and British embassies would be compromised by helping with the escape
operation, and requested guidance from the Foreign Office as to how deeply he should
get involved.673
The Foreign Office files also reveal differences between Bevin and the Northern
Department in terms of how far they were willing to go to help with the escape.
Hankey’s draft reply authorised Broad to do ‘everything possible’ to assist Mikołajczyk
‘in view of [the] clear and authoritative undertakings we have given to help him in case
of need’. Bevin, however, noted at the end of the draft that the initiative should be left to
the Americans since Mikołajczyk had made his approach to them. ‘This is all to the
good,’ he commented. Similarly, Hankey was prepared to authorise the use of Broad’s
luggage to hide Mikołajczyk but Sargent crossed out the paragraph and inserted a
stipulation that the American official’s luggage be used instead.674
The S.S. Baltavia arrived safely at London Bridge on 24 October.675 The Foreign Office
was very concerned that the details of Mikołajczyk’s escape be kept strictly secret.  At
first, the Foreign Office worried that if the story leaked out before the ship was clear of
the Baltic, it might be stopped by the Soviet navy. Officials also sought to protect both
Hazell and the shipping line from any reprisals by the Polish authorities.676 Almost all
of the correspondence sent between Warsaw, Gdańsk, and the Foreign Office
concerning Mikołajczyk’s escape ends with instructions to ‘burn after perusal.’ No
written account of the circumstances of Mikołajczyk’s escape was circulated outside the
Foreign Office.  Bevin informed Attlee; James Chuter Ede, the Home Secretary; and
Eden verbally on 27 October; Dixon informed Churchill the following day. Bevin sent
673 TNA: PRO FO 1093/445, Broad to Hankey, 19 October 1947.
674 Broad’s luggage was used in spite of Sargent’s instructions. TNA: PRO FO 1093/445, Hankey to
Broad, draft telegram, 21 October 1947; Foreign Office to Warsaw, 20 October 1947.
675 TNA: PRO FO 1093/445, Danzig [Gdańsk] to Warsaw, 21 October 1947; Foreign Office to Warsaw,
25 October 1947.
676 TNA: PRO FO 1093/445, Foreign Office to Warsaw, 22 October 1947.
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instructions to the British embassy in Washington never to refer to the Mikołajczyk
affair, ‘even in conversation between staff’.677
The Foreign Office went to extraordinary lengths to conceal the real circumstances of
Mikołajczyk’s escape, concocting a cover story that he had fled via Czechoslovakia. To
lend credibility to this story, Mikołajczyk had to be kept completely hidden for a period
commensurate with the time it could be expected to take to travel from Czechoslovakia
to the western zone of Germany.678 The Foreign Office arranged for MI5 to take
Mikołajczyk in complete secrecy straight to a secure place in the countryside
immediately after the ship’s arrival in London.679 In order to cover their tracks
completely, the Foreign Office arranged for a decoy flight to take Mikołajczyk from the
British occupation zone to Manston airfield near Ramsgate on 3 November. The
Foreign Office informed the British military governor in Berlin of the bare details of the
plan, requesting that he explain the situation to the commander-in-chief and
commanding air officer ‘personally and most confidentially’, and to confirm the Foreign
Office’s version of the story should he receive any press enquiries.680
Even internally, the Foreign Office kept two sets of records concerning Mikołajczyk’s
escape: one set – only released publically in May 2013 – which concerned the real
arrangements, and a second, sanitised version, which supported the fictional account of
Mikołajczyk’s journey over the Czech border, and across the Soviet zone of Germany.
In the ‘sanitised’ file, the first report – via an ‘en clair’ telegram from Broad – of
Mikołajczyk’s disappearance dates from 26 October 1947, by which time the PSL
leader was already safely hidden in the English countryside.681 There followed a series
677 TNA: PRO FO 1093/445, Dixon minute, 28 October 1947.
678 TNA: PRO FO 1093/445, Foreign Office to Warsaw, 22 October 1947; Warsaw to Foreign Office, 22
October 1947.
679 Mikołajczyk agreed willingly to remain hidden in England. Bagiński and his wife, Bryja, and
Mikołajczyk’s secretary, Maria Hulewiczowa, with the help of the Americans, had made an escape
attempt via the Polish frontier into Czechoslovakia at the same time as Mikołajczyk had been taken to
Gdynia. Mikołajczyk did not want to stage his reappearance until he was sure that they had managed to
get out of Poland safely. The escape attempt of Hulewiczowa, Bryja, and Bagiński was entirely an
American affair about which Broad had not been consulted. Bagiński and his wife reached the American
zone of Germany on 29 October. Hulewiczowa  and Bryja were arrested. Hulewiczowa was imprisoned
and tortured; she served three years in jail. TNA: PRO FO 1093/445, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 22
October 1947; Foreign Office to Warsaw, 25 October 1947; Warsaw to Foreign Office, 3 November
1947; Warsaw to Foreign Office, 5 November 1947; Foreign Office to Washington, 6 November 1947:
Janusz Gmitruk, Maria Hulewiczowa Sekretarka Stanisława Mikołajczyka (Warsaw: Muzeum Historii
Polskiego Ruchu Ludowego, 2010), 40-2.
680 TNA: PRO FO 1093/445, Foreign Office to Berlin, 31 October 1947.
681 TNA: PRO FO 371/66095/N12250/6/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 26 October 1947.
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of bland telegrams recounting press reports and official reaction, as well as repeating
speculation as to how the escape might have been effected.682
When questioned by the press upon arrival in Britain, Mikołajczyk gave a partial
account of his escape, and then refused further comment on the grounds that it might
compromise the route for others. The story of Mikołajczyk’s escape featured
prominently in the press, and at first no journalist cast any doubt on the official Anglo-
American version of events. The Manchester Guardian’s headline on 4 November
announced Mikołajczyk’s safe arrival in Britain after fleeing through the Soviet zone of
Germany. The paper reported Mikołajczyk’s arrival at his wife’s home in Kenton,
Middlesex, a suburb northwest of central London.683 According to the paper, the street
was so crowded with press cars, reporters, and photographers that Mikołajczyk had to
alight 30 yards from the house, and was escorted through the crowd by RAF officers.
Mikołajczyk told the assembled reporters that he had left Warsaw by train on 20
October and had arrived in the British zone of Germany on 1 November. He stated that
he had not met with any British government officials since his arrival the previous day,
and declined further comment, saying: ‘“All I want do now is get to sleep.”’684 The
coverage of the story in The Times recounted the same details.685 Similarly, the
American press did not at first question the official line. Drew Middleton, the New York
Times correspondent in London, claimed to have ‘learned authoritatively’ that
Mikołajczyk had crossed the Soviet zone of Germany with the help of an underground
organisation.686 The Associated Press carried a similar version of this story, adding that,
according to a US military source, Mikołajczyk’s escape had been organised by a
special detailment whose function was to convey important individuals from behind the
iron curtain to the west at an average rate of two per day.687
The press did soon pick up on Polish government accusations that the British and
American embassies in Warsaw had facilitated Mikołajczyk’s escape. The New York
682 TNA: PRO FO 371/66095/N12337/6/55, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 27 October 1947.
683 The street name was Vista Way.
684 [Diplomatic Correspondent], ‘Mr. Mikolajczyk Safe. Escape Through Soviet Zone to England.
Thought his Life in Danger’; ‘Did Not Want to Be Killed Like a Sheep’, The Manchester Guardian, 4
November 1947: 5.
685 ‘M. Mikolajczyk in Britain’, The Times [London, England], 4 November 1947: 4, The Times Digital
Archive (accessed 10 March 2014).
686 Drew Middleton, ‘Mikolajczyk Is in Britain; Feared Dying “Like a Sheep”’, The New York Times, 4
November 1947: 1.
687 TNA: PRO FO 1093/445, Washington to Foreign Office, 4 November 1947.
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Times printed a flat denial by Broad of any British involvement.688 Further suggestions
about Anglo-American involvement leaked out after PSL treasurer, Wincenty Bryja;
Mikołajczyk’s private secretary, Maria Hulewiczowa; and his former secretary in the
Ministry of Agriculture, Mieczysław Dabrowski, were captured on the Czech border
and handed over to the Polish police. The evidence suggests, however, that the
newspapers simply reported the accusations of the Polish government. The New York
Times reported that the Polish government had issued a series of communiqués alleging
a link between Mikołajczyk’s escape and ‘an unidentified embassy in Warsaw.’689 The
papers reported the volley of accusations and denials which were lobbed back and forth
between the Polish government on the one hand, and Mikołajczyk and the embassies on
the other over the following weeks, but the actual circumstances of Mikołajczyk’s flight
did not emerge publically at the time.690
Mikołajczyk created an entirely fictitious account of his escape in his memoirs,
published in 1948. In this invented account, described with cinematic vividness, the
escape began with a car chase through the streets of Warsaw, in which Mikołajczyk’s
chauffeur cleverly succeeded in outwitting the security police. Instead of sticking to the
version of the story in which he fled via the Czech border, in his memoirs Mikołajczyk
invented the story of a journey across western Poland. After reaching an unnamed
village near Krotoszyn, Mikołajczyk created a succession of brave individuals –
including a forest guard and his daughter, and a fake communist who entertained Polish
and Russian soldiers in his home while Mikołajczyk hid upstairs – who smuggled him
over the German border, and across the Soviet zone, eventually depositing him in a
small unnamed German village in the British zone. At this point, Mikołajczyk’s version
dovetails with the official British record, as he recounts that he was flown by RAF plane
to Britain.691 The Americans published details of the escape in the Foreign Relations of
688 ‘British Envoy Denies Aid’, The New York Times, 4 November 1947: 4.
689 Sydney Gruson, ‘3 Fleeing Poland Seized at Border: Embassy in Warsaw Accused of Aiding Peasant
Aides who Left with Mikoajczyk’, The New York Times, 6 November 1947: 8.
690 ‘Foreign Aid Denied by Mikolajczyk: He Calls Warsaw Claims on Escape “Pack of Lies” – Says 4
Others who Fled are Safe’, The New York Times, 7 November 1947: 12; ‘Mr. Mikolajczyk: British and
U.S. Ambassadors Deny Giving Help’, The Manchester Guardian, 7 November 1947: 8; ‘Mikolajczyk
Held Aided: Warsaw Says Group in Berlin Played Part in Escape’, The New York Times, 8 November
1947: 6; ‘Poles Demand Recall of U.S. Official: “Helped Mr. Mikolajczyk”’, The Manchester Guardian,
21 November 1947: 5; ‘U.S. Envoy Denies Aid in Escape of Poles’, The New York Times, 22 November
1947: 7.
691 Mikołajczyk, Pattern of Soviet Domination, 267-78.
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the United States series in 1972. The involvement of the SIS appears to explain the
delay in the release of the British files.
Mikołajczyk in Britain
The Foreign Office found itself again at odds with Broad over Mikołajczyk’s right to
claim asylum in Britain. On 27 October, the undersecretary of state in the Foreign
Office, Christopher Mayhew announced in the House of Commons that Mikołajczyk
would receive asylum if he came to Britain (Mikołajczyk was of course already in
hiding in Britain at this point).692 While the Foreign Office insisted that the British
government must stand by that promise, Broad fretted that Anglo-Polish relations would
be ‘embittered’ if Mikołajczyk stayed in Britain for long, with the result that ‘the
position of [the Warsaw] Embassy would become far more difficult even than it is
now.’ He suggested that a ‘neutral’ capital such as Paris or Lisbon would be preferable
as a destination for Mikołajczyk, and until he had reached ‘some such place’ it would be
best if his whereabouts remained secret.693 Hankey commented that Broad was
becoming ‘jumpy’, which Hankey attributed to the pressure on the Polish employees of
the Warsaw embassy, one of whom had been arrested, with another facing arrest and a
third about to stand trial.694 In any case Mikołajczyk intended to leave Britain for the
US, where he believed that the large Polish community would be of greater help to him
and his supporters than the London Poles who were for the most part ‘lukewarm’ in
their support.695 This exchange further supports my view that there was a misalignment
of views and objectives between the Foreign Office and Broad. In a note at the bottom
of Hankey’s minute, Warner asked when Gainer was due to return to Warsaw. ‘He
knows our mind on the question of asylum etc’, commented Warner, the implication
being that Broad did not understand or execute Foreign Office policy so well.696
The reaction from the Polish government itself was relatively low-key. On 31 October,
Broad reported that although the PPR was ‘secretly rabid’ that Mikołajczyk should have
managed to escape from under their noses, they were actually quite pleased to have
692 443 H.C. Deb 5s, column 493.
693 TNA: PRO FO 1093/445, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 27 October 1947.
694 Charles Whitehead had been arrested; it was feared that the arrest of Mary Buyno was imminent; and
Marinowksa’s trial was due to begin soon. TNA: PRO FO 1093/445, Hankey minute, 28 October 1947.
695 TNA: PRO FO 1093/445, Record of Hankey’s debrief with Mikołajczyk, 27 October 1947.
696 TNA: PRO FO 1093/445, Warner minute, 31 October 1947.
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gotten rid of him.697 Once Mikołajczyk’s arrival in Britain was made public, Gainer was
summoned to see the Polish minister for foreign affairs. Modzelewski gave no
indication that he knew the true circumstances of Mikołajczyk’s escape. He expressed a
fairly mild objection to Mikołajczyk’s removal from the British zone in an RAF aircraft,
which essentially amounted to official auspices.698 The minister’s main concern was that
Mikołajczyk should not be formally received by the prime minister, the foreign
secretary, or by any other British official. The Polish government had no objection to
Mikołajczyk residing ‘quietly’ in Britain as a private individual, as long as he was not
treated as an ‘official personage.’699
Mary Buyno700
Just days after Mikołajczyk’s arrival in London came another request for assistance in
evacuating a Polish citizen, Mary Buyno, a translator employed by the British embassy
in Warsaw. After the arrest of Marinowska and Charles Whitehead,701 both Polish
nationals working in the embassy, it seemed inevitable that Buyno’s arrest would
follow, and her British colleagues sought to help her flee. On 5 November, Gainer
advised the Foreign Office that Buyno’s removal from Poland was ‘essential and
urgent.’ He requested assistance to arrange her escape.702 The embassy had already
considered several different plans, none of which seemed particularly likely to succeed.
First, they had considered drawing up fake papers so that Buyno could leave the country
697 TNA: PRO FO 1093/445, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 31 October 1947, No. 1559.
698 On the other hand, the Polish government did demand the removal of George Andrews and Monroe
Blake, the First and Second Secretaries in the American embassy, based on evidence obtained during the
questioning of Bryja and Hulewiczowa. It appears that the Polish government only knew that Andrews
and Blake had been involved in helping Mikołajczyk to escape but not by what means. FRUS, 1947, vol.
4, 464-67.
699 TNA: PRO FO 1093/445, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 6 November 1947, No. 1556.
700 In the Foreign Office files, Mary Buyno is only ever referred to as ‘Mrs. Buyno’ or ‘Mrs. B’. In his
memoirs, John Waterfield, who was Third Secretary in the Foreign Office Northern department at the
time gives her first name as Mary. This is possibly an anglicisation of Maria. Similarly, her surname was
probably Bujńo. I did not find any other references to her in the secondary literature. John Percival
Waterfield, ‘Memories of 1945-50: Christ Church, Northern Department in the Foreign Office, Poland
and Moscow’, http://www.tamburlane.co.uk/ [accessed 25 February 2014].
701 Charles Whitehead was a Polish national of British origin who had been employed since January 1946
in the commercial section of the British embassy in Warsaw. He was arrested on 17 October 1947.
Whitehead was accused of collaborating with the Germans during the war. In fact, he had been called up
and fought with his unit in the Polish army during the six week campaign in 1939. During the war he
belonged to a Polish underground press agency which collected and circulated the news put out by the
British and other anti-Nazi broadcasts; he also fought in the Warsaw uprising. Further, he and his father
provided assistance to Allied prisoners of war. 443 H.C. Deb. 5s, columns 1818-20.
702 TNA: PRO FO 1093/445, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 5 November 1947.
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posing either as a British member of staff or as the wife of the commercial attaché,
Gilbert Holliday. In the second case, the plan was for Holliday to drive her personally in
an embassy car to Prague. If they were caught, the couple could pretend that the reason
for the falsification of documents was ‘an illicit weekend’, which would protect the
embassy itself. Even with this cover story, however, Buyno would still be arrested and
Holliday ‘would be hopelessly compromised.’ Holliday was nevertheless prepared to
make the attempt. The risks already inherent in the road route had been accentuated by
Mikołajczyk’s escape, which had resulted in extremely close scrutiny of embassy
vehicles and their occupants. A third option would be to issue Buyno with a British
passport in her own name with a counterfeit Polish exit visa affixed. Buyno was,
however, too well known to the authorities to risk leaving Warsaw by train or plane
with false papers, leaving the Czech road route as the only viable option.703
Notwithstanding their success in evacuating Mikołajczyk, Gainer acknowledged his
staff’s lack of expertise in coordinating this type of clandestine operation, and he turned
to the Foreign Office for assistance.
Garvey conducted a fairly clinical weighing up of the risks and benefits of Buyno’s
clandestine removal from Warsaw: ‘The most obvious, though not necessarily most
compelling, purpose is to save her liberty and possibly her life. Secondly, and more
important, the Polish Government seem to be trying to make it impossible for us to
continue to employ Polish staff without whose assistance the work of the Embassy
would be seriously impaired.’ Garvey calculated that the Polish government was
‘already two up’ following the arrests of Marinowska and Whitehead, and Britain
‘clearly [had] an interest in halting the process.’ Garvey sought advice from the SIS,
who judged that of the three options proposed by the Warsaw embassy, the ‘illicit
weekend’ had the best chance of success, provided that Holliday was not the object of
surveillance by the UB.704 Gainer, however, reported that the frontiers were being
watched extremely closely following Mikołajczyk’s disappearance, and ‘it would be
really running an unreasonable risk’ for the embassy staff ‘to stage an illicit
departure.’705
703 TNA: PRO FO 1093/421, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 26 October 1947.
704 TNA: PRO FO 1093/421, Garvey minute, 27 October 1947.
705 TNA: PRO FO 1093/421, Hankey minute, 29 October 1947.
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At this point, the Foreign Office requested SIS assistance with the escape.706 Garvey
initially objected to the use of the SIS ‘for the purpose of pulling minor Foreign Office
chestnuts out of the fire.’ He pointed out that the chief had been willing to accept the
risk of compromising the service’s intelligence network in Poland in order to evacuate
Mikołajczyk because of his particular importance to the British government. Garvey
doubted that the service would consider that Buyno’s evacuation justified the same risk.
He doubted that he would succeed in persuading the SIS to take on the operation, and
asked the Northern Department to reconsider putting the request to the chief. Hayter
agreed with Garvey, commenting that ‘C’s organisation exists to provide intelligence.
Its use for other purposes can only be justified in very exceptional cases of major
importance.’ Both Garvey and Hayter feared that the rescue of Buyno might precipitate
a barrage of similar demands from British diplomatic missions behind the iron curtain.
Hankey commented drily that the SIS chief should set up a ‘frontier-crossing
organisation . . . because we shall shortly be living in times where it may on occasion be
essential.’707
Hankey did not let the matter rest, insisting that Garvey put the matter to the secret
service chief. He emphasised Gainer’s warning that Buyno had enough information to
compromise the British embassy should she be arrested and interrogated. Garvey
therefore made contact with an SIS officer stationed in Germany who was aware of a
‘commercial’ escape line run by ‘entrepreneurs’ with no political or underground
affiliation out of Poland into Germany which handled ‘a not inconsiderable amount of
persons who wish for one reason or another to leave Poland.’ The officer told Garvey
that the operation could be carried out within three weeks. Ultimately, the SIS were
‘quite glad’ to undertake the operation because it afforded a chance to test the feasibility
of this commercial line. The route required Buyno to make her own way to Szczecin
with her twelve year old son, where she would be met by guides who would take her to
a farm situated near the German border, draw up German documents, drive her across
the frontier of the Soviet zone of Germany, after which she would complete the journey
to Berlin by train. It was understood that the organisers paid a retaining fee to the guards
on both sides of Polish/Soviet zone frontier. Hankey noted, ‘We must make it clear that
706 TNA: PRO FO 1093/421, Garvey minute, 11 November 1947.
707 TNA: PRO FO 1093/421, Garvey, Hayter, and Hankey minutes, 7-12 November 1947.
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we have no direct knowledge or experience of this route of escape, but it is the best we
can offer.’708
It took two attempts before Buyno was evacuated successfully. Twice she made her way
to Szczecin – with her son – and found that the guides had not arrived. Further, the
woman at the address where she had been instructed to wait was very reluctant to have
her stay and agreed to let her remain for only one night. For four nights she stayed at a
boarding house, which meant that she was registered – as required – with the police in
her real name, before finally returning to Warsaw. Gainer sent an angry telegram to the
Foreign Office warning that the failure of the plan had increased the ‘risk of Mrs. B’s
arrest and render[ed] the consequences of such arrest more serious than before.’ He
asked for immediate assistance in getting her rapidly out of the country and demanded
an ‘explanation as to why we have been so badly let down from the other end after
incurring such risks.’ The Foreign Office explained that the guides had been arrested by
German police for black marketeering, which delayed their arrival in Szczecin. The
Foreign Office acknowledged the heightened risk of repeating the plan but could
suggest no alternative.709 After the failure of the first attempt, Holliday wrote directly to
Hankey, and offered to travel with Buyno and her son from Warsaw to London via
Prague by train. Holliday proposed simply to ask for a week’s leave, and to make the
arrangements without informing his Warsaw colleagues, which would protect the
embassy if anything went wrong.710 This offer was superseded by plans for a second
attempt via the Szczecin route. On the second occasion, after some delay, which led to a
panicky telegram from the Warsaw embassy asking the Foreign Office what had
happened, the guides did eventually turn up and Buyno and her son arrived in Berlin on
24 December 1947. The telegram informing Warsaw that Buyno was safe was signed
off: ‘Happy Christmas.’711
The amateurish, haphazard way in which Buyno was evacuated, which very nearly
ended in catastrophe, marked the beginning of a shift in British secret intelligence
operations abroad in late 1947. The lack of coordination and absence of clear
708 TNA: PRO FO 1093/421 Garvey to Aubrey, 31 December 1947; Garvey minute, 14 November 1947;
Hankey minute, 14 November 1947.
709 TNA: PRO FO 1093/421, Warsaw to Foreign Office, 9 December 1947; Foreign Office to Warsaw, 11
December 1947.
710 TNA: PRO FO 1093/421,Holliday to Hankey, 10 December 1947.
711 TNA: PRO FO 1093/421, Foreign Office to Warsaw, 21 November 1947; Warsaw to Foreign Office,
24 December 1947; Foreign Office to Warsaw, 24 December 1947.
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communication between the embassy, the Foreign Office, and the SIS shows the extent
to which everyone concerned was forced to improvise. Hankey’s jocular comment that
the SIS should set up a people-smuggling organisation held a certain prescience. The
requests for assistance which came in quick succession from Poland helped to alert the
SIS to the need for just such an operation. As the shape of the postwar international
system became clearer, and the status of the Soviet Union metamorphosed from ally to
foe, the SIS had to confront both the paucity of its information and contacts in Central
and Eastern Europe, and the difficulties involved in establishing a strong and reliable
network in ‘highly alert and paranoid Communist state[s] at anything more than the
most pedestrian level.’712 The SIS would not be able to continue to rely on some
unknown ‘commercial’ people smugglers but would have to establish a much more
carefully controlled and coordinated system.
Buyno’s escape again highlights the way that the Foreign Office Northern Department,
together with some of the diplomats in the Warsaw embassy seized chances where they
could to push ahead with their own initiatives. It is not clear from the files whether
Bevin was even aware of the efforts to help Buyno and her son leave Poland. What is
obvious, however, is that Hankey and his colleagues used their authority to override
other branches of the establishment, most notably the SIS liaison staff. Buyno’s
colleagues in Warsaw displayed a similar determination to prevent her arrest and help
her to flee the country. In addition to a fundamental sense of loyalty, the efforts of the
Northern Department and the Warsaw embassy suggest that, as with the escape of
Mikołajczyk, assisting Buyno was regarded as a kind of substitute for the British failure
to influence the postwar political settlement in Poland in a more significant way.
Conclusion
By early 1947, Bevin had abandoned the attempt to pursue cooperation with the Soviet
Union. The prospect of economic collapse in Britain made the consolidation of the
bizone arrangements an urgent necessity. Bevin sought to persuade the Americans to
abandon four-power administration of Germany; instead, the priority should be to
secure the western zones against Soviet influence. Underpinning Bevin’s desire to hive
712 Jeffery, History of the Secret Intelligence Service, 668-9.
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off the western zones of Germany and shut the Soviets out was an implicit bargain,
which precluded American and British involvement in the Soviet sphere of influence. In
order to secure western Germany against Soviet interference, Britain had to relinquish
any stake in the political future of Poland or indeed any other Eastern European state.
Bevin therefore observed a ‘hands off’ policy towards Poland from early 1947 on. This
approach is particularly evident in his decision not to deliver the statement on the Polish
elections in the House of Commons, and in the strictly limited scope of his talks with
Modzelewski and Cyrankiewicz in April. Bevin was eager to resolve the remaining
points of contention which dogged Anglo-Polish bilateral relations. He disassociated
himself virtually completely, however, from Poland’s internal political affairs. The
Foreign Office was less quick to withdraw support entirely, as evidenced by the Office’s
irritation with Broad for allowing contact with Mikołajczyk to lapse completely, as well
as in its insistence that support should be extended to the PPS wherever possible. The
drift and disjunction in British policy was exacerbated by the long period without an
ambassador present in Warsaw after Cavendish-Bentinck’s departure. It is not a
coincidence that the officials who could not quite bring themselves to withdraw from all
involvement in Poland’s political future were those whose association with the Polish
opposition extended back to the wartime period. In the end, the degrees of commitment
varied from person to person, as was evident in the different approaches to
Mikołajczyk’s rescue, with Bevin hoping the Americans would take over, Broad
carrying out his duties scrupulously but under duress, and Hankey enlisting the help of
MI6 and pushing hard until the very end.
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Conclusion
The picture which emerges from this study is one of considerable uncertainty and
frequent inconsistency in the formulation of British foreign policy during a period of
transition from war to peacetime, and one in which the international system was in the
process of being reconfigured. This study has shown how British planning for postwar
Poland was thrown into disarray not long after the end of the war. It has also
demonstrated that the British did not regard the derailment of their Polish policy as
inevitable. On the contrary, there was an expectation on the part of British leaders and
policymakers that they would continue to exert influence on the postwar political
settlement in Poland. What looks like misplaced optimism in hindsight was actually the
product of sustained observation and analysis of Soviet policy and actions throughout
the war years which, by early 1944, had sharpened into several distinct assumptions
about the probable direction of Soviet postwar policy. There was a shared consensus
across the British policymaking establishment that a combination of the Soviet need for
postwar economic assistance and Stalin’s realpolitik would quell the instinct to interpret
the security imperative too widely, and ensure that the Soviet Union would not cross the
limits of what Britain considered acceptable.
These were the assumptions that underpinned the British attempt from early 1944
onward to bring about a resolution of the Polish-Soviet dispute and secure an acceptable
territorial and political settlement for Poland. There were some grounds for British
optimism: a deal was very nearly reached in early 1944,713 and again during the talks
with the Soviet ambassador, Lebedev in the spring.714 After a rocky spell in the post-
Yalta period, British officials detected signs of a more cooperative Soviet approach in
its relations with Britain,715 and a shift in Soviet policy towards Poland. They saw
Stalin’s agreement to Mikołajczyk’s inclusion in the new provisional government as an
important indication of a change after the frustrating months of negotiations on the
713 TNA: PRO PREM 3/355/8, Record of a Meeting Held at 10 Downing Street attended by Churchill,
Eden, Cadogan, O’Malley, Mikołajczyk, Romer and Raczyński, 16 February 1944; Foreign Office to
Chequers, 19 February 1944; Colville to Foreign Office, 20 February 1944.
714 TNA: PRO FO 371/39404/C9097/8/G55, ‘Record by O’Malley of a Conversation at Dinner at the
Foreign Office on the 29th June [1944]’; FO 371/39404/C9172/8/G55, Eden to O’Malley, 11 July 1944.
715 Folly, Churchill, Whitehall and the Soviet Union, 171.
238
Three Power Commission.716 This is not to suggest that the British were not often beset
with doubts, uncertainty and hesitation about future Soviet policy vis-à-vis Poland.
Apart from analysis of Soviet intentions, however, British policy was also based on the
conviction that the weakness of the PPR would leave the party no choice but to form a
broad-based coalition government, in which Mikołajczyk, as the leader of the party with
the strongest popular support, would have a key role. Once established as part of the
leadership, the British calculated that the PSL would have a good chance of emerging as
the dominant political force in the country.717
This work has established that British leaders and policymakers considered their
commitment to Poland as ongoing even after the dissolution of the Polish government-
in-exile and Mikołajczyk’s return to Poland. It is clear that the British had a sense of an
as yet undischarged obligation to see that Poland was reconstituted as a free and
independent state after the war. This sense of obligation arose primarily from the
accumulation of political commitments made to the Polish exile leaders in exchange for
their military contribution to the British war effort. The persistence with which the
British pursued a settlement long after the end of hostilities was unusual, and did not
conform to the more detached British approach in the rest of Central and Eastern
Europe. Comments by the Foreign Office and embassy officials in particular suggest
that individual British policymakers had a sense of an unmet moral obligation towards
the Polish opposition, which helps to explain the longevity of their involvement in
Polish political affairs after the war.
Initially there was continuity in British policy towards Poland, as evidenced by Bevin’s
approach in the negotiations with the leaders of the Polish provisional government at the
Potsdam conference, his instructions to Cavendish-Bentinck before the latter’s departure
for Warsaw and the preparations to challenge the Soviets at the London Council of
Foreign Ministers meeting over the repression of the opposition parties in Poland and
the continued presence of the Red Army on Polish territory.718 By early 1946, however,
716 TNA: PRO FO 371/47595/ N7312/6/55, Moscow to Foreign Office, 22 June 1945; N7508/6/55,
Foreign Office Minutes, 2 July 1945.
717 TNA: PRO FO 371/47594/N7295/6/G55, Moscow to Foreign Office, 21 June 1945; N7297/6/G55,
Moscow to Foreign Office, 21 June 1945.
718 TNA: PRO FO 371/47603/N9922/6/G55, Record of a Meeting at the Foreign Secretary’s House,
Potsdam, 31 July 1945; FO 371/47706/10656/211/55, Bevin to Cavendish-Bentinck, 23 August 1945; FO
371/47608/N12851/6/55, ‘Brief for discussion on Poland in Council of Foreign Ministers’, 15 September
1945.
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British policy towards Poland had started to unravel. Anglo-Soviet relations began to
deteriorate in the wake of the breakdown of the London meeting, and the crises over
Greece and Iran. Bevin’s approach at first was to try to eliminate sources of
disagreement with the Soviets in order to keep conflict to a minimum and restore
relations. The postwar British government, including, initially, Bevin saw the
maintenance of good Anglo-Soviet relations as essential to establishing a stable security
system in Europe and securing Britain’s long-term interests. The importance of
preventing Anglo-Soviet relations from descending into open acrimony was reinforced
by the belief that the American presence in Europe after the war would be short-lived.719
Britain sought to avoid a scenario in which it was left alone in Europe facing a hostile
Soviet Union. For this reason, Bevin tried to disentangle the Polish issue, which was a
perpetual source of friction, from the Anglo-Soviet relationship.
The problem of the future of Germany – with its attendant consequences for Britain’s
economy and security – became the central foreign policy preoccupation in 1946. The
German dilemma had an important impact on the reconfiguration of British policy
towards Poland. As the arrangements agreed at the Potsdam conference for the joint
administration of Germany faltered and then failed, Bevin concluded that the only
solution was to call a halt to four-power cooperation. The inevitable consequence of this
step would be an open breach with the Soviet Union, for which the US was not yet
prepared in 1946. While Bevin pursued his dual policy – continuing to seek improved
Anglo-Soviet relations while simultaneously beginning to plan on the basis that
cooperation would end – he was anxious to avoid any policy initiative that would create
the impression that the failure of the Potsdam process was Britain’s fault, rather than the
result of Soviet intransigence. This determination to stay in step with the Americans was
clearly evident in British policy towards Poland in 1946 when Britain refrained from
making strong representations to the Warsaw government when the US disagreed or
changed its mind. This pattern was evident in the British decision to moderate the tone
of its protest note concerning the PPR’s pre-referendum campaign of repression against
the PSL, and in the decision to drop the plan to bring the Polish issue before the UN
General Assembly after Byrnes objected to the idea.720
719 Reynolds, From World War to Cold War, 276-7.
720 TNA: PRO FO 371/56437/N5068/34/55, Foreign Office to Warsaw, 19 April 1946.
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Bevin’s policy was also circumscribed to some extent by the pressure from within his
own party to establish closer Anglo-Soviet relations. By the spring of 1946, the critics
on the left of the Labour party had begun to coalesce and Bevin’s policy was strongly
criticised at the party conference in June. The internal opposition gathered momentum
as the year wore on, culminating in the November censure motion.721 Thus, with the
German problem already simmering, Bevin sought to avoid giving his critics greater
ammunition by further antagonising the Soviet Union with a confrontation over Eastern
Europe. The exact effect of the internal criticism on Bevin’s policy is difficult to
determine with absolute certainty, and it was not as significant as the American position
or indeed Bevin’s own concerns about the possible consequences of excessive
provocation of the Soviet Union, but the party’s opposition did exert some pressure on
the direction of Bevin’s policy.
The collapse of British policy towards Poland caused consternation in the Foreign
Office and the Warsaw embassy. Officials attempted to steer Bevin back to the
established policy. They had some success, for example in persuading him not to
withdraw support for the PSL.722 Nevertheless, the absence of strong British support for
Mikołajczyk at key junctures, such as before and after the referendum, at the time of the
introduction of the new electoral law, and in the run-up to the general election, further
undermined the position of the PSL as the PPR moved more aggressively to marginalise
the party. Britain also missed a potentially significant chance to influence the shape of
the final political settlement in Poland when it failed to throw its support behind the
faction of the PPS which sought greater autonomy from the PPR.
After the Polish elections, the Foreign Office attempted to keep up its support for the
opposition. But the PSL had been seriously weakened in the period preceding the
elections and the independently-inclined wing of the PPS had been defeated, leaving
little scope for meaningful British intervention. British withdrawal from involvement in
internal Polish politics was underscored by the withdrawal of Cavendish-Bentinck, who
had been an active supporter of Mikołajczyk and the PSL. From this point on, British
relations with Poland centred mostly on the resolution of outstanding bilateral issues.
The threat to Mikołajczyk’s safety brought about a temporary reversal of the process of
721 Jones, Russia Complex, 128, 136-7; Bullock, Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 328.
722 TNA: PRO FO 371/56434/N2624/34/55, Sargent Memo, 14 February 1946; FO
371/56435/N2912/34/55, Warner Minutes, 6 March 1946; Sargent to Cavendish-Bentinck, 13 March
1946.
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British withdrawal from Polish affairs, as Churchill’s 1945 promise was invoked.
Foreign Office officials showed great determination to live up to this commitment. At
the same time, however, the episode of the escape highlights the way in which the
original British commitment had diminished over the course of the two and a half years
since the end of the war.
242
Bibliography
I. Archives
The UK National Archives, Public Record Office, Kew, London
CAB 65 War Cabinet Minutes
CAB 66 War Cabinet Memoranda
CAB 121 Cabinet Office: Special Secret Information Centre Files
CAB 128 Cabinet Minutes
CAB 129 Cabinet Memoranda
FO 371 General Correspondence
FO 372 Treaty Department
FO 800 Private Office Papers: Bevin, Clark Kerr, Sargent
FO 945 Control Office for Germany and Austria
FO 954 Private Office Papers of Sir Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon
FO 1093 Permanent Under-Secretary’s Department
HO 213 Home Office Aliens Department
HS 4 Special Operations Executive: Eastern Europe
HW 1 Government Code and Cypher School: Signals Intelligence
PREM 3 Prime Minister’s Office: Operational Correspondence and Papers, 1937-
1946
PREM 4 Prime Minister Papers: Confidential Correspondence and Papers, 1934-
1946
PREM 8 Prime Minister’s Office: Correspondence and Papers, 1945-1951
WO 106 Directorate of Military Operations and Military Intelligence
WO 214 Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean Theatre: Papers
Archiwum Akt Nowych, Warsaw
Polska Partia Robotnicza, Komitet Centralny
British Library, London
Oliver Harvey diary
Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, University of Cambridge
Ernest Bevin Papers
George Leggett diary
Hoover Institution, Stanford University
Stanisław Mikołajczyk Papers
Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, Warsaw
Dept. Polityczny, 1945-1948
Biuro Konsularne
243
Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum, London
Prime Minister’s Office
II. Newspapers
The Manchester Guardian
The New York Times
The Times [London]
III. Published Primary Sources
Anders, Władysław. An Army in Exile: the Story of the Second Polish Corps. London:
Macmillan, 1949.
Anderson, Herbert Foster. What I saw in Poland – 1946. Slough: Windsor Press, 1946.
Attlee, Lord. As It Happened. London: Heinemann, 1954.
Eden, Anthony [Earl of Avon]. The Eden Memoirs: The Reckoning The Memoirs of
Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon: The Reckoning. London: Cassell, 1965.
Balfour, Harold. Wings Over Westminster. London: Hutchinson, 1973.
Ball, Stuart, ed. Parliament and Politics in the Age of Churchill and Attlee: The
Headlam Diaries, 1935-1951. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Barclay, Roderick. Ernest Bevin and the Foreign Office, 1932-1969. London: published
by the author, 1975.
Birse, Arthur Herbert. Memoirs of an Interpreter. London: Michael Joseph, 1967.
British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office
Confidential Print, Series A, 1939-1950.
Cazalet, Victor. With Sikorski to Russia. London: Curwen Press, 1942.
Churchill, Winston S. The Second World War, Volume VI, Triumph and Tragedy.
London: Cassell, 1954.
Ciechanowski, Jan. Defeat in Victory. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1947.
Colville, John. The Fringes of Power: Downing Street Diaries, 1939-1955. London:
Hodder and Stoughton, 1985.
Dalton, Hugh. The Fateful Years. Memoirs, 1931-1945. London: Frederick Muller,
1957.
________
. High Tide and After. Memoirs, 1945-1960. London: Frederick Muller, 1962.
244
Deane, John R. The Strange Alliance. The Story of our Efforts at Wartime Co-operation
with Russia. New York: Viking, 1947.
Dilks, David, ed. The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan. London: Cassell, 1971.
Dixon, Piers. Double Diploma: the Life of Sir Pierson Dixon, Don and Diplomat.
London: Hutchinson, 1968.
Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations, 1939-1945. 2 vols. London: Heinemann, 1961-
1967.
Gladwyn, Lord. The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
1972.
Griffis, Stanton. Lying in State. New York: Doubleday, 1952.
Halifax, Earl. Fulness of Days. London: Collins, 1957.
Harriman, W. Averell and Elie Abel. Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946.
London: Hutchinson, 1976.
Harvey, John, ed. The War Diaries of Oliver Harvey. London: William Collins Sons &
Co. Ltd., 1978.
Healey, Denis. The Time of my Life. London: Michael Joseph, 1989.
Hunt, David. On the Spot: an Ambassador Remembers. London: Peter Davies, 1975.
Ismay, Lord. Memoirs of General the Lord Ismay. London: Heinemann, 1960.
Jędrzejewicz, Wacław and Pauline C. Ramsey, eds. Poland in the British Parliament,
1939-1945, 3 vols. New York: Józef Piłsudski Institute, 1946-1962.
Kimball, Warren, ed. Churchill and Roosevelt: the Complete Correspondence, 3 vols.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
Kirkpatrick, Ivone. The Inner Circle. London: Macmillan, 1959.
Kochański, Aleksander, ed. Protokoły posiedzeń Biura Politycznego KC PPR 1944-
1945. Warsaw: Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1992.
________
, ed. Protokoł obrad KC PPR,w maju 1945 roku. Warsaw: Instytut Studiów
Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1992.
________
, ed. Protokoły posiedzeń Biura Politycznego KC PPR 1947-1948. Warsaw:
Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 2002.
Kot, Stanisław. Conversations with the Kremlin and Dispatches from Russia. London:
Oxford University Press, 1963.
245
Lane, Arthur Bliss. I Saw Poland Betrayed: An American Ambassador Reports to the
American People. New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1948.
Lockhart, R. Bruce. Comes the Reckoning. London: Putnam, 1947.
Lowenheim, F.L., ed. Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence
London: Barrie & Jenkins, 1975.
Maisky, Ivan. Memoirs of a Soviet Ambassador. London: Hutchinson, 1967.
Mikołajczyk, Stanisław. The Pattern of Soviet Domination. London: Sampson Low,
Marston & Co., 1948.
Mikołajczyk, Stanisław and Maria Hulewiczowa. Diariusz Stanisława Mikołajczyka
prowadzony przez Marię Hulewiczową; wstęp i opracowanie Mieczysław Adamczyk i
Janusz Gmitruk. Warsaw: Muzeum Historii Polskiego Ludowego w Warszawie,
2002.
Moran, Lord. Churchill at War 1940-45. London: Robinson, 2002. First published 1966
as Churchill: the struggle for survival, 1940-1965.
Pelly, M.E. and Roger Bullen, eds. Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series 1, vol.
2: Conferences and Conversations 1945: London, Washington and Moscow. London:
HMSO, 1985.
Pelly, M.E., H.J. Yasamee, K.A. Hamilton and G. Bennett, eds. Documents on British
Policy Overseas, Series 1, vol. 6: Eastern Europe, August 1945-April 1946. London:
HMSO, 1991.
Polonsky, Anthony, ed. The Great Powers and the Polish Question, 1941-1945: A
Documentary Study in Cold War Origins. London: London School of Economics,
1976.
Raczyński, Edward. In Allied London. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962.
Reale, Eugenio. Raporty: Polska, 1945-1946. Warsaw: Państwowy Instytut
Wydawniczy, 1991.
Roberts, Frank. Dealing with Dictators. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1991.
Ross, Graham, ed. The Foreign Office and the Kremlin: British Documents on Anglo-
Soviet Relations 1944-1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
Rzheshevsky, O.A. War and Diplomacy. The Making of the Grand Alliance. From
Stalin’s Archives, trans. T. Soronika. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers,
1996.
Soviet Union, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Stalin’s Correspondence with Churchill,
Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman, 1941-45. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1958.
246
Strang, Lord. Home and Abroad. London: Andre Deutsch Limited, 1956.
Szkopiak, Zygmunt C, ed. The Yalta Agreements: Documents prior to, during and after
the Crimea Conference, 1945. London: the Polish Government in Exile, 1986.
Toranska, Teresa. Oni: Stalin’s Polish Puppets, trans. Agnieszka Kolakowska. London:
Collins Harvill, 1987.
US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers.
The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943. Washington: United States Government
Printing Office, 1961.
________
. Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944. The British
Commonwealth and Europe, vol. 3. Washington: United States Government Printing
Office, 1965.
________
. Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers. The Conferences at
Malta and Yalta, 1945. Washington: United States Government Printing Office,
1955.
________
. Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945. Europe, vol.
5. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1967.
________
. Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers. The Conference of
Berlin (Potsdam), 1945, vol.2. Washington: United States Government Printing
Office, 1960.
________
. Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945. General:
Political and Economic Matters, vol. 2. Washington: United States Government
Printing Office, 1967.
________
. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946. Eastern Europe; the Soviet Union,
vol. 6. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1969.
________
. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947. Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union
vol. 4. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1972.
Waterfield, John Percival. ‘Memories of 1945-50: Christ Church, Northern Department
in the Foreign Office, Poland and Moscow’, last modified 7 February 2002, accessed
25 February 2014, http://www.tamburlane.co.uk.
Woodward, Llewellyn. British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, vol. 3.
London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1971.
Yasamee, H.J. and K.A. Hamilton, eds. Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series
1, vol. 7: United Nations: Iran, Cold War and World Organisation, 2 January 1946 –
13 January 1947. London: HMSO, 1995.
247
IV. Published Secondary Sources
Adamthwaite, A. ‘Britain and the World 1945-49: the view from the Foreign Office’, in
Power in Europe? Britain, France, Italy and Germany in a Postwar World, 1945-
1950, eds. Josef Becker and Franz Knipping. Berlin; New York: Walter de Gruyter,
1986.
Alexander, G. M. The Prelude to the Truman Doctrine: British Policy in Greece, 1944-
1947. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992.
Aronsen, Lawrence and Martin Kitchen. The Origins of the Cold War in Comparative
Perspective: American, British and Canadian Relations with the Soviet Union, 1941-
48. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988.
Barker, Elisabeth. Britain in a Divided Europe, 1945-1976. London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1972.
________
. British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War. London:
Macmillan, 1976.
________
. Churchill and Eden at War. London: Macmillan, 1978.
Bartlett, C.J. ‘The Special Relationship’: A Political History of Anglo-American
Relations Since 1945. Harlow: Longman, 1992.
Bell, P.M.H. John Bull and the Bear. British Public Opinion, Foreign Policy and the
Soviet Union, 1941-1945. London: Edward Arnold, 1990.
Bennett, Gill. ‘Escape from Eastern Europe’, Secret Intelligence Service website,
accessed 21 February 2014, https://www.sis.gov.uk/our-history/pusd-records/escape-
from-eastern-europe.html.
Berrington, Hugh B. Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons, 1945-55. Oxford:
Pergamon Press, 1973.
Bethell, Nicholas. Gomułka, His Poland and His Communism. London: Longmans,
Green & Co. Ltd., 1969.
________
. The Last Secret. Forcible Repatriation to Russia, 1944-7. London: André
Deutsch, 1974.
Borodziej, Włodzimierz. Od Poczdamu do Szklarskiej Poręby: Polska w stosunkach
miedzynarodowych, 1945-1947. London: Aneks, 1990.
Brus, Włodzimierz, ‘Stalinism and the People’s Democracies’. In Stalinism: Essays in
Historical Interpretation, edited by Robert C. Tucker. Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1977.
Brzezinski, Zbigniew. The Soviet Bloc – Unity and Conflict. Cambridge, Massachusetts,
1967.
248
Bullock, Alan. The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin, Volume 2: Minister of Labour,
1940-1945. London: Heinemann, 1967.
________
. Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 1945-1951. London: Heinemann, 1983.
Burridge, Trevor. Clement Attlee: A Political Biography. London: Cape, 1985.
Carlton, David. Anthony Eden: A Biography. London: Allen Lane, 1981.
Carroll, F.M. ‘Anglo-American Relations and the Origins of the Cold War: the New
Perspective’, Canadian Journal of History 24, no. 3 (1989): 191-208.
Charlton, Michael. The Price of Victory. London: British Broadcasting Corporation,
1983.
Charmley, John. Churchill’s Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special
Relationship, 1940-57. New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1995.
________
. Churchill. The End of Glory. London: John Curtis, 1992.
Ciechanowski, Jan. The Warsaw Rising of 1944. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1974.
Clogg, Richard. A Concise History of Greece. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1992.
Close, David H. The Origins of the Greek Civil War. London: Longman, 1995.
Colville, John. Strange Inheritance. Salisbury: Michael Russell, 1983.
Connell, John. The ‘Office.’ A study of British foreign policy and its makers, 1919-1951.
London: Allan Wingate, 1958.
Conway, Martin and José Gotovitch, eds. Europe in Exile: European Exile
Communities in Britain 1940-1945. Oxford: Berghahn, 2001.
Coutouvidis, John and Jamie Reynolds. Poland, 1939-1947. Leicester: Leicester
University Press, 1986.
Coutouvidis, John. Lewis Namier and the Polish Government-in-Exile. London: School
of Slavonic and East European Studies, 1984.
Craig, Gordon A. and Francis L. Loewenheim, eds. The Diplomats, 1939-1979.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.
Crampton, Richard J. Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century and After. London; New
York: Routledge, 1997.
________
. Bulgaria. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
249
Crockatt, Richard. ‘The Origins of the Cold War and the Problems of Synthesis: A
Review of Recent Work’, Contemporary European History 4, no. 3 (November
1995): 383-92.
Davies, Norman. Rising ’44: ‘The Battle for Warsaw’. London: Macmillan, 2003.
________
. Europe East & West. London: Pimlico, 2007.
Deighton, Anne, ed. Britain and the First Cold War. London: Macmillan, 1990.
________
. The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany and the Origins of the
Cold War. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.
Dilks, David. Epic and Tragedy: Britain and Poland, 1941-1945. Hull: Hull University
Press, 1995.
Dimitrov, Vesselin. Stalin’s Cold War: Soviet Foreign Policy, Democracy and
Communism in Bulgaria, 1941-8. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2008.
Dunbabin, J.P.D. The Cold War: The Great Powers and their Allies. Harlow: Longman,
1994.
Edmonds, Robin. The Big Three: Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin in Peace & War.
London: Hamish Hamilton, 1991.
________. ‘Yalta and Potsdam: forty years afterwards’, International Affairs 62, no. 2
(1986): 197-216.
John Erickson, The Road to Berlin: Stalin’s War with Germany. London: Cassell, 2003.
Eubank, Keith. Summit at Tehran. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc.,
1985.
Feis, Herbert. Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War they Waged and the Peace they
Sought. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957.
Fitzsimons, Matthew A. The foreign policy of the British Labour government, 1945-
1951. Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1953.
Folly, Martin H. Churchill, Whitehall and the Soviet Union. Basingstoke: Macmillan,
2000.
________
. The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of the Second World War. Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 2004.
Frank, Matthew. Expelling the Germans: British Opinion and Post-1945 Population
Transfer in Context. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
250
Gaddis, John Lewis. We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1997.
Gardner, Lloyd C. Spheres of Influence: The Great Powers Partition Europe, from
Munich to Yalta. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1993.
Gilbert, Martin. Road to Victory: Winston S. Churchill, 1941-1945. London:
Heinemann, 1986.
________
, ed. Churchill. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967.
Gillies, Donald. Radical Diplomat: The Life of Archibald Clark Kerr, Lord Inverchapel,
1882-1951. London: I.B. Tauris, 1999.
Glantz, David M. & Jonathan M. House. When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army
Stopped Hitler. Edinburgh: Birlinn Limited, 2000.
Glees, Anthony. Exile Politics during the Second World War: the German Social
Democrats in Britain. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982.
________
. The Secrets of the Service: British Intelligence and Communist Subversion,
1939-51. London, 1987.
Gmitruk, Janusz. Maria Hulewiczowa Sekretarka Stanisława Mikołajczyka. Warsaw:
Muzeum Historii Polskiego Ruchu Ludowego, 2010.
Gordon, Michael R. Conflict and Consensus in Labour’s Foreign Policy, 1914-1965.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969.
Gori, Francesca and Silvio Pons. The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943-
53. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996.
Gormly, James L. From Potsdam to the Cold War: Big Three Diplomacy, 1945-1947.
Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1990.
Gorodetsky, Gabriel. ‘The Origins of the Cold War: Stalin, Churchill and the Formation
of the Grand Alliance’, The Russian Review 47, no. 2 (April 1988): 145-70.
Greenwood, Sean. Britain and the Cold War, 1945-91. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000.
________
. Titan at the Foreign Office: Gladwyn Jebb and the Shaping of the Modern
World. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008.
Harbutt, Fraser J. Yalta 1945: Europe and America at the Crossroads. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Harris, Kenneth. Attlee. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982.
Hennessy, Peter. Never Again: Britain, 1945-1951. London: Vintage, 1993.
251
Holdich, P.G.H. ‘A Policy of Percentages? British Policy and the Balkans after the
Moscow Conference of October 1944’, International History Review 9, no. 1
(February 1987): 28-47.
Hope, Michael. The Abandoned Legion: A Study of the Background of the Post-War
Dissolution of Polish Forces in the West. London: Veritas Foundation Publication
Centre, 2005.
Howard, Michael. The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War. London:
Greenhill Books, 1993.
Howarth, Patrick. Intelligence Chief Extraordinary: The Life of the Ninth Duke of
Portland. London: The Bodley Head, 1986.
Jackson, Robert J. Rebels and Whips: An Analysis of Dissension, Discipline and
Cohesion in British Political Parties. London: Macmillan, 1968.
Jeffery, Keith. MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service, 1909-1949. London:
Bloomsbury, 2010.
Jenkins, Roy. Churchill. London: Pan Macmillan, 2001.
Jones, Bill. The Russia Complex: the British Labour Party and the Soviet Union.
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1977.
Kacewicz, George. Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the Polish government in exile,
1939-1945. The Hauge: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979.
Kamiński, Marek Kazimierz. Polska i Czechosłowacja w Polityce Stanów
Zjednoczonych i Wielkiej Brytanii, 1945-1948. Warsaw: Instytut Historii PAN, 1991.
Kennedy-Pipe, C. Stalin’s Cold War. Soviet Strategies in Europe, 1943-1956.
Kenney, Padraic. Rebuilding Poland: Workers and Communism, 1945-1950. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1997.
Kent, John. ‘British Policy and the Origins of the Cold War’. In Origins of the Cold
War: An International History, 2nd edition, edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and David S.
Painter. New York: Routledge, 2005.
Kersten, Krystyna. The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943-1948, trans.
John Micgiel and Michael H. Bernhard. Berkley, California: University of California
Press, 1991.
Kimball, Warren F. The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1991.
Kitchen, Martin. British Policy Towards the Soviet Union During the Second World
War. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986.
252
________. ‘Winston Churchill and the Soviet Union during the Second World War’,
Historical Journal 30, no. 2 (June 1987): 415-36.
Knight, Jonathan. ‘Russia’s Search for Peace: The London Council of Foreign
Ministers, 1945’, Journal of Contemporary History 13, no. 1 (January 1978): 137-
163.
Kochavi, Arieh J. ‘From Cautiousness to Decisiveness: Changes in Soviet Negotiation
Tactics toward the British during World War II’, East European Quarterly 36, 4
(January 2003): 481-509.
Korbonski, Stefan. Warsaw in Chains. London: Allen & Unwin, 1959.
Lane, Anne and Howard Temperley, eds. The Rise and Fall of the Grand Alliance,
1941-45. London: Macmillan, 1995.
Langhorne, Richard, ed. Diplomacy and Intelligence During the Second World War.
Essays in honour of F. H. Hinsley. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Lee, John Michael. The Churchill Coalition, 1940-1945. London: Batsford, 1980.
Leffler, Melvyn P. The Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman
Administration, and the Cold War. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992.
________
. ‘Bringing it Together: The Parts and the Whole’. In Reviewing the Cold War:
Approaches, Interpretations, Theory, edited by Odd Arne Westad. London: Frank
Cass, 2000.
Lewis, Julian. Changing Direction: British Military Planning for Postwar Strategic
Defence, 1942-1947. London: Sherwood, 1988.
Mark, Eduard. ‘American Policy toward Eastern Europe and the Origins of the Cold
War, 1941-1946: An Alternative Interpretation’, The Journal of American History
68, 2 (September 1981): 313-336.
________. ‘October or Thermidor? Interpretations of Stalinism and the Perception of
Soviet Foreign Policy in the United States, 1927-1947’, The American Historical
Review 94, 4 (October 1989): 937-962.
Mark, Eduard. ‘Revolution by Degrees: Stalin’s National Front Strategy for Europe,
1941-1947’, Cold War International History Project.
Mastny, Vojtech. Russia’s Road to the Cold War. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1979.
Mayhew, Christopher. ‘British Foreign Policy since 1945’, International Affairs, 26, no.
4 (October 1950): 477-86.
Mazurkiewicz, Anna. Dyplomacja Stanów Zjednoczonych wobec wyborów w Polsce w
latach 1947 i 1989. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Neriton, 2007.
253
McGilvray, Evan. A Military Government In Exile: The Polish Government-in-Exile
1939–1945: A Study of Discontent. Solihull: Helion, 2010.
McNeill, William Hardy. America, Britain & Russia: Their Co-operation and Conflict,
1941-1946. New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1976 [second reprinting].
Mevius, Martin. Agents of Moscow: the Hungarian Communist Party and the Origins of
Socialist Patriotism 1941-1953. Oxford: Clarendon, 2005.
Milward, Alan S. The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1951. London:
Routledge, 1992.
Miner, Steven Merritt. Between Churchill and Stalin: the Soviet Union, Great Britain
and the Origins of the Grand Alliance. North Carolina: North Carolina Press, 1988.
Mołdawa, Tadeusz. Naczelne Władze Państwowe Polski Ludowej, 1944-1979. Warsaw:
Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 1979.
Morgan, Kenneth O. Labour in Power, 1945-1951. Oxford: Clarendon, 1984.
Nadeau, Remi. Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt Divide Europe. New York: Praeger,
1990.
Naimark, Norman and Leonid Gibianskii, eds. The Establishment of Communist
Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944-1949. Oxford: Westview, 1997.
Northedge, Frederick Samuel. Descent from Power: British Foreign Policy, 1945-1973.
London: Allen and Unwin, 1974.
Olla, Paola Brundu, ed. Yalta: un mito che resiste; relazioni e comunicazioni presentate
al convegno internazionale organizzato dalla Provincia di Cagliari, 23-26 aprile
1987. Rome: Ateneo, 1987.
Overy, Richard. Russia’s War. London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1998.
Parker, R. A. C. Winston Churchill: Studies in Statesmanship. London: Brassey’s, 1995.
Pastusiak, Longin. Polska-Stany Zjednoczone w latach 1945-1947. Warsaw: Dom
Wydawniczy Herold-Press, 1992.
Payne, Robert. The Great Man: A Portrait of Winston Churchill. New York: Coward,
McCann & Geoghegan, Inc., 1974.
Pearce, Robert. Attlee. London: Routledge, 1997.
Polonsky, Antony and Bolesław Drukier. The Beginnings of Communist Rule in Poland.
London: Routledge, 1980.
254
Polonsky, Anthony. ‘Stalin and the Poles, 1941-7’, European History Quarterly 17
(1987): 453-92.
Portero, Florentino. ‘Spain, Britain and the Cold War’, in Spain and the Great Powers
in the Twentieth Century, edited by Sebastian Balfour and Paul Preston. New York:
Routledge, 1999.
Prażmowska, Anita J. Britain, Poland and the Eastern Front, 1939. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987.
________. ‘Polish refugees as military potential: policy objectives of the Polish
government in exile’. In Refugees in the Age of Total War, edited by Anna C.
Bramwell. London: Unwin Hyman, 1988.
________
. Britain and Poland, 1939-1943: The Betrayed Ally. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995.
________. ‘The Polish Socialist Party, 1945-1948’, East European Quarterly 34, no. 3
(September 2000): 337-59.
________
. Civil War in Poland, 1942-1948. New York & Houndmills, Basingstoke,
Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.
________
. Władysław Gomułka: A Biography. London: I.B. Tauris, (forthcoming).
Raack, R.C. Stalin’s Drive to the West, 1938-1945: The Origins of the Cold War.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995.
Reynolds, David. ‘Churchill and the British “Decision” to Fight On in 1940: Right
Policy, Wrong Reasons’. In Diplomacy and Intelligence During the Second World
War: Essays in Honour of F.H. Hinsley, edited by Richard Langhorne. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1985: 147-67.
Reynolds, David, Warren F. Kimball and Aleksandr Oganovich Chubarian, eds. Allies
at War: The Soviet, American and British Experience, 1939-1945. Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 1994.
________
. From World War to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International
History of the 1940s. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Roberts, Andrew. ‘The Holy Fox’: a life of Lord Halifax. London: George Weidenfeld
and Nicholson, 1991.
Roskill, Stephen. Hankey: Man of Secrets, Volume III: 1931-1963. London: Collins,
1974.
Ross, K.G. ‘Foreign Office Attitudes to the Soviet Union 1941-45’, Journal of
Contemporary History 16, no. 3 (July 1981): 521-40.
255
________. ‘The Moscow Conference of October 1944 (Tolstoy)’. In British Political and
Military Strategy in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe in 1944, edited by
William Deakin, Elisabeth Barker and Jonathan Chadwick.  Basingstoke: Macmillan,
1988.
Rothwell, Victor. Britain and the Cold War, 1941-1947. London: Jonathan Cape, 1982.
Rozek, Edward J. Allied Wartime Diplomacy: A Pattern in Poland. New York: Wiley,
1958.
Rutkowski, Tadeusz Paweł. Stanisław Kot : 1885-1975 : biografia polityczna. Warsaw:
Wydawnictwo DIG, 2000.
Sainsbury, Keith. Churchill and Roosevelt at War. The War They Fought and the Peace
They Hoped to Make. 2nd edition. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996.
Saiu, Liliana. The Great Powers and Rumania, 1944-1946: A Study of the Early Cold
War Era. New York: East European Monographs, 1992.
Self, Robert. British Foreign and Defence Policy Since 1945: Challenges and Dilemmas
in a Changing World. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2010.
Sharp, Tony. ‘The Origins of the “Teheran Formula” on Polish Frontiers’, Journal of
Contemporary History 12, no. 2 (April 1977): 381-93.
Shlaim, Avi, Peter Jones and Keith Sainsbury. British Foreign Secretaries since 1945.
Newton Abbot: David and Charles, 1977.
Skrzypek, Andrzej. Mechanizmy uzależnienia stosunki polsko-radzieckie, 1944-1957.
Pułtusk: Wydawca Wyższa Szkoła Humanistyczna im. Aleksandra Gieysztora, 2002.
Smith, Raymond and John Zametica. ‘The Cold Warrior: Clement Attlee Reconsidered,
1945-7’, International Affairs 61, no. 2 (1985): 237-52.
Smith, Raymond. ‘A Climate of Opinion: British Officials and the Development of
British Soviet Policy, 1945-7’, International Affairs 64, no. 4 (Autumn 1988): 631-
47.
Staar, Richard F. Poland, 1944-1962. The Sovietization of a Captive People. Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962.
Stępka, Stanisław. Stanisław Mikołajczyk: rozprawy i studia. Warsaw: Muzeum Historii
Polskiego Ruchu Ludowego, 2001.
Sword, Keith. Deportation and Exile: Poles in the Soviet Union, 1939-1948. New York:
St Martin’s Press in association with School of Slavonic and East European Studies,
University of London, 1994.
256
Sword, Keith, Norman Davies and Jan Ciechanowski. The Formation of the Polish
Community in Great Britain, 1939-1950. London: School of Slavonic and East
European Studies, University of London, 1989.
Tolstoy, Nikolai. Victims of Yalta. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977.
________
. Stalin’s Secret War. New York: Reinholt and Winston, 1982.
Vital, David. The Making of British Foreign Policy. London: George Allen & Unwin,
1968.
Webb, Adrian. Routledge Companion to Central and Eastern Europe since 1919. New
York: Routledge, 2008.
Williams, Francis. Ernest Bevin: portrait of a great Englishman. London: Hutchinson,
1952.
Williams, Francis. A Prime Minister remembers: the war and post-war memoirs of the
Right Hon. Earl Attlee, based on his private papers and on a series of recorded
conversations. London: Heinemann, 1961.
Wrona, Janusz. System partyjny w Polsce, 1944-1950. Lublin: Wydawnictwo
Universytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 1995.
Wolfe, Thomas W. Soviet power and Europe, 1945-1970. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1970.
Yergin, Daniel. Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National
Security State. London: Andre Deutsch, 1978.
V. Unpublished secondary works
Micgiel, John Stanley. ‘Coercion and the establishment of Communist rule in Poland,
1944-1947.’ PhD dissertation, Columbia University, 1992.
Ostrowski, Mark. ‘To return to Poland or not to return: the dilemma facing the Polish
armed forces at the end of the Second World War.’ PhD dissertation, University of
London, 1996.
Reynolds, Jaime. ‘The Polish Workers’ Party and the Opposition to Communist Power
in Poland, 1944-1947’, PhD dissertation, London School of Economics and Political
Science, 1984.
Tendyra, Bernadeta Irena. ‘General Sikorski and the Polish Government in Exile 1939-
1943: a study of Polish internal émigré politics in wartime.’ PhD dissertation,
London School of Economics and Political Science, 1999.
